Scholar Warrior, CLAWS, Spring 2019

Options for addressing the Kashmir issue
https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/466086318_AliAhmed.pdf

The aggravated internal security situation in Kashmir gets into its fourth decade over the turn of the decade. Though the forty year mark is not unusual in insurgencies, particularly where proxy war and hybrid war is endemic, it is a timely juncture for reflection as to whether more needs doing and what needs doing differently. This article attempts such an exercise, assuming that a strategy for return of normalcy by mid-decade is worthwhile.

The assumption springs from the logic that India’s great power ambitions are debilitated by its commitment in Kashmir. Fallout from the protracted conflict in Kashmir is leading to India being boxed into South Asia, by being hyphenated with Pakistan serving as a cat’s paw of China. A second assumption is that a strategy for putting the Kashmir issue behind India by mid-next decade would entail an ‘all of government’ approach. The logic of this assumption is Clausewitzian: that that the political level supersedes the military. A political problem brooks for a political solution, with a military template being at best a conflict management tool that cannot substitute for conflict resolution. 

Beginning with a quick environment scan, the article first outlines strategy options along a continuum weighed at one end by a security forces-heavy approach and by a peace process at the other. The three options arising are hardline, mixed and softline. The three are not mutually exclusive.  The broad military measures in place being known, are not reiterated here. Instead, the article thereafter conducts a brief outline of a peace process and a conflict analysis to highlight the possibilities in the peace prong of strategy.

An environment scan

Operation All Out, launched to contain the outbreak of agitations after the death of Hizb ul Mujahedeen affiliated Burhan Wani, continuing into its second year has resulted in over 250 terrorist deaths.[i] This is indicative of the military returning Kashmir yet again to a level of relative stability under which a political prong of strategy can be relevant. However, owing to the demise of the ruling coalition in the state mid last year, the state has been under governor and president’s rule. The central government has also been looking at national elections. The security conditions conducive to political action have been under-utilised,[ii] with the special representative[iii] inactive and the governor attending to governance issues. The upshot has been in reports of increasing radicalism. Some 300 youth continue to be in militant ranks. This implies the security forces (SF) have their hands full over the coming year, with the immediate concern being security for the parliamentary and assembly elections.

The regional security situation is marked by the efforts towards a dignified exit from Afghanistan by the United States’ (US) led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The US has over the Trump presidency weighed on Pakistan to deliver the Taliban to the table for talks, including through some arm twisting such as withholding of funding for its military.[iv] The talks’ process is set to acquire two tracks, one between the US and Taliban and the other between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Whether this eventuates in a transitional government at Kabul or the scheduled national elections mid-year is among next steps. India has taken care to be at the table, having sent two retired foreign service officers as observers to one meeting of the renewed peace initiative.[v]

The pressure on Pakistan helped keep it in check through the year in Kashmir. It has made the best of the situation by projecting the Kashmir problem as an indigenous one. It has however kept its support alive through keeping the Line of Control (LC) active, despite an understanding reached early in the year for reverting to the ceasefire. Politically its new government has reached out to India and has used India’s understandable reticence in election year to participate in any new political outreach, to attempt upstage India.[vi] Given that Pakistan has some cards up its sleeve in relation to its partial control over the Taliban, Pakistan is well placed to refresh its nefarious activities in Kashmir in case of the Afghan peace initiative either succeeding or failing.

The three broad strategy options  

The hardline option

The option stems from the perspective that Pakistan may take time to turn round, implying that the security forces would remain at the forefront for some time. Depending on how the Afghan situation shapes up, the effort would be to turn the tables on the two-front problem that India is faced with on Pakistan. An active western front would keep Pakistan from being overly proactive in Kashmir. Besides, it would open up scope for India’s conventional deterrent to kick in, since the proactive operations Cold Start strategy is predicated on quick retribution in case of Pakistani provocations crossing India’s tolerance threshold. Over the summer the integrated battle group concept, central to the cold start strategy, is on the test bed.[vii] The resulting restructuring of the mechanized formations would enable India to resuscitate its conventional deterrent. It would also tie in better with the nuclear deterrent, in that conventional operations would be better able to stay below the Pakistani nuclear threshold while administering punitive costs on its military. Not dwelt on here are offensive intelligence operations that can suggest to Pakistan its underbelly needs bothering about more than its jugular.

The manner the option would play out in Kashmir is in two steps. The first would be in a wrapping up the militancy. Not only would Pakistani terrorist need to be wiped out but fresh infiltration stalled. This would entail a continuing of tactical aggression on the LC. As indicated by the Chief,[viii] the options in the tradition of surgical strikes are many to retain the initiative and moral ascendancy. This may require up to two campaigning seasons on Kashmir, before the conditions for a political outreach develop. In the interim, the separatist camp would require being kept pressured through undercutting their access to hawala funds and their funding of the stone throwing agitationists. Eventually, the aim would be to drop a line from a position of unassailable strength to the by then much mellowed separatists. Their weightage in the outreach would be diluted by the presence at the table of the mainstream parties, civil society organizations, groupings of displaced Kashmiri Pandits and representatives of the other regions. This can play out over the balance of tenure of the forthcoming government, making for an incentive for the governments at both the center and state to stay the course and take credit for a return of normalcy. A nationalist narrative in the hinterland can keep up the support of the majority elsewhere.

The mixed option

The option is essentially more-of-the-same as thus far. This has involved a military prong of strategy, an internal political and developmental prong and a diplomatic offensive. The military template has been in the policing of the LC in multiple tiers and people-friendly operations in the hinterland. The political prong of strategy has been in the holding of elections that have witnessed an alternation of political parties in power. The development efforts have been energized by projects in J&K.[ix] At the diplomatic level, the thrust has been in isolating Pakistan by using the leverage of India as a growing market compared to Pakistan being on the brink of a failed state status. India has succeeded in distancing the US from Pakistan and a strategy with a like end in respect of China is in the works. The repeated outreach to Pakistan has found little reciprocation, leading the government to rest its hand till Pakistan commits to its oft-repeated pledge of wrapping up support for terrorism.[x]

The outcome of the mixed strategy has been in a continuing of conflict management. This is only seemingly suboptimal. Its advantage has been that neither has the internal security situation ever been out of control and nor has the external security situation deteriorated to war. There have been episodes of terror warranting conventional retribution, but Indian grand strategy has privileged the economy in such cases. An ability through the Cold Start doctrine to keep a conflict non-nuclear continues as a deterrent threat that keeps Pakistan’s hand in Kashmir in check.

This is a strategy India is familiar with. It may be left with little option than to continue with in case of a varied coalition coming to power in the coming elections. It is a low cost option, in line with India’s war-avoidance strategy of restraint. It is aligned with counter insurgency theory predicated on the long haul. It is cognizant of peace theory which calls for creation and seizing of opportunities stemming from a ‘hurting stalemate’ (for insurgents) and ‘ripe moments’.[xi]

The softline option

India has a major tradition in its strategic thought, the Asokan tradition, which can usefully be taken advantage of.[xii] India’s liberal democracy has the creative wellsprings that can envisage accommodationist solutions. India’s Constitution is flexible and given political will, it can provide the framework for political peacemaking. There is precedent of addressing India’s ethnic problems politically, ranging from the Mizo accord and the Nagaland framework agreement. Within Kashmir, there have been a plethora of initiatives waiting to be built on. These include the papers from the five working groups of the 2000s and the report of the three interlocutors.[xiii] Out-of-the-box answers such as trifurcation of the state must figure on the talks menu. The silver lining in the conflict, such as the largely secure conduct of the Amarnath Yatra, progress of the tourist season and the residue of good will between the two Valley communities – Muslims and Pandits - need to be leveraged. Civil society groups and their activity provide a fertile ground for birthing and sustaining such initiative.

Needless to add there are issues that would come up as the peace initiative acquires traction. Talking to separatists would be inescapable. A recall of their meetings with the prime minister and home minister in the mid 2000s suggests this is not an outlandish proposition. Follow through would be dependent on security indices, for instance, a phased with-drawal of the Armed Forces Special Power’s Act may be warranted as talks head towards climax. The usual sequencing of peace processes – preliminary negotiations, negotiations, agreement, follow up arrangements, reconciliation, peacebuilding, reintegration of militants – would need thinking through, planned for, agreed on and implemented. The end state would inevitably be the return of Kashmiri Pandits to the Valley with dignity, honour, security and full restitution. The vexed human rights issue would require investing in an innovative truth telling, remorse expression, forum for apology and reconciliation framework, headed by spiritual and legal luminaries of national stature.   

In respect of Pakistan, there is a robust precedence with engaging with that state ranging from traditional diplomacy, high level summits, quiet diplomacy on sidelines of meetings, personal initiatives, national security adviser engagement, meetings along the LC, links between heads of military operations and back channel talks. Given political will, these can be taken to their logical end. The US is on board. China’s transcontinental connectivity project also is advantaged and China can be co-opted. The prospects of détente on the subcontinent can have beneficial portents for the Afghan settlement. There is a dormant regional organization that can provide cover for the reaching out by both sides.

This is a viable pathway in either circumstance: of governmental continuity or change. In case of continuity, a right wing government is usually taken as the best bet for taking hard decisions in the national interest. The government having already proven the tough line can afford to pass out some line to test waters. In case of a change in government, the governmental policy may also be to seek a change in the Kashmir template to more of the peace process in its Kashmir strategy, if only to distance itself from the predecessor. The option can also be clubbed with the first, being the second phase of a hardline initially, followed up with a softline, to be played out respectively over two governmental terms spanning the coming decade.  

The peace prong of strategy

The proxy/hybrid war dimension implies that the peace prong of strategy would have two pegs, one relevant to the mitigation of the proxy/hybrid war directed externally and the second being internal political, both hyphenated to the degree. A feature of the subconventional operations doctrine is that the kinetic phase is to be capitalized by a talks process.[xiv] Negotiations are to advance respective interests through joint action. A conflict analysis precedes such a process identifying the positions, interests, needs and fears of parties, setting the stage  for a negotiations strategy providing a sense of the viability, direction, pace, content, sequencing, negotiation footwork, ideas and the ‘best alternative to negotiated agreement’ (BATNA) of each party. It essentially identifies interests at stake – procedural preferences, psychological needs and substantive outcomes - and a via media towards a win-win proposition for most.[xv]

There are two options for the deal making. The first is an introspective one in which India settles with its disaffected Kashmiris and the second a wider erstwhile J&K wide process. The latter was on the plate in the mid 2000s in a version of the Musharraf formula, but is not considered here any further for limit of space. It is posited here that an internal settlement is plausible and that Pakistan will fall in line as the process progresses, using the opportunity to claim credit for bringing India round to a political settlement. It can be tacitly offered the sop of an economic lifeline that it desperately needs and will fall for. The Pakistan dimension may require to be progressed secretly initially, with a diplomatic face-saver designed to get Pakistan fall in line. Operations would of course proceed against Pakistani mercenaries with a surrender-and-be-tried choice left to them.

A conflict analysis identifying the primary and subsidiary parties to the conflict would include the people, the political parties, the separatists, the internally displaced community – Kashmiri Pandits, and representatives of the other regional communities of Jammu, Ladakh and possibly Rajouri and Doda. The positions and underlying interests of each party would be outlined on each of the procedural and substantive issues at stake: political devolution, economic development, legal and constitutional aspects, human rights, resettlement, surrender and amnesty policy etc. Many creative options have already been conjured up by the interlocutors who have worked on this earlier. These will need evaluating against objective constitutional criteria of legitimacy, justice and equality so as to provide the lead negotiator a sense of the approaches. Workshops of the participants need being organized so as to empower each stakeholder and familiarize each with the procedures of the joint problem solving negotiations process.

The process itself will comprise preparatory proximity talks, opening statements, procedural guidelines and consensus on agenda and framing of issues, joint exploration and mutual appreciation of interests, collective option generation through presentation of proposals and counter proposals and evaluation of options against objective criteria. The resulting time-bound agreement would require national support and parliamentary ballast, a supervisory mechanism and forum for tackling problems as they arise in the implementation phase. This would involve coextensive perception management and transparency.

An initial challenge will be identifying of a consensus and respect commanding lead negotiator and forming of a multi-agency support team. Later it would be spoiler management of the violent, disruptionist and silent variety. A joint ceasefire management mechanism would require to be operationalised as has been done in Nagaland. There is considerable depth to the Indian experience on all of this, not only in the series of negotiated suspension of operations agreements in the north east, but also in Indians participating in peace processes in a United Nations setting.

Conclusion

The strategy option adopted would derive from the grand strategy of the incoming government. The first option would be likely in case the strategic doctrine of the new government is in the realist tradition. The second option of business-as-usual would be likely in case of a risk-averse coalition. The third option’s likelihood increases in case of a stable government, willing to profess a liberal doctrine. The peace prong of strategy as outlined would require complementing all three options, increasing in weightage in the third, softline, option.   

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[i] PTI, ‘257 terrorists killed in Jammu and Kashmir in 2018, highest in 10 yrs: DGP’, Business Standard, 31 December 2018,

https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/257-terrorists-killed-in-jammu-and-kashmir-in-2018-highest-in-10-yrs-dgp-118123100898_1.html

[ii] HS Panag, ‘Indian Army made way for government to resolve Kashmir, but politics failed’, The Print, 6 December 2018,

https://theprint.in/opinion/indian-army-made-way-for-government-to-resolve-kashmir-but-politics-failed/159217/

[iii] PIB, “Centre Appoints Shri Dineshwar Sharma as its Representative in J&K,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, October 23, 2017, viewed on November 01, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=171866

[iv] Ashley Tellis et. al. ‘Review of President Trump’s South Asia Strategy: The Way Ahead, One Year In’, Atlantic Council, 11 December 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/12/11/review-of-president-trump-s-south-asia-strategy-way-ahead-one-year-in-pub-77939

[v] ‘In a first, India to send two former diplomats to talks that include Taliban representatives’, The Hindu, 8 November 2018,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/taliban-talks-in-moscow-india-to-attend-at-non-official-level/article25445933.ece

[vi] Devirupa Mitra, ‘Peace Talks With India After 2019 Elections: Imran Khan’, The Wire, 29 November 2018,

https://thewire.in/external-affairs/peace-talks-with-india-will-be-taken-forward-after-2019-elections-imran-khan

[vii] Nitin Gokhle interviews General Bipin Rawat, ‘IBGs Will Not be Based on the Concept of One-Size Fits All, Says Gen Bipin Rawat’, bharatshakti.in, 17 December 2018,

https://bharatshakti.in/ibgs-will-not-be-based-on-the-concept-of-one-size-fits-all-says-gen-bipin-rawat/

[viii] ‘Need another surgical strike, says Army chief Bipin Rawat’, India Today, 24 September 2018, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/bipin-rawat-on-surgical-strikes-1347522-2018-09-24

[ix] ‘PM Modi on visit to J&K, Leh: Highlights’, The Times of India, 3 February 2019, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-modi-on-visit-to-jk-leh-ladakh-highlights/articleshow/67814766.cms

[x] TNN, ‘Sushma Swaraj at UN: No talks with Pakistan amid terror’, The Times of India, 30 September 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sushma-at-un-no-talks-with-pakistan-amid-terror/articleshow/66011468.cms

[xi] Peter Wallenstein, Understanding Conflict Resolution, London: Sage, 2015, pp.37-84.

[xii][xii] Ali Ahmed, ‘Indian Strategic Culture: The Pakistan Dimension’ in Kanti Bajpai et. al. (eds.), India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, New Delhi: Routledge, 2014, pp. 290-93.

[xiii] Radha Kumar, Paradise at War: A political history of Kashmir, New Delhi: Aleph, 2018.

[xiv] Army Training Command, Doctrine on Sub Conventional Operations, Shimla: ATRAC, 2006.

[xv] Michael Butler, International Conflict Management, New Delhi: Routledge, 2012, p. 129.

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/16824/The-Coming-Politicisation-of-the-Military

The Coming Politicisation of the Military
With national security ushered to a front seat at election time by a prime minister seeking reelection, the threat of politicization of the military has loomed large. The (ab)use of military achievement as campaign props by the ruling party led military veterans to petition the President of India that he caution offenders.

Some signatories reportedly backtracked; a report - in turn - challenged by the petition initiators, claiming that it was put out by a media organization at the behest of the ruling party. One air marshal wrote of why he thought the inclusion of a reference to ‘secular’ in the missive amounted to a bias against a particular political party, which he said led to him not signing up.

Apparently, there is disquiet among military veterans in the manner the ruling party in particular has usurped national security and the military’s contribution to its electoral ends. They claim to have given voice to the military miffed by the manner votes are sought on the back of military action and lives.

Even if the government understandably takes credit for its stewardship of the defence sector, the refrain is that national security showing is nationally-owned and - therefore - not one to be appropriated for parochial political purposes.

The military has been party to this to an extent.

The Air Force has repeatedly intervened to present a well-worn case that the Rafale is a fine aircraft, knowing fully that the controversy is not about the air craft’s capability in first place. It has - yet again repeatedly – stoked the legitimate controversy surrounding the ‘result’ of the Balakot aerial attack by unnecessarily referring to it. On the Naushera points-scoring with Pakistan, it has trotted-out evidence of downing an F-16.

All tend to play into the hands of the ruling party, busy diverting voter attention from consequential issues of joblessness, arbitrary decision making etc.

The army in wake of Pulwama has on three occasions at least let it be known it is robustly pushing back terrorism, trotting out statistics on terrorists killed (militant Kashmiri youth for most part), with the general in Badami Bagh much in the press. This feeds in timely into the ruling party nation-wide rhetoric of being strong on defence and works to its favour in narrowly chasing votes south of the Pir Panjals.

The brass cannot be taken as a political ingénue. It is well aware of the day’s headlines. There is no cause to suspect a situational awareness deficit in the year long hiatus from soldiering the brass is provisioned at Raksha Bhawan immediately prior to stepping up to the rank. That it has nevertheless chosen to tread where it should not implies it has been put to it.

From where such pressure originates can easily be divined. The national security establishment is headed by Ajit Doval, who fired the first shot of the campaign by going beyond his brief as a government official in calling for a strong government for another ten years. The Pulwama aftermath provided an opportunity to showcase such a government (never mind that miscued choreography led to the proverbial slip by his political principal over the relationship of nuclear weapons and Diwali).

There are three possibilities.

The first is if the services want to paper over their showing that has come under some valid questioning. This is understandable, mitigating their media interventions somewhat.

The second is a deficit of moral courage in the brass.

Or third, there is a likemindedness with its national security supervisors. The former is but a step away from the latter. Neither is edifying and spell of politicization, incipient (in case of lack of moral fibre) or underway (in case of perspective sharing).

This is a significant apprehension worth voicing since polls are underway. If the situation is at such a pass at five year mark of this regime, what could happen if it is given another lease?

There are four referents for a military’s primary loyalty: the Constitution represented by the president; the government stewarded by a cabinet accountable to the parliament; a political leader vesting authority in his person; and the ‘nation’, comprising the people. Politicisation is when the military fails to arrive at the right choice of or balance between the four.

It is easy to spot politicization in the third case, of personalisation of authority. Even so it cannot be ruled out as a prospective downhill destination five years on. There are bhakts in the military, with a social media line to bhakts amongst veterans. There are authoritarian tendencies in the system, on display in decision making ranging from demonetization to the Balakot strike and and a personality cult centering on a potential Hindu-hriday samrat or Loh Purush II. With deep-selection of chiefs now normalised, it is unlikely that strong leadership can emerge to decelerate such an outcome.

Of the second – subservience to the government - there has been some reservation. The military’s conservative instincts make it liable to fall easily behind a conservative government rather than march to a discordant tune of a coalition. The military’s position on Siachen and the withdrawal of the armed forces special powers act were seen as bucking a government inclined to a review. The self-valuation of a professional position on such matters, almost amounting to pre-empting the government and exercising of veto, suggests confusion in the military between the two primary loyalty referents: the Constitution or the government.

On the ‘nation’ as referent, the notion is prevalent. It found expression sometime late last century when a book launch by a general of his diary on Kashmir was cancelled by a last minute fiat. The book had within it the claim that the nation preceded revolving-door governments in the loyalty stakes of the military. This is of a piece with the confusion universally in all militaries on this score. General MacArthur was famously dismissed at the height of his career for holding such a view.

Five years on the extreme right wing ideology would have contaminated institutions and society; enough to have the military uncritically believe that it belongs to a ‘nation’ defined in majoritarian terms. Like a frog in slow-boiling water, the military will likely miss the shift from civic nationalism to ethnic majoritarianism. Consequently, its inability to foreground the first – its Constitutional loyalty – would lend its institutional weight to a seemingly democratic Constitutional coup.

Clarity can be expected to attend the first – loyalty to the State as represented by the flag and Constitution. This explains the foot-dragging (‘shirking’ in Peter Feaver coined civil-military terminology) when its inclination is not aligned with that of a government.

A convergence in the other three referents – an autocratic, populist government – could paper over the tectonic shifts away from the Constitutional ideals – largely subterranean at present. Ironically, standing inert under the circumstance would amount to politicization, as much as standing tall to deter the same.

This regime at its five year mark asks for votes on its showing along the visible spectrum of national security. Instead, the unremarked on underside of national security - explicated here - is by far more consequential.

India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343.

Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007) in India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343.

Praveen Swami has established his journalistic credentials in reporting and analysing, among other things, the Kashmir situation, for the reputed periodical, Frontline, and for the well regarded paper, The Hindu. Recourse to his in depth reporting is virtually a necessity for gaining a handle on the complex situation. This owes to his range of sources, particularly in the intelligence and police, but also his self-imposed requirement of getting a feel of the ground through visits to the remote and relevant locales as necessary. The insights gained have been packaged with balance and sensitivity over the years. That said, the book falls short of his own standards in terms of being unidimensional in its focus on ‘Jihad’ at the expense of the several factors that have underpinned the India-Pakistan six decade long tangle and the two decade old insurgency in Kashmir. Jihad has of late acquired a notoriety that sells. Any linkage with Jihad these days instinctively leads to delegitimisation so strong is the dominant, largely western media led, discourse. Unfortunately, insertion of the term, Jihad, in the title serves to misrepresent the Kashmiri situation and in doing so does a disservice to the very people Swami has so sensitively written about for over a decade.

At the outset, it is conceded that the author has brought to fore a relatively lesser known dimension of the vexed Kashmir question – that of the covert war between the two states and by non-state actors. This is a signal and original contribution to the otherwise over-crowded Kashmir book shelf. Since other dimensions such as the foreign policy and military, have already been brought out by other perceptive authors earlier, there was little remaining to be told. Swami, in accessing the intelligence trove that is usually off limits, has been able to shed fresh light on the conflict. His work therefore is a necessary supplement to known aspects. It is with good reason that Swami writes: ‘No one book of course can tell the tale of all these and all the other struggles which together constitute the Jammu and Kashmir conflict…This book traces just one thread of a complex weave. It is however a thread that few have paid attention to…’ Nevertheless, the catchy manner it is titled, its narrow focus on Pakistani directed Jihadi terror and his reading a historical continuity into it distracts from the other, equally salient, dimensions absent from his book. This shortcoming can however be overcome with the discerning reader keeping in mind the context, parallel happenings and competing narratives in other facets of the conflict.

Swami’s book is a product of his Senior Fellowship at the United States Institute of Peace in 2004-05. This is perhaps the cause for the over-emphasis on ‘Jihad’, since during the period the topic had reached a crescendo in the US. He covers his ground with great detail, even delving into hitherto fore classified intelligence files. He traces the Jihadist journey in Kashmir to the original schism between the fundamentalists and secularists in the anti-feudal politics in Kashmir prior to Accession. Thereafter the political project of the Muslim Conference was taken up by the Pakistani state for identity and other, more secular reasons grounded in realpolitik. The despatch of the tribal lashkars and later a like invasion under Operation Gibraltar in 1965 are examples. The untold story revealed by Swami is in how the Jihadist enterprise was kept alive through the quieter period of the seventies and eighties. He attributes the explosion over the turn of the last decade to the ability of the infrastructure already available in Pakistan to exploit and hijack the civil unrest in Kashmir. He thus sees continuity in Kashmir’s troubles in Jamaati politics and its linkage to the other side of the border.

In actuality, the religious motivation aspect, while not absent, does not impel the most grave challenge the Indian state has ever faced from any of its constituent minorities or ethnic groups. Among the prominent competing factors is the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan based on secular, historical and resource related claims. The covert war is a result also of this tussle between the two states. Then is the aspect of the uprising since 1990. This was occasioned by a constellation of factors to include the culpability of the Indian state. This was not a jihad to begin with, though Jihadi forces did play a role and have since acquired prominence. Lastly, on the aspect of power asymmetry between the two states, some analysts deem as most consequential to the relationship. Addressing this through realist logic meant that Pakistan tie down Indian military power in manpower intensive counter insurgency operations. This strategy explains ‘K2’ (Khalistan and Kashmir) referred to by Swami. This implies jihad has been more a strategic tool rather than having any autonomous reason to exist. It is for this reason that Pakistan continues to hedge in curbing terror originating from its soil, despite the ‘blowback’ it is currently experiencing.

Take for instance the numbers of Jihadis. The number of foreign terrorists has seldom touched 60 percent. The largest outfit is the Hizb ul Mujahedeen that is recognised to be of Kashmiris, all of whom are not necessarily Islamists. Kashmir’s story is as much about militant youth, as about hardened terrorists. Motivations among foreigners range from mercenary to youth escaping anonymity and ennui in the stratified Pakistani society. Witness the origins of Kasab. Even their handlers, though espousing Islam for self interested reasons, are not oblivious to money, power and proximity to power centres in Pakistan. Swami’s neglect in bringing out a more variegated picture indicates his scholarly instinct has been subordinated to his intelligence sources. The requirement of bringing new sources to light is important. Drawing sustainable conclusions is more so. To Swami’s credit, he acknowledges a limited purpose: ‘Social, economic, political and ideological forces far larger than the jihad itself indisputably contributed to that cataclysmic event (1989-90): my effort here is to highlight an ignored narrative thread in the history of those events. Given his breadth of engagement with the subject, he would have done better to stitch this thread into the wider Kashmir story, if only in the introduction or conclusion. Not doing so lends his work to manipulative use by interested political forces, not only in Kashmir but outside it in India.

The important point that emerges indirectly from Swami’s work is that the Indian state has been responding primarily to the element of jihad that is only one among the multiplicity of factors and not necessarily the most significant. This is evident from the importance intelligence experts have had over the years in formulating India’s policy with respect to Kashmir. Many are listed in Swami’s sources and some remain unnamed. Swami has elsewhere informed us of the interface the ISI has had with RAW over Kashmir that did not lead anywhere in the early nineties.  Such contacts are in the air as of the writing of this review, and in light of the competition between the two state agencies, are bound to lead nowhere.  This calls for a political approach and political control. That such a strategy will not be forthcoming owes to policy space conceded to the intelligence community, strengthened in wake of Kargil with addition of new structures. While the pathology is well understood in case of Pakistan as has been amply brought out by Swami; that intelligence input has queered India’s policy response awaits a book length treatment. It is perhaps one reason why India has not been able to bring the problem to a closure through political means. Having misinterpreted the Kashmir problem as Jihadi covert war alone, it has understandably not wanted to appease such forces. The political working group established as a result of the Prime Minister’s Round Tables exercise of mid this decade did not even submit a report. The governance initiatives that have been taken are arguably not enough.

An accurate interpretation of the Kashmir problem has been held hostage by many factors including intelligence analysis fed by institutional bias. Others include the zero-sum contestation with Pakistan. Since acceding to legitimate grievances in Kashmir would be taken as a Pakistani ‘victory’, India stays its hand in turning rhetoric of ‘sky is the limit’ and ‘hand of friendship’ to reality. The ascendance of the conservative end of the spectrum and cultural nationalism in India over the nineties has also influenced the government’s position. The hard line is therefore inescapable. Analysis such as this book from the otherwise credible author only serves to further undercut necessary initiatives. Thus Kashmir remains on the boil. This serves Pakistani interests. Indian interests are not served since Kashmiris are Indian citizens and secondly continuing instability gives Pakistan a handle. Lastly, it energises forces that Swami describes as Jihadi. Other factors that excite Kashmiri alienation such as ethnicity, historical grievance and a distaste of counter insurgent pressures, that are amenable to policy ministration, are marginalised.

The corresponding covert war from the Indian side not only in Kashmir but also in Pakistan, not being covered, Indian intransigence is only superficially understandable. In case these are to be factored in, what emerges is a duet between two contending intelligence agencies, virtually autonomous of political control. While in Pakistan the ISI can be expected to be granted a blank cheque by the military, in India there appears to be a deficit of political and parliamentary control. Swami’s narrative begins with a shadowy spymaster, Colonel Hassan Walia, making his entry into Kashmir on a ‘brutal winder evening’. Thereafter ‘the book is a history of a secret storm that swirled around the house on the hill: the long jihad fought in Jammu and Kashmir from 1947-48 to the present day’. The ‘House on the Hill’ has since been inhabited by the Assistant Director, Intelligence Bureau. Swami informs that on the same hillside are the office cum residences of the Research and Analysis Wing and Kashmir’s premier interrogation centre, Parimahal; notorious in the Valley among people and security practitioners as ‘Papa One’. The crucial question is who exercised control over what goes on at that Hill? Intelligence men from BN Mullick in the early period to former RAW chiefs, ‘Gary’ Saxena and Dulat, in the later period have been key players. This is a telling comment on India’s democratic good health in which accountability over actors is to be exercised by people’s representatives in legislatures and the parliament. Swami unintentionally opens up a ‘Pandora’s box’ that it would behove political decision makers to introspectively address in the North Block and 7, Race Course Road.

A storm has greeted the joint statement issued pursuant to the meeting of the two prime ministers in Sharm el Sheikh. This is over the allusion to the disturbances in Baluchistan. That Baluchistan figures in the news is evidence of an ongoing covert war, brought to notice in its avatar in Kashmir by Swami. That it extends to Baluchistan indicates that Jihad is not at the root. Instead this is a manifestation of state contestation explicable in the realist paradigm over eminently secular definitions of national interest – territory and balance power. Power play requires to be called by the right name and political control exercised accordingly. This requires a holistic view to preserve policy from appropriation by the lead agency and contamination by its institutional interest. A broad front political reengagement with the Kashmir issue is called for to realign Indian policy.

Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, July-Sep 09

Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence, New Dehi: Knowledge World, 2009, pp. 395, Rs. 880/-, ISBN 978-81-87966-70-8

The author is the quintessential strategic analyst with a dozen years in defence think tanks. This is her third book and bears the mark of her earlier academic training at JNU. These credentials from complementary fields lend credibility to her ambitious attempt at dissecting India’s nuclear strategy. The otherwise daunting subject is packaged simply for ease of access even by the concerned citizen. Therefore the book is recommended reading as an introductory primer, particularly as it covers the entire gamut of nuclear doctrine, not excluding the topical nuclear deal. 

Her book is enhanced by her conversations on various aspects of the strategy with eminent thinkers and practitioners in the field including the ‘Bhishma Pitamah’, K Subrahmanyam and his protégé, Jasjit Singh. Thus, it conveys the Indian position, and the intricate thinking behind it on many connected and subsumed issues. It also brings out mainstream Indian reflection on the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear postures. It takes the middle-of-the-road position, with hyper-nationalists being on one side and the radical critique on the other. Befitting a book on the strategy of nuclear deterrence, it is rightly dedicated to the next generation with the intent that they ‘may live without the fear of a nuclear holocaust’.

The book carries a chapter each on the current state of nuclear strategy of great powers; nuclear doctrines of Pakistan, China and India; specific strands of the Indian case with respect to command and control and survivability; controversial issues as ballistic missile defence, the nuclear deal and the coming arms control and disarmament negotiations; and lastly, the connection between nuclear and conventional planes. It largely restricts itself to conceptual issues. This approach acquaints the reader to the major, if not dominant, perspective in the strategic community. The wider ranging book therefore has areas where argument could have been more rigorous; a critique that carries the underside that then the length would have made it dissuasive.  

The author brings out that nuclear weapons are political weapons meant for deterrence rather than war-fighting. India’s strategy is of ‘assured retaliation’ of ‘massive’ proportion to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. The author rightly brings out that a ‘massive’ punitive counter may not be necessary. While such a posture may be useful from deterrence point of view, it would require to be reconsidered on breakdown of deterrence. In case the levels of provocation of ‘first use’ by the enemy are not of a level warranting counter value targeting, then India would do well to move towards a ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation posture. This would preserve India from like targeting by an enemy enraged by what it perceives as India’s intemperate and incommensurate response. In such cases misplaced political resolve would lead to an undesirable increase in nuclear threat to Indian value assets. The likelihood of higher order nuclear first use is limited by the operation of deterrence and ongoing developments, including acquisition of a nuclear submarine, in India’s second strike capability. Therefore, lower order use is possible, requiring India to think through options other than reflexive infliction of ‘unacceptable damage’ as defined by the author.

Curiously, despite recounting the four famous Kidwai thresholds – territorial, military, economic and political stability - in which the word ‘large’ is used thrice, she deems this as the exposition of a low threshold. The author rightly considers that Limited War is a feasible proposition. However, her expectation that a deeper penetration is possible in the desert sector as against the developed sector may be contested, given that Pakistan would more likely use the weapon in the desert sector to avoid collateral damage. Likewise, her discussion of air in a limited conflict leaves out that Pakistan would likely react in the dimension they are stronger, indicating the inherent escalatory dynamic in the use of air power. Admittedly, she merely provides a provocative start point in the discussion on the conventional-nuclear interface and her book is a timely call for consideration along these neglected dimensions.

More importantly, her suggestion of inclusion of the three service chiefs in the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority needs to be taken up separately. (Mistakenly the term National Command Authority is used in referring to the NCA, a term used by Pakistan.) The Political Council is mandated to take nuclear related decisions. It is obvious that it would do so after the requisite all-round consultations, including with the military brass. Inclusion of the apex military leadership into the decision making body would be to queer deliberations with institutional baggage; an expectation that organisational theory bears out. The criticism that the military has been kept out of the decision loop is no longer tenable, therefore a recommendation based on such an understanding would amount to an over-correction. Though not explicit, given the author’s seeming scepticism of the presence of political resolve, her inclusion of the military men, in an imitation of the Pakistani case, may be to strengthen political resolve against the possibility of self-deterrence. This may be required in case perhaps of a future minority government with squabbling ministers of different parties. Even against such a possibility, at best, the Political Council could have the Chiefs, or more preferably the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and better still the Chief of Defence Staff, when created, in an advisory capacity, along with the  National Security Advisor, and not as members empowered to take decisions. The deliberations and decision should remain a political prerogative and be taken on a political, as against a military dominant, yardstick. Her recommendation inexplicably leaves out the NSA, much required to integrate the civil component of security.  

Though altogether a compliment-worthy effort, a few points are highlighted here. The author, while covering the Draft Nuclear Doctrine could also mention that one time Defence Minister, Jaswant Singh, had stated in an interview to The Hindu that the draft doctrine was merely recommendatory. Secondly, some sources have it that the Chinese nuclear doctrine is without caveat. While the author credits a noted China expert on the caveats she mentions, this could be re-examined. Her discussion of the CDS could be fleshed out further, since the appointment is consequential in integrating the conventional and nuclear planes of a conflict. It is not a job that can be done by a double-hatted Chief; one who, in our system, is also an operational head of his service.  

The hard cover book is well turned out in a presentable jacket and only a few printer’s devils. Its font lends itself to an easy read as does the unforced and unpretentious writing style. Perhaps for its next edition, the author could add a recommended reading list, in particular because resort to foot notes has not been very liberal. This would, along with appendices and list of acronyms, enable readers find most issues within one set of covers. It is recommended here as a ‘must read’, particularly for those embarking on the journey in security studies either in uniform or out of it, and a ‘must buy’ for libraries servicing this clientele.

Third Frame, 1:3, Jul-Sep 2008

Rajagopalan, Rajesh, Fighting Like a Guerilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, 2008, Routledge, New Delhi

The book is the first of an intended series of Studies on War and International Politics edited by Srinath Raghavan, a lecturer in the reputed War Studies Department of King’s College London. To bring to bear an interdisciplinary focus on security in its international and domestic dimension, the series has begun well in choosing this book authored by Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan, an Associate Professor in the dynamic School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

The book is based on the author’s PhD thesis at City University of New York and is unsurprisingly, therefore, theoretical rigorous and avidly referenced. Its distinctive characteristic is the able use the author has made of the perspective of defence professionals, listed in his Acknowledgements, who command respect in the uniformed fraternity. He has also been intrepid enough to gain access to libraries stocked with service journals to access the authentic voice of practitioners and convey to us a feel of the debate within the services on his very ‘live’ subject.

He attempts to answer the question ‘Why do strong states lose guerilla wars?’ by discussing the Indian experience of peacekeeping in Sri Lanka as a case study. His thesis is that armies have a conventional war bias to their counterinsurgency doctrine. This owes in part to existence of conventional threats, explained in the neorealist paradigm of self-help in an anarchical system necessitating military readiness, as much as to organizational culture. He uses the prism of these two approaches to discuss how conventional armies adopt inappropriate counterinsurgency doctrines. The theoretical contribution of his ‘contending theories’ methodology is that these two are not mutually exclusive as is generally assumed. His conclusion is that ‘structure’ conditions state response through acculturation, with the resulting ‘culture’ being but the institutionalization of the socialization process.

A theoretical bias is by now a characteristic of his writings. This was visible in his earlier book on nuclear strategy, Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia (2005, Penguin Viking, New Delhi). This constitutes a fresh trend in the nascent and burgeoning strategic scholarship in India. Military professionals dissect their experience linearly, such as the recent publication on the Sri Lankan experience by the commanding general of the first phase, Major General Harkirat Singh’s Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (2007, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi); while academics illumine the same subject with their learning, as has been done by Rajagopalan in respect of the battle for Jaffna. Thus mere events and their telling acquire a context and substance - a healthy convergence for an emerging power that is India.

The book would be of interest to soldiers and scholars, to policy makers and the lay public. It has educative discussions on military jargon such as the distinction between doctrine and strategy; conventional and counterinsurgency doctrine; and the contrast between the Indian approach with that of other armies equally beset with insurgency. He attempts to define the early counterinsurgency doctrine thus: Army operations were limited in the use of force and supplemented with a ‘hearts and minds’ approach; isolating the insurgent, the ‘fish’, from the populace, the ‘sea’, was through control measures and ‘cordon and search’; wresting control of areas from insurgents and thereafter dominating it through the establishing of a grid; and finally maintaining a superiority of forces both in deployment and in operations. Only lately has the army evolved its operational practice further in favour of intelligence led small team operations, employment of special forces and of friendly ‘proxy groups’ of turned militants. These latter aspects do not find explicit mention in the book.

Nevertheless, the author needs to be complimented for tracing, perhaps for the first time, the development of India’s counterinsurgency doctrine since the early days in Nagaland in the Fifties. That this has not been done elsewhere, even in well resourced books such as Lieutenant Colonel Vivek Chadha’s Low Intensity Conflict in India: An Analysis (2005, Sage Publications, New Delhi), is surprising. This further indicates the necessity of a scholarly focus on affairs military that has, as the popular critique suggests, been neglected on account of India lacking a strategic culture.  

India’s sobering experience in Sri Lanka has generated heat. Rajagopalan notes, that despite other factors explaining its failure, such as the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) as  wanting in intelligence, language skills, training and equipment; it was the army’s inability to adapt to the changed circumstance of guerilla war that led to its eventually inglorious departure. While its conventional war expertise won it the Jaffna battle, persisting with the conventional war bias into the subsequent guerilla war phase lost it the war. This inability to change is explained by the author as a product of organization culture predicated on the continuing threat it faced across its western border.

Value addition to the book has been possible by the author in light of his later experience in think tanks and as an official with the National Security Council secretariat. He reflects in summarizing the IPKF experience that the army is still on the learning curve in that while in Kashmir it has made organization innovations in the form of the Rashtriya Rifles, its has not been able to dispel the conventional war bias in the force as, in the authors own words, ‘doctrinal changes were too hard’.

This has obvious policy implications, which under the current circumstance of draw down of militancy in Kashmir are under threat of being overlooked. This would be unfortunate as the army’s engagement with counterinsurgency is unlikely to end any time soon, given that the conditions in Central India appear right for it. It would be too easy to concede that India’s army differs from other armies in that, in believing it is fighting its own citizens, it is less violent. The difference instead is that its advantage in numbers enables it to dispense with compensating their lack with firepower that accounts for the disproportionate violence of other armies. It is only recently that India has finally given itself a sub-conventional war doctrine that posits ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’ approach. As to the extent this would withstand a robust challenge in any future internal conflict is to be watched. The author can be faulted for failing to contemporize his book through a look at this publicly released doctrine on sub conventional operations dating to December 2006 (http://indianarmy.nic.in/part_1.doc).

In summation, the book is recommended reading to gain an insight into the army’s experience of countering insurgency in general and its difficulties in doing so specifically in north east Sri Lanka. The author is right in discerning the conventional war bias in its counterinsurgency doctrine and assessing that this remains the case even today. The book would have made a telling difference were it to energize the army into appropriate self-correction for early termination of current and preemption of future internal conflicts.