Tuesday, 22 March 2022

 Book chapter contribution for the book on RIMC's 100th anniversary 

https://www.amazon.in/Valour-Wisdom-Years-Unparalleled-Leadership/dp/9356075964/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1647925269&refinements=p_27%3ASidharth+Mishra&s=books&sr=1-2

edited by Air Marshal PP Reddy (retd.) Sidharth Mishra 

FOR THE HONOUR OF INDIA

Rimcos have gone global. A prominent field of their martial endeavour and cosmopolitan spearheading is peacekeeping with the United Nations (UN). This is inevitable, since being toppers in their respective batches, the computer at MS 17 invariably throws up their names. As elsewhere in the spectrum of national life, Rimcos remain at the UN’s knife edge and spear tip. UN peacekeeping came into its own after the Cold War. Quite naturally, the story of Rimcos’ incremental engagement matches that of the evolution of peacekeeping.

Characteristically, having been the first Indian to lead a brigade and only Indian brigade commander of World War II, Kodendera Subayya ‘Timmy’ Thimayya (1922-24/Raw) set the bar high for Rimcos by heading two different UN peace operations. He had his baptism in such operations while heading the India-Pakistan Boundary Force. Faiz Ahmed Faiz had then paid poetic tribute to him, saying, ‘Na hindu, na musalman, sirf insaniyat tha Thimayya ka imaan (Only humanity was Thimayya’s faith).’ No other competency required for a UN assignment, Thimayya was the new multicultural nation’s natural choice when asked for by the UN to head a delicate operation of repatriation of over 120000 prisoners on both sides in wake of the Korean War, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), in May 1953. For his year-long stint on the 38th parallel he was awarded the Padma Bhushan. After serving out the balance of his eventful service, he was recalled in July 1964 from retirement to lead yet another intricate UN operation comprising 6000 troops along yet another ethnic fault-line, in Cyprus in 1964. Timmy passed away in harness in end 1965, setting standards that, as in anything else he took up, can only be aspired to, never surpassed.

Close on the heels of Thimayya to be appointed as a force commander was Lt. Gen. Prem Singh Gyani (1923-29). As 2nd Lt, PS Gyani became the first Indian officer to be commissioned into 'A' Field Brigade which was a unit comprising four batteries of horse-drawn guns. He was a graduate of United Kingdom’s Imperial Defence College, and had commanded the artillery school, Deolali, and Staff College, Wellington. He was appointed the second commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first traditional UN peacekeeping operation. The UNEF was set up in 1956 to secure an end to the Suez crisis by deploying some 8000 troops of 11 states, including India. General Gyani led the force from December 1959 to January 1964 with his headquarters located in Gaza City. His location in the Middle East allowed him to gain another unique distinction of briefly heading two other peacekeeping operations, for kick starting both, before returning to UNEF: the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) between September and November 1963 and the UN mission in Cyprus, UNFICYP. Sent to Cyprus between January and March 1964 as the Secretary General’s personal representative and observer, he then raised the force before handing over to its first commander, General Thimayya. 

Madras Sapper Major T Rajaratnam Lokaranjan (1937-42/Raw) headed a mobile team in Cambodia with a mandate similar to that of Timmy’s in Korea.  Following the French defeat by the Vietnamese in Indo-China, he headed a mobile team of the International Commission for Supervision and Control set up under the Geneva Agreement of 1954. He was perhaps the first Rimco military observer, a noteworthy distinction since many Rimcos, such as Maj Gen (then Major) Pramoda Dattatraya Sharlekar (1946-49, Rawlinson) who joined the UN Observers Group in Lebanon in 1958 soon after, followed in his footsteps.

With Timmy in the Indian Custodian Force served Lt Col Mihirsing Gehising Hazari (1933-40/Raw) leading 3 Dogra, the first post-independence Indian participation in an operation abroad. Hazari is the only Indian with a twice-over infantry command experience with the UN. He led 1 Dogra in the first UN peace enforcement operation, United Nations Operation in The Congo, in 1961-62. A fellow battalion commander in the 99 Independent Infantry Brigade Group, at the forefront of ONUC operations in retaking Katanga from rebels, was Lt Col Raghuraj Singh (1938-43/Roberts) leading 2 JAT. The following rotation saw Ashok K. Mehta (1950-55/P) serving in Katanga with his unit 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, the deployment of which saw the UN to boast of two Victoria Cross winners in its service, the only time ever. Alongside, Maj Arvind Moreshwar Joglekar (1940-46/Roberts) led 22 Bombay Field Company.

Rimcos’ tryst with the mighty River Congo has never ceased since. As UN peacekeeping came into its own with the new world order in the nineties, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) witnessed its most challenging multidimensional operation. This contributor was privileged to be among the early military observers there. South Kivu, in 2010 witnessed the heroics by the Indian brigade led by the Rimco pair, commander Chandi Prasad Mohanty (1973-78/S) and deputy, Sanjay Singh (1976-81/S).  

Taking over the helm of the brigade at a challenging time when a Company Operating Base had just been overrun by an armed group, they went on to neutralize the Mai Mai Cheka armed group, that had carried out some 300 rapes, using the atrocity as a weapon of war and terror in a remote area, Luvungi. The Rimco duo got in touch on satellite phone through over-ground friends with the head of the armed group, coaxing him to hand over the leader of the unit that had perpetrated the crimes against humanity. They launched the first heliborne operation deep into the jungles, right into the heart of the armed stronghold of the group, where they were outnumbered 15 times over. Using an attack helicopter combat air patrol, helicopter gunships for close support and transport helicopters for flying in and out, Sanjay led the ground troops and Mohanty kept watch in an Airborne Command Post. They arrested the deputy of the perpetrators, flying him out to face the law. Seven such operations followed.

Close at hand, Rohit Kapur (113/S) went about doing something different. He had two tenures commanding the Indian Field Hospital Level-III for Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO, at Goma. The hospital is the only hospital at the highest Level-III in the UN peacekeeping system. Under Rohit, it has stared down both Ebola and the COVID-19. As a major in the mid-nineties, Rohit served as Regimental Medical Officer with the 16 GUARDS battalion group in UNAVEM-III, the third iteration of the UN operation in Angola.

His battalion had a Rimco commanding officer, Raj Kumar Manucha (1964-69/S). Manucha’s battalion was securing the peace as political transition was underway across Angola. He had several Rimcos serving alongside, with Vikramjeet Singh (1979-83/R) in his unit and Atul Rawat (1978-82/P) as part of his mechanized infantry company. Atul’s work involved escorting the UN convoys through the government and rebel held territory. As with most officers of his generation, it was his first exposure to the work culture of the UN, interaction with foreigners and exposure.

An extensive Rimco ecosystem developed, with Adosh Kumar (1977-82/P) a staff officer in the regional headquarter at Uige, Vijay Yeshwant Gidh (1967-72/S)as second in command of his unit, 14 Punjab (Nabha Akal), Hariharan Dharmarajan (1978-82/C) and Gurinder Singh (1977-82/S) with the 417 (Independent) Engineer Company. The sappers undertook demining and construction of 10 bridges all over the country. The Rimcos reached out to help each other across hundreds of kilometres, despite the lawless situation.

Similar Rimco networks have been witnessed across peacekeeping theaters. This author profited from one in 6 Mahar, deployed in South Sudan’s most difficult province, Jonglei. As the Mission’s political affairs officer looking at political reconciliation with the Murle and Nuer armed groups in the province, I invited myself to a stay over on occasion with Rajneesh Giri’s (1990-93/C) company over at remote Pibor. On hand at Juba, were Mayank Chandola (1995-98/R), Ashish Kumar (1994-99/C) and Abhishek Mamgain to tap into. When the civil war broke out in Juba in December 2013, the airport shutdown and supplies ran out, I landed up at their close-by mess now and then to replenish. They were at the vanguard of the UN’s protection of civilians learning curve, securing the internally displaced people who flooded into their camps at Juba and Bor.

The other epicentre of the civil war was further north, at Malakal, that changed hands 13 times over its course. Here, starting 2017, Gaurav Batra (1991-95/R) headed the 3 MADRAS Infantry Battalion Group over 18 months. He oversaw a volatile area bordering Sudan and Ethiopia, strategically important due to presence of oil fields contested by the rebels. Besides, there were the POC sites at Malakal and Melut, the latter successfully terminated in his tenure. He deployed a company operating base across the gigantic Nile for the first time after a decade long UN presence. His unit received the Force Commander’s Commendation.

That battalion command is the epitome of leadership in the Indian army is well known. In 2006-07, Rishi Deo Sharma (1975-79/P) led 1/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), selected as Force Reserve Battalion for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). For the first time in UN peacekeeping, a Battalion group was earmarked as the Force Reserve, but in a Mission with a Chapter VI mandate. The whole of undivided Sudan, the largest country in Africa then, was earmarked as his area of responsibility (AoR), a world record. Understandably then, it was deployed at Kadugli, Wau and Juba. As expected of a Rimco, Sharma took home a UNMIS Unit Citation.

A decade later, I served for some five years in those parts, ending up as a senior political affairs officer. For a duration I managed relations between two border communities in the UN’s most remote Mission at Abyei. I figure my Pratapian days over the turn of the eighties alone accounted for me withstanding the rigour.

A post commander is another unique position to tenant. In 2002, Samar Singh Pundir (1984-90/P) served with the INDBATT 4 in an otherwise well-endowed by dangerous-at-times Mission, in Lebanon. Besides pleasant diversions as command of the Medal Day Parade at Ab el Saqi, he was post leader of 4-7C, the forward post in the infamous Cheeba farms area, the tri junction of Lebanon, Israel and Syria. The Hizbollah squared off with Israelis in firefights and shelling.

Incidentally, his elder brother, Vikram Singh Pundir (1981-85/P) also flew helicopters for the Indian Air Force under the UN flag in the DRC. There their armed Cheetah helicopters supported the Pakistani brigade convoys along the banks of Lake Tanganyika. He misses sumptuous lunches at the Pakistani officers’ mess with their brigade commander, who went on to be the Pak army chief, General Bajwa. International exposure and/or exposure to scotch from UN PAX outlet does mellow warriors.He recalls operating from a 5000 ft altitude lava covered runway with under threat of further eruptions.

The IAF’s peacekeeping contribution beginning with Canberras flying over Congo in 1961 covered Somalia, Sierra Leone, DRC and Sudan. Rimcollians have been a part of helicopter contingents. Vikram’s earlier stint was in Sierra Leone in 2000,where rushed in on very short notice as part of Op Khukri, he helped in the release of 5/ 8 GR troops held hostage by rebels. Separately, he blew up rebel vehicles to secure six British troopers held similarly. With Mi- 35 attack helicopters inducted under a Chapter VII mandate in the DRC, Amitabh Shendye (1984-88/R), Jasdeep Singh Sandhu (1981-85/P) and Atul Anand (1980-84/R) occupied cockpits over the Great Lakes.

Among military staff officer billets, Arvinder Singh (1978-83/C) and Rakesh Verma (1995-2000/S) have tenanted the very busy Staff Duties 3 desk that oversees the UN’s highest Troop Contributing Country matters, in Delhi. In Delhi, Dharmendra Singh Gill (1973-78/C) headed the Center for UN Peacekeeping, India’s prestigious think tank. In the field, in 2003, Khurshed Manek Balsara (1968-73/S) served in the Asmara headquarters of the Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMEE, as chief logistics officer and deputy chief of integrated services staff. As India senior for part of his tenure, he was the hub with the Indian expatriate communities in both countries.

The military observer’s job is the quintessential, and is also the most memorable, UN assignment. Suyash Sharma (1978-83/C) had such a stint in Côte d'Ivoire, leading a Milob team in Duekoue in 2005. His team site received the Force Commander’s complimentary letter for its quality information and analysis that helped oil the Mission’s OODA loop.

This snapshot of UN contributions suggests that Rimcos were very much there at the global front. Their profile as high achievers has them don blue berets, where their qualities of character and professional competence prove invaluable. A UN ribbon, from possibly his most pleasant and profitable tenure, is thus often spotted on a Rimco’s chest.

 



Tuesday, 1 March 2022

 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/nuclear-command-and-control-locating-the-strategic-forces-command/#.Yh2rmq5hZIU.twitter

UNEDITED VERSION

Nuclear Command and Control: Locating the Strategic Forces Command

It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear command and control (C2) arrangement. In the current nuclear C2, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command (SFC), who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines. While operational authority over the SFC is said to lie with the National Security Adviser (NSA), the SFC once had an administrative reporting line to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), which is presumably now the remit of the Permanent Chairman (PC) COSC.

This article discusses the nuclear C2 in relation to the SFC. Closing on 20 years since its formation, its well-regarded success as a joint command bears discussion alongside the ongoing one on jointness. Also, much doctrinal and hardware development has occurred, necessitating a revisit to the verities. Even if the current arrangement has stood the test of time and there is a case for ‘not mending what ain’t broke’, the intervening two decades is good enough reason to revisit assumptions and arrangements. This article proceeds to do so by looking only at the paper trail, limited though it is on nuclear C2, since a keener look ‘inside the box’ is not possible owing to confidentiality that attends nuclear matters in general.

Whither command authority over SFC?

An academic has described the nuclear C2 arrangement as: ‘the command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) through the office of the NSA to the CCoSC (Chairman COSC) and the SFC commander.’ This indicates NSA’s operational line over both the CCOSC and SFC as regards decision implementation on nuclear matters.

Whether this is ‘proper’ must be examined in light of the criteria of ‘command’. The definition may provide a handy yardstick to examine if command relationships in regard to the very potent SFC are adequate. A definition from Indian Army Doctrine (pp. 31-32) can help in this regard:

Command is the legal authority exercised by the commander…. It carries with it the responsibility for planning, organising, training, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned, implied or inherent missions together with administrative responsibility for supply, health, welfare, morale, discipline, assignment and relief of personnel.

There are two aspects to command in relation to the SFC. The first is that of the C
-in-C in regard to the SFC itself. This is disposed off here at the very outset, with the focus shifting to the second, more significant, aspect of nuclear C2: Who does the C-in-C SFC in turn report to?

It is self-evident that by this definition the C-in-C SFC’s command authority over SFC assets - described as ‘manages and administers’ - is rather limited. The two terms do not lend confidence in the nuclear C2 standard put out by the Draft Nuclear Doctrine have been met, specifically: “For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.” The terms ‘manages and administers’ is not a viable substitute for a command relationship between the commander charged with execution and his tools.

The second aspect is of the location of the SFC in the nuclear C2 arrangement. The amendment to the Allocation of Business rules on the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) gave out the authority of the CDS in his capacity as PC COSC. The press release on the appointment of the CDS informs that the CDS ‘will not exercise any military command, including over the three Service Chiefs, so as to be able to provide impartial advice to the political leadership.’ His command authority is restricted to ‘(T)ri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space.’

Since SFC does not find explicit mention, the PC COSC relationship to the SFC is subsumed in his nuclear role: ‘the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ The earlier mandate of administrative oversight that logically devolves on the PC COSC does no find explicit mention among his duties, but can be presumed. Even so, it is a notable omission, even if a premeditated one.

The relationship of the PC COSC with the SFC is restricted to an indirect advisory role on nuclear matters and a (presumed) direct one in terms of administrative oversight. More on the former role later, but, prima facie, mere administrative oversight appears suboptimal. Quite like the other Cs-in-C of geographical commands of the Services who report to their respective Service Chiefs - who exercise command authority - the C-in-C SFC as head of a functional joint command requires being accountable to the PC COSC. Earlier there being a rotating Chairman COSC, this aspect did not figure. But with a PC, it demands relook.

Need for clarity

As for the advisory role of the PC COSC, this too could do with enhancing. For this the popular understanding of the SFC being operationally under the NSA needs to be problematised. It is surprising that there is no mention of nuclear C2 in the Allocation of Business rules. The NSA, with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the Principal Adviser on National Security matters to the Prime Minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role, which puts into question the operational authority that the NSA is supposed – in the popular narrative - to exercise over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: ‘The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’ This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the Executive Council, operational authority over the SFC: C-in-C SFC being a member of the Executive Council.

The Political Council, being ‘the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons (italics added),’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The Executive Council ‘executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’ In other words, a subordinate committee (Executive Council) is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee (Political Council).

Recall also, the single-point authority given in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine, thus, ‘(T)he authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India (italics added),’ was not replicated in the 2003 nuclear doctrine. The latter reads: ‘The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons’ (italics added).

The inference is that the C-in-C SFC, a member of Executive Council, is answerable to the Political Council as part of the collective, the Executive Council, answering to the collective, the Political Council. Such an interpretation of the official nuclear doctrine in effect suggests - irrespective of the NSA’s presumed operational authority – that there is no single-point authority – military or civilian – overseeing the three-star C-in-C SFC. This suggests that the Draft Nuclear Doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has not been fully met as yet. The operational and administrative disjuncture militates against ‘unity of command’, which reasonably ought to apply to a significant force as the SFC.

Changes proposed

The finding here so far is that command relationships in respect of the SFC are not strictly compliant with the definition (covered earlier) of ‘command’: ‘Command is the legal authority exercised by the commander… (italics added)’. There is no ‘commander’ the C-in-C SFC reports to, unlike other Cs-in-C of the three Services. In the ongoing jointness debate, C2 of joint theatre commands is a significant aspect of the debate. However, the C2 over the functional command, the SFC, has not figured so far. The ongoing defence reforms offer an opportunity for explicit insertion into the nuclear C2 arrangement a military superior for the C-in-C SFC in a consequential addition to the remit of the CDS as PC COSC.

Even in the presidential system of the United States (US), the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls the nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the Secretary of Defence.

The PC COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the Political Council, as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, the PC COSC would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the Political Council, of which the defence minister – the civilian political authority over the military - is part. Operational authorization of nuclear weapons can thus be transmitted to the SFC through a single - uniformed - chain of command.

By virtue of such empowerment of the PC COSC, he could also co-Chair the Executive Council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity; not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state.

The PC COSC would require a nuclear staff as a separate vertical in the HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Hiving off the strategic weapons’ ‘employment-related’ operations staff from the Strategy Programs Staff, with the nuclear weapons ‘development-related’ staff retained under the NSA, will be necessary.

This onerous responsibility requires that CDS’ bandwidth needs to be enlarged. To avoid an overload, the Secretary Department of Military Affairs hat of the CDS can be shed to a three star vice CDS.

Arguing for the makeover

With the SFC ‘under command’ the PC COSC, deterrence is the gainer. Continuing with a nuclear C2 that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. The PC COSC is best positioned to keep a tag on the escalatory dynamic of conflict, making for an efficacious discharge of his nuclear advisory role. Having an executive role alongside makes for a neater nuclear C2 arrangement, that should impress prospective foes.

Escalation possibilities necessitate keeping an intimate eye on when and how nuclear weapons can move from the backdrop to foreground and responding appropriately. Whereas the full spectrum deterrence threat held out by Pakistan is a concern, China continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal. Consequently, military factors in the nuclear domain are of increasing import in conflict. The PC COSC presence in the Political Council in an advisory capacity will ensure that military factors are not blindsided, but resilience of response compels a military – uniformed - chain of command.

Irrespective of validity of the conception that ‘nuclear weapons being political weapons are not meant for warfighting’, periodically revisiting the concept is warranted. A military chain of command for the SFC does not violate this principle since it does not in any way affect the C2 doctrinal principle: that authorization for nuclear use rests with the Political Council headed by the prime minister and advised by the NSA. 

The change can also ease the span of control issues for the National Security Council system under the NSA. The NSA would then have more attention span for forward looking and civilian predominant areas – nuclear weapons development, general deterrence and a holistic national security overview. The NSA’s ambit has increased lately, with his wearing the hats of the Defence Planning Committee and the Strategic Policy Group. Therefore, both an explication and revision of his mandate is in order.

The counter argument

The plausible counter argument is that operational authority is better retained by the NSA. The NSA is more situationally aware of the political and diplomatic dimensions of conflict. It is the overall situation rather than its narrowly military coordinates that will drive nuclear input and decision making. Next, he is also better positioned in conflict to oversee the responsiveness of the civilian nuclear complex.

Finally, if command over the SFC is vested with the PC COSC, this would be a departure from the military understanding of ‘command’: directing military forces for achieving military objectives. The SFC does not easily come under this definition since it is not meant to deliver on strictly military objectives as are other military forces. India is not venturing into the realm of low yield nuclear weapons and therefore there is no call for a military command over SFC.[2] 

Conclusion

The proposal is the next logical step in the incremental cooption of the military into national security structures. A maturing of the three systems involved - the CDS, the SFC and the NCA – allows for inclusion of nuclear C2 in the consideration on ongoing defence reforms.  With a new CDS in saddle soon, the proposal here can be thrashed out in the ongoing debate on jointness, the SFC being a significant - and popularly regarded as the most successful - joint command. Rebuttal of the counter argument in favour of the status quo is not attempted here for reasons of space as much as keeping powder dry if a debate ensues. There is also little doubt that nuclear C2 has gone much further than the initial steps reviewed in this paper cover. At a minimum, the government needs bringing such de facto strides into the open domain since these depict implacability of the deterrent, enhancing deterrence. At a maximum, the government could take the next steps in nuclear weapons operationalisation by indubitably domesticating these in military structures, thereby - yet again - boosting deterrence.



[1] 

[2] ­The author thanks a reviewer’s feedback on this article for this point.


Tuesday, 22 February 2022

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/defence-reform-chief-of-defence-staff-nuclear-command-control

Defence Reform: Giving teeth to the new Chief of Defence Staff

India is temporarily back to the erstwhile system of a rotating Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) in which the senior most serving Service Chief tenanted the appointment. It’s now over a month since General Bipin Rawat’s untimely demise in saddle, but the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has not been appointed as yet.

The jointness initiative has been at a pause. The Services have been asked to turn in studies on how each wished to see jointness shape up. Appointed interim CCOSC, General Naravane, though familiar with the fledgling steps taken on jointness so far, cannot take it forward full throttle.

This indicates certain sanguineness that the CDS will not be overly missed, even though the CDS appointment is triple-hatted, with the third hat being that of Secretary Department of Military Affairs.

This complacence owes to the CDS appointment missing a vital ingredient, that of command authority. His command authority is restricted to ‘Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space.’ Therefore, his absence does not appear critical.

However, this inadvertently gives rise to a question that curiously has not figured with any salience in the strategic commentary so far. Since the CDS’ command authority does not include the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in its remit, who exercises command authority over the SFC?

The CDS, in his capacity as Permanent Chairman (PC) COSC, is only ‘the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ The NCA’s Military Adviser being absent appears to have been easily reconciled with. The implication is that the SFC does not report to the PC COSC.

A cursory look at the security situation over the past two years, when a military crisis has been ongoing in Ladakh, suggests that keeping deterrence honed would be a priority. To be sure, there is no nuclear dimension to the crisis, but general deterrence is never meant to be upfront. It is to be quietly ticking away in the background.

Persisting with a structural flaw in not having the SFC under a command authority and having a part-time Military Adviser to the NCA – which is what a reversion to the rotating Chairman COSC implies – means a neglect of deterrence.

The forthcoming appointment of the new CDS can only resolve the latter. The suggestion here is that the former deficit also be simultaneously addressed. 

Ambiguity galore

In the current nuclear command and control (C2) arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command (SFC), who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines: with operational authority lying with the National Security Adviser (NSA) and being only administratively under the PC COSC.

An academic has described the nuclear C2 arrangement as: ‘the command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) through the office of the NSA to the CCoSC (Chairman COSC) and the SFC commander.’ However, there is no mention of nuclear C2 in the Allocation of Business rules.

The NSA, an unelected civilian presently with cabinet rank and with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the Principal Adviser on National Security matters to the Prime Minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role for the NSA. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the NSA’s operational authority over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: ‘The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’

This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the Executive Council, operational authority over the SFC, the C-in-C SFC being a member of the Executive Council. Does this also mean that the NSA also has operational authority over the other members that include Service Chiefs and the PC COSC? Chairmanship of a committee does not imply subordination of the members by the Chair.

The Political Council, being ‘the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons,’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The Executive Council – as a collective - ‘executes the directives given to it by the Political Council’. In other words, a subordinate committee (the Executive Council) is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee (the Political Council).

In this interpretation, the C-in-C SFC, a member of Executive Council, is as part of the collective, the Executive Council, answerable to a collective, the Political Council.

Recall the Draft Nuclear Doctrine had named the prime minister, as head of the Political Council, the sole authority for nuclear use authorization. The relevant para reads: “The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).”

The official doctrine departed from this by vesting the authority with the Political Council, stating: “The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”

In effect, a three-star C-in-C SFC is without a single-point superior with command authority overseeing him and his Command. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has apparently not been met.

It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear C2. Even so, the lack of transparency that gives rise to such ambiguity does not help with deterrence.

Why fix nuclear C2?

To vest the NSA with operational authority over of the SFC is an anomaly in India’s democratic system of governance based on collective ministerial responsibility. The NSA’s advisory role is understandable. But an executive mandate with operational authority over a critical military formation – the SFC - is at odds with the ministerial system.

Even in the presidential system of the United States (US), the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls the nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the Secretary of Defence.

The belief that ‘nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting,’ may have led to the civilian political authority channeling its nuclear directives through a civilian NSA. The apprehension may be over militarization of nuclear decisions. Since the NSA would be on hand for a holistic input, such a situation would not arise. The NSA has a Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat, a military veteran, who can potentially provide a second opinion to the military’s advice.

Changes necessary

The PC COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the Political Council as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, the PC COSC would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the Political Council, of which the defence minister – his boss - is part. Operational authorization of nuclear weapons can be transmitted to the SFC through a single - uniformed - chain of command.

By virtue of this empowerment of the PC COSC, he could also co-Chair the Executive Council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity, not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state. 

With the SFC ‘under command’ of the PC COSC, deterrence stands to gain. Departing from the nuclear C2 that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. The security juncture is appropriate for the military to take over the operational reins of the SFC, the logical final step in the structural inclusion of the military.

In the interim - at a minimum - the role of the PC COSC in relation to the SFC must be explicated by in the mandate of the new CDS. Leaving the SFC out of his remit is either an oversight, that can be remedied, or is result of a misplaced sense of confidentiality, which too needs amending.




Tuesday, 8 February 2022

 Lt Gen Jameel Mahmood, AVSM, ADC (09 May, 1938----07 May ,1993) 

My unforgettable memory of Lt Gen Jameel Mahmood. 

I got my wings on 18 May 1976 and was posted to 659 AOP Sqn in Baghdogra. 3 months later I got married. He was a col then and commanding the Air OP Sqn. I submitted a formal application to him seeking permission to get married. He called me into his office and congratulated me. When I landed at the airport with my wife Neena, I was surprised to see all the officers and their wives along with Gen Jameel waiting to give us our most unforgettable experience of our lifetime. They all clapped and congratulated us both. Then we were escorted to a waiting Jonga with a trailer behind which had a sofa in it. We were made to sit in it. The entire group then lined up on their personal vehicles and the Jonga followed behind with a huge sign “ Just Married” on the trailer. As it started to move forward we heard a loud noise of tins from below !!!!! There were dozens of them tied to the trailer causing the sound. All the passengers who came on the flight saw it all and clapped. The motorcade then drove through all corners of Baghdogra officers camp, before it halted in from of the mess. A grand lunch was laid out. After lunch Gan Jameel asked Neena & me to follow him. He took us to a house, opened it and gave the keys and said, “ This officer is on leave for the next two months, you are welcome to use it as your own home. God bless you both”. I had tears in my eyes. I could not stop them. I knew Mrs. Jameel even before I came to Baghdogra. I knew the Zaki family since 1962. Haroon Zaki and I joined RIMC in Jan 1962. He was from Hyderabad. My father was a doctor in the Railways working in Hyderabad. He used to go every Saturday without fail, rain, shine or hail to look up Mrs. Jameel’s mother. Sit with her and check her health conditions and give medications as required. He treated her like his own mother. To this day I look up Lt Gen Zaki whenever I go to Hyderabad. On 07 Feb, 1977 the Chetak I was flying in had a spacing cable failure. Col PC Reddy was in the center seat. It is because of him I’m still alive today. Sukhi & Col PJ came and picked me from Kishanganj. The crash took place around 11:30 AM. I was picked up in the evening.Gen Jameel was still in the office waiting for me. He personally dropped me in his Jonga at my house and came up and spoke to Neena and had a cup of tea made by her. We flew together a couple of times to the helipads in Sikkim. I still recall going to Kerang, the northernmost helipad where suddenly all the mountains vanish and you don’t see an anthill for miles looking North: The Tibetan Plateau. Mrs Jameel was a great cook. We were invited for dinner as newlyweds and treated to typical Hyderabadi cuisine. On one occasion the Army Commander Eastern Command was passing through Baghdogra. He was received at the airport and a lunch was arranged in the Officer’s Mess. He came to know that the Army Commander was having a bad tummy and had requested khichdi for lunch. We all thought that we too will get khichdi for lunch. No we had the usual drinks and lavish menu laid out. He had the rare quality to make junior officers feel absolutely at his ease in his company, irrespective of their rank. And similarly he was at ease with seniors no matter what their rank was. I saw it when he was interacting with the Army Commander. He was a Colonel then, commanding 659 AOP Sqn. We can never forget the couple. Not in this lifetime. May their souls RIP. His son Brig Adil Mahmood looks like him.

Messages from Army aviators who knew Gen Jameel 

"Got these interesting pics of Lt Gen Jameel Mahmood (courtesy: his son Brig Adil Mahmood) who was in Air OP. The Gen was GOC-in-C Eastern Command. He got his wings in 1964 and later commanded 6 Air OP Flt and 659 Air Op Sqn. He passed in an IAF heptr crash in Western Bhutan in 1993. The Gen, who was also my uncle, my aunt, another uncle Col Naeemuddin Ahmed (NDA 31st course), and 7 others armed forces personnel including two IAF pilots didn't make it. The Gen was a 5th generation soldier. His father was a POW with the Japanese in WWII while in Mysore Infantry (18th Madras)". He had stopped specifically for a cup of tea along with Mrs. Jameel Mahmood in our Mess (659 R & O Sqn) in Sevoke Road, enroute from Sukhna to Bhutan. It was a Sunday. He had rung me up & spoken personally that day to say that he starting off in 15 minutes from Sukhna & wanted to meet The wife of his old BM of the Inf Bde he Commanded & was presently staying alone in Sevoke Road presently & that cold I get her to the Avn Mess for a quick cup of tea & meet up. That set the 'Cat amongst the pigeons' - Imagine the chaos of expecting an Army Cdr at real short notice in a 'Avn Mess' early morning after a Saturday Night ! No one could vouch for the general get up of the Mess, forget the standard to be fit to receive an Army Cdr ( & that too my Old Sqn Cdr in the same Sqn !). Anyway, to cut the story short, " All hands on deck" & lo behold when "The Army Cdrs Cavalcade arrived" within an hour or so, we had managed to collect 'The Lady (Old BM's wife) & receive a beaming Army Cdr with things decently in order, for his 'cup of tea'. He & Mrs Jameel met the Lady, laughed around with us and left in high spirits within 20 minutes or so, in a happy mood. He had told me he will make another trip after a month or so to Bhutan & then would like to fly by The Sqn Heptr to Bhutan. Of course destiny sadly planned otherwise... He was our senior most yo at the time of raising of 18 Field Regt in 1960 at Hyderabad under Lt Col GS Reen. He along with Dilrus made an excellent couple. Their hospitality was par excellent. Sweet memories. RIP

CeeEmm, could it have been Mrs Narinder Singh? Why I feel so is that Col Narinder of Raj Rif and I were together as DS in SC Wing, College of Combat (now War College) and he was the BM with Gen Jameel when he commanded his Bde. There could have been more than one BM, I agree but Narinder had a very interesting story to tell which gives out a great facet of Gen Jameel's persona. At a party then Brig Jameel asked Mrs Narinder, who was just a graduate, as to why she was not taking up the opportunity to do BEd as a regular student since a local college was running a one year course for BEd after graduation. The lady expressed her constraint that her son was just two years old and she couldn't leave him alone to attend college. To her utter surprise the Commander said that this was not a problem, on her way to college she should leave the child with him in his office and he would look after him. The lady demurred but the Commander would have none of it and unbelievable as it sounds, the lady was able to do her BEd and the Commander was the nanny/creche, whatever you may like to call it!! Since the whole thing was narrated by the officer, Col Narinder himself, there is no element of doubt. As per Narinder, the child was kept busy in some interesting activity with the Brig going to check maybe once every 25-30 minutes, have a bit of a play around and then leave the child on his own resources to attend to his own work. Rather a difficult thing to swallow since the Commander would have things to do outside his office quite frequently but knowing Gen Jameel, he would have innovated a solution. When he took over 659, I was in the process of moving 17 Flt ground party by train as OIC Train and then was fortunate to have him first as my DS in the first tutorial at DSSC and then as my SI Div on promotion to Col(this was in 1980 when DS were Lt Cols and SI full Cols). Fortunately, had a good equation with him and kept running into him during service, more so when he came as ADG Army Aviation in 1991, got promoted to Lt Gen and stayed as DG for a short while before going as 4 Corps Cdr and then moving as Eastern Army Commander. His younger brother, Maj Gen Sultan Mahmood was my MG Arty during my stay at Raiwala as CArty and had number of exchanges about the late elder brother. The General was a great man and God pulled him away since He needs good men around Him. Sorry for this long tale, regards, Bimbo.

An excellent human. Flew him extensively ex TRINCOMALEE as GOC 36. While we were flying 6avuniya to trinco , he carried a cas in his lap in chetak rear seats. Then flew him in SIKKIM BHUTAN as Eastern Army Cdr. Before the heptr crash , we did 3 days op recce in Bhutan. Flew his and the COMD HQ mortal remains ex Haa Dzong to Hashimara For 659 Raising Day my wife took help of Cheetah Flight Manual to bake a cake depicting a replica of a heptr . Over 3 feet long with skids, tail boom , fuel tank rotors all to scale. I have very fond memories of late Gen & Mrs Jameel Mehmud. He had such sterling qualities forwhich we all held him in awe. I am reminded of an incident in Baghdogra AF mess. He saw late Brig Balwinder Singh smoking with his turban on . Next day he called him to his office and told him I don’t mind you smoking but respect your religion . I will appreciate if you don’t do it ( as related to us by late Balli Singh ) . When I was commanding 166 Med Regt at Lekhapani he came on a visit to Dinjan. I rung him up and invited him to my mess which he readily obliged. He confided in me RS I JUST COULD NOT SAY NO TO YOU 659 and all officers who were part of my team have a special place in my heart. He really enjoyed the impromptu Social Evening arranged by my officers and ladies. He was COS Eastern Comd then . I asked him as to how is the future. He in his absolute positive approach to life said RS future is always good. Brig Adil is the elder of the two siblings . The younger one was Mrs Jameels pet. The couple were I the most wonderful people I have met .May their souls RIP. Gen Jameel was a wonderful person. I first met him in the NDA where he was my SI in pre- Staff course. Shortly thereafter he came to Deolali for the reunion and we met at the para drop demo. He told me that he would be coming to my place the next day for breakfast. Very informal. Next, when he came as ADG Army Avn, I was sent to receive him and family at the airport. A week later, around 9.30 pm the doorbell rang and I find them standing there. What a surprise! He said he had come to visit a close friend in the next block and came to know that I was living close by. So he dismissed his car because he decided to pay us a surprise visit and ask me to drop them back. Such informality was his unique quality. Unfortunately, I was the Colonel Avn in HQs Eastern Comd when he met his end in that horrible crash. He had great affection for all who wore the wing. I will always remember him with great respect� Yes sir, that was a horrible day.

We were 3 heptrs waiting at Paro the next valley to Haa Dzong. We were to take off post his departure. Morning 810 am. Unfortunately his heptr toppled over post hitting cable from valley to haul logs. FELL UPSIDE DOWN AND CAUGHT FIRE. There after I flew the King Bhutan with Indian Ambassador much against rules in a single engine heptr. Got direct clearance from MO Dte

Tuesday, 1 February 2022

 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/india-needs-a-national-security-doctrine-for-furthering-jointness/

India needs a national security doctrine for furthering jointness

The absence of a national security doctrine is much lamented. The necessity of a strategic doctrine being rather obvious, here an additional argument is made that India’s efforts towards jointness can potentially be stepped up in case informed by a national security doctrine.

India’s civil-military relations are such that the military is left out of the policy loop but, almost as though in compensation, is allowed doctrinal and operational space. However, the three services - like the proverbial blind men of Hindoostan examining an elephant – end up appraising war through the prism of the respective domains - land, sea and air - each is predominant in. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), being first among equals, is not empowered enough to adjudicate.

Some of the areas that have emerged in India’s recent fledgling steps towards jointness can be illumined by an authoritative and a suitable referent. A national security doctrine can place ideational tensions – controversies if you will - that have emerged in the jointness debates in perspective; thereby, assisting the armed forces to take the next doctrinal and structural steps towards jointness with alacrity. 

The story so far

General Bipin Rawat was tasked to further jointness, simply put as conducting military operations with an ‘All-for-one and one-for-all’ approach. There are two lines for bringing about change towards jointness: doctrinal and structural. The former approach builds on the periodic doctrinal products of the military, including that of the HQ IDS that have dealt with joint doctrine. Structural change could then follow. Hampered by non-availability of a higher-order doctrine, General Rawat privileged structural change as precursor to a meeting of minds over jointness.

Pushback on Rawat’s visualization of front-specific integrated theatre commands was quick. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has long held that the numbers of squadrons and aircraft were limited in relation to the scope of wartime operations. Their employment philosophy has been centralized control-decentralized execution, taking advantage of characteristics of air power afforded by air space: speed, flexibility and versatility. Were joint theatre commands to come up, it would add to procedural tedium, with turf battles decreasing responsiveness and heightening uncertainty that attends military operations.

As part of the debate, Rawat - perhaps inadvertently - sparked off acrimony with candid expression of his view that in a border conflict, the Air Force had a supportive role, likening the Air Force with support arms as artillery. On their part, an air power strategist argues that, “the IAF must be able to degrade and delay PLA … carry out interdiction of communication lines ranging from 150 km … fight to create and maintain a favourable air situation over a limited area … revisit all the classical roles of offensive airpower within a limited war framework.”

Alongside such support for the army’s  operations on land, the Air Force bids for continuing relevance as a strategic player, that - acting jointly - can deliver war winning advantages and outcomes. Not oblivious to developments in air power, it maintains that its roles of taking the war to the enemy through ‘parallel warfare’, comprising, inter-alia, an offensive strategic air campaign and counter air operations, must inform war strategy.  

Similar in kind was the controversy in relation to the Navy. CDS Rawat favoured a sea-denial capability predicated on submarines, while the Navy plugged for a carrier battle group based sea-control capability. Its maritime strategy places sea control as the ‘central concept around which the Indian Navy will be employed’ for ‘strategic effect’. Naval strategists argue that in a conflict provoked in the Himalayas by China, India could take recourse to pressurizing China in the maritime domain. India must take advantage of India’s strategic location in relation to the sea lines of communication and bottlenecks in the Indo-Pacific.

Matters for inclusion

A national security doctrine can not only dispel such ‘controversies’, but also preempt other doctrinal disagreements. From the debates is visible thrust towards conflict limitation. As the controversy involving the Air Force indicates, with air power pitching in, vertical escalation has to be reckoned with. Likewise, a maritime answer to a possible predicament posed by China in the Himalayas - of geographical expansion into the maritime domain - spells horizontal escalation.

Escalation implies more resources sucked in and higher political stakes. It has intrinsic dynamics that inevitably impact the bounds of a war originally intended as a limited one. However, acquiring capabilities that carry the war to the enemy enables being undaunted by the manipulation of the threat of escalation by the other side. This helps with deterrence, since an enemy would be doubly wary of taking on an adversary with human, physical and conceptual elements primed for escalation. Limitation implies having the capability for it for deterrence sake, but refraining deliberately as a policy choice.

Thus, there is a tension between war-fighting and deterrence, the capabilities and readiness for demonstrating either being much the same. The build-up of capabilities leads to an interstate contestation under a ‘security dilemma’, in which military related actions of one state are viewed as a threat and matched by the neighbour. This plays out in peace time as arms racing.

Capabilities are obtained over time and at a steep cost, in addition to a hidden opportunity cost. Weighing between the short haul preparedness and preparation over the long durée is required. Further, cultural change necessary to internalize makeovers takes longer.

Finally, the untimely departure of the protagonist of the process, General Rawat, and delay in the appointment of his successor indicates the salience of the triple-hatted CDS. Left untouched by Rawat was the command and control arrangement. India can neither revert to the British era commander-in-chief model nor can the CDS as Permanent Chair of the Chiefs of Staff Committee run a war by committee.

Though the Services have been tasked to submit studies, the bottom-up approach can do with some direction from top. These are issue areas that the Services would require political direction on. Instead of a blue-ribbon commission on defence reform, India has had a succession of committees since the Kargil War as substitute and has implemented many of the conclusions reached. A national security doctrine is an essential next step.   

The government needs stepping up

Doctrinal conundrums do not necessarily have a ‘right’ answer. This necessitates political engagement, with politics as ‘the art of the possible’. A strategic doctrine defines the place of use of force in the broader national scheme. The policy maker can use the document constructively to elaborate on vexed issues holding up jointness. Further, the political master must follow-up by lending imprimatur to a joint doctrine and structures that emerge thereafter.

A government distinct in the way it approaches defence has an additional onus to be responsive on this score to calls from the strategic community. Political dividend is a low hanging fruit. National security reform with the national security doctrine as a central agenda item should figure in the creation of New India.

There is no dearth of draft afloat on such a higher order doctrine. In run up to the last elections, the opposition had articulated a national security strategy. Lately, even Pakistan adopted a human security-centric national security policy. Press reports have it that the National Security Adviser-led Defence Planning Committee, tasked with writing up the strategy, has a draft.

Even if the main document is kept confidential, as with the nuclear doctrine put in the open domain through a press release, it can be given out in an abridged form. The impending appointment of the next CDS provides an opportunity, with the Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav as appropriate backdrop.