India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343.
Praveen
Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret
Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007) in India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343.
Praveen
Swami has established his journalistic credentials in reporting and analysing,
among other things, the Kashmir situation, for
the reputed periodical, Frontline,
and for the well regarded paper, The
Hindu. Recourse to his in depth reporting is virtually a necessity for
gaining a handle on the complex situation. This owes to his range of sources,
particularly in the intelligence and police, but also his self-imposed
requirement of getting a feel of the ground through visits to the remote and
relevant locales as necessary. The insights gained have been packaged with
balance and sensitivity over the years. That said, the book falls short of his
own standards in terms of being unidimensional in its focus on ‘Jihad’ at the
expense of the several factors that have underpinned the India-Pakistan six
decade long tangle and the two decade old insurgency in Kashmir. Jihad has of
late acquired a notoriety that sells. Any linkage with Jihad these days
instinctively leads to delegitimisation so strong is the dominant, largely
western media led, discourse. Unfortunately, insertion of the term, Jihad, in
the title serves to misrepresent the Kashmiri situation and in doing so does a
disservice to the very people Swami has so sensitively written about for over a
decade.
At
the outset, it is conceded that the author has brought to fore a relatively
lesser known dimension of the vexed Kashmir
question – that of the covert war between the two states and by non-state
actors. This is a signal and original contribution to the otherwise over-crowded
Kashmir book shelf. Since other dimensions
such as the foreign policy and military, have already been brought out by other
perceptive authors earlier, there was little remaining to be told. Swami, in
accessing the intelligence trove that is usually off limits, has been able to shed
fresh light on the conflict. His work therefore is a necessary supplement to
known aspects. It is with good reason that Swami writes: ‘No one book of course
can tell the tale of all these and all the other struggles which together
constitute the Jammu and Kashmir conflict…This book traces just one thread of a
complex weave. It is however a thread that few have paid attention to…’ Nevertheless,
the catchy manner it is titled, its narrow focus on Pakistani directed Jihadi
terror and his reading a historical continuity into it distracts from the
other, equally salient, dimensions absent from his book. This shortcoming can
however be overcome with the discerning reader keeping in mind the context,
parallel happenings and competing narratives in other facets of the conflict.
Swami’s
book is a product of his Senior Fellowship at the United States Institute of
Peace in 2004-05. This is perhaps the cause for the over-emphasis on ‘Jihad’,
since during the period the topic had reached a crescendo in the US . He covers
his ground with great detail, even delving into hitherto fore classified
intelligence files. He traces the Jihadist journey in Kashmir to the original
schism between the fundamentalists and secularists in the anti-feudal politics
in Kashmir prior to Accession. Thereafter the
political project of the Muslim Conference was taken up by the Pakistani state
for identity and other, more secular reasons grounded in realpolitik. The
despatch of the tribal lashkars and later a like invasion under Operation Gibraltar
in 1965 are examples. The untold story revealed by Swami is in how the Jihadist
enterprise was kept alive through the quieter period of the seventies and
eighties. He attributes the explosion over the turn of the last decade to the
ability of the infrastructure already available in Pakistan
to exploit and hijack the civil unrest in Kashmir .
He thus sees continuity in Kashmir ’s troubles in
Jamaati politics and its linkage to the other side of the border.
In
actuality, the religious motivation aspect, while not absent, does not impel
the most grave challenge the Indian state has ever faced from any of its
constituent minorities or ethnic groups. Among the prominent competing factors
is the territorial dispute between India
and Pakistan
based on secular, historical and resource related claims. The covert war is a
result also of this tussle between the two states. Then is the aspect of the
uprising since 1990. This was occasioned by a constellation of factors to
include the culpability of the Indian state. This was not a jihad to begin
with, though Jihadi forces did play a role and have since acquired prominence.
Lastly, on the aspect of power asymmetry between the two states, some analysts
deem as most consequential to the relationship. Addressing this through realist
logic meant that Pakistan
tie down Indian military power in manpower intensive counter insurgency
operations. This strategy explains ‘K2’ (Khalistan and Kashmir )
referred to by Swami. This implies jihad has been more a strategic tool rather than
having any autonomous reason to exist. It is for this reason that Pakistan
continues to hedge in curbing terror originating from its soil, despite the
‘blowback’ it is currently experiencing.
Take
for instance the numbers of Jihadis. The number of foreign terrorists has
seldom touched 60 percent. The largest outfit is the Hizb ul Mujahedeen that is
recognised to be of Kashmiris, all of whom are not necessarily Islamists. Kashmir ’s story is as much about militant youth, as about
hardened terrorists. Motivations among foreigners range from mercenary to youth
escaping anonymity and ennui in the stratified Pakistani society. Witness the
origins of Kasab. Even their handlers, though espousing Islam for self
interested reasons, are not oblivious to money, power and proximity to power
centres in Pakistan .
Swami’s neglect in bringing out a more variegated picture indicates his
scholarly instinct has been subordinated to his intelligence sources. The
requirement of bringing new sources to light is important. Drawing sustainable
conclusions is more so. To Swami’s credit, he acknowledges a limited purpose:
‘Social, economic, political and ideological forces far larger than the jihad
itself indisputably contributed to that cataclysmic event (1989-90): my effort
here is to highlight an ignored narrative thread in the history of those
events. Given his breadth of engagement with the subject, he would have done
better to stitch this thread into the wider Kashmir
story, if only in the introduction or conclusion. Not doing so lends his work
to manipulative use by interested political forces, not only in Kashmir but
outside it in India .
The
important point that emerges indirectly from Swami’s work is that the Indian
state has been responding primarily to the element of jihad that is only one
among the multiplicity of factors and not necessarily the most significant. This
is evident from the importance intelligence experts have had over the years in
formulating India ’s policy
with respect to Kashmir . Many are listed in
Swami’s sources and some remain unnamed. Swami has elsewhere informed us of the
interface the ISI has had with RAW over Kashmir
that did not lead anywhere in the early nineties. Such contacts are in the air as of the
writing of this review, and in light of the competition between the two state
agencies, are bound to lead nowhere.
This calls for a political approach and political control. That such a
strategy will not be forthcoming owes to policy space conceded to the
intelligence community, strengthened in wake of Kargil with addition of new
structures. While the pathology is well understood in case of Pakistan as has been amply brought out by Swami;
that intelligence input has queered India ’s policy response awaits a
book length treatment. It is perhaps one reason why India has not been able to bring
the problem to a closure through political means. Having misinterpreted the Kashmir problem as Jihadi covert war alone, it has
understandably not wanted to appease such forces. The political working group
established as a result of the Prime Minister’s Round Tables exercise of mid
this decade did not even submit a report. The governance initiatives that have
been taken are arguably not enough.
An
accurate interpretation of the Kashmir problem
has been held hostage by many factors including intelligence analysis fed by
institutional bias. Others include the zero-sum contestation with Pakistan . Since
acceding to legitimate grievances in Kashmir would be taken as a Pakistani
‘victory’, India
stays its hand in turning rhetoric of ‘sky is the limit’ and ‘hand of
friendship’ to reality. The ascendance of the conservative end of the spectrum
and cultural nationalism in India
over the nineties has also influenced the government’s position. The hard line
is therefore inescapable. Analysis such as this book from the otherwise credible
author only serves to further undercut necessary initiatives. Thus Kashmir remains on the boil. This serves Pakistani
interests. Indian interests are not served since Kashmiris are Indian citizens
and secondly continuing instability gives Pakistan a handle. Lastly, it
energises forces that Swami describes as Jihadi. Other factors that excite
Kashmiri alienation such as ethnicity, historical grievance and a distaste of counter
insurgent pressures, that are amenable to policy ministration, are marginalised.
The
corresponding covert war from the Indian side not only in Kashmir but also in Pakistan , not
being covered, Indian intransigence is only superficially understandable. In
case these are to be factored in, what emerges is a duet between two contending
intelligence agencies, virtually autonomous of political control. While in Pakistan the ISI can be expected to be granted a
blank cheque by the military, in India there appears to be a deficit
of political and parliamentary control. Swami’s narrative begins with a shadowy
spymaster, Colonel Hassan Walia, making his entry into Kashmir
on a ‘brutal winder evening’. Thereafter ‘the book is a history of a secret
storm that swirled around the house on the hill: the long jihad fought in Jammu and Kashmir from
1947-48 to the present day’. The ‘House on the Hill’ has since been inhabited
by the Assistant Director, Intelligence Bureau. Swami informs that on the same
hillside are the office cum residences of the Research and Analysis Wing and
Kashmir’s premier interrogation centre, Parimahal; notorious in the Valley
among people and security practitioners as ‘Papa One’. The crucial question is
who exercised control over what goes on at that Hill? Intelligence men from BN
Mullick in the early period to former RAW chiefs, ‘Gary ’ Saxena and Dulat, in the later period have
been key players. This is a telling comment on India ’s democratic good health in
which accountability over actors is to be exercised by people’s representatives
in legislatures and the parliament. Swami unintentionally opens up a ‘Pandora’s
box’ that it would behove political decision makers to introspectively address in
the North Block and 7, Race Course
Road .
A
storm has greeted the joint statement issued pursuant to the meeting of the two
prime ministers in Sharm el Sheikh. This is over the allusion to the
disturbances in Baluchistan . That Baluchistan
figures in the news is evidence of an ongoing covert war, brought to notice in
its avatar in Kashmir by Swami. That it
extends to Baluchistan indicates that Jihad is
not at the root. Instead this is a manifestation of state contestation
explicable in the realist paradigm over eminently secular definitions of
national interest – territory and balance power. Power play requires to be
called by the right name and political control exercised accordingly. This
requires a holistic view to preserve policy from appropriation by the lead
agency and contamination by its institutional interest. A broad front political
reengagement with the Kashmir issue is called
for to realign Indian policy.