http://www.milligazette.com/news/16687-modi-2-0-indian-muslim-survival-kit

Modi 2.0: Indian Muslim survival kit

NOTE: THE ADIL AHMAD DAR MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE BELOW IS ERRONEOUSLY DONE BASED ON A  MISTAKEN REPORT IN THE KASHMIR TIMES. THE SURRENDERED MILITANT REFERRED TO WAS ADIL HUSSAIN DAR, NOT THE PULWAMA BOMBER, ADIL AHMAD DAR. 

On the renewal of his mandate for another term by India’s voters, Narendra Modi has reportedly promised inter-alia an ‘inclusive’ India. Normally it would not be fair to question a positive intent within days, but in light of Modi’s past five years at the helm it is easy to agree when some question his commitment to inclusivity.

The principal features of his first term has been the political marginalization of Muslims, their invisibilisation from democracy’s representative institutions and instilling of fear through micro-terrorism practiced by his supporters, the most visible form of which being lynchings. His elevation of a monk with known anti-Muslim predilections to the chief ministership of India’s largest state, that has 20 per cent Muslim population, and—the final straw—the nomination for parliament of terror-accused, Pragya Singh Thakur, are illustrations of what can be expected from his regime continuing.

In Kashmir, the killings this year are just shy of the three figure mark. Arguably, the operational zeal of security forces resulted in the Pulwama terror attacked, that was in turn capitalized on by Modi for political gains. Now that he has returned to power, it is a no-brainer that the antecedents of the terror attack will be glossed over, such as where the 80 kgs of explosives was obtained from by the terror group in the most heavily militarized and surveilled place on earth. The fact that the Jaish member who set off the car bomb, Adil Ahmed Dar, was earlier picked up by security forces from an encounter site in which two Hizb militants died will be covered up. Suspicion will therefore forever cloud the incident that led up to the Indian reprisal with the Balakot aerial strike.

By his own campaign-time soliciting, Modi’s election sweep can be attributable to the decision to strike back. Never mind that there is no evidence of any damage at the target end, reportedly due to his decision to go ahead in a cloudy night (which to his mind would limit radar effectiveness!) that led to no photographic evidence with India to show for bomb damage. It is a separate story that the Pakistanis hit back with alacrity and in the ensuing dogfight India lost a plane, with the pilot being captured. The rest – a downed F-16 – is information war. Modi’s claim that his threats to bring down a ‘qatl ki raat’ on Pakistan is just that, a story which even he does not take ownership of, but attributes to some western sources.

It is this so-very convenient timing of the incident for Modi compels ruling in other explanations — such as Pulwama being yet another black operation — than Pakistani sponsorship alone, reminiscent of the Parliament attack. In the 26/11 episode, it bears recall that the so-called Deccan Mujahedeen that made a guest appearance has not been seen since. It enabled the ruling party to escape answering tough questions of significance for voters, forcing these off the radar by the diversionary resort to faux nationalism for vote-fetching purposes. It enabled Modi to don the mantle of Hindu Hriday Samrat, worthy of a statue on retirement taller than the one he built of the Iron Man of India, Sardar Patel. For his showing in putting India’s Muslims into a corner and intimidating Pakistan, he received India’s largest mandate.

The magnitude of his vote share is of significance in thinking about the next five years. That 37 per cent of the voters voted for him suggests that the earlier patronizing perception of the native wisdom of the electorate is no longer valid. Modi’s New India is just that, a New India, with a new, ugly Indian. Such voters bought into the line that it is payback time for Muslims for their over-lordship of India for some seven hundred years. They are the potential foot soldiers who will indulge in one-sided violence on call and form part of lynch mobs. To expect them to snap out of their trance in the next five years is naïve. They are the product of thirty years of brainwashing by an organization with the largest membership in the world, the Sangh Parivar.

The next five years are likely to see an intensification of the conditions that prevailed in the last five. Modi’s first tenure was heralded by the killing of a techie in Pune, who as the killer mob later claimed ‘looked like a Muslim’ and - therefore - beaten to death. Modi’s parliamentary majority will be deployed for making constitutional changes to further throttle secularism. There is the Citizen Amendment Bill issue to be taken forward. Now that the north-east that had some reservations is in the kitty, it can be proceeded with. Its provisions define Indian identity, restricting it to those with religious affiliations anchored in the subcontinent.

As sop to his north-eastern voters and those who voted for him in West Bengal, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) will be taken to its logical conclusion. In the north-east, gulags will likely be established to place the forty lakh odd people falling afoul of the procedures mandated by the Supreme Court-monitored process. The ruling party head has promised to extend the NRC elsewhere in the country, which perhaps fetched his party some Bengali votes. The Supreme Court is seized with hastening the matter, having ruled against the intervention of an activist, Harsh Mander, on the process outcome.

The most deadly terror attack in South Asia, the Sri Lankan Easter day terror attack, has put the spotlight back on terror in India, this time in South India. Apparently the intelligence on the impending attack in Sri Lanka was provided by Indian agencies after interrogation of a Tamilian involved. The Sri Lankan army chief claimed the bombers had visited Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Bangaluru. The National Investigation Agency can be expected to deploy its resources more diligently on this case than the manner it investigated the Samjhauta blast and the Abhinav Bharat cases. This will put the Muslim communities that are relatively forward under scrutiny.

In Kashmir, the threat to Articles 35A and 370 looms. It is of an existential nature to the culture of Kashmir. Any constitutional and legal tinkering will provoke a political fight back, with youth liable to join with violence. There are also some 340 militants yet to be wrapped up in Operation All Out. The usual 100-odd terrorist infiltrations may compensate for some of those killed. While 40 youth signed up this year so far, the number could cross a 100 by year end. This means that there would still be some 300 odd militants left over as the assembly elections loom large sometime in autumn. The pressure cooker in Kashmir can thus be set to continue, even though the government could well change tack. Having demonstrated its muscles and winning the national elections, the hardline is expendable now.

What line it pursues in Kashmir would be dependent on what it plans to do with Pakistan. Pakistan for its part has offered talks. The chances of this are bright, if only so that on terminating these down the line sometime, India cannot be blamed for not having tried the talks route. It is apparent that the pressure of the United States on both sides, emanating from its overriding need to exit Afghanistan, is more likely to see the two sides talk rather than not. This may be useful in letting up the anti-Muslim pressures within the country, since some bhakts are apt to conflate Indian Muslims with Pakistan.

The survey of the security environment besetting the minority suggests that the insecurity will persist for another five years. It may do so indefinitely till a balance reemerges in Indian politics against the current sway of Hindutva forces. Muslims would require surviving the interim. This might entail continuing the pragmatic policy of the last five years in which they concentrated on bread and butter issues and long-term improvements as education and employment. They must not be left out of the handouts by the regime, since reportedly the economy is liable to slow down ahead. The key to survival is to keep the focus on outlasting the regime, with the help of liberal and progressive forces. There is no call to be the foil in the resolution of the dilemmas internal to our compatriot Hindu society.

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/politics/modi-2-0-where-is-indias-pakistan-policy-headed-4015981.html

Modi 2.0 | Where is India’s Pakistan policy headed?

Even as elections in Kashmir ended, the Army intensified its operations in the state, going in for 14 ‘kills’ in Defence parlance. The tally of militants dead is pegged at 86 so far this year. The upping of the ante after the elections even though Ramzan is ongoing was perhaps intended to set the stage for the next government. The new Modi dispensation with its renewed mandate can thus hit the ground running in the trouble-torn state.

Its return to power owes much of the dynamics  of its Kashmir policy, from which flows the conjoined Pakistan policy. The Pulwama terror attack provided an opportunity for the ruling party to walk its tough talk. It is a separate matter that the terror attack was arguably brought on by the pressure cooker conditions of the preceding months that resulted in killings of seven, allegedly stone-throwing civilians, in December.

Commentary has it that the reprisal aerial attack at Balakot was put to good use by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to embellish his strongman leader image. His campaigning references to surgical strikes and Balakot can be taken as the outline of his government’s strategic doctrine, illustrated best by his phrasing borrowed from the tagline of a film: ‘andar ghus ke maarenge’.

For its part, as the general elections results came out, Pakistan not only had Imran Khan tweeting his congratulations and hopes for taking the peace process forward with the new government, but alongside take care to test a Shaheen II missile as a signal of its deterrent.

It has also appointed a new envoy to Delhi for exploring any opportunity for talks. Alongside, it is in the process of filling in the position of its national security advisor, vacant since Imran Khan took over, with a military man so that a credible interlocutor is in position for a back-channel process.

Early in his innings, Khan had reached out to India, but amid scepticism that he was  fronting the Pakistan Army, he decided to keep his powder dry till a new government was sworn in. During election rounds, Imran Khan made a mention of Pakistan’s preference for a right wing government in Delhi, perhaps believing that such a government, more self-assured, would be more ameable to the give-and-take of negotiations.

Recent feelers include reports of the Pakistan Army keen to de-escalate on the Line of Control.  There was a stage-setting exchange of pleasantries between the two foreign ministers at the Shanghai Cooperation Council foreign ministers’ meeting in Bishkek earlier.

How India responds to Pakistani overtures will be known soon enough. Previously when Modi was sworn in as the PM, he invited neighbouring prime ministers to the Rashtrapati Bhavan forecourt. India may keep Pakistan waiting till it peoples the Cabinet first.

Even as the context to its Kashmir policy is shaping up in Delhi, on the ground, the annual operational momentum can be expected to continue. There is no repeat of the Ramzan ceasefire of last year. The summer campaign under way is gearing up for the Amarnath Yatra.

Since Pakistan is attempting to woo India back to the table, it is likely to keep its infiltration levels down for now though the Northern Command’s chief –reports that it continues its usual tricks. With fewer locals signing up for insurgency – 40 at last count for this year – the security forces are looking to whittle down the overall number of militants currently pegged at 340 further.

The key decision to be taken early by the new government would be the timing of the Assembly election. Autumn is being touted as the likely window after another extension of the Governor’s rule takes it into the second year.

The manner the elections shape up will be contingent on the security situation. In the case of talks with Pakistan, the proxy war will likely be in low gear. Pakistan requires refurbishing its proxy fighters to keep the insurgency going. If its talks offer gets thwarted, heightened infiltration and activities along the Line of Control is likely.

While a political party cannot be held to its campaign rhetoric – intended as such mouthing is to garner votes – the new government could shift gears in case it wishes to reciprocate the Pakistani outreach.

The government is in a position to do this since it has already demonstrated its strength. It can afford to dictate the agenda and restricting talks with Pakistan to the latter ending terror and demonstrating this on the ground.

It can take advantage of Pakistan being on the ropes economically, with the financial action task forcekeeping tabs on the actions against terror. It can ride its victory at the UN on the Masood Azhar sanctions.

Within Kashmir, the fear over Articles 35A and 370 will energise an election turnout so that the Assembly poses a legal hurdle to any constitutional tinkering by the ruling party’s parliamentary majority. The younger parties will also mount a challenge to their older counterparts, making for feisty polls – putting to rest the question mark over voter turnout of a mere 30 per cent recently.

Though speculation over the twin policies – Pakistan and Kashmir – is not warranted this early, it can be hazarded that the elections crystallise into a strategic cultural shift towards a self-assertive New India. This may play out pending any gear shift towards a softer approach to Pakistan and in Kashmir in the near term by Modi 2.0.

http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=6

Gratis advice for the next National Security Adviser

NOTE: ADIL AHMED DAR, THE PULWAMA BOMBER, IS MISTAKENLY REFERRED TO AS THE SURRENDERED MILITANT FROM AN ENCOUNTER IN SHOPIAN ON 11 SEP 17, BASED ON AN ERRORNEOUS REPORT IN KASHMIR TIMES THAT GOT THE NAME OF THE MILITANT WRONG. THE SURRENDEREE WAS ADIL HUSSAIN DAR.  

The right wing’s information warriors that comprise self-selected nationalists, former spooks, unwary denizens of the strategic community, ruling party inclined hacks and paid-up members of the bhakt brigade, are having their last hurrah. Having manipulated opinion polls, they have extended ‘acche din’ by a week. Even so the nation awaits the electoral verdict with bated breath, to learn if it is possible – as the information warriors believe – to fool all the people all the time.

The last bit of pulling wool over peoples’ eyes was in the information operations surrounding the Balakot-Naushera episode. The narrative was that India came out on top, delivering a mortal blow to Jaish at its labyrinth within mainland Pakistan, bringing down an F-16 with a Mig-21, and scaring the living daylights out of Imran Khan, forcing him to hand back the captured Indian Mig-21 pilot.

The unfortunate part of this was that the target was not so much Pakistan - itself a target of the Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations’ General Asif Ghafoor – as much as the Indian electorate. The electorate needed diverting from naysayers looking for dirt in Gross Domestic Product numbers, unemployment figures, demonetization effects, suicides by farmers etc. Alongside, for good measure, some ten such contrarians were locked up for being urban Naxals out to ‘get Modi’, making others similarly-inspired more circumspect.

The nation awaits the electoral verdict if this strategy of buoying the national morale with tales from the Pakistan front worked. The opinion polls have it that it has done wonders. But this amounts to the information warrior brigade writing-up its final confidential report on its showing over the year. That it has done a creditable job of what it was put to is without question.

There is nary a word on the possibility that the Pulwama terror attack may have been a black operation. The antecedents of Pulwama bomber, Adil Ahmad Dar, who was constantly in and out of police stations as much as in and out of tanzeems, needs probing further, especially the cryptic report in this publication that he was once whisked away from the site of an encounter in which two Hizb compatriots died. That such suspicion can legitimately be entertained is clear from the immaculate timing of the episode, enabling the response to Pulwama enough time to play out and be taken advantage of electorally by the ruling party.

That the information warriors have carried the day is also clear from the absence of a round of missile exchanges even though India went down in the psychological-ascendance game after the Pakistani Naushera riposte to its over-hyped Balakot aerial strike. Strategising and war-gaming would have reckoned with following up to even the score. Instead, information war was resorted to, to paper over the loss of high ground.

This restraint makes sense only in terms of domestic politics. The uncertainty that attends escalation – such as an untimely Diwali - is something the political head could have done without in elections run up. So it made sense to wrap up early, with the pickings magnified by information war: 300 jihadis dead, one F-16 downed, Imran the Khan pleading for peace etc. The reasoning is perhaps that the score can be evened in killing some more Kashmiri armed youth – the score has long crossed 600 over the last three years of Operation All Out, with 87 killed this year of which 9 were killed last week. This spike since end of polls in Kashmir suggests a certain desperation to get even before being boarded out of power.

The desperation was in evidence as the rounds of polls progressed. Information warriors not only manage perceptions, but also keep tags on the information space. So it was within their ken to feel the electoral pulse through the rounds. The feedback perhaps explains the desperation that culminated in the nomination as the ruling party’s parliamentary candidate of the terrorist, Pragya Singh Thakur, even as the breathtaking spin put out by no less than the prime minister was that she was the epitome of a five thousand year old Hindu civilization.

That no Hindu could be a terrorist implies that all terror India has been subject to over the past fifteen years has been Muslim-perpetrated. (The violence in the north east and in central India is attributed to insurgency not counting as terrorism.) In one instance, this writer heard a former foreign secretary opine in an open forum that the Hindu terror angle needs to be mellowed down lest it impact India’s Pakistan strategy cornering it over terror. The opinion polls suggest that the nation has bought into this line. That this line has been in evidence over the past decade and half implies ownership by some amorphous entity.

Information war of the order surrounding the elections as depicted here bespeaks of an organization behind it rather than a set of non-governmental information warriors under a right wing umbrella. In an earlier column in this publication (23 March 2018), the possibility of an Indian ‘deep state’, based on its intelligence agencies subscribing to the cultural nationalist philosophy and participating in its project, had been mooted. The buck in the shadowy intelligence world stops at the door of the national security-cum-intelligence czar’s door.

It is self-evident that the reins of the governmental complex that unwarily participated in the field operations connected with the electoral information war are National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval, controlled. It can be reasonably surmised – from the hagiographies put out on Doval and breathless tracts on the Modi-Doval doctrine – that he holds the reins also of the non-governmental side, with former spooks owing him allegiance bridging the two. There is also the Amit Shah controlled apparatus comprising ruling party trolls, which more than likely defers to the larger intelligence project of returning Modi to power. Modi’s two Man-Fridays – one managing the governmental side and the other the non-governmental – have timed beautifully. That politics is outside an NSA job description indicates the extent of rollback pending.

Operation Elections - the information war project that has surrounded it - has shot its bolt. The Election Commission can yet retrieve is down-in-the-dumps credibility in case it keeps election voting machines sacrosanct over the coming days. In case the Election Commission redeems itself, what should be the national security agenda of the next NSA?

The objective in this rather-extended introduction has been to present the extent of the problem. The next NSA has his task cut out: to identify, contain and dismantle the ‘deep state’. This would not be easy since those self-selecting to the deep state are impassioned by the belief in their cause of midwife-ing religious majortarianism. If the gullible voters need perception management to this end, then manipulating democracy and subverting institutions is small price to pay. An awareness of the iceberg below the water surface is a good start point for an incoming NSA.

Obviously, this cannot be done unless the political class bottles-up Hindutva: religious majoritarianism masquerading as cultural nationalism. Merely wresting the national discourse back from the ideology’s grasp does not make India safe. The NSA can help retrieve the state from right wing formations that made instrumental use of the ideology for state capture. A state duly freed from right wing infiltration and penetration can assert its space, emboldening throwing away of ideological blinkers by society at large. A resulting virtuous cycle can over time undo the damage of the last thirty years to polity, society and institutions.

Is there a (wo)man for the job? To acknowledge that the intelligence community is outsized is passé. Two NSAs in quick succession from within its ranks have revealed its limitations and dangers. The foreign service provided three head honchos. The first was over-extended, overseeing the governmental apparatus alongside as principal secretary; the second could not withstand the demands physically; and the third, though right-minded, was light-weight. The steel frame abdicated, allowing NSA Doval to take headship of the strategic policy group. Yet another policeman cannot be risked. This leaves the military, its credentials burnished since dismantling the iceberg requires moral fiber that only a military life can impart. (There is civil society to also be vetted as site for candidates, but space prevents going into this here.)  

Some candidates with demonstrated intellectual capital, professional stature and moral strength are easy to spot, to wit, Admiral Arun Prakash and retired lieutenant generals Rustom Nanavatty, HS Panag and Prakash Menon. One needs look no further than General DS Hooda, presciently picked by the Congress to upbraid its national security credentials. He courageously put out a well-regarded blueprint that informed the fairly forward-looking security paragraphs in the manifesto of the Congress party. The agenda is spot-on in its intent to bring the NSA appointment to parliamentary heel, a constitutional-empowering of the appointment as necessary first step in the rollback of the deep state.

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https://www.dropbox.com/s/bch58m97lvd28t5/ebook%20of%20book%20reviews%20%281%29.docx?dl=0

Firing from others’ shoulders

By Ali Ahmed

eBook XI – Compilation of book reviews

For Major General (Retired) Dipankar Banerjee

In gratitude

Preface

This ebook compilation comprises book reviews written 2008 onwards. The book is aptly titled, Firing from others’ shoulders, since it discusses ideas thrown up by authors in respective books. The books were prominent contributions to the literature, mostly in the field of strategic studies. Some have been agenda setting and many discussed ideas already in the national security discourse. Between them, they illuminate vast stretches of South Asia, its happenings and times over the past decade. Many of the points made have been referred to by me in my writings, collected in the earlier ten compilations. The strategic studies field has been greatly advantaged by the swirl.

The ebook traces the intellectual ferment in strategic, security and peace studies. The books covered touch topics ranging from nuclear doctrine to terrorism. In discussing the books - and adding my two pennies worth - the attempt has been to deepen thinking on regional and national security. I believe the mainstream can do with some stirring. It is far too statist, cloistered in realism and – worse - made vapid over the period by the ideological contamination of ascendant cultural nationalism. Swimming against the current has been challenging, but made interesting on that account all the same. It can hopefully be seen on these pages from choice of books to review and the particular idea to highlight, thrash out or trash.  

I am grateful to editors who have given space in their publications, in particular the prominent journal, The Book Review India. I must mention Adnan Farooqui in this breath. I have not included the reviews that were carried in service journals in the period and prior to 2008. In the nineties, I was an avid contributor of book reviews to the United Services Institution Journal, where some 30 reviews were published, albeit with a few being merely a paragraph long. All told, I have crossed the 100 book reviews mark. Not only have I enjoyed the reading, but also the thinking that went into taking the work further to sets of readers, both within and outside uniform. The book would interest students and academics, besides helping narrow the reading lists of practitioners constantly short of time. The books appear chronologically, making it easier for lay readers to follow the developments from the global to the local.

I dedicate the book to General Dipankar Banerjee, who I have had the privilege of knowing all through my time on the strategic circuit and who has constantly had an encouraging – and at times life defining - word all along.

As with all other Preface write ups in my ebook compilations, I end this one with a word of thanks for my family, who have patiently allowed me to disappear from time to time behind book covers and then proceed right away to bang away at the keyboard. My excuse has been that the output might be worth something. Since I fire from others’ shoulders in this book, I am certain this time round it would not be a lame excuse.

Contents

Happymon Jacob, Line on Fire: Ceasefire violations and India-Pakistan escalation dynamics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019

Srinath Raghavan, The Most Dangerous Place: A History Of The United States In South Asia, 2019, Penguin Random House, Gurgaon, India

Saifuddin Soz, Kashmir: Glimpses of History and the story of Struggle, Rupa Publications India, 2018

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Pshycho-nationalism: Global Thought, Iranian Imaginations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp.170, ISBN – 978-1-108-43570-3.

Chris Ogden, Indian National Security, New Delhi: Oxford University Press (Oxford India Short Introductions), 2017; ISBN 0-19-946647-5, pp. 152; Rs. 295/-

Chris Ogden (ed.), New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2016, pp. 183, ISBN 978 81 250 62615

Avinash Paliwal, My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal, HarperCollins; 1 edition, 2017

Kaushik Roy and Sourish Saha, Armed Forces and Insurgents in Modern Asia, Routledge, 2016

TV Paul (ed.), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future, Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 326, ISBN – 978-1-316-63394-6

Sumit Ganguly, Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations At The Dawn Of The New Century,  Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2016, 188, 395

Ikram Sehgal, Escape from Oblivion: The Story of a Pakistani Prisoner of War in India, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 138, Rs. (Pak) 695/-, ISBN – 978-0-19-906607-0

Vivek Chadha, Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A Perspective on Human Rights, Occasional Paper 2, IDSA, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 40

Nandini Sundar and Aparna Sundar (eds.), Civil Wars In South Asia: State, Sovereignty, Development, Sage Publications, Delhi, 2014, pp. 273, Rs. 850.00

Rajesh Rajagopalan  and Atul Mishra,  Nuclear South Asia: Keywords And Concepts,

Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 306, Rs. 850.00

Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Gaddafi: Libya And The Limits Of Liberal Intervention,

Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 249, Rs. 495.00

Taj Hashmi,  Global Jihad And America: The Hundred-Year War Beyond Iraq And Afghanistan, Sage Publications, Delhi, 2014, pp. 322, Rs. 995.00

Ahmed S. Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat Of The Tamil Tigers ,

Foundation Books, Delhi, 2013, pp. 267, Rs. 850.00

Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla (eds.), Afghan Endgames: Strategy And Policy Choices For America’s Longest War, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 229

Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making Of The Pakistani Bomb, Foundation Books, Delhi, 2013, pp. 520

V.R. Raghavan (ed.), Internal Conflicts Military Perspectives, Vij Books, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 324,`1250.00

Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson (eds.) Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, And Limitations On Two-Level Games, Foundation Books, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 259.

D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds.), Armed Conflicts In South Asia 2011: The Promise And Threat Of Transformation, Routledge, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 297, `795.00

Ali S. Awadh Asseri, Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabias Role In The War On Terror, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 196, Rs 450.00

Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, Pentagon Press, Westport (CT), 2008,

pp. 221, Rs. 795,  ISBN 978-0-275-99945-2

K.S. Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2010, pp. 88, ISBN 978-93-80502-24-3, Rs 225. 

Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis

Behaviour and the Bomb, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 251, $126, Rs 795, ISBN

978-0-415-44049-3

Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova (eds.), Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 266, Rs. 695, ISBN 978-81-7829951-8 (Hardback)

Harsh V. Pant, Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, pp. 202, ISBN 0-230-60458-7

M.J. Akbar, Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan, Harper Collins, New Delhi, 2011, 343 pp., Rs 499, ISBN 978-93-5029-039-2

Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army: Vision 2020, New Delhi, Harper Collins, 2008, pp. 342, Rs. 495/-, ISBN 13: 978-81-7223-732-5

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism, Hurst and Company, London, 2011, $45, 338 pp., ISBN 978-184904-097-6

Talmiz Ahmad, Children of Abraham at War: Clash of Messianic Militarisms, Delhi: Aakar Books, 2010, pp. 475/-, Rs 1250/-, ISBN 978-93-5002-080-7

Suba Chandran, D., “Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo Pak Conflict”; India Research Press, New Delhi, 2005; pp. 161, Rs. 495/-

Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007, Pp. 258. Price: Rs 495. ISBN 978-0-415-40459-4

Carey Schofield, Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror, Pentagon Press; 2012 

Astri Sukhre, When More Is Less: The International Project In Afghanistan 

Hurst & Co, London, 2011, pp. 293, £ 25.00

D. Caldwell, Vortex Of Conflict: US Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan And Iraq, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011 (First South Asian Edition 2012),

Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation, New Delhi: PenguinViking, 2010

Priyanjali Malik, India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb, New Delhi: Routledge, 2010, ISBN 978-0-415-56312-3, pp. 344, Rs. 795/-

Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia; Ranikhet, Orient Longman Pvt Ltd; pp. 373, Rs. 695/-; ISBN 81-7824-231-1

Karnad, B., ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy’: New Delhi, MacMillan, 2002; pp. 724, Rs. 795/-

Rajagopalan, Rajesh, Fighting Like a Guerilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, 2008, Routledge, New Delhi

Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence, New Dehi: Knowledge World, 2009, pp. 395, Rs. 880/-, ISBN 978-81-87966-70-8

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/politics-the-bogey-of-islamic-state-in-kashmir-3981691.html

The bogey of the Islamic State in Kashmir

The resurfacing of Al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (IS), when he took credit for the worst terror attacks in South Asia, the Easter Day attacks in Sri Lanka, is indicative that though United States’ (US) President Donald Trump declared victory over the IS in end-February, the terror entity is not quite history as yet.

It is unlikely to be defeated with finality any time soon since it finds conflict zones are fertile grounds for thriving in and such zones are aplenty in the region ever since the US chose to deploy the extremist philosophy of Saudi origin, Wahabbism, as a mobilization tool to entrap the Soviet Bear in Afghanistan. Current day, Afghanistan is site for pockets of IS presence, confined by the Taliban’s ethnic-nationalist, rather than pan-Islamist, insurgency in Afghanistan.

Even as close-at-hand Kashmir continues as a conflict zone, this does not amount to IS being at India’s doorstep. As a conflict zone, Kashmir can be expected to attract the IS’ sympathetic and self-serving attention and in turn its once-ascendant star may have attracted disaffected Kashmiris youth surfing social media, its recruiting ground. But that is as far as the IS has gotten to yet.

Over the past five years there have been over-blown reports of IS activity in Kashmir. Black flags made an appearance in some street demonstrations. Terror mastermind, Zakir Musa, currently with an Al-Qaeda inspired outfit, once advocated the caliphate. For his pains, he was roundly criticized for weakening the political dimensions of the Kashmir problem and expelled from his position as leader of the local group, the Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen.

Over the turn of the year, masked youth appeared Srinagar’s historic Jamia Masjid after the Friday prayers waving IS flags, prompting a rally the following Friday by the separatist conglomerate, the Hurriyet, against what they claimed was an attempt by unspecified forces to way-lay their ‘indigenous’ movement for ‘self-determination’. For its part, the Pakistan-sponsored Lashkar-e-Toiba pointed to ‘Indian agents’ being behind the incident.

The latest instance of IS rising its head is in its designating Kashmir as Wilaya-e-Hind, a province of a to-be caliphate. Earlier, Kashmir was on the radar of the IS-affiliate overseeing its supposed Khorasan province that includes Afghanistan.

The claim was made in immediate wake of the killing by security forces of the last known surviving member of the group, IS in Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK). The ISJK had only a handful of self-proclaimed cadre to begin with and no links with West Asia. It was wiped out in successive operations over the past two year, while two alleged associates were caught in the mainland.

The police has thus rightly characterized the IS announcement as propaganda, since there are no IS remnants in Kashmir. The claim is transparent as a bid to break out of its current status as a virtual threat confined to cyber space.

Not having made inroads in Kashmir even when at its height and when the post-Burhan Wani phase was at its peak, a return of the IS under improved conditions of today is unlikely.

Besides, the last IS-affiliated terrorist was also known for tanzeem hopping, having signed up to terrorism after reportedly being tortured by security forces. Another fighter was reportedly disgruntled at losing a cousin in police firing. This indicates motives other than radicalism, pointing to a magnification of radicalization as threat.

The Kashmir police was apt in rejecting the allegation by the Sri Lankan army chief that the Easter Day terrorists had visited Kashmir, there being no record of the visit. The image of Kashmir as a hot-bed of radicalism does not square with the politics of Kashmir rooted as they are in an inter-state territorial dispute

Hyping of any IS mention in the media appears in Kashmir as motivated attempts to tarnish the ‘movement’. Likewise, strategic commentary taking IS’ claims at face-value betrays a confirmation bias, useful as it is for points-scoring against Pakistan. Electoral dividend is also sought by motivated political forces feeding into an anti-Muslim discourse as part of a rightwing project of Othering Muslims. There is danger of reports of IS being manipulated to continue with a militarized status quo. Placing it in perspective is necessary. 

Even so, it takes merely a handful of terrorists to perpetrate horrendous outrages such as the Easter Day attacks and Mumbai 26/11. Vigilance is inescapable. It would be denial to believe that the politics and insurgencies in India provide no opportunity for attention of nefarious forces. Alongside, therefore, ‘root causes’ must be addressed.

The United Nations plan of action for prevention of violent extremism provides a comprehensive framework of response. The report says, ‘Urgent measures must be taken to resolve protracted conflicts.’

This underscores the necessity to bring back a political track to complement the military prong of strategy in Kashmir. Ending the status of Kashmir as a conflict zone can best preserve it from the proverbial evil eye.

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/16934/The-Five-Years-Of-Mr-Ajit-Doval

The Five Years Of Mr Ajit Doval

Toting up Ajit Doval’s final score card

In wake of the ultimate piece of evidence on decision making prowess and process of the Modi regime – Modi’s reasoning that clouds hampered radar that under-gird his decision on the Balakot aerial strike – the long-suspected dysfunctionality at the heart of India’s national security system is by now amply clear.

The dysfunction owes to the wrong choice of national security adviser (NSA) in first place. For this the hagiography by bhakts in the media fattened on intelligence handouts that heightened expectations on Ajit Doval’s taking over of the appointment as Modi’s first act in office is not alone to blame. All of Doval’s operational expertise could not redeem his record in office.

He started off matching his Agent Vinot image, with a finger in every pie:

- He was all over Burdwan, covering up the tracks of the Hindutva terrorists who had blown themselves up accidentally making bombs so as to implicate Muslims in bombings.

-In Delhi, he inquired after the Uber rape case.

-He dashed off to Mumbai to oversee arrangements on the hanging of Yacub Memon.

-He skipped the prime ministerial trip to Bangladesh to oversee the surgical strikes into Myanmar, though the army chief was also on hand.

-He undercut the foreign ministry by going to Myanmar to placate their ruffled feathers.

-He jumped off the prime minister’s plane on a trip to Central Asia in order to make an unscheduled trip to Dubai and arrange the prime minister’s West Asian outreach.

-He oversaw the supersession of traditional succession in the military and the foreign ministry. It is widely acknowledged he botched the Pathankot anti-terror operation by over-supervision, which - in this author’s view - was to cover up any Indian fingerprints over this possibly ‘black’ operation. (The view owes to a cryptic paragraph in a gushy account of Parrikar’s defence minister tenure in which the author refers to the strange case of a police officer escaping the clutches of the terror squad that infiltrated to carry out the attack.)

-He oversaw articulation and implementation of the Doval doctrine – variously called the Modi doctrine or Modi-Doval doctrine by bhakts in academia and the strategic community. The doctrine is a shift from India’s traditional strategic doctrine of strategic restraint to an offensive one, which Doval in a pre-accession lecture at Sastra University dubbed erroneously as ‘defensive offense’.

There is no such thing in strategic lexicon as defensive offense (ask Uncle Google). Presumably he meant to say ‘offensive defence’, taking a leaf out of the Pakistani characterization of its strategic doctrine. Given this confusion at the conception stage, it explains a description of its implementation in one characterization as ‘pirouettes’ in foreign policy, particularly in respect of Pakistan.

As for his elevation to displace the Defence Minister (in retrospect not such a bad idea in light of the defence minister’s inability to outgrow her ruling party spokesperson role) in his heading of the Defence Planning Committee and the Cabinet Secretary in taking over the reins of the strategic policy group, the outcomes speak for themselves.

There is no articulation of strategic doctrine. The nuclear doctrine remains static. The army’s latest doctrinal publication was put out surreptitiously. The air force rued missing Rafale aircraft during its response to Pakistan’s counter at Naushera to Modi’s Balakot caper.

The standing up to China at Doklam was accompanied by some eighteen rounds of talks to de-escalate the incident. That these were in Beijing tells a story. These were followed up the following year with Modi proceeding to Wuhan, the abject optics of which the so-called Wuhan spirit could not obscure. That India remains outside the nuclear suppliers group thanks to China speaks more than India having finally pushed Masood Azhar into a corner.

To be sure, it would be unfair to judge Doval in areas he has little expertise of. He should instead be appraised for his showing on the Pakistan-Kashmir front, where he reputedly did a seven years stint (‘undercover’ as hagiographers have it). The Pulwama-Balakot-Naushera episode has been presented by his boss, the Prime Minister, all through the elections as India’s arrival finally as a strategically-minded regional power capable of deploying hard power in the national interest.

Firstly, Doval’s persisting with the hardline in Kashmir set the conditions for the Pulwama episode. There was an intelligence lapse and no khaki heads rolled for convoy mismanagement. That the episode provided a political opportunity is no reason for not following up with accountability.

However, Doval is answerable for the key question as to why was Pulwama not deterred in first place. The conditions that can set up a spiral continue – Operation All Out and military alert - compounded by bans redolent of vendetta against the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and the Jamaat. The election figures from Kashmir of mere 20 per cent turnout bust India’s case against plebiscite as it is has extended democracy to Kashmir.

Secondly, as for the boldness on display in the Balakot operation, there was never a case that such a response was ever precluded by Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. For the Prime Minister to imply as much in his political gimmickry drawing a connection between nuclear weapons and Diwali implies that he is either ill-served by advisers or self-serving in appropriating a military achievement.

As former Pakistani foreign minister Mehmood Kasuri’s memoir’s mention, the Indians had apparently thought of targeting Muridke after 26/11, but in the event better strategic sense prevailed.

The option was discussed widely as far back as 2010 when the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry discussed it. Upping the ante against Pakistan was not exercised thereafter since there was no terror attack worth risking escalation, other than the one at Uri that was followed by surgical strikes.

Even if the military operations branch disavowed from any such strikes prior to September 2016, that surgical strikes were part of the repertoire of responses has been made crystal clear by the Congress owning up to six strikes. In any case, Pakistan’s response put the surgical strikes in better perspective than the eponymous super-hit movie that had a Doval look-alike and political affiliate assaying his character in the movie.

Third, from the hyperactivity of Baluch freedom fighters, there appears to be a fillip to intelligence operations, as Doval had outlined in his Sastra University addressed. This is understandable if the pressure point so created could provide dividend elsewhere. However, Doval busted his opportunity to network with the Pakistani deep state in his discussions, reportedly over six plus meetings.

The Pakistani NSA’s trip to Delhi was cancelled early on in mid 2015. Their military’s replacement of the NSA with a military man to provide Doval with a credible interlocutor also did not help any. Finally, the Pakistanis have done away with the position itself. Their positive feelers – to the extent of postponing their support for the Kashmir insurgency – have been rejected. Doval is handing over a rather empty file.

Last but not least is internal security. Lynchings apart, there is the designation of Hindu terrorists as India’s ‘good terrorists’, never mind the implications for India’s long standing advocacy for an international convention on international terrorism. Perhaps the convention keeps domestic terrorism outside its scope and restricts itself to Islamist terror. This is the long term damage Doval will be remembered for.

In short, national security has been ill-served. That information war has been deployed to paper this over and instead to project national security mindedness of this government as its USP amounts to yet another hoax, jumla in plainspeak. While national security does have political impulse behind it in genearl, Doval’s has politicized national security inordinately by allowing ideology to contaminate strategy, handing ovr his successor a ready start point – de-toxification.

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=90607
http://srinagar.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=6

Kashmir: Radicalisation and what to do about it

The Sri Lankan army chief has thrown the cat among the pigeons. He indicated to the press that some Sri Lankan bombers visited Kashmir, Kerala and Bangaluru. The assumption is that they may have picked up their knowhow, wares or extremism from their visit. The initial response of the Kashmir police was that there is no record of such a visit to Kashmir.

Even so, it is apparent how easily Kashmir figures in the imagination as a ‘go to’ place for would-be terrorists. This should be troubling, especially since the shift to radicalization in Kashmir has found mention through this decade. Evidence touted is the Islamist affiliation of leading terrorist Zakir Musa and his attempt at wresting of the political direction of the movement; the appearance of black flags symbolizing extremism on the streets; the recent fracas by a group within the precincts of Srinagar’s Jamia Masjid after Friday prayers; the inclusion of Kashmir in the invective of the Islamic State (IS) stalwarts assigned as minders to the region; the proximity of IS affiliated outfits close at hand in Afghanistan etc.

The ascent of the IS in Iraq and Syria mid-decade witnessed eddies in the region. However, the IS influence has been greatly exaggerated, particularly as the temporary ascendance of the IS was speedily tamped down by reaction of the great powers and their local partners, such as the Kurds, in West Asia. The IS has ceased to exist as a territory holding entity, but the resurfacing of Al Baghdadi, its leader, in taking ownership of the Sri Lankan mayhem, suggests that it continues as a ideological threat-in-being. This is of a piece with the Al Qaeda, which, though considerably whittled, exists as a lodestar for radicals, not least because the geopolitical critique it propounds of the global and regional order is not about to change. In effect, both IS and Al Qaeda will not disappear till the ‘root causes’ that give rise to their line of thinking – such as (in their view) the energy security related grip of the US-led West over core Arab regimes and the suppression of the Palestinians - are not appropriately addressed.

The major point, missed in the western media mediated information on the IS, is that politics and civil society being largely absent in Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia (remember the Khashoggi case), the opposition to the reactionary regimes there takes a perverse form. It comprises ultra-right extremist religion-based organizations, aiming to outflank rightist and feudal sheikhdoms. Wahabbism – ultra orthodox, sharia-based Islam - that is the ideology of the regimes is sought to be outflanked by Salafism, an obscurantist version. The competitive religiosity leads to offshoots of sectarianism and extremism, such as the takfiris. The United Nations Security Council has set up a mission to report back on the IS depredations when it was in power.

Added to the doctrinal differences is the political aspect, political Islam. Political Islam has a component that critiques the world order in which the ‘Middle East’ is under sway of ‘Western’ hegemony. The Europeans who flocked to the IS were mostly swayed by this. This facet of the IS has been blocked from view by the media and think tanks that selectively transmit the worst of IS messaging in their translations of largely Arabic literature put out by these organisations. Some think tanks, such as MEMRI which is relied on for information is reportedly being funded partially by Zionist interests.

There is military presence of the United States in the region. The Americans last week sailed an aircraft carrier into the Mediterranean to frighten Iran. This politico-military grip has an energetic discursive counter. The Arab Spring was a manifestation of sorts in its bid for a democratic turn, but as seen over through the decade, it was either nipped in the bud or its outcome upturned for a return to conservatism. The latest instance is in Sudan, where the military regime that took over from Al Bashir is applying the brakes, with the help of the Saudis, Egypt and United Arab Emirates, against the civilian led uprising. The political backlash such retrograde action prompts is constricted, leaving political Islam as opposition and much in evidence in badlands and conflict zones now spread across the Arab lands from Iraq to Libya. This context to Islamist radicalization finds little mention.

As for the linkage of the IS with India, the potential for its minority to be radicalized has been over-hyped and deliberately so. This columnist has argued here and elsewhere that the Islamist threat and the susceptibility of Indians to it has been a Hindutva project, put forward to a degree by similarly motivated members of the intelligence and strategic communities and those bent on points scoring over Pakistan. There are stooges in the media to carry forward and amplify the fake news that IS is at the doorstep. Little else can be inferred from the din over the past five years over the numbers in a mere middle double digits of Indians in the IS fold. Most of these were from the Indian diaspora living in the Gulf region. Though it does not take more than a handful to perpetrate mayhem, the column inches were less to deter than to marginalize and ghettoize.

Admittedly, Indian immunity to IS overtures – due to a sufistic-snycretic ethos of Indian Islam, India’s democratic traditions and positive economic trajectory - has found mention in the same breath. This is routinely trotted out, but more as a sweetner to the minority, even as in doing so – such as on occasion by the home minister – the message is on the graciousness of the majority community rather than good sense of the minority.

The ruling party has campaigned on the plank that its tenure has not witnessed any home grown terror. Pulwama was Jaish instigated. This only goes to prove that the Hindutva terrorists who are at root to some 17 bomb blasts across India (according to Ananty Patwardhan’s latest documentary, Reason) in the tenure of the previous government have been put to pasture by this one, since it did not need them anymore. In fact, it has gone on to rehabilitate all of them, one with a ticket to parliament and another back in uniform, in the secular, apolitical army. ‘Sadhvi’ Praya Thakur’s bad mouthing national hero, Hemant Karkare, served as backdrop to a new book by a former Inspector General of Maharashtra police, Mushrif, which argues that there is more to the Mumbai 26/11 terror episode and killing of the Anti Terror Squad head, Karkare.

Radicalization in the national context is not related to India’s Muslims. It is instead related to Hindutvavadis and the affiliated extremist groups such as Abhinav Bharat and Sanatan Sansthan. This in-the-face feature is elided rather dexterously in the strategic discourse. Even a change in government may not be enough to expel the majoritarian virus, given that the bombings attributed to Muslim terrorists but undertaken by Hindutva terrorists as part of black operations took place on the watch of the previous Congress-led government. The national security adviser then, an intelligence chief in his time, in his two op-ed articles for The Hindu (3 April, 20 December) on terrorism had not a single word on Hindutva terrorism. Such silence shouts out a hidden truth.

Given this rather extensive – if contrarian – background, one needs being wary of reports of radicalization in Kashmir. As with the case in Arabian countries, where there is an absence of politics, any radicalization can only be attributed to the limitation of political space in Kashmir. The space for voicing their interpretation of Azadi is constricted, since the government has gone out of its way to ignore the subject.

Its so-called interlocutor certainly draws a salary, but on what count is a state secret. On taking over his assignment he had referred to one agenda area being radicalization of the youth. The social media networked youth, seen as more susceptible to radical discourse, are sufficiently disaffected from the Indian state – seen from their stone throwing propensity - to be fertile ground for such ideologies.

Such political neglect opens up space for radicalization as a political strategy of elements in Kashmir’s rebellion. Even separatists, who once took out a march after the episode of radicals’ sudden appearance of Srinagar’s historic Jamia Masjid, have implied as much, arguing that the territorial and political problem appears to be headed southwards into radical hands. This may be tactical, to stampede the state into taking them seriously as a preventive measure. This downgrading of the radicalization thesis is not denial – as the doyen of South Asian international relations scholars Mohammad Ayoob woud have it in his column in The Hindu - as much as putting it in perspective.

That said, the potential for radicalization needs addressing. This cannot be in the form the state has adopted, such as in the recent banning of the Jamaat i Islami. The action misses the difference between orthodoxy and radicalism. There is also no call for suppression in the form of the custodial killing by torture of a Jamaat linked school teacher. Further, there is sufficient experience in south Indian police forces for methods of prevention and de-radicalisation that can be tapped for best practice. An early decision on the lead agency can preempt turf battles since other security agencies may elbow in on the action on the latest buzzword. Kashmir police is the best bet. It can create a special cell to take this head on. The army and the Rashtriya Rifles have their military task cut out and need not expand into this operational area to legitimise their continued presence in civilian spaces in Kashmir.

There is no escaping the fact that bringing back politics is the only recourse, prevention being better than cure. The radical threat has been elevated since it helped the government to keep off interfacing politically with the Kashmir issue. It legitimised the hardline in Kashmir. It helped the ruling party gain votes in the cow dust belt for being strong on security. The radicalization gimmick helped India interface supportively with Gulf regimes, enabling the prime minister to nab the highest national honour from both the Saudis and the UAE. Consequently, the purposes having been met, the radicalization line and the hardline can be abandoned by Modi if returned to power. If another government, it must upturn the Kashmir legacy of its predecessor and watch the threat of radicalization vanish in a puff.