From the archives, 18 Aug 1995
COUNTER-GUERILLA STRATEGY: A PERSPECTIVE OF THE FUTURE
The typology of war based on belligerent,
intensity and scope ranges from Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to Total War.
Guerilla War (GW), as a 'form of war' adopted by the 'strategically weaker side
to give it the capability of selective tactical offensive' occurs 'in support
of' operations by regular forces in wars of the higher spectrum as Limited and
General War. In LICs as Revolutionary Wars, GW is the principle form of war ,
especially in the initial stages of the conflict.[1]
This essay deals with GW as employed in the
'seizure of political power by the use of armed force' ie Revolutionary War or
Insurgency[2].
Characterised by revolutionary objectives these occur within nations. Based on
aspects of modernity as industrialism and imperialism, Revolutionary Wars have
been ideological and/or for national liberation[3].
The latter ended with formal colonialism and the former has possibly passed
into history alongwith discredited communism.[4]
Two contemporary trends that manifest
revolutionary GW are militant Fundamentalism[5]
and primordial identity based subnationalism[6].
Strategic
Threats.
Ethno-cultural
self determination is visible in multi-ethnic states as GW predominant
secessionist movements. The fall of the Iron Curtain and consequent reconfiguration
of communist Europe has given impetus to these struggles, many of long standing
nature. The transformation in Eastern and Central Europe, being politically
engineered, forestalled the convulsion through GW that would have resulted from
a Centre forcefully reasserting its control. In states where the constellation
of forces that favour such an outcome has not occurred GW is much in evidence.
Examples are India and Srilanka.
Fundamentalism, oft prefixed with 'Islamic'[7],
is the other 'threat'[8]
that may yet turn out to be a self fulfilling prophecy. GW in this case is
essentially an anti-West phenomenon, possibly a long delayed national
liberation movement given the neocolonial nature of ties that bind these areas
in patron-client relationships with Western powers. It is portrayed as
anti-modern and therefore anti-West, while it could conceivably be a violent
cultural backlash against the virtually synonymous relationship between
modernisation and westernisation- a result of globalisation[9].
Within the Muslim world is the debate on the distinction between fundamentalism
and fanaticism[10].
The former being a pan-Islamic reassertion and the latter presaging the 'clash
of civilisations'[11].
GW characterises this phenomenon on the national plane as in Algeria and Egypt
and on the international level in the form of 'transnational terrorism'.
Selfdetermination.
Most
states so subject are creations of colonial administrative convenience
maintained by the norm of recognition of boundaries of nation-state actors in a
global structure valuing stability. The comfortable availability of a
countervailing power in the form of a Cold War belligerent seeking avenues for
proxy war, in the hope of preserving thereby the central strategic balance[12],
is now absent. The sovereignty based concept of statehood is also under seige
from two contradictory forces- suprastate structures and subnationalism[13].
It is the latter that appropriates GW strategy. Though the norm against
dissolution of states is still prevalent, recent history indicates that it is
not sacrosanct. The final arbiter essentially is force. Legalism is at best a
rationalisation.
For instance if the numerous new entrants
to the UN are worthy of statehood, it cannot reasonably be denied to the
numerous nationalities struggling for like recognition. The fact that their
claim is held in abeyance is a measure of the systemic differential of power
and relationships. The Kurds and Chechens cannot be permitted sovereign
existence though Kuwait and Estonia
exist as such.
For states combatting the resultant
centrifugal GW, a viable counter-GW strategy is in the holistic
politico-military tradition as the counter-communist GW doctrines. The military
template is for gaining time, crisis management, gaining a position of strength
and for retaining control as long as it takes socio-economic measures to
dissipate the Cause. Of critical importance during this phase is the retention
of legitimacy by the state through lawful and morally justifiable military
campaign conduct. This is both a pragmatic and a political imperative. The
military persuasive means are to compel the guerilla to recognise state resolve
and effectiveness. Preconditions on resulting negotiations must permit the
guerilla to save face. The ensuing political process must ensure rehabilitation
and incorporation of the guerilla into the system by facilitating development
of his stake in it- the latter perhaps through constitutional accession to
power of the guerrilla. Follow through in terms of fulfilment of negotiated
commitments is essential.[14]
This strategy presupposes a tractable cause
that is reasonable, limited and negotiable. The Chiapas rebellion is of this
category. The Cause is seldom susceptible to elimination through
politico-socio-economic ministrations these days. An illustrative example of
the complexity that characterises problems is the Kashmiri militancy. Military
coercion has been applied for gaining the environment necessary for resumption
of the democratic political process within the federal polity.The promised
autonomy may be less than tempting given the past record of the Center's
propensity for interfering in provincial affairs. Besides aspects as
pan-Islamism, historical Pakistani involvement and Fundamentalism may prove
beyond the capacity of Indian secular credential, itself under threat from
resurgent majoritarian nationalism, to balance.
Thus is oft witnessed a military
predominant counter-GW strategy in a political vacuum. The problem herein is
consequent exposure to external influence- direct and normative. An example is
the collapse of Ethiopia on lapse of patron interest in its integrity at the
end of the Cold War[15].
Another manner of impact on operations is external self-interest based action.
An example is creation of safe areas for the Iraqi Kurds against Iraqi action
that can be no worse than that being carried out by the Turks against 'mountain
Turks' to the North. In the normative category is the increased interest in
hitherto internal matters with ascendence of interest in human rights issues.
This however is selective and self serving. Force gives the ability to
disregard or deter this, if other possibilities are absent, as a growing market
or strategic location.
The conundrum is the extent to which and
duration for a state can pursue a reformist agenda without compromising itself.
The state is after all but a means to an end. Since politics is the art of the
possible, resolution is not impossible. It requires political imagination and
resolve as the cases of Israel and South Africa indicate. The colonial powers
discerned the change of era and did depart eventually. This flexibility may be
unavailable with national governments but political judgement must be tempered
with realism as Srilanka seeks to demonstrate in its ongoing quest for
compromise with the Tamil militants.
A counter-GW strategy therefore is
situation specific. A few principles may be drawn-
-
Prevention is better than cure ie autonomy to the extent possible to devolve to
community level. Democracy is the best means in a federal or confederal setup.
-
Political solution is best. Military measures are at best instrumental.
-
Military measures to continue indefinitely in absence of achievement of
environment conducive for implementation of suitable political solution. Of
importance is primacy of legitimacy in conduct of operations. The other
traditional point of importance is unity of command, preferably under a
civilian head who understands and has confidence of security forces.
-
Intractable problems may require political imagination and a leap of faith.
Ofcourse every Mandela requires a deKlerk.
-
External environment must be so controlled as to preclude direct or indirect
interferance. Force is the ultimate guarantee.
-
Resolve is necessary both for flexibility and resoluteness.
- Follow
through of negotiated settlement is required.
Fundamentalism.
Parallels[16]
have been drawn between the universalistic, deterministic, and authoritarian
nature of resurgent Islam and Communism. A more apt parallel is the political
use of Islam as a complementary force in a nationalistic agenda[17]
as was socialism in liberation movements. Polemic characterises conduct of and
riposte to revolutionary wars[18].
With that as a descriptive rather than ascriptive basis, possibility of accommodation of the phenomenon can be
studied.
The aim being total this is an intractable
problem as Algeria realised on the assassination of Boudiaf. The only strategy,
if it can be dignified by the term, is as is operational there- a military
predominant coercive template. This suffers the problems as mentioned in the
last section, thus is more of a calculated risk. The alternative is a
recognition as dawned on colonial powers, albeit after a lot
of
bloodletting, of a change in era- an end state that implies abdication of
incumbent regimes.
The demagogues that have thus far espoused
a similar agenda have only lent credibility to their stereotype deaminisation[19].
This adds to the emotional ferment of the latest manner of furthering national
purpose- GW, a response explicable in a Social Darwinistic paradigm. The GW is
also expression of an intra-Islamic debate on whether fundamentalism is
'Islamic'. A counter strategy must therefore seek to ensure the prevalence of
the progressive over the radical.
Of this there appears to be a realisation
and is evident from the response of the various regimes threatened. The regimes
have appropriated the Islamic mantle. The delicacy of the manoeuvre is to stop
short of appeasement. For instance the Egyptian campaign[20]
against the Muslim Brotherhood is carried on simultaneous with Egyptian efforts
at urging on the Palestinian peace process, and adoption of a tough line on
Israeli nuclear policy. In Pakistan on the contrary the state has tried to
preempt fundamentalists by taking on board an Islamic agenda. However the price
of a divided political establishment and weak government is self evident[21].
In Algeria Zeroual can at best hope that the Ninjas eliminate sufficient
extremists to enable negotiations with a moderate faction[22].
Begetting moderation through such means is unlikely. In Kashmir India hopes for
the triumph of the secular secessionist element in the fratricide between it
and the fundamentalist groups.
The attitude of the West reflects its
confusion. The American have rightly differentiated between the fundamentalist
threat and Islam. Their action and position on Bosnia, Chechenia, Algeria,
Palestinian peace process and Somalia is among other strategic imperatives to
placate Muslim sentiment. Their collaboration with the sheikdoms, now in the
midst of economic problems, in maintaining the price of oil by keeping the UN embargo
of Iraq in place[23],
as part of their policy of Dual Containment[24],
(among other reasons as the continued good health of Saddam) is indicative of
double standards lending credibility to the anti-American militant position.
Differences with Europe persist not only for economic reasons but also because
the Europeans are virtually frontline states in this regard.
It would appear that the war has just
begun. The challenge is to see that power which is almost on the streets is
intercepted by progressive forces. It is a matter external forces can influence
but not direct. It is an outcome that will be known by whether the Muslim world
enters its Dark Ages or emerges therefrom. A few principles worth mention are-
Internal. - Recognise the emotional stimulus of the problem as being centred in
nationalism.
- Fulfil
state socio-economic-political role.
-
Military measures for regime survival to stop short of tearing fabric of
society apart.
- Cast
off perceived nexus of elite with external powers.
-
Contribute to ascendence of moderates as driving forces in cultural resurgence.
External. - Disengage interests from being dependent on regimesurvival.
-
Balance professed ideals with the realism that presently overshadows the
former. In short practising what is preached is the best example. Make actions
consistent with rhetoric.
- Take a
long term perspective. In the short term the availability of disaffected
recruits and weaponry make the problem loom larger than it perhaps is. In the
long term the reaction against modernisation shall be moderated by coming to terms
with it by cultures so effected as have the South East Asian ones.
- Do not
seek to overtly direct the intra-Islamic debate. Foreign involvement lends
credibility to the fight for national self respect. In this regard the French
connection of the Algerian may well be its handicap.
Conclusion.
GW is
the means as a part of a comprehensive strategy to a revolutionary end. As a
form of warfare it has to be dealt with militarily but then in turn as part of
a Clausewitzian politic-military framework. Military force must seek to
preserve, at worst prevent erosion, of legitimacy. In the final analysis so
long as it is not anti-society force has its own legitimacy.
Intractable problems may require change of
character of the state in recognition of an idea whose time has come. The
intent then must be a political transition so managed as to bring about a
measured cession of power to the group amenable to progressive ends. This is
the predicament that states face when confronted with the challenge of selfdetermination
and fundamentalism.
The state-centric counterstrategy for the
former has to incorporate the tried and tested wisdom of the '60s, but with the
realisation that 'victory' lies only in accommodation arrived at through
political enterprise and
initiative.
The transnational nature of the latter is dependent on
the ongoing adaptation of culture to modernity and the perceived economic and
cultural imperialism of external powers in the outcome. Fundamentally
nationalistic, its transnational nature has origin in the concept of the Ummah.
It does not require a counter-strategy in the conventional sense but requires a
strategy to ensure that the forces as emerge adapt to a global state structure
with minimal confrontation- thereby negating a 'clash of civilisations'.
[4]counter
guerilla strategies regards these wars are dealt with in the books as given in
the bibliography.
[14]for
traditional principles see Beckett in McInnes and Sheffield eds, Warfare in the
Twentieth Century; Unwin Hyman; 1988; p208
[16]for discussion
of Islam as a threat or otherwise please see Halder's 'Contrived threat' and
Miller's 'Challenge of radical Islam' in Foreign Affairs, Vol72/2 of '93.
