Thursday, 23 March 2023

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/did-rahul-gandhi-just-sound-the-gong

Did Rahul Gandhi just sound the gong on R2P?

At speaking engagements in the United Kingdom, Rahul Gandhi pointed to the demise of democracy in India. He was bringing home to his foreign audience that molly coddling the Modi regime by democracies, for the strategic end of containing China, can only embolden India to proceed further down-hill from its current position as an electoral autocracy, moving past authoritarianism to totalitarianism and from hyper-nationalism to fascism.

Whereas Gandhi, a legislator, restricted his observation to how democracy is faring in India, can it be taken as tacit articulation of an early warning, of waiting-to-happen atrocity crimes? Taking cue from Amartya Sen’s thesis that democracy keeps famine away, can it be said democracy also prevents mass atrocity? Absent democracy, will India go down an unthinkable route?  

That a cultural genocide of Muslim India is underway has already been proclaimed by would-be perpetrators, Hindutva-subscribing Right-Wing formations, collectively, the Parivaar. The epidemic of renaming is example. The negation of Muslim icons, for example Tipu Sultan, is another. At the recent India Today conclave, a prominent Muslim rued the over-turning of the salad bowl concept of nation.

As for physical manifestations of mass atrocity, these shall be few and far between, to be almost undetectable. Micro terror - the latest instance being of abduction in Rajasthan of two Muslim men and their torching in Haryana – even when taken cumulatively, does not amount to mass atrocity, but certainly indicates trends.

At best, pogroms that respectively won Narendra Modi the Hindi heartland in 2014 and followed his election victory in 2019 - Muzaffarnagar and North-East Delhi - may repeat. These may not presage crimes against humanity like the one Narendra Modi presided over as a provincial chief minister.

Instead, China’s example of human rights violations by stealth in Tibet and Xinjiang may be the model in Modi's tenure. However, this cannot be said of tenures to follow of his prospective successors, who are outdoing each other in emulating Chief Minister Modi.

It would be hard to pin Hindutva down. Afterall, it too has learnt its lessons from the fascist period in European history. It has mastered the art of boiling the frog so that it does not jump the water. As it consolidates, Hindutva has been circumspect.

Increasingly, with no opposition grouping within sight, it does not need to worry of any challenge from the domestic space. Externally, over the past nine years it has invested in winning indulgence for India; mere opprobrium sliding off its back like water off a duck’s.

Internally, as Rahul Gandhi noted, the long-infiltrated institutions of State have been taken over. The opposition bearing the brunt of these institutions – lately the Enforcement Directorate - cannot expect a level playing field. The legislature is currently witnessing an unprecedented moment with the ruling party holding up proceedings of the Lower House, to - as all know - to cover-up the fusion of corporate and governance, described as Modani. Stalling of parliament proves Gandhi’s truth, that Indian democracy lies embalmed for burial at the soon-to-be-inaugurated parliament building.

The third pillar – the judiciary - is in a lonely rearguard battle, pushed on the backfoot on the Collegium issue. Its dissenting retirees have been styled honorary members of the anti-national gang. A counterattack is in the launch pad, with the Court at long last taking up electoral bonds for scrutiny.

Of the fourth pillar, Amartya Sen had it that a free press helps democracies keep famine at bay. By analogy, its dissipation is an enabling precondition for atrocity crimes. The proverbial last line of defence – India’s military – has been diligently neutered.

Externally, the Modi government has artfully arrived at a stable strategic sweet spot in its milking of India’s strategic location in respect of China. This helps keep the West off its back on democratic down-sliding. It is also Panda-hugging having Xi come over twice to Delhi during the year. The Mother of Democracy had no comment on Chinese treatment of its Uighurs. It has kept mum on Russia waging of a war of aggression. As a regional power, it had no word on what the Tatmadaw did to the Rohingyas. As for Muslim countries, all it takes – a lesson learnt for which the ruling party spokeswoman paid a price - is to take care when mouthing hate to avoid reference to the Prophet.

While Pakistan has taken to querying Indian impositions on its minority, it is merely part of the usual exchange between the two. The Pakistan Army stands exposed when its jugular vein, Kashmir, was severed by India through a reengineering of Article 370. A pullback of the high commissioner was all of Pakistan’s tepid response. Internally, Pakistan is hemmed in by the United States (US), retaliating for Pakistan’s role in its ignominious exit from Kabul. An outcome of the General Bajwa visit to the US is in the cornering of US-critic, Imran Khan. Under the circumstance of resulting political instability, a strategic Pakistan, espying India sawing the branch it sits on, will know India does not need a Pakistani nudge down. 

With the internal and external space rendered manageable, the final nails are being driven into democracy’s coffin. Elections will be called once the two back-to-back summits in the national capital commemorate India’s arrival as Vishwa Guru and the newly minted temple, to be inaugurated in autumn, elevates Ayodhya to being India’s Mecca.

Even if the economy is buffeted by eddies from foreign bank failures and Adani blues persist, there is always the identity drip the patient can be placed on. Last time round, similar economic straits stemming from Modi’s demonetization misstep, were sidestepped by a Pulwama. Modi’s national security minders carefully missed Balakot so as not to arouse Pakistan into an over-reaction.

This time round, China at the doorstep, a security stratagem will be foolhardy. Modi’s kitchen cabinet cannot really believe he is due for a Nobel prize or that he is Modi the Immortal. They were rudely made aware of the limitations of Mann ki Baat in the reaction of Modi’s chosen constituency, India’s youth, at the launch of the Agniveer scheme.

Luckily, the Ukraine War has bailed Modi out. War profiteering keeping the economy on even keel helps Modi over the finish line, while the opposition quarrels outside the stadium. That the Russian oil has not pushed down petrol prices does not matter. The expectation that a tortoise on a Bharat Jodo Yatra will beat the hare on a hattrick is the delusion of liberals. Modi’s Base (Incidentally, Base translates as al Qaeda!) is adding 100000 shakhas and 2500 pracharaks. They can go door to door electioneering, and later help implement the first 100-days program of Modi’s third term.

The first 100-days’ agenda last time included the demoting of a state. It hasn’t gotten back democracy since, leave alone Azadi, willfully misinterpreted as self-determination. This time round Modi may prove more ambitious, it being perhaps his last term. He may take aim at the Constitution itself. The Vice President has already sounded the bugle with his denigrating of the basic structure doctrine as a judicial overreach. The Preamble will be divested of terms ‘socialism’ and ‘secular’. Whether ‘Hindu Rashtra’ will be added is worth speculation.

Amit Shah’s Chronology, put on back-burner by onset of Covid-19, will be back. The Census, advisedly postponed, will be used to populate the National Population and Citizens’ Registers. By then, the multiple detention centers being constructed across India will be readied for inmates. As intended, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) will help keep non-Muslims out. Foreign Minister Jaishankar is right: CAA has little to do with Indian Muslims. Muslims will be offered a choice they cannot refuse: a return to the hierarchical fold whence ancestors had the temerity of exiting.  

The campaign for welcoming the Pasmanda Muslims back into the lower castes is already in full swing, on the directions of the prime minister. The Pasmandas are to throw off the Ashraf yoke. Later it will be revealed that the Ashrafs are only to be substituted, the yoke to remain. No favour to the Pasmandas, its Chanakyan strategy of Bhed, that colonialists liberally borrowed from for their ‘divide and rule’.

It is to strike at any vertical integration of Muslims by severing any elite-mass connect. Alongside, the elite is under assault, with a set of it prised off into confabulating with the Hindutva mothership, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), while it keeps up a confounding din that all Indians are Hindu, and caste is a latter-day invention.

Most Muslim communities are easily targeted. If this is so easily done in the national capital that has a non-Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) government, such as witnessed in Jehangirpuri, what is happening in BJP ruled states, such as in Khargaon, Madhya Pradesh, can well be imagined. All it takes is to deliberately route processions past Muslim localities and throw in a provocation or two (a DJ, stone pelting, saffron flags hoisted from minarets, trishuls brandished), as done at multiple sites during the last Ram Navmi.

Quite like the world’s longest cruise, Dozer Raaj has linked the Ganga to the Brahmaputra. Sudhir Chaudhary’s list of ‘jihads’ will be innovatively elongated to constrict Muslim presence further. Muslim women might have more to contend with than educational setbacks engineered through the hijab ban.

Hyderabadi Muslims, represented by the feisty Asaduddin Owaisi, need only have right-wing stalked KCR go-under. The opening salvos on his daughter testify to the nature of the campaign coming up for Telangana. Just as Bangalore, though a strategic city, did not restrain the BJP from polarizing Karnataka, that party won’t stop risking destabilization of Hyderabad. Indeed, unrest if any will be blamed on Muslims, legitimizing a hardline.

Micro terror will metastasize, now that Rule of Law under Amit Shah has been redefined as rule by vigilantes. Discharged Agniveers will join the vigilante ranks in the middle of Modi’s next term. What that spells for the State’s monopoly of force is easy to guess.

Muslim communities that have a strength in numbers are being steadily whittled. Kashmir is under dragnet, with the army to hand over to the central reserve police as the lead force in the Valley. This will make Kashmiris easy pickings, since armed police exhibit a pronouncedly anti-minority prejudice, if their actions in the Jamia Millia Islamia and North-East Delhi violence episodes are any guide. Reportedly, on taking over as operations’ lead the central police has started sending its new recruits into Kashmir. Since their growing up has been in the Modi era – so to speak – it will soon be known if they have the hate imprint. But with journalists jailed - the latest being Irfan Mehraj - no one would be any the wiser.

In the tradition of Modi’s reference to Wayanad once, Amit Shah’s exhortation to Kannadiga voters not to end up resembling Kerala, shows the Gujarat Model going national. Its physical manifestation is evident from Siddique Kappan’s recall of his interrogation in the Hathras ‘conspiracy’ case. The crackdown on the Popular Front of India – an outfit that at worst mirrors Hindutva outfits - is to preemptively defang Muslims in anticipation of Hindu Rashtra. Deprived of hotheads in its self-defence and activists to forge alliances, Muslim communities are expected to fall in line.

However, the primary candidates for Hindutva’s nefarious attention are Bengali Muslims of Assam. Their nation-wide presence as migrants holding down subsistence level jobs helps Hindutva spin its myths. BJP has not advanced in the North-East, part of all but the Mizo government, for aggrandizement alone. The battle ground stands ringed. Bengali Muslims, that got away lightly in the population register trailer restricted to Assam, are in the sights. The Ideologue in place in Guwahati is creating conditions for the grand Inquisition.

Breaking Bengali ethnic-based unity is essential step for breaking into the Bengali heartland, so far out of reach of Hindutva. Preempting Bengali ethnic unity kicking-in is essential to the project. There is no guarantee a Hindutva version of Hinduism supersedes Bengal’s shared language, DNA, history and culture. Over-zealousness in its grafting onto the lower-Gangetic belt by upper-Gangetic Hindutva-subscribing tract may well prompt a lower-riparian Bengali, cross-border consolidation. The external bogeyman can then be used to discredit Muslims, setting India down an Operation Searchlight of its own.

Rahul Gandhi’s is an early warning. Though not put out with a purpose to trigger a Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it nevertheless must prompt Pillar I implementation of the concept on part of India. Pillar I has the State addressing an emergent and prospective problem. Indians instinctively know the problem at hand. If it is any help, the executive summary of the just-released US report on human rights in India for last year can be perused on trends that can take India down the path apprehended.

It is only when Pillar I is not invoked or is deliberately not worked that Pillar II comes to fore. Pillar II has the international community step up to its responsibility of assisting a dithering or under-resourced State. With democracy under threat, relying on Pillar I alone may not be prudent but invoking Pillar II may be premature.

However, it should not be India reaches Pillar III – when a State manifestly fails on account of being either unwilling or unable to shoulder its responsibility - unthinkingly. It can be hazarded that the closer Hindutva gets to being a failed social project, the more likely scapegoating of Muslims might lead up to the unthinkable.

Now that the early warning gong has sounded, there is no excuse to avoid the first stage of R2P: Responsibility to Prevent. Prevention will preclude a subsequent Responsibility to React and avoid a costly Responsibility to Rebuild further downstream.

The onus is on India to address the problem, as Rahul Gandhi has it. Since the government won’t and the opposition can’t, it is the voter who has to step up and restore good health to democracy. The possibility of ‘Modi Hatao’ by voters acting for ‘Desh Bachao’ must be credibly held out, hoping it might restrain Modi and help rein in the saffron ‘Base’.

Friday, 17 March 2023

 From the archive, 1998

LIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

 

Public International Law is a rudimentary body of law  governing,

to  a limited extent, relations between the constituent  elements

of the international system, that include, primarily, states  and 

supra-national  bodies. With respect to armed conflict,  the  two

streams of international law  are jus-ad-bellum and jus-in-bello.  
 

 

The threat or use of force in international relations is  covered

by jus-ad bellum - law with regard to  initiation of inter  state

armed  conflict, and is subsumed in international  constitutional

law.   It is jus-in bello  that covers the actual application  of

violence  in armed conflict - that is central to the  subject  of

discussion  here. It comprises the Law of Armed  Conflict,  which 

is  international  customary and treaty law  with regard  to  the

application of force in armed conflict.
 

 

Jus-in-bello has had two streams of input- the Geneva Law and the

Hague  law.  Geneva law deals with protection  of  non-combatants

and  combatants placed hors-de-combat.  Hague Law deals with  the

regulations  of  means and methods  application  of  force.   To­

gether these are alternatively called international  humanitarian

law or Law of Armed Conflict.
 

 

Another  body of law, International Human Rights Law, deals  with

the  standards  and regulation of human rights that  states  have

pledged  to foster and maintain with respect to their  citizenry,

as  part  of  their international obligation as  members  of  the

state-centric world order.  Law of Armed Conflict enters into the

picture  with regard to this body of law when these are  effected

by  prevalence  of  internal armed conflict, for  it  deals  with

protection of victims of armed conflict. 
That being a theoretical prelude, a closer look at the confluence
 

of human rights law and humanitarian law is in order. The aim  is

to  study the relationship of Law of Armed Conflict and  Low  In­

tensity  Conflict (LIC).  Having been briefly introduced  to  the

scope of the law of armed conflict, a definitional exercise  with

regard  to  LIC  is required to complete the frame  work  of  the

discussion.   This is followed by a sequential reflection on  the

relationship   of  LIC with international  constitutional,  human

rights, and humanitarian law.
 

LIC
 

 

LIC  is  an American term denoting a low level of  intensity  and

scope  of operations, eg.  US intervention in Grenada ;  the  em­

ployment of  UNITAF as part of UNOSOM; and the post-Dayton  I-FOR

in the Balkans.  In its adaptation to our situation, LIC  implies

politico-military   action to stabilise and reverse a  discordant

internal  security situation.  Whereas, the original  term  could

have been applicable to the situation in Siachen, our  adaptation

of  makes it subsume within it both counter-insurgency and  proxy

war,  while excluding military action along the Line  of  Control

(LC)  and  Line  of Actual Control (LAC).
 

 

In passing it may be mentioned that ours is possibly a corruption

of  Kitson's term Low Intensity Operations, for the inclusion  of

`Conflict' in our terminology implies one between the state and a

portion  of its society- the acceptence of which for a  fact,  as

our usage of the term LIC does, is not politically prudent. 
 

 

LIC  is essentially  an internal security issue,  albeit  (though

not  necessarily so) one in which there is an external source  of

sustenance.   Since human rights are in the domain of a  states's

relationship  with its citizenry as defined by  its  constitution
 

and  promulgated  laws, it is a state  responsibility  to  ensure

preservation  of the same in the conditions obtaining in the  LIC

extant in the area.
 

 

LIC and Human Rights Law
 

 

Firstly,  in so far as the state has bound itself through  treaty

obligation  to  respect human rights, external  interest  in  the

state fulfilling its erga-omnes obligation is explicable.   Thus,

the periodic submission by the states at Geneva based UN  Commis­

sion on Human Rights  on their human rights record is unexceptio­

nable.
 

 

The International Covenants on Human Rights  (on Civil and Polit­

ical   Rights; and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  (1966));

the UN Charter Article 55 (c) on human rights;  and, the  Univer­

sal  Declaration  on Human Rights (1948) are  binding  as  either

customary  and treaty law.  India has translated these  into  na­

tional law in the form of Fundamental Rights, that are  suspenda­

ble in Emergency ; Directive Principles, that are non-judiciable;

and,  the  protection of Human Rights Act of 1993 ,  that  estab­

lished the National Commission on Human Rights.
 

 

Of interest here, is the ascendance of trans-nationalism as  evi­

denced  by  the self-appropriated supervisory role of  state  be­

havior in relation to human rights by NGOs.  Next, is the politi­

cal use of international  fora by inimical neighbors.  While  the

latter requires a  political answer, the former has to be  appre­

ciated in  the context of the `global village'.  To admit to this

is not to imply that politicization of trans-national  forces  is

being ignored; nor that the debate over priorisation between  the

Third  World's defense of `third generation' rights, such as  the

right  to development, versus the West's concern with the  `first

generation'  civil  and political rights, is  to  be  diluted.
 

 

The trend is also indicative of the CNN connection between  areas

of  domestic strife and donor drawing rooms, as also  of  respon­

siveness of the western governments to the power of their  elect­

orates,  especially  in election years.  This  trend  is  however

subject to donor fatigue through psychic numbing, and the strate­

gic  concerns of the West that, for instance, prioritise  `white'

Balkans over `black' Africa.
 

 

In  this decade there has been increasing resort to  humanitarian

intervention under the binding Chapter VII, given UN responsibil­

ity  as  per  Articles 1:3 and 56 (eg.  Somalia,  Haiti,  Kurdish

Iraq).  At regional level too this has been done under the  guise

of peacekeeping (eg. ECOMOG), in keeping with UN Charter Articles

53, 54 and 56 and existing regional arrangements.  Thus there  is

an expansion of the legal basis and precedent for external inter­

est  in  human  rights issues, under the pretext  of  spill  over

across borders to threaten international peace and security.
 

 

LIC and Jus-ad-bellum
 

 

In  this  connection is the question of ` Proxy  War'.    In  the

Nicaragua  Case  (1986), the International Court of  Justice  has

pronounced  that  a  state may be deemed an  aggressor  when  its

intervention is of the order of an `armed attack'. However polit­

ical,  moral  and material support for a non-state party  to  the

conflict  is intervention in internal affairs and is contrary  to

the  non-intervention  principle,  that  has  jus-cogens  status. 

Where  intervention is deemed of the level of an `armed  attack',

the self-defense doctrine (the sole option for use of violence in

inter-state affairs open to states in the Charter era (Article 51)) becomes operative.   Even

in  this  case  the principal of  proportionality  and  necessity

applies. 
 

 

The  conundrum is that,  short of this, and in the event of  hos­

tilities,  the  Security Council is entitled to  intervene  under

Chapter  VI  (non-military) and VII (military means)  of  the  UN

Charter.  The last remaining option of reprisal  as response  has

been ruled out by the UN Charter.  The problem therefore is  that

`proxy war' below a certain threshold is not subject to  military

response  externally. Another problem is that this  armed  attack

requires to be against the political independence and territorial

integrity  of a state (Article 2:4) to trigger  the  self-defense

measures.
 

 

Taking the case of Kashmir, its locus-standi furnishes Pakistan a

loophole,  in  that, its action is  against  neither  territorial

integrity (as seen from its perspective), nor political  indepen­

dence of India. Though the level of intervention is of the  order

of  an `armed attack' (as evident from the published  figures  of

casualties  and recovery of war-like material enough  to  provoke  

the  resort to force in self-defense), it is not deemed a  viable

option.  Given the partially indigeneous roots of the problem; of

the  economic imperative against `war'; and, fear  of  consequent

internationalisation,  India is constrained to pursue  LIC  there

to its logical conclusion.
 

 

LIC and Humanitarian Law (Jus-in- bello)
 

 

In LIC, the environment is such that human rights of the inhabit­

ants  are  imposed upon, under the  utilitarian  principle.   The

state  grants extra-ordinary power to the security forces,  given

the extra-ordinary threats to stability obtaining in such sce‑
 

narios.   In  India,  these have at various  times  included  the

region-specific Armed Forces  Special Powers Acts, the  Emergency

powers, TADA,the MISA,  the Disturbed Areas Acts etc . The premi­

um on good faith in abiding by the in-house `Do's and Dont's' and

the  principles of impartiality, minimum force, good  faith,  and

no-reprisals  gets strained, given organisational, personal,  and

philosophical  inadequacies  in approach and action.   While  the

strategic  and  political  need for protection  of  human  rights

exists,  it  is tempered by the more fundamental  requirement  of

restoring  state  authority, legitimacy  and  penetration.   (The

requirement  spelt out by the CM to the  Police  Commissioner  of

Mumbai  in the film `Satya' is interesting example).  Given  this

scenario  protection  of the hard-core  non-derogable  rights  of

right  to life, prohibition of torture, slavery and  retro-active

punishment, becomes both necessary and difficult.
 

 

How does international humanitarian law impinge on this seemingly

domestic issue? The development of both Hague Law (limitations on

warfare) and Geneva Law (protection of the defenseless) has  been

in  an inter-state context.  However, the evolution of Hague  Law

that deals with protection of cultural property (1954),  biologi­

cal weapons (1972), chemical weapons (1993), excessively  injuri­

ous  conventional  weapons  (1981),  environmental   modification

techniques  (1977),  mines  (1997), the establishment  of  a  War

Crimes court (1998) etc, also bears on internal armed conflict.
 

 

The   Geneva  Conventions (1949) Common  Article   3,  stipulates

protection  in  terms  of violence to life  and  person,  hostage

taking,  outrages on personal dignity, extra-judicial  sentences,

and medical care for those not taking active part in  hostilities

and protection of members armed
 

forces placed hors-de-combat.  Its applicability is in non-inter­

national armed conflict, and covers all parties to the  conflict. 

The International Committee of the Red Cross is empowered  (Arti­

cle  3, Para 2) to offer its services to the parties to the  con­

flict  to ensure protection of civilian and military  victims  of

the conflict, without prejudice to the status or position of  any

party.  Therein is its applicability to LIC.
 

 

Common  Article 3 has been supplemented by Additional Protocol II

(1977) in order to adapt the laws of war to conditions of contem­

porary hostilities.  The Protocol has applicability only in  non-

international  armed  conflict between a state  party  and  armed

groups  that  are under responsible command and  exercise  enough

control  over territory to enable them to carry out sustained and

concerted military operations, while being able to implement  the

provisions  of the Protocol.  Clearly, this is a highly  restric­

tive  scope,  yet,  despite the  guarantee  of  non-intervention,

states, including India, are not party to it, thereby denying  it

customary  law  status.  The innovative provision  of  illegality

terrorist acts (Article 123)  thus gets neglected.
 

 

India in not signing the Additional Protocols wishes to  preserve

its  internal sovereignity; stands by its domestic criminal  jus­

tice system as adequate to cope with incidental transgression  of

human rights that occur; considers its constitution, legislation,

and organisational (eg. NHRC) measures as appropriate to  protect

human  rights  and humanitarian issues even in such adverse  cir­

cumstances.  In short, similar to its stand on the non-prolifera­

tion  treaty (NPT), it does not have to sign the treaty to  abide

by  its  tenets.  It is also wary of the  instrumental  political

leverage  of  the human rights issue in its  relations  with  the

West,  and  does not wish to give these states another  point  of  

accountability   to  pressurise  it  over  its   vuluerabilities. 

Another  facet  of this is the  felt need to  forward  the  Third

World position in a global agenda apparently appropriated by  the

West, that includes issues of human rights.  Lastly,   unacknowl­

edged,   is  its sensitivity to its own indequacies in  terms  of

soft-ware  and  hard-ware  as a developing state  encompassing  a

turbulent society.
 

[1]Conclusion[1]
 

This  introductory  essay to international law has  used  LIC  to

situate international human rights and humanitarian law for three

reasons.   The first is that LIC is a familiar phenomenon to  us,

and, secondly, it is at the confluence of human rights and human­

itarian law.  The  latter owes to human rights being imposed upon

by the exigencies of armed conflict, and the necessity to protect

the  victims  of the same through implementing  humanitarian  law

therein.  Lastly, is that in the army there is a  legalistic  ap­

proach to understanding human rights issues, which detracts  from

taking  a holistic view of the issue. This article was an  effort

at stimulating self-study towards the latter.
 

 

There has been, over the past decade, a concerted trend of expan­

sion  in international awareness of humanitarian law,  which  has

impacted on India in terms of pressure - given the coincidence of

its economic liberalisation with the onset of a critical internal

security  situation in its geographical periphery.  Consequently,

and  as  a  measure of the maturity of  its  internal  regulatory

mechanisms, there has been societal interest in the human  rights

issues  in such areas. While these have been responded to  appro­

priately  by  both the government and the military,  there  is  a

scope  of improvement in terms of living up to the  standards  of
 

 

 

moral authority of our civilisation, of the expectations of us as

a nation, and the respect that our military commands.
 

Select Reading
 

 

1 Walzer,  M, `Just and Unjust Wars'; New  Yark,  1977.
 

2 Best, G, `Humanity in Warfare ; London, 1980.
 

3 Introduction  to International Humanitarian Law,  ICRC,  New

Delhi, 1997.
 

4 Kalshoven, F, `Constraints on Waging of War'; ICRC, 1992.
 

 

 From the archive, 9 Jan 1999

LIC : INTERVENTION AS PARADIGM
 

 

Intervention, in both its avatars - intra and extra-regional -  is

characteristic of inter-state relations in Southern Asia. Whereas,

in  colonial times it was along the periphery of  the  'br-indian'

empire;  in  the post-colonial era the constituent states  of  the

region also exhibit the propensity - making the phenomenon endemic

in South Asia.
 

 

This   owes  to two factors.  The first is  the  preponderance  of

India on the sub-continent in terms of giantism and power.   Thus,

India  is, at best, `big brother', and, at worst,  an  existential

threat.   Therefore, the two reactions, in terms of  intervention,

of  certain  states,  by,  either,  invitation  to  extra-regional

powers  to fulfil the `need' to `balance India'    (extra-regional

intervention); or, by  sustaining irridentism and secessionism  in

India, in order  to whittle it down to size (intra-regional).   In

turn,  India,  to live up to its self-image of a  regional  power,

plays  a like game - that  of exploiting its  neighbour's  vulner­

abilities.
 

 

The  second factor, also a characteristic of the subcontinent,  is

the  very  existence  of these  vulnerabilities,  that  constitute

threats  to  juridical and territorial sovereignity.   This  stems

from the multi-faceted, and overlapping, nature of  socio-economic

terrain in terms of diverse ethnicity, religions, castes,  classes

and linguistic communities in societies - themselves  artificially

circumscribed by national boundaries. 
 

 

The  consequent  nation-state building process, often  results  in

political  alienation, or  a perception of  relative  deprivation,

which in turn occasions militancy in the  expression of  disaffec­

tion,  or  insurgency - the latter condition  subsumed  eventually

under the category of LIC. 
 

 

These  `vulnerabilities'  are  exploited by  an  interested,  mal-

intentioned,  neighbour,  operating in the Realist  paradigm    in

which  relations are viewed as a zero-sum game.  Though  strategic

advantage  is taken of a neighbour's predicament,  the  spill-over

effect  of  conflict  may also  occasion  intervention.  Owing  to

the  overlapping  nature  of spread  of  ethno-cultural  entities,

states   acquire  an  interest  in  the  `internal   affairs'   of

neighbours. 
 

 

Thus,  can  be  witnessed the phenomenon  of  intervention,  which

predictably  expands  in the Clausewitzian  logic  of  escalation. 

Where  the strategic interest of the intervening  state  supplants

the  original stake in the neighbour's  back-yard, the  condition,

in regional parlance, is termed `proxy war'.
 

 

Given   that  in  the  Charter  era,  intervention  in  terms   of

interferance in internal affairs is illegal (Article  2:7  of  the

UN  Charter), it is, either, covert or quasi-covert, for  ease  of 

`plausible  deniability'.   Thus,  fueling  an  insurgency  on   a

neighbour's   territory  may be a covert act, but  engaging  in  a

`proxy  war'  may involve overt moral and political  support,  and

quasi-covert  physical  and material support  for  the  surrogate. 

(The  third  manner of intervention may be overt,  as  the  Indian

inter‑vention in Bangladesh in Nov-Dec 1971 and in Srilanka in June

1987. Discussion of this  manner is, however, beyond the scope  of

this essay.)
 

 

To   complete   this  theoretical  background,   a   typology   of

intervention,  leading up to LIC,  may be said to include :  overt

military; state-sponsored; and state-supported; and,  trans-border

transnational  forces-insurgent  nexus.   Where the state  is  not

directly  implicated,   such linkage may  be  with  state-condoned

governmental  agencies pursuing their own agenda;  state-tolerated

non-governmental  organisations  pursuing autonomous ends  ;  and,

with   fronts   of   trans-national   forces   as   fundamentalist

organisations,  drug cartels, and crime syndicates.

An  illustrative example, at this stage, would help  validate  the

preceding theory.  A look at Kashmir is, therefore,  in order, for

to  do  so  would also help dispel the mythology  that  has  built

around  this  emotive  symbol of national  resolve,  identity  and

effort - on both sides of the Radcliffe   line.       
 

 

Proxy War in Kashmir : An Illustration
 

 

Pakistan's case is that the territory is of disputed status,  and,

therefore,  it  has  a locus standi, given, in  its  version,  the

military  suppression  of  a  self-determination  movement  there. 

There,  having been no movement in terms of bilateral  negotiation 

towards  a  'final settlement',  as posited by the  Simla  Accord,

and,  given  that  it deems its action as not  being  against  the

sovereignity or territorial integrity of India  (in its version of

the status of Kashmir), it feels it can provide  moral,  political

and diplomatic aid to the militants in Kashmir.  It does not admit

to  material or organisational support, since it has  'privatised' 

such  aid,  and provides it under the auspices  of  an  ostensibly 

renegade  intelligence  agency, the  ISI -   thereby,  seeking  to

decrease its culpability  as a state. 
 

 

Owing  to   Pakistan  being a 'soft state',  with  all  manner  of

nonstate  autonomous  actors disturbing its polity,  it  has  only

tangenially  been made accountable for intervention  in  violition 

of  international  law in international public  opinion.   Another

reason  for  such  an attitude is that  the  Pakistani  state,  as

represented  by  the civil government, is a `known  devil,'  being

relatively  moderate in comparison to the forces that threaten  to

take  over. To destabilise such a government, which may itself  be

a  convenient front for  forces that  may indeed include the  Army

(which  is  said  to control  the ISI), would  be  to  enable  the

triumph of these ex‑tremist forces - thereby further  destablishing

the region.
 

 

The  relationship  of the Pakistan army  with  the  fundamentalist

conduit of control of the Kashmir intervention is instrumental, in

that,  the  situation  in  Kashmir  helps  keep  India  tied  down

strategically, both, politically and militarily-hereby  redressing

the  power  assymetry. In so far as the situation  in  Kashmir  is

within Indian capability of containment, escalation is ruled  out. 

Thus,  can be discerned the  strategic aim as being an outcome  of

the Realist philosophy which informs Pakistani Kashmir policy.  By

this  yardstick,  Pakistan is, indeed, engaged in a  'proxy  war',

having  hijacked  an  insurgency of indigenous origin to  its  own

politico-military ends.
 

 

The 'indigenous' roots of the insurgency spanning the period 1989-

92 are well documented.  In so far as Pakistani complicity in this

was concerned, it was, at best, more than the normal  intelligence

game  on between the two countries, given the circumstances of the

Punjab and Afghan situations then.  The so-called OP TOPAC, or the

K2 plan, in thier expansive versions, are  not quite history.  Our

error  of misrepresenting, or misperceiving,  the  people-centered

movement   of   the  early  1990's  occasioned    the   rise    of 

`insurgency' per-se. 
 

 

In this regard four landmarks can be discerned : the Rubaiah case,

the January 1990 crackdown, the prolonged curfews and the massacre

at the Mirwaiz's burial procession. Given Pakistan's calculus, its

abatement of the resulting insurgency was predictable. It was only

by  1992-93 that the Kashmir angst declined, and Pakistani  vested

interests were ascendent.  (This  is the crucial point made by  Lt

Gen  (Retd) Nayar in a recent article in the USI Journal).  It  is

then that intervention amounting to 'proxy war ' emerged.
 

 

The  lesson of this in terms of internal security  management  for

India  is  to sensitise the SF and  politico-military  policy  and

decision  making apparatus to socio-political issues.  This  would

help us distinguish between a popular militancy and an insurgency,

and  between  an  insurgency  and proxy-war,  in  order  that  the  

obtaining  situation be addressed appropriately in a  pre-emptive,

re‑storative   and  foundationary  mode.   It   is   for   military

professionals  to  realise the doctrinal implications of  such  an

analysis of the status of an internal security situation, in order

that    the   military   template   is   situation-specific    and

casesensitive.
 

 

[1]Conclusions[1]
 

 

Having  disscussed  the   'why?' and  'how?',  and  witnessed  its

operation through a case-study, it is necessary, if this paper  is

to  go beyond theory  to being policy relevant, to consider  'what

then?'.   Recapitulating  the  identified  'causes'  -   perennial

vulnerabilities,  and  exploitation of the same  from  without  in

accordance  with  the tenets of the realist philosophy;  and,  the

'effects' corresponding to the level of exploitation, in terms  of

LIC and proxy war - it is clear that while military containment is

apposite for the latter, the former requires a political approach. 
 

 

A  holistic  - external and internal - approach would  require  to

comprise  of two strands : internally, in the provision of  socio-

political space for autonomy of ethno-cultural collectivities, in,

both,  precept  and  practise;  and, on  the  external  plane,  to

reconfigure  the perception-action model from a realist  framework

to a liberal-rationalist one.  With this as the direction a polity

informed  by  robust theory ought to take, it may be  of  interest

here to do a brief reality-check. 
 

 

On  the  external  plane, the SAARC  exists  for  a  functionalist

impetus  to  re-ordering  relations.   Internally,  the  direction

democracy  is  taking  in  all these states  is  indicative  of  a

healthier  centre-periphery relationship.  The former  will  shift

the  accent  from a realist discourse based  inter-course   to  an

integrative, inter-dependence oriented structural realist model  -

a philosophy anchored in the broader definition of security and to

its  implications for the long term.  The latter is  in  political

engineering already underway, given the economic imperative.
 

 

Whereas  the  expriment to this end is not without  impediment  in

terms  of  revivalism,  majoritarianism,  and  fundamentalism,   a

realistic (as against Realist) regional agenda fromulation demands

a pro-active, economy and ecology sensitive, collective  approach. 

Inherant to such an approach  is the obsolesence  of intervention- 

the  paradigm  of  LIC - as an instrument  in  the  repertoire  of

interstate  relations  on  this  sub-continental   'civilisational

area'.