https://www.academia.edu/43510813/The_Indian_Muslim_Security_Predicament

The Indian Muslim

Security Predicament

For a world safe for believers

Foreword

I dedicate this book to believers in Islam. I write of their security predicament in India. I make the case that they have been short-changed by this secular, democratic republic. And this is not only on the time of the current regime in power. It dates back at least thirty years when a virus worse than corona inserted itself into the body politic of this nation. Today, the regime in power is a product and at a grave national security cost.      

The regime has taken power on the back of a Big Lie. It has manufactured the perception of an internal security threat by projecting the largest minority anywhere in the world as one. It has ridden the coat tails of the Islamophobia prevalent abroad. It has presented the Indian Muslim as the Other to build up its vote bank based on Hindus. It has subverted national institutions; thus, even when it was not in power, it was in a position to paralyse the government from within. Now that it in power it is in a position to saffronise at will. This explains the dedication in that saffronsisation is a threat to the safety and well being of India’s Muslims.

I have followed the left-liberal thesis on the right wing ascendance in India. I have seen at first hand the influence of the right wing ideology in the military and within the strategic community. I have recorded this in my writings elsewhere. Here I have put together some of the writings that directly deal with the Indian Muslim security predicament. Since I have covered Kashmir in another book, I have not included the travails of Kashmiris here.

In the process of putting this compilation of writings that have appeared at various websites, I have concluded that it is possible to arrive at a security perspective unique for a minority. While usually national security is taken as indivisible, it is not so in reality. If the state is appropriated by parochial interests, such as of the right wing in India’s case, then the minority at the receiving end has to consider its own security by its own lights.

From a reading of this book, it is possible to conceptualise, that where the state is captured by particularist interests, its usage of instruments at its command constitutes a threat to the minority. This is an important finding from a reading of this book, making the compilation a significant one not only for India’s Muslims, but for the national security establishment, strategic community and the attentive public. 

I thank the publications in which these 76 articles and commentaries have appeared (milligazette.in; thecitizen.in; ipcs.org; countercurrents.org; kashmirtimes.com; indiatogether.org etc). The first one in the compilation did not find any publisher. I trust readers will find the compilation that covers the last fifteen years offering a different, if not a unique, perspective.

I hope it is read also by Hindu friends so that they can see for themselves the premier internal security threat to India stems from the right wing regime’s subversion of democracy and by its supportive formations that want to use their sway in power to fashion a Hindu India. With the hope they bestir to reclaim the republic.

The book is my modest contribution to my community and to my nation of which my community is part. My gratitude to my wider family that inspired the book.   

Contents

1.    Terror Redux : A Minority Perspective

2.    The Fiction Of ‘Minority Terror’

3.    The Missing Muslim Army Officers

4.    The Army: Missing Muslim India

5.    Nailing the lies in name of national security

6.    Consequences for India’s minority of the gathering war clouds after Pulwama

7.    George Fernandes keeps his date with Gujarat carnage martyrs

8.    The minority security problematic

9.    Finally, the IS bogey laid to rest 

10.  PM Modi's version of Rajdharma

11.  The army’s robustness in aid to civil authority: Lessons from the Gujarat Carnage

12.  On the Strongman myth

13.  A national security mess

14.  Noting the spokesperson-minister’s remarks

15.  An officer and gentleman: Worthy of a Muslim's ambition    

16.  The 'incident': Nothing but political

17.  Is there an Indian 'deep state'?

18.  The dissident terror narrative

19.  Kashmir's scenery makes its way to the 'hinterland'

20.  Terror: More serious than most know

21.  Dark side of Army’s social media groups

22.  The army officer corps: Missing Muslims

23.  A problem wider than Kashmir

24.  After left-liberals, Muslim are next

25.  The Paris attacks and India’s Muslims

26.  Whither Modi, and, at one remove, India?

27.  Why Ramchandra Guha speaks too soon

28.  A Viewpoint: Home Minister Brings ‘Saffron Terror’ Back on the Agenda

29.  Kashmir and India’s Muslims

30.  How deep does our prejudice run?

31.  Contesting the Mushrif thesis

32.  Deconstructing Mr. Modi’s speech

33.  Strategy for the Modi era

34.  What is a moderate Indian Muslim to do? @Chetan_Bhagat

35.  Mr. Modi's next stunt

36.  Messiah Modi: What to make of him?

37.  The Fear That Does Not Speak Its Name

38.  Majoritarian terrorism: The resounding silence

39.  Normalisation of the terror narrative: The response

40.  The relevance of Vanzara's letter

41.  A good school for Maqbool

42.  The importance of being Asif Ibrahim

43.  A secure minority, for a secure nation

44.  Shall we imprison everyone?

45.  An indirect response to terror

46.  How deep is the rot?

47.  In Muslim India, an internal battle

48.  Internal security agenda for the new year

49.  Muslim headcount: A useful controversy

50.  Life Under Modi

51.  Strategising for the Modi Era

52.  The Next Polls and Beyond

53.  Muslim Absence from the Strategic Space

54.  Doing More with the Military

55.  Elections 2014: The Worst Case Scenario

56.  What if Modi Makes it to Race Course Road

57.  Afzal Guru: The Man Who Knew Too Much

58.  Taking on Mr. Modi’s Chief Cheerleader: Chetan Bhagat

59.  The Unfolding Gameplan of Majoritarian Extremists

60.  More than just a visit

61.  Not So Easy, Mr. Modi

62.  Chetan Bhagat: Caught at it Again

63.  Catching up with the SIT Chief

64.  Mr. Bhagat: Please Get Off Our Backs, Will You!

65.  A Reply for Mr. Narendra Modi

66.  An Open Reply to Modi’s Open Letter

67.  Blasting the Terror Narrative

68.  The Gujarat Revelations

69.  Blast from the Past - The Varanasi Explosion

70.  Muslim India: A Security Perspective

71.  The Counter Narrative on Terror

72.  Understanding Minority-Perpetrated Terrorism

73.  Haldighati II: Implications for Internal Security

74.  Widening the Discourse on Terror

75.  Muslim India as ‘Threat’

76.  Terrorism’ and Intellectual Responsibility

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/18337/Whose-Army-is-it-Anyway

Whose army is it anyway?

My father having once been commandant of the Indian Military Academy receives a complimentary copy of the IMA’s biannual journal that covers happenings at the academy over the past term. Visiting on holiday, I leisurely leaf through the journal to catch up on my alma mater from which I was commissioned in summer 1987. In this article I share an observation on the IMA, hoping to redflag a trend I have spotted from my scrolling through some ten journals in some detail over the last decade.

Perusing through the Autumn Term 2019 issue I found not a single Muslim Indian officer listed in the faculty, and only one Muslim Indian gentleman cadet (GC) listed among the 306 passing out comprising the 145th Regular and 128th Technical Graduates courses. There are however 54 Muslim GCs of friendly foreign countries, including 50 from Afghanistan and their two Afghan army officer instructors.

There is no Muslim Indian officer in the lists below group photos of the headquarters and administrative staff, the training team, the academic department and the Army Cadet College Wing. Below the group photo of the commandant with all officers of the academy, of the 123 officers listed, none are Muslim Indians. Two Afghan officers are listed. Of the 59 officers posted in and out of IMA during the term, none was Muslim.

Of the 146 instructors below officer rank, there are two Muslims in the training team, one in the drill section, and one with the weapon training section. Of these four, only one is a junior commissioned officer. Three Muslims are with the equitation section, of whom two are junior commissioned officer level – only because the only equitation unit in the Indian army, the 61 Cavalry, has a proportion of Muslims. There is no Muslim in the Physical Training Section.

There is a lone Muslim Indian GC, Shahid Shah, most likely from Kashmir. He is also the lone Muslim to figure in the group photo of GC appointments with the commandant, having made it to the lowest GC appointment of Cadet Quarter Master Sergeant.

While this is the state of the passing out course, I looked forward to spotting some Muslim Indians amongst the academy sports teams, since they also list GCs of the junior course on the team. Not a single Indian Muslim figures in the nine academy sports team photos or the combined group photo, suggesting that the forthcoming passing-out course of summer 2020 will also be rather lean in Muslim Indian representation, and with no outstanding Muslim gracing its numbers. There is also not a single Indian Muslim name in the writeups on hobbies and clubs, such as the names of winners of debates etc.

To substantiate that this is a long standing trend incontrovertibly, below are extracts from my earlier articles in various journals highlighting this as a troubling aspect, calling out for enlightened intervention:

. “A perusal of six editions of the biannual IMA journal over the period 2005–11, covering about half of the seven-year period, led to a tally of 50 Muslim officers having passed out of the IMA. This suggests that about 2% were Muslim, excluding those from friendly foreign countries. In the academy journal’s Spring Term 2016 edition, on the 137th Regular and 120th Technical Graduates’ course, nine out of 469 or 1.9% of the officers having passed out were Muslims. The figure from the 2016 Autumn Term is five GCs with Muslim names out of 403 GCs. The figure goes up thrice over, to 14 GCs for the following course, Spring 2017, that had 423 GCs in all. In effect, Muslims constituted 2.1% of those taking the Antim Pag, the ‘final step’ of training, also the first step as an officer, to the lilt of ‘Auld Lang Syne’.”

. “The problem appears to be worsening. The latest National Defence Academy course at Pune commencing in January 2018 and consisting of 371 cadets (including those bound for the air force and navy) has only four Muslims. Only two Muslims joined the 153 cadets of the 10+2 Technical Entry Scheme course that commenced in January 2018 in Gaya. In the Direct Entry course that commenced at the IMA in January 2018, only one Muslim GC featured in the list of 103 names. Only one of the nine who joined the Army Education Corps course commencing in January was Muslim. One Muslim figured in the list of the 59 who joined the Technical Graduates course at the IMA. Of the 705 Indian youth signing up for an army officer career at the start of 2018, Indian Muslims could not even make it to double digits.”

. “The IMA journals perused for data reveal only one Muslim as having figured in the top GC appointments (34 appointments per course) at the battalion and company levels. In the two recent courses examined (Autumn 2016 and Spring 2017) only two Muslims held a ‘tabbed’ appointment as the lower-rung Junior Under Officers, responsible for a platoon (the subordinate grouping to a company). Of the surfeit of academy awards, only one Muslim GC received a mention for meritorious performance in equestrian sports.”

. “There were no Muslim officer instructors in two of the terms examined, one each in 2008 and 2011. In the latest two editions of the journal, there was a single Muslim major visible in the IMA Autumn 2016 edition and two in the Spring 2017 edition.”

. “The Platinum Jubilee issue of the magazine of the IMA, published in 2007, has some revealing tidbits of information. Only six Muslim officers who have passed out of the IMA have made the supreme sacrifice for the country since the 1971 War. Only one, the late Captain Haneefuddin of Kargil fame, has been awarded a higher gallantry medal, a Vir Chakra, since then. Only one Muslim Gentleman Cadet has won the Academy’s Sword of Honour post Independence, with that award being won way back in 1973.”

. “From the two IMA magazine issues in 2005, it is evident that only eight Muslims passed out of the portals of the institution to become commissioned officers. In the Spring Term 2006, there were eight Muslims commissioned. In the Spring Term 2007, nine Muslims took the ‘Antim Pag’ or ‘Last Step’ as GCs, but their first step as commissioned officers, of the 555 taking commission that term. The following Spring Term, 11 Muslim GCs passed out of 611. In the Autumn Term 2011, 14 Muslims passed out. However, this last figure includes those from friendly foreign countries such as Afghanistan.”

. “In other words, of the six magazines perused for ascertaining the numbers of Muslims gaining the officer commission from the IMA, 45 have made the grade. Assuming some were from foreign countries, less than 40 Indian Muslims have made it over two-and-a-half years into the Army from IMA.”

. “A concerning figure, but less remarked upon, is that of the 291 cadets of the passing-out course from the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, in the Spring Term 2019, only five were Indian Muslims; all of 1.7 per cent. The figure is from the NDA’s magazine, Trishakti. In contrast, seven cadets are from foreign countries. Among the 132 names below photos of the faculty, only one was Muslim. Two junior commissioned officer-instructors were Muslim, both unsurprisingly in the equitation section since the only horsed cavalry regiment is 61 Cavalry.”

. “The IMA’s Spring Term 2016 edition figure is that of the 469 GCs of the 137 Regular and 120 Technical Graduates courses commissioned on 12 December 2015, nine were Muslims, making a percentage of 1.9 per cent.”

. “A leading military school in the country recently compiled the list of cadets that had entered its portals ever since it was founded pre-Independence. Of 2,896 cadets that have entered its precincts since Independence, only 28 had Muslim names.”

A similar exercise can be undertaken to see if there is similar institutional absence of the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Caste communities. It can be hazarded that even if these comprise one per cent each, the tentative percentage from the disadvantaged communities comprising some 45 per cent of India’s population is about 5 per cent, implying a deficit of nine times over.

The finding here is that the Indian army is not representative of all India’. From the profiles of the thirty-odd higher GC appointments of battalion level, only five were from other than north India. My suspicion is that the under-representation is to the benefit of north Indian, Hindi speaking, Hindu communities of the erstwhile ‘martial classes’ and emergent Other Backward Classes.

This narrowing of the social base of induction into the Indian army can only have long term, mostly negative, repercussions. The new Department of Military Affairs must introspect.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/16687-modi-2-0-indian-muslim-survival-kit

Modi 2.0: Indian Muslim survival kit

NOTE: THE ADIL AHMAD DAR MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE BELOW IS ERRONEOUSLY DONE BASED ON A  MISTAKEN REPORT IN THE KASHMIR TIMES. THE SURRENDERED MILITANT REFERRED TO WAS ADIL HUSSAIN DAR, NOT THE PULWAMA BOMBER, ADIL AHMAD DAR. 

On the renewal of his mandate for another term by India’s voters, Narendra Modi has reportedly promised inter-alia an ‘inclusive’ India. Normally it would not be fair to question a positive intent within days, but in light of Modi’s past five years at the helm it is easy to agree when some question his commitment to inclusivity.

The principal features of his first term has been the political marginalization of Muslims, their invisibilisation from democracy’s representative institutions and instilling of fear through micro-terrorism practiced by his supporters, the most visible form of which being lynchings. His elevation of a monk with known anti-Muslim predilections to the chief ministership of India’s largest state, that has 20 per cent Muslim population, and—the final straw—the nomination for parliament of terror-accused, Pragya Singh Thakur, are illustrations of what can be expected from his regime continuing.

In Kashmir, the killings this year are just shy of the three figure mark. Arguably, the operational zeal of security forces resulted in the Pulwama terror attacked, that was in turn capitalized on by Modi for political gains. Now that he has returned to power, it is a no-brainer that the antecedents of the terror attack will be glossed over, such as where the 80 kgs of explosives was obtained from by the terror group in the most heavily militarized and surveilled place on earth. The fact that the Jaish member who set off the car bomb, Adil Ahmed Dar, was earlier picked up by security forces from an encounter site in which two Hizb militants died will be covered up. Suspicion will therefore forever cloud the incident that led up to the Indian reprisal with the Balakot aerial strike.

By his own campaign-time soliciting, Modi’s election sweep can be attributable to the decision to strike back. Never mind that there is no evidence of any damage at the target end, reportedly due to his decision to go ahead in a cloudy night (which to his mind would limit radar effectiveness!) that led to no photographic evidence with India to show for bomb damage. It is a separate story that the Pakistanis hit back with alacrity and in the ensuing dogfight India lost a plane, with the pilot being captured. The rest – a downed F-16 – is information war. Modi’s claim that his threats to bring down a ‘qatl ki raat’ on Pakistan is just that, a story which even he does not take ownership of, but attributes to some western sources.

It is this so-very convenient timing of the incident for Modi compels ruling in other explanations — such as Pulwama being yet another black operation — than Pakistani sponsorship alone, reminiscent of the Parliament attack. In the 26/11 episode, it bears recall that the so-called Deccan Mujahedeen that made a guest appearance has not been seen since. It enabled the ruling party to escape answering tough questions of significance for voters, forcing these off the radar by the diversionary resort to faux nationalism for vote-fetching purposes. It enabled Modi to don the mantle of Hindu Hriday Samrat, worthy of a statue on retirement taller than the one he built of the Iron Man of India, Sardar Patel. For his showing in putting India’s Muslims into a corner and intimidating Pakistan, he received India’s largest mandate.

The magnitude of his vote share is of significance in thinking about the next five years. That 37 per cent of the voters voted for him suggests that the earlier patronizing perception of the native wisdom of the electorate is no longer valid. Modi’s New India is just that, a New India, with a new, ugly Indian. Such voters bought into the line that it is payback time for Muslims for their over-lordship of India for some seven hundred years. They are the potential foot soldiers who will indulge in one-sided violence on call and form part of lynch mobs. To expect them to snap out of their trance in the next five years is naïve. They are the product of thirty years of brainwashing by an organization with the largest membership in the world, the Sangh Parivar.

The next five years are likely to see an intensification of the conditions that prevailed in the last five. Modi’s first tenure was heralded by the killing of a techie in Pune, who as the killer mob later claimed ‘looked like a Muslim’ and - therefore - beaten to death. Modi’s parliamentary majority will be deployed for making constitutional changes to further throttle secularism. There is the Citizen Amendment Bill issue to be taken forward. Now that the north-east that had some reservations is in the kitty, it can be proceeded with. Its provisions define Indian identity, restricting it to those with religious affiliations anchored in the subcontinent.

As sop to his north-eastern voters and those who voted for him in West Bengal, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) will be taken to its logical conclusion. In the north-east, gulags will likely be established to place the forty lakh odd people falling afoul of the procedures mandated by the Supreme Court-monitored process. The ruling party head has promised to extend the NRC elsewhere in the country, which perhaps fetched his party some Bengali votes. The Supreme Court is seized with hastening the matter, having ruled against the intervention of an activist, Harsh Mander, on the process outcome.

The most deadly terror attack in South Asia, the Sri Lankan Easter day terror attack, has put the spotlight back on terror in India, this time in South India. Apparently the intelligence on the impending attack in Sri Lanka was provided by Indian agencies after interrogation of a Tamilian involved. The Sri Lankan army chief claimed the bombers had visited Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Bangaluru. The National Investigation Agency can be expected to deploy its resources more diligently on this case than the manner it investigated the Samjhauta blast and the Abhinav Bharat cases. This will put the Muslim communities that are relatively forward under scrutiny.

In Kashmir, the threat to Articles 35A and 370 looms. It is of an existential nature to the culture of Kashmir. Any constitutional and legal tinkering will provoke a political fight back, with youth liable to join with violence. There are also some 340 militants yet to be wrapped up in Operation All Out. The usual 100-odd terrorist infiltrations may compensate for some of those killed. While 40 youth signed up this year so far, the number could cross a 100 by year end. This means that there would still be some 300 odd militants left over as the assembly elections loom large sometime in autumn. The pressure cooker in Kashmir can thus be set to continue, even though the government could well change tack. Having demonstrated its muscles and winning the national elections, the hardline is expendable now.

What line it pursues in Kashmir would be dependent on what it plans to do with Pakistan. Pakistan for its part has offered talks. The chances of this are bright, if only so that on terminating these down the line sometime, India cannot be blamed for not having tried the talks route. It is apparent that the pressure of the United States on both sides, emanating from its overriding need to exit Afghanistan, is more likely to see the two sides talk rather than not. This may be useful in letting up the anti-Muslim pressures within the country, since some bhakts are apt to conflate Indian Muslims with Pakistan.

The survey of the security environment besetting the minority suggests that the insecurity will persist for another five years. It may do so indefinitely till a balance reemerges in Indian politics against the current sway of Hindutva forces. Muslims would require surviving the interim. This might entail continuing the pragmatic policy of the last five years in which they concentrated on bread and butter issues and long-term improvements as education and employment. They must not be left out of the handouts by the regime, since reportedly the economy is liable to slow down ahead. The key to survival is to keep the focus on outlasting the regime, with the help of liberal and progressive forces. There is no call to be the foil in the resolution of the dilemmas internal to our compatriot Hindu society.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/16569-consequences-for-indias-minority-of-the-gathering-war-clouds-after-pulwama

Consequences for India’s minority of the gathering war clouds after Pulwama

The army’s new land warfare doctrine, put out in December last year, has it that a gray zone obtains where a state-sponsored proxy war is incident. While Kashmir is not mentioned as such, it is unmistakable that to the army it lies athwart a gray zone. From this gray zone emerged a gift horse for Prime Minister Modi. Surveying the election scene mid-month, Modi would likely have been nervous. Now he stands much more self-assured. He has been handed a potential election wining factor by the lone wolf from Pulwama.

PM Modi, and his political Man Friday, Amit Shah, have wasted no time looking the gift horse in the mouth. They are milking the aftermath to draw ahead of the competition. The leading opposition party, the Congress, initially wary of criticizing the government has only belatedly got into gear. This gave the ruling party some lead time to draw ahead and back in the lead by promising military delivered retribution. Meanwhile, mobs supposedly impelled by nationalism hit the streets, looking for Kashmiris to beat in many places, such as Dehra Dun and Jammu.

The sorry episode of hunting of Kashmiris by mobs that required the Supreme Court to step in and tell off nine states that they must uphold their constitutional duty by protecting Kashmiris in other parts of India has much of significance for India’s largest minority, its Muslims. This time it is Kashmirs, next time it is us, the larger constituency of readers of this publication. And our time need not necessarily be some time in Modi’s next term. It could well be now.

Modi has got onto a horse, he would be unable to dismount any time soon. He has ordered the army to swing into action in retaliation for the Pulwama terror attack. The army is presumably planning and preparing. The visit of the Saudi crown prince and Modi’s visit to South Korea have given it time. It would likely have come up with options by now and may have taken a sign off from the Modi-Doval combine on the punitive strike.

This strike may not be long in coming since there is a reasonable limit to the time lapse between suffering a terror blow and retaliation. As the United States was quick to point out, India has the right to retaliate, but the right to retaliate is limited in international law by the principles of proportionality and discrimination. While the army has been allowed to retaliate at a time and place of its own choosing, so that it is most effective and suffers least casualties, there cannot be too much of a delay between the provocation and the reprisal. The reprisal cannot be indefinitely delayed but must bear some co-relation with the initial provocation.

Currently, the Pakistani army is on alert. Its air force has flown combat air patrols. The villages along the Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have been alerted to possible hostilities. The hospitals as far away as Baluchistan have been warned to keep beds for use by the military in case of casualties. This alert implies that in the immediate term there is little possibility of catching the Pakistanis by surprise as was the case during the surgical strikes two years back.

The longer India waits to get a counter punch in, the closer it gets to elections. While this will give the Modi-Shah duo more time to milk the situation of its election-related worth, it would also complicate the run up to the elections. The opposition will remind the ruling party of its rhetoric and point to its inability to follow through. It cannot be put beyond Modi to put back the elections in case he thinks the verdict is still iffy for him. He can use the impending operations as excuse.

Conducting operations sooner than later, prior to the elections, has a downside. As mentioned, the Pakistanis can hold up their guard longer. The operations are liable to meet with opposition. This could result in a costly operation, if not a reverse. It can be expected that Modi’s expertise in perception management, duly aided by national security supremo, Doval, can have the usual game of smoke and mirrors obscure the reality. India can come away the winner, whatever the ground reality. This would of course be contested by the Pakistanis, no spring chickens at spinning a yarn themselves.

Even so, there is no guarantee the government’s narrative of the outcome of the military showdown between the two armies would go India’s way and that India’s slip would not show. This implies that there is a possibility of escalation to what one Modi minister calls an ‘aar paar’ conflict. To ensure a victory of sorts, Modi may require upping the ante. In short, body bags can be expected to come home.

This is when the threat for attacks on minorities would tend to go up. Dehra Dun, for instance, witnessed the bodies of two of its sons come home in quick succession, one of which was in relation to operations connected with the Pulwama terror attack aftermath. This led to orchestration by the right-wing of nationalist sentiment to spike up the threat to Kashmiris studying in Dehra Dun, a well-regarded educational hub. Kashmiri youth are studying across India, including in Dehra Dun, mostly under centrally-sponsored schemes designed as much to respond to unsettled conditions in Kashmir – by sending them outside for study - as to prevent alienation in youth there from – by exposing them to India’s soft power.

What happened in Dehra Dun can be expected to be witnessed across India. Given the possibility of a bloody nose, the right-wing would also need to take out its invective and angst. The internal ‘Other’ – India’s Muslims – are readily available, particularly as they are ubiquitous, vulnerable and have in the popular construct already been identified with Pakistan – allegedly cheering for Pakistan during cricket matches. Thus, turning to vent their frustration and cow the rest of the majority and voting public, Muslims could form a useful outlet. The intensity of anti-minority mob violence will tend to increase as the Modi-Doval spiel on the outcome of the military contest unravels as facts inevitably seep through the information war blanket.

This is the good part. There is no limit to escalation since the threat of nuclear war cannot be discounted or underestimated how much ever the national security establishment prefers to sweep it under the carpet. They wish to do so in order to deny Pakistan a deterrence card. It also enables the establishment to undertake a punitive operation by ridiculing the notion that advent of nuclear weapons in such conflict is a far-fetched notion. Nevertheless, a thought to the outcome of such escalation in terms of early warning and consequence management is warranted.

Consider the prospect of escalation. It could occur on both counts, an alert Pakistani army setting back an Indian operation or an Indian operation drawing blood. In the former case, the Indians might be compelled to escalate, since for a bigger power to end up in a draw with the weaker one, it is to lose. The latter case is when the Pakistanis over-react to an Indian success; invest heavily in their counter, and in doing so provoke an Indian cold-start level conventional operation. The Pakistanis have time and again warned that should this happen, they may resort to their nuclear weapons. India is promised to ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation in such eventuality and the current thinking is that it may jettison its No-First-Use and take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in a damage limitation nuclear strike with first strike equivalent of megatonnage.

Whatever the level of nuclear exchange - lower order or higher order – there would be hell to pay for India’s minority, even if Pakistan comes out worse and India is spared the worst. It would provoke a backlash to rival Partition. The election backdrop will disappear and the multiple pogroms can acquire a historical mark of their own. There is no indication that the state is envisaging such possibilities as it hurtles along the nuclear path worshipping the false god, deterrence. The state institutions are too suspect to be relied on to follow their rajdharma in such a case.

Even if they were so capable, the Modi era has hollowed them out thoroughly. Recall, Modi was more bothered of the backlash received by the train Vande Bharat express he flagged off – and which promptly hit a snag – than the Kashmiris hounded across India by his supporters. His showing in the Gujarat carnage can only serve to warn of a nationwide repeat in case of a nuclear exchange, irrespective of whether India comes out on top.

The upshot of this consideration of national security matters with implications for minority security is that adverse India-Pakistan equations are not in the good health of India’s Muslims. Such adversarial relations are useful only for the right-wing. This is best evidenced by their attempt to profit in the aftermath of the Pulwama terror attack. Their sway over power compels the national security establishment also to fall in line. The upshot is a hardline against Pakistan and in Kashmir, one that can go tragically wrong – as seen here - for the country and its largest minority. The antidote is the good health of the relations between the two South Asian neighbours. This can be only through boarding out the right-wing by mid this year, lest some other terror attack later bring the house down on Indian Muslims.