The Book Review
February-March 2013
http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/issues/the-book-review/50.html
http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/issues/the-book-review/50.html
Book Review
INTERNAL CONFLICTS MILITARY PERSPECTIVESBy
V.R. Raghavan (ed.) Vij Books, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 324,`1250.00
Internal Conflicts, an output of the Center
for Security Analysis, Chennai whosemandate is to look at the non-traditionalsecurity
lens, of necessity reflects on the issueof internal security that has been
germane totraditional security for at least a quarter centurynow. It comprises
papers presented atseminars that notably were also conducted atplaces other than
the national capital,organized as part of an ongoing three-yearproject on
internal conflicts and transnationalconsequences.
The editor in his strategic overviewexpands
the coverage to include Sri Lanka andMyanmar. This widening of scope of the bookis owed to the
Center, co-founded by theeditor along with M.K. Narayanan in 2002,also engaging
with security of South and SouthEast Asia. It is one of two organizations
inIndia that are part of the strategic studiesnetwork of the Near East South
Asia Center(NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, NationalDefence University,
Washington D.C.. Thesecond section of the book carries papers byretired
military brass, with VedMarwah beingthe exception. While the papers are
Indiacentric, there is one on consequences of internal security operations on
the Nepal Army.
The editor’s extended essay over 150pages
is masterly. His discussion of internalconflicts in India covers North East
India, J&Kand Naxalism. The Maoist conflict in Nepaland ethnic conflicts in
Sri Lanka and Myanmarare the other areas of focus. He discusses stateresponses,
peace processes, economicconsequences, militarization and politicalimpact in
its internal and external dimensions.The editor’s conclusion is that the four
stateshave used some or a combination of the fourapproaches available: security
approachwherein police forces are used, militaryapproach, political
accommodation andeconomic/development approach. India’s owncase has been that
of a ‘combination approach’but with mixed results whereas for the otherthree,
it has been predominantly a militaryapproach. His reflection on peace talks,
peaceaccords and ceasefire agreements, also termedSuspension of Operations
agreements, is usefulin extending the discussion on internalsecurity otherwise
restricted to the conflictmanagement aspects to conflict resolution. Herightly
highlights that the main deficiency insustaining peace is inadequate political
followup. Given that most conflicts are aboutidentity related greivances,
‘states have toaddress the possibility of accommodation inmulticultural,
multiethnic and multireligiouscontext’ (p. 173).
Lt. Gen. Raghavan’s military insight is
inevidence in his Foreword on the ‘trilemma’faced in countering insurgency. He
writes that‘in an asymmetrical warfare it is impossibleto simultaneously
achieve, 1) force protection,2)
distinction between enemy combatants andnon-combatants and 3) the
physicalelimination of insurgents. In pursuing any oneof these options, the
armed forces need toforgo the other two options (p. x).’ Theexistence of the
‘trilemma’ is borne out in thecryptic reference by Lt. Gen. Sudhir Sharmain his
paper on the debate within the army:‘It has been argued by some, that
winninghearts and minds is in frucuous (sic) as it doesnot contribute to
military success’ (p. 197).It is to his credit that he does not agreewith this
line of agrument. This begs thequestion of the strength of the
constituencyamidst the brass that does. Clearly, the SriLankan model of
military elimination of theLTTE has not come about in a conceptualvacuum. The
danger is in the militaryresolving the ‘trilemma’ in favour of point
threelisted by Raghavan. The Myanmar andNepalese examples suggest as much
andexpectations are that in case the Sri LankanGovernment remains oblivious of
postconflict justice for neglect of point two, thenits military victory will be
pyrrhic. Theinability of the superpower, the US, to achieveall
threesimultaneously in Afghanistan shouldcertainly make any debate rest.
The chapter by Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoimakes
the distinction between the traditionalinsurgencies ‘indigenous’ (p. 189) to
Indiaand those that are fostered from outside, suchas proxy wars with jihadi
overtones. He isdoubtful if India’s traditional approach ofminimal force can
sustain into the future.Seeing that the military’s continuingemployment is
inevitable, he is of the viewthat an internal security force of the army
becreated distinct from its force for conventionaloperations. There will
therefore be a two-tierapproach: traditional insurgencies beingtackled by the
central police forces and the‘externally sponsored high grade
insurgencies’being combated by the army’s internalsecurity force. He wants that
this force shouldbe ‘an integral part of the army and should bedeployed,
employed and controlled by theArmy Headquarters (p. 194).’ This seems tobe the
case even now with India’s twoparamilitary forces, the Rashtriya Rifles andthe
Assam Rifles, operating under the Army. Acriticism that can easily be
anticipated is thatthe Army in such a case will end up lessaccountable and
become a vested interest ininsurgency. From the Army’s foot dragging onissues
such as Armed Forces Special Powers Act(AFSPA), some believe that is already
the case.
Lt. Gen. Arvind Sharma, a former
EasternArmy Commander and overall in charge ofoperations in the North East,
writing on thepsychological effects on soldiers opines thatsenior commanders
must be ‘involved inshaping the environment to include smoothfunctioning with
state government, sociocultural organisations, relations and dealingwith the
public, the media and local authorities’(p. 218). He says this in the context
of toomany commanders wanting to lead from thefront and imposing on tactical
level operations.This debate goes back at least to the midnineties. The problem
with arm-chair generalship is in the ‘strategic sergeant’ losing the warfor
‘hearts and minds’ by misapplication offorce. The result is in the commander
then‘managing the environment’ by ‘perceptionmanagement’ rather than taking
action against inappropriate force
application. Such actiononly draws scepticism about the Army’s recordon human
rights, detracting from itsinstitutional credibility. With the state
ofrectitude of the military increasinglyapproximating their civilian
counterparts, thereis a case to the contrary, for the commander’somnipresence,
particularly in high intensitycounter-insurgency.The book is a useful record of
the military’sdoctrinal approach at the current time.
BOOK REVIEW
ASIAN RIVALRIES: CONFLICT, ESCALATION, AND
LIMITATIONS ON TWO-LEVEL GAMES Edited by SumitGanguly and William R. Thompson,
Foundation Books, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 259, price not stated.The Book Review /
February-March 2013
Two-level games are interactions in
whichdecision makers operate in competitivedomestic and international environments.Elites
not only have to initiate and respondin the international domain but also have
totake domestic constituencies along. Suchinteractions are usually in the
context of longlasting and ongoing ‘rivalries’—discordbetween serial disputants
with potential forconflict and armed confrontation.
The book edited by Ganguly andThompson
situates the analysis in Asiabecause of its ever-increasing importance andits
‘high potential for conflict over regionalhegemony and global leadership of
anyregion’. The region has witnessed thirty-tworivalries in the modern era, of
which nineare ongoing ones. The book covers thefollowing dyads: China-Taiwan,
US-China,India-Pakistan, Sino-Indian, Sino-Russian,the two Koreas and
China-Vietnam. To theeditors, this makes Asia ripe for a freshoutbreak of
rivalry in a multipolar future.The ‘Middle East’ is excluded from theregion
since it has already received adequateattention and there is corresponding
deficitin relation to the rest of Asia that can arguablyprove more significant
in the future.
The two chapters of interest to readersin
this part of the world involve India in itsrelations with both its significant
neighbours:China and Pakistan. This fact is itself a tellingstatement on its
levels of (in)security.Through the
two-level game prism, such apotentially hazardous situation cannot havebeen
brought about by factors solely in eitherdomain: international and domestic.
Indiais in an intractable or protracted conflict withits neighbours not only
because of factorsthat cannot be wished away such as criticalterritorial
issues, but also because issues withresonance in domestic politics, such
asnationalisms and identity, have made itdifficult. Consequently, when faced
withcrisis or events, it would be imprudent torule out domestic sphere factors
asinfluencing decisions on escalation or deescalation.
S. Paul Kapur’s chapter on the
Indo-Pakrivalry does bring out the salience of thedomestic sphere. However, his
argumentationdoes not rise to the expectations raised byhis intricately argued
book, DangerousDeterrent but merely
retraces the well knownmeandering of Indo-Pak relations over threeperiods: the
first conflictual period fromIndependence to the 1971 War; the ‘longpeace’
between 1971 till the outbreak of theinternal troubles in Kashmir in 1989;
andthe troubled period since. The author rightlycharacterizes India and
Pakistan as the‘quintessential Asian rivals’. His argument isthat the rivalry
has been driven by thedispute over territory of Kashmir that hasidentity
related portents for both states, aconstant in domestic politics.
Theinternational factors—or factors related to theexternal strategic
environment—have driventhe rivalry within this context. The domesticdomain has
provided the permissive cause oftension while the efficient or proximatecauses
lie in the realm of international strategic variables.
Manjeet S. Pardesi, a doctoral candidatein
Indiana University, aims at understandingthe role of domestic politics in the
rivalrydynamics between India and China. Heconsiders two cases: the late
fifties and earlysixties and the late eighties. His conclusionis that the
domestic sphere has littleinfluence on the decision to escalate butbecomes
significant once a decision has beenmade. Escalation is more likely when
thethreat perception becomes more acute anddeescalation when there is
littleaccentuationin the threat. To him, Nehru adopted theforward policy once
the internal situation inTibet deteriorated due to China reneging ontheir 17
point agreement with the DalaiLama signed when they reasserted theirsovereignty
in 1950. This resulted in reducedTibetan autonomy and increased Chinesepresence
in Tibet and pressure. While thedecision to escalate did not have
domesticpressures behind it, once the die had beencast, nationalism ensured
that the tiger couldnot be dismounted. While the latter is true,to discount the
input of the domesticdimension into Nehru’s decision isdebatable. Though Nehru
had centralizedforeign policy, he was concerned withdomestic opinion on his
leadership sincequestioning in one sector could spill over tojeopardize the
whole, or his vision for India.
This can also been seen in his policy
onKashmir and in relation to nucleardevelopments.
Likewise, Pardesi believes that in the
lateeighties the Chinese threat not having beenprominent, India chose to
de-escalate afterthe Sumdorong Chu crisis of 1986. This ledup to Rajiv Gandhi’s
landmark visit of 1988.However, the preceding OperationChequerboard and the
militarily activeresponse to the crisis can be seen equally asIndia demonstrating
its muscles to a domesticaudience in order to undertake the deescalation
without its credentials as a credibleactor being questioned.This sensitivity of
strategic decisionmakers to the domestic sphere is liable forunderestimation
and thereby a misreadingof India’s intentions and actions. It makesfor the
dominant perception that areasonable India has been imposed on byinsistent
neighbours, who have even gangedup on occasion to corner India. This lies
atbase of the ‘two front’ thesis that has beenascendant over the past half
decade. Thenational resources that then get diverted intostrategic deterrence
and military preparedness are thus legitimized. These havebeen seen instead as
India reassuring itselfthat it can negotiate
from a position ofequality with China and can compel Pakistanby placing it in a
position of asymmetry. Inother words, the domestic factor predominates in
India.
The other chapters will be of interest
tothe expanding numbers of China specialists.China is seemingly at the center
of Asia withmarked rivalries along its periphery. This isuseful for the third
party, the US, to get afoot in the door and to justify its ‘pivot’
or‘rebalancing’. TheAmerican editors justify US
engagement with the region as an Asian power.It is no wonder then
that they prognosticatethe potential for
conflict in the region.
