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India’s national security: A feast for Advisers

Nov 2

Recently, Lt Gen (Retired) Vinod G Khandare hastened to inform that he continues in his role as a Secretary-level Principal Adviser to the Ministry of Defence. He was contradicting a media report, that perhaps reasoning that now that a retired army officer – Lt Gen Anil Chauhan – was recalled on promotion, Khandare was history.

Chauhan is to serve as Chief of Defence Staff, Secretary Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and Permanent Chair Chiefs of Staff Committee. (Curiously the last was left out in the press release on his appointment, though the role figured in the one on his assumption of the rank and appointment.)

A triple-hatted CDS in the chair begs the question: Why is Khandare still around?

Rajnath Singh has three advisers – the CDS, Gen Chauhan, and Lt Gen (Retired) Khandare and the defence secretary.

Perhaps the distinction between the two military men is that the CDS is ‘Principal Military Adviser to the Raksha Mantri on all Tri-Service matters’, while Khandare, appointed at a time when the CDS post was vacant, is styled ‘Principal Adviser to the Ministry of Defence’.

It is incomprehensible how a general as CDS cannot provide ‘strategic input and advice’, which, according to the media, is the Khandare brief. It is not known if the senior defence bureaucrat remonstrated against a designation for Khandare that seemingly trespasses on his turf.

Up front, it would appear that Khandare has the cake, with the CDS – a general to boot – confined narrowly to the military sphere. It is an untenable distinction since generals are expected to inhabit the strategic sphere, with its overlap with grand strategy – a politico-military domain.

In the current case, that CDS Chauhan has also sidestepped – as had Khandare – from the position of Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), it cannot be that Khandare has any wider or deeper engagement with grand strategy.

It is only reasonable that Khandare stay-on if he has a separate – elaborate - job description, such as, in preparation for the integration of the three services with the creation of integrated theatre commands (ITC), envisage and craft the relationship of the reorganized military with the ministry.

The CDS charged with ITC, would bring about ‘jointness’ at the Services level, while the adviser could perhaps suggest measures towards ‘jointedness’ (to borrow a term mistakenly used by the previous national security adviser when referring to jointness) between the new military and the ministry. But this is only speculative.

Within the defence ministry are two antagonist departments: the new DMA, with now-deceased General Rawat at helm, and the hoary Department of Defence (DoD). The upstart DMA has the CDS – who is nominally senior to the defence secretary – at its head. This made the protocol conscious military and power-sensitive bureaucrats less able to coordinate. Did that divide lead to Khandare’s induction? 

The DoD is headed by a defence secretary, empowered just prior to the 1962 War vide the hallowed Allocation of Business Rules with the responsibility of ‘the defence of India.” The 60th anniversary of the rather well-known outcome of that War is currently being observed.

The regime had a chance to make a correction on that high-falutin role for the bureaucrat with the creation of the post of CDS. However, status quo persisting, the defence secretary’s take on defence of the realm is being supplemented with Khandare’s.

At a stretch, the inordinately long delay in the second CDS assuming his post, may have led to a stop gap arrangement in which Khandare being accommodated. Even this as excuse for the unprecedented appointment betrays civil-military tension.  

The regime had taken care not to announce the next senior Service Chief as taking over any of the deceased CDS’ three responsibilities. While the regime approved a passing of the baton of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in an acting capacity to General MM Naravane, it did not do so when it was ACM VR Chaudhury’s turn.

Was it because by then Khandare was ensconced in the ministry? Was Khandare’s unprecedented insertion into the civil-military equation to balance against military input – such as on the disruptive Agnipath that came up in the period?

Now that the triple-hatted CDS is in place, it is not that dissonance will necessarily result. The working relationship between the CDS and the adviser can be expected be smooth. The previous perch of the CDS was Military Adviser in the NSCS, taking over from Khandare. Both being the regime’s men, can be expected to get along. (As an aside, it is interesting that even in civvies – incumbents having hung up their boots - those tenanting the appointment are referred to as ‘Military’ Adviser.)

Even so, dissonance cannot be discounted. To the extent this is a possibility, it can be notched up as yet another hit-wicket of sorts of this regime that fancies itself as strong-on-defence.

Recall the major civil-military face-off in India between Viceroy Nathaniel Curzon and his Commander in Chief, General Herbert Kitchener over the Viceroy giving himself additionally a uniformed major general as military adviser. Kitchener was against his advice being second guessed by his junior, or anyone else for that matter. That he was statutorily mandated by his post legitimised his argument. The controversy saw off Curzon from India.

It's not that the moral fibre of the brass hats has so rusted that they are unable to even discern what was self-evident to Kitchener. The problem today is that the checks and balances that characterized democracy once in India have disappeared.

Individuals – howsoever morally upright – cannot take on  a system commandeered by Hindutva. The Bhagwat case is illustrative of the system’s ability to isolate and take out individuals.

And what about India’s fabled ‘steel-frame’?

Leave alone the military, the bureaucrats must also be miffed since the defence secretary and the minister’s secretariat also have an advisory function. It cannot be that both the military and the bureaucrats are parochial and require an umpire in the form of an adviser.

Recall rumours of bureaucrats’ foot-dragging. For a regime in a hurry and only comfortable with ‘Yes Men’ (preferably of the Gujarat cadre), that is unaffordable. It is for this reason that the National Security Adviser (NSA) early on displaced the Cabinet Secretary from head of the Strategic Policy Group. (The self-aggrandizement, along with appropriation of the DPC chair, by NSA Ajit Doval, sees him rifling through papers sent up by himself.)

With regime flagship enterprises as Atmanirbhar Bharat at stake – the stake being crony capitalism that keeps Hindutva moneyed for propagation and self-perpetuation - departures from the normal can be expected.

If it is the case that the two spheres – civil and military – are to be bridged, it is a ministerial role, not Khandare. For sure, the minister can do with using Khandare’s services – being only a few tax payer’s rupees additional to the budget. But it does reflect on how the minister is using his resources.  

Not only are there existing official channels available for advice, so are informal conduits. There was occasion when the ruling party in its previous stint at power had an ex-servicemen cell, peopled by the likes of General ‘Jake’ Jacob, for informal advice to then defence minister, Jaswant Singh (Pravin Sawhney, The Last War).

There is also the ministry’s own once-autonomous think tank. In a recent twitter-storm, it claimed that it has not been far behind in providing its input on jointness.  What more does Rajnath Singh need?

That Rajnath Singh has his political as against ministerial avatar to fore is evident from his most-recent foray into policy dissemination by proclaiming that the desired end state of the regime’s Kashmir policy is the incorporation of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Given proximity of the border to Pakistan’s national capital region – making it within artillery distance – and that such an invasion will snip the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor - materializing a Two Front war - it can only be hoped that such a political aim is not included in the defence minister’s operational directive.

One would think Khandare’s presence could have watered down such bombast, but the tragedy is that perhaps his input keeps up the diversionary din on Kashmir.

The operational directive is the right place to gauge Rajnath Singh’s fitness, and the regime’s claims of felicity in defence matters. The last directive dates to 2009, when the much-reviled AK ‘Pope’ Antony reportedly penned one at long last, early in the second stint of his government and tenure in the chair.

Since this regime is nearing end of its second stint – but remains high on cornering credit on the overhyped defence front – it bears reminding it that the previous government was quicker at the draw on the directive. Could Khandare draft one, to justify his pay?

That the directive does not exist is explicable since the other Adviser, the NSA, has not signed off on the national security strategy he was to roll out as head of the DPC – another post that ought to have remained with the ministry with the CDS heading it – but appropriated by the NSA, with nary a pushback from Rajnath Singh.

The NSA is significant since he sits on (pun intended) three files: Pakistan, since it is his area of expertise; China, as India’s Special Representative; and, as the adviser on nuclear matters, being secretary to the Political Council and heading the Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).

On the first, it is eight years into the regime, and Pakistan has not withered away. The situation in Kashmir – on which the violence indices are untrustworthy - is such that Pakistan can choose its own time and place to reinsert itself into the problem. Now theres no damocles sword of financial action over it. The offline talks, reportedly underway since a Gulf State brokered the ceasefire, have not thrown up anything worthwhile.

Assuming the secret talks are to buy India time to settle matters in Kashmir – taking Pakistani sentiment into account – the projected events in Kashmir – conducting a gerrymandered election – are unlikely to yield ‘permanent peace’, to quote Prime Minister Narendra Modi borrowing from wishful Amit Shah.

As for China, there have been no Special Representative talks lately, though they had an impressive nip when his predecessor – a China expert – was NSA. Ajit Doval inherited a draft ‘framework’ for a border deal. Not all of his prime minister’s persuasive charm could take matters forward. Even informal summits failed.

Clearly, the NSA could not orchestrate a symphony between the military – straining at the bit on the Line of Actual Control - and diplomats and the ruling party’s political shenanigans in erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir in relation to Article 370. The score instead went wildly – and lethally – off-key.

The ‘A’ in NSA does not suggest an executive role for the NSA. And yet, he is in the chain of command over crown jewels held by the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Though the CDS is now in the loop, it is only as military adviser to the NCA.

Since CDS is an adviser, who is in the command loop? Or is it ‘command by committee’, by the NSA-headed Executive Council?

It is inconceivable that the authority over India’s most lethal three-star-led formation is not a four-star general, but a civilian with an advisory role. (Could the arrangement have led to a missile getting fired off and a nuclear submarine getting flooded?)

Space does not permit finessing the point any further than pointing to the definition of ‘command and control’ in the glossary of military terms and to see if either the NSA or CDS fulfils it. Since it cannot be the NSA, the CDS’s remit must be tweaked with him taking on a co-chair position in the Executive Council and being represented - alongside the NSA - in the Political Council.

This is easier said than done since the CDS has no command authority for now (‘will not exercise any military command, including over the three Service Chiefs, so as to be able to provide impartial advice to the political leadership’), other than perhaps the proto-domain forces for cyber, space and special operations. A consequential upping of the CDS salience might be if the CDS ends up with command authority over the ITC.

When the defence minister cannot hold his own - and requires a supervisory appendage in the form of an adviser – taking on command authority over ITC, as is the case in the United States with the combatant commands under the defence secretary, is inconceivable. The CDS thus emerges as an alternative, with a title suitable rejigged to reflect the command profile than a staff one.

In anticipation of vesting the CDS with command authority some time down the line, the SFC can indubitably be brought under him, with the headquarters Integrated Defence Staff having a nuclear supervisory accretion. 

Finally, there is the mentioned Military Adviser in the NSCS (an adviser to an adviser). While it is possible to infer the military adviser keeps an eye on the Strategic Programs Staff (SPS), since the first incumbent of the post had nuclear expertise, his successors have no such a flair. Besides, the SPS has a nuclear expert at its helm, with a former SFC commander once serving as its chief on demitting uniform.

The military adviser’s role is nebulous, allowing for the NSA to use his talents suitably. A non-uniformed post facilitates dispassionate input, but needs to reckon with a rejigged title – ‘military’ being reserved for the uniformed.  

Taking a benign view, Khandare’s reverting to governmental service is to help implement that controversial Agnipath and the Atmanirbhar Bharat schemes, thought up in his last stint in government. He also presumably engaged with jointness issues, since his deputy (an adviser to an adviser to an adviser) at the NSCS was an expert on jointness. Both Khandare and Chauhan – an ethnic kin and regimental mate of General Rawat – knew Rawat’s mind, so their twinned induction into the defence ministry makes for continuity and institutional memory.

However, the conclusion can only be less benign. As laid out here, the national security system appears a galore of Advisers. It bears reminding that the overarching system is of parliamentary democracy, with the principle of ministerial accountability at its core.

While ministers can do with all the advice they can get – in any case most need more of it than should be the case – it shouldn’t be that a ministerial responsibility is palmed off to advisers.

Take the case of nuclear weapons, where willy-nilly an Adviser – with no nuclear background - has executive authority. While the command authority over the SFC should vest with the military, the CDS is instead an Adviser.

It should not be that with a proliferation of Advisers, a presidential system is stealthily put in place. The parliamentary system privileges ministers for democratic accountability.

The suborning of senior minister Rajnath Singh by emplacing of a political commissar on his shoulder undercuts this. Setting this right must begin with putting Khandare - who is beyond his sell-by date - to pasture.

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/defence-reform-chief-of-defence-staff-nuclear-command-control

Defence Reform: Giving teeth to the new Chief of Defence Staff

India is temporarily back to the erstwhile system of a rotating Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) in which the senior most serving Service Chief tenanted the appointment. It’s now over a month since General Bipin Rawat’s untimely demise in saddle, but the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has not been appointed as yet.

The jointness initiative has been at a pause. The Services have been asked to turn in studies on how each wished to see jointness shape up. Appointed interim CCOSC, General Naravane, though familiar with the fledgling steps taken on jointness so far, cannot take it forward full throttle.

This indicates certain sanguineness that the CDS will not be overly missed, even though the CDS appointment is triple-hatted, with the third hat being that of Secretary Department of Military Affairs.

This complacence owes to the CDS appointment missing a vital ingredient, that of command authority. His command authority is restricted to ‘Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space.’ Therefore, his absence does not appear critical.

However, this inadvertently gives rise to a question that curiously has not figured with any salience in the strategic commentary so far. Since the CDS’ command authority does not include the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in its remit, who exercises command authority over the SFC?

The CDS, in his capacity as Permanent Chairman (PC) COSC, is only ‘the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ The NCA’s Military Adviser being absent appears to have been easily reconciled with. The implication is that the SFC does not report to the PC COSC.

A cursory look at the security situation over the past two years, when a military crisis has been ongoing in Ladakh, suggests that keeping deterrence honed would be a priority. To be sure, there is no nuclear dimension to the crisis, but general deterrence is never meant to be upfront. It is to be quietly ticking away in the background.

Persisting with a structural flaw in not having the SFC under a command authority and having a part-time Military Adviser to the NCA – which is what a reversion to the rotating Chairman COSC implies – means a neglect of deterrence.

The forthcoming appointment of the new CDS can only resolve the latter. The suggestion here is that the former deficit also be simultaneously addressed. 

Ambiguity galore

In the current nuclear command and control (C2) arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command (SFC), who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines: with operational authority lying with the National Security Adviser (NSA) and being only administratively under the PC COSC.

An academic has described the nuclear C2 arrangement as: ‘the command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) through the office of the NSA to the CCoSC (Chairman COSC) and the SFC commander.’ However, there is no mention of nuclear C2 in the Allocation of Business rules.

The NSA, an unelected civilian presently with cabinet rank and with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the Principal Adviser on National Security matters to the Prime Minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role for the NSA. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the NSA’s operational authority over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: ‘The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’

This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the Executive Council, operational authority over the SFC, the C-in-C SFC being a member of the Executive Council. Does this also mean that the NSA also has operational authority over the other members that include Service Chiefs and the PC COSC? Chairmanship of a committee does not imply subordination of the members by the Chair.

The Political Council, being ‘the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons,’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The Executive Council – as a collective - ‘executes the directives given to it by the Political Council’. In other words, a subordinate committee (the Executive Council) is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee (the Political Council).

In this interpretation, the C-in-C SFC, a member of Executive Council, is as part of the collective, the Executive Council, answerable to a collective, the Political Council.

Recall the Draft Nuclear Doctrine had named the prime minister, as head of the Political Council, the sole authority for nuclear use authorization. The relevant para reads: “The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).”

The official doctrine departed from this by vesting the authority with the Political Council, stating: “The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”

In effect, a three-star C-in-C SFC is without a single-point superior with command authority overseeing him and his Command. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has apparently not been met.

It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear C2. Even so, the lack of transparency that gives rise to such ambiguity does not help with deterrence.

Why fix nuclear C2?

To vest the NSA with operational authority over of the SFC is an anomaly in India’s democratic system of governance based on collective ministerial responsibility. The NSA’s advisory role is understandable. But an executive mandate with operational authority over a critical military formation – the SFC - is at odds with the ministerial system.

Even in the presidential system of the United States (US), the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls the nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the Secretary of Defence.

The belief that ‘nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting,’ may have led to the civilian political authority channeling its nuclear directives through a civilian NSA. The apprehension may be over militarization of nuclear decisions. Since the NSA would be on hand for a holistic input, such a situation would not arise. The NSA has a Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat, a military veteran, who can potentially provide a second opinion to the military’s advice.

Changes necessary

The PC COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the Political Council as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, the PC COSC would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the Political Council, of which the defence minister – his boss - is part. Operational authorization of nuclear weapons can be transmitted to the SFC through a single - uniformed - chain of command.

By virtue of this empowerment of the PC COSC, he could also co-Chair the Executive Council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity, not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state. 

With the SFC ‘under command’ of the PC COSC, deterrence stands to gain. Departing from the nuclear C2 that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. The security juncture is appropriate for the military to take over the operational reins of the SFC, the logical final step in the structural inclusion of the military.

In the interim - at a minimum - the role of the PC COSC in relation to the SFC must be explicated by in the mandate of the new CDS. Leaving the SFC out of his remit is either an oversight, that can be remedied, or is result of a misplaced sense of confidentiality, which too needs amending.

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 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/defence-reform-jointness-and-command-and-control/

Defence reform: Jointness and command and control

The story of General Rawat’s efforts as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to infuse critical velocity into the military’s jointness process is well known. Empowered by the amendment to the Allocation of Business rules that called for the CDS to facilitate ‘restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands,’ General Rawat proposed a prototype model of jointness.

In the main, the prototype had front-specific theatres, with the landward theatres facing Pakistan and China respectively and a maritime theatre. These theatres would be the provenance of joint Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC). There are also to be joint functional commands, such as for logistics and training.

The genesis of the front-specific ITC is in the ‘two-and-half-front’ dilemma. The prototype copes with the two-front challenge by delegating operational responsibility on each front to respective ITC, while the ‘half-front’ – short hand for Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir - has the Army’s Northern Command continuing its counter insurgency role, besides coping any collusive, China-Pakistan, threat.

The command and control conundrum

The command and control issue over front-specific ITCs poses a conundrum as to how the chain of command will be configured. Though this has received attention, with two options finding mention, there has been no authoritative conclusion to the debate so far.

The first is modeled on the US system in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff body is in an advisory role to the defence secretary, who has command authority over the ITC equivalent formations, their Combatant Commands. In the case of China, that also has theatre commands - with its Western Theatre Command facing India - the command authority vests with the Central Military Commission (CMC).

However, the suitability of both models for the Indian system is suspect. Here, the CDS is the principal military adviser to the defence minister and the government. Even with the advice of the CDS, a defence minister with limited domain knowledge and assisted by a bureaucracy with a known deficit in strategic expertise would not be able to exercise command authority adequately, while there is no equivalent of the Chinese CMC.  

The second option is that the Chief of Defence Staff system (CDS) could be suitably modified with the CDS in his capacity as Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC COSC) taking on command responsibility. This too would not fit in with India’s civil-military relations since the CDS would be inordinately powerful, as was the commander-in-chief during the pre-Independence era. India’s civil-military relations have moved on considerably since, subordinating the military to the civilian political sphere.

Instead, conceptualizing and structural change towards geographic ITCs is a way forward. This would enable respective Service HQs to retain operational authority - as hitherto - over operations in the medium of respective responsibility: land, sea and air. This continuity on two counts - geographic commands and command authority with the Service Chiefs – makes for acceptability of this way forward.  

Tackling the conundrum

Geographic theatres of operations have figured among the lessons of past wars. For instance, instead of one front-specific ITC against Pakistan, there could be more number of geographic ITCs along the front. In the 1965 War, one field army, the Western Command, looked after the western theatre. The 1971 War witnessed two field armies on the western front, with the Southern Command looking after the southern stretch of the front. After the 1971 War, the Northern Command was added, making for three field armies deployed. The Operation Parakram experience led to addition of another field army, headquartered at Jaipur. Likewise, the China front saw the creation of the Central Command after the 1962 War and the Northern Command taking over the Ladakh sector on its raising after the 1971 War.  

Likewise is the case with the maritime domain, where three theatres are possible to envisage: one each astride the two seaboards and the Andaman and Nicobar Command. A configuration with more number of ITCs relegates the front-specific ITCs favoured in the prototype. To the extent the Chinese move to a front-specific command facing India has been inspiration for the prototype, it needs adapting to the Indian genius.  

Even so, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) reservation on ITCs needs being factored in. The IAF finds it inadvisable to parcel out its limited numbers of multi-role aircraft to ITCs. The higher the number of geographic ITCs, the keener rings the IAF’s critique.

This can be reconciled by having the IAF delegate its counter surface operations role to the ITCs, with the inescapable minimum number of platforms under respective ITC, with the caveat that the Air HQs could allocate assets out of the ITC jurisdiction when necessary. The military jargon spelling out the distinction in the arrangement is ‘under command’ and ‘under operational control’. The ITCs would have only the latter authority over air assets seconded to them. Currently, the IAF’s regional commands locate an Advanced HQ with the field army HQs for liaison, joint planning and coordination. An ITC HQ would have this appendage merged into.

The IAF would retain its counter air campaign and strategic air campaign roles that it could exercise through dedicated functional air commands. Thus, the Air HQs would also have three functional commands, including the air defence command, reporting to it.

The CDS would additionally have authority over capabilities in the other domains significant in grey zone war, visualized as the future of war: space, cyber and Special Forces. HQ IDS could have its operations directorate enhanced to service the COSC.

The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), also a joint command, has a reporting line to the PC COSC. Since the CDS is the principal military adviser also to the government, the 2003 nuclear doctrine could be suitably updated to include him in an advisory capacity in the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority in tandem with its secretary, the National Security Adviser (NSA). Alongside, the mandate of the CDS must include a mention of his nuclear advisory and, if added, command responsibilities. The latter will remove the current anomaly in which the commander SFC receives his operational orders from an unelected civilian, the NSA, an arrangement without parallel elsewhere. If the PC COSC figures in the Political Council, he can receive the orders directly from the civilian political leadership and be responsible for its execution.

The government needs to step up

This variation to the prototype is in keeping with India’s civil-military relations. The jointness process is currently paused, with the Services having been asked to provide studies on how each contemplates next steps in and outcome of the jointness process. These could do with suitable political guidance through authoritative means as an updated Raksha Mantri directive or release of a national security policy. The fortuitous changeover of the CDS provides an opportunity for the government to step up on defence reforms.

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Note: The CDS' nuclear advisory responsibility has been explicated in the press release on appointment of the CDS. He, as Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, is the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority. Here the argument is that he must also have command authority over the SFC.