http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=87929

REMINDING THE POLITICAL CLASS OF CLAUSEWITZ'S FIRST INJUNCTION

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has indicated that the military has been given a free hand in implementing the government's decision for punitive retaliation against the terror attack in which 44 central reserve police bravehearts were killed in Pulwama last week. The decision was taken at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security in the morning following the explosion by a car laden improvised explosive device set off by a Kashmiri terrorist.

The parameters of the retaliation are not known. Testimony of the brass then has it that strategic guidelines that ought to accompany such orders have not been given by the political masters earlier in the case of the Kargil War and Operation Parakram in response to the parliament terror attack. This time round, with the National Security Council system entering into its third decade, it can be expected that the military has received its parameters as part of its marching orders.

That the military has not as yet acted on the orders suggests that it is a work in progress and the preparatory phase is underway. Learning lessons from 26/11, the military has over the past decade kept battle ready forces, albeit small, for just this eventuality. It is apparent that these forces have not been employed. It can be inferred that the military is readying for a higher order operation.

The punitive operation itself may be more measured, but the uncertainty attending its success and of Pakistani response would entail the military making wider preparations, not only to conduct the operation but to deal with the aftermath. The onus of escalation will be on Pakistan and it may resort to actions requiring an Indian counter. Pakistan is currently prepared for both reaction and response, no doubt registering the prime minister's words. The Indian military is therefore taking the necessary precautions.

The current hiatus gives the advantage of setting the diplomatic stage. The foreign ministry has been busy apprising their global interlocutors of Indian compulsions and Pakistani complicity. It enables the international community to also chip in and get Pakistan to reverse its policy. The military preparations make for urgency in this, besides strengthening the hands of diplomats.

The diplomats have already made headway, with the United States accepting India's right of self defence informing any proportionate military action it contemplates. It also gives Pakistan's other close partner, Saudi Arabia, an opportunity to rein it in, with the visiting Saudi crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), prevailing on Pakistan to shift away from its terror-friendly neighbourhood policies.

Minimally, the visit can provide Pakistan cover to step back by taking sustainable measures to the satisfaction of India against the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the architects of the Pulwama attack, and defuse the crisis. India can follow up with MBS during his Indian next stop over on details of Pakistani compliance. In such a case, diplomacy would continue at the global level to have the JeM head, Masood Azhar, put on the United Nation's terror list.

With diplomacy given a chance, India would have set the stage for a military strike, which it could launch at 'a time and place of own choosing' depending on where surprise and deception give it best dividends. There are limits to surprise since both armies have had opportunity in earlier crises to observe the other's moves.
As to time limits to any such strike, it would depend on readiness of both sides. Pakistani readiness levels tend to heighten as the preparatory phase rolls out. However, Indian forces may be hard put to maintain readiness levels to outlast the Pakistanis.

Besides the political reason of polls in the offing, the punitive strikes would likely be sooner than later. The 'surgical strikes' provide a clue as to when military operations may be launched. While the Uri terror attack was in mid September 2016, the counter went in later that month. This enabled India to prepare the ground at the United Nation's General Assembly session that took place in the interim.

While last time the Pakistanis seem to have stood down their guard, this time round they will likely hold it up for longer. Intelligence reports indicating that Pakistan did not vacate some 50 of 60 posts it usually vacates during winter indicates that they appear to have anticipated the situation. Its military cannot for a second time allow an Indian operation to go unchallenged.

This implies that the contemplated military operation would be liable to escalation, not only by a Pakistani counter but also in India pressing the accelerator either to get out of a jam or to come out on top. The Indian preparations would be catering for this, including a stealthy occupation of defences across the international border by core teams and possibly a graduated mobilization as the operation unfolds. Needless to say, Pakistan will match step.

The strategic directions referred to at the beginning of the article require to essentially deal with such escalatory possibilities. There is no indication so far that the political masters have given their mind on this to the military. In fact, what is available from the media compels one to apprehend the opposite.

The prime minister has said that the military has been delegated the responsibility to conduct the strikes. A credible strategic pundit has rightly pointed out that this amounts to abdicating its responsibility. The prime minister's announcement twice over that a military operation is imminent appears to have put the onus on the military, enabling the political master to distance himself from any adverse fallout of the operations.

In the case of the surgical strikes too, though Prime Minister Modi in an interview claimed responsibility, the parameters he alluded to alongside do not lend confidence that the political head is fully aware of what military operations entail as fallout. He said that he had required troops participating to head back from the operation irrespective of its success or otherwise without incurring casualties by day-break. These are unrealistic parameters for military operations. In the event, it is no wonder Pakistan denied the surgical strikes ever took place.

As outlined here, there is no guarantee of a successful outcome. The political master needs to be put on notice timely that the head on the block is his in case of the counter getting out of hand. The buck cannot be passed on to the military, even if it manages to do a professional job of it and rescues the political master from such fate.

In a democratic set up the political aims are to be indicated by the political leadership, along with any strictures. A joint civilian-military cogitation then ensues under the leadership of the national security advisor and the outcome - strategic and military objectives - vetted and approved by the political leadership in another sitting of the CCS. This may be underway and the ownership of the military operations may be taken up by the political leadership at some stage here on.

The extent to which the political leadership is willing to countenance escalation must be made known to the military. The manner in which the right wing has orchestrated nationalist hysteria since the attack needs no spelling out. This can only come back to boomerang on the political leadership when and if faced with military set back. Impending elections will make the likely impact on elections of the decisions taken as the overriding factor and not what is best in the interests of national security.

The doyen of strategists, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz had said that the first consideration in contemplating entering into military conflict is to have no illusions over what military perpetrated violence entails. Military conflict is two sided. In South Asia, there is no missing the nuclear overhang.

Therefore, Prime Minister Modi needs reminding that he has his task cut out, even though hopefully such common sense has been communicated to him by his national security adviser. That the Pulwama incident happened at all suggests that this cannot be left to the national security establishment. It failed to deter Pakistan, though it upped the military ante in Kashmir over the past four years without a complementary peace track. It can fail yet again as it moves from deterrence to compellence. It needs reminding timely of Clausewitz's first principle recounted here, so that it does not fail the nation yet again.

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=87626#

The Army's land warfare doctrine

The army released its land warfare doctrine (LWD) in mid December 2018. Leaving out the nuclear level, it covers the other two levels of war - sub-conventional and conventional. Since the two levels are relevant to the army in Kashmir and to readers in Jammu and Kashmir of this column, the implications of the LWD are covered here.

As regards the sub-conventional level, the LWD characterizes the problem in Kashmir as a case of Pakistan sponsored trans-border terrorism. It consigns this to what it calls the 'Gray Zone', in which hybrid war is ongoing. The manner how the army perceives the problem it is faced with is key to understanding its response. This is now well known, three years into the current spell of unrest - intifada if you will. The army chief has been around for two of those years and has effusively given out his mind, both during visits to Kashmir and in talks to the media and audiences elsewhere. He had dwelt on the hybrid war theme in his address at the United Services Institution of India - the oldest security think tank - early on in his tenure. So how there is little to surprise in the LWD on this score.

It is also unsurprising that the view is now official in terms of a written self-administered doctrine. It is not known as to the level of approval and sanction the document has in relation to the civilian masters of the army. It is also not known if the home ministry - which presumably ought to have a say on internal security matters - was in the loop. It can be surmised that the national security establishment, headed by Ajit Doval, is on board since the view finds resonance with Doval's pre-appointment discourses on national security that are littered across youtube.

However, it is of little consequence if the defence ministry and madam defence minister approved the document since the division of labour between the political class and the military is by now rather well known. Though in democratic politics doctrine-making ought to be a collegiate exercise involving both civilians and the military, and approval must rest with the civilian masters, in practice the doctrinal sphere is left to the military. The civilians are too shy to reveal their ignorance by venturing into unknown doctrinal territory. The last time a civilian ventured bold was K. Subrahmanyam. An unofficial word went round the army that his think tank was to be boycotted by the army then. Civilians appear to have over-learnt the less and the lack of oversight is an abdication of sorts, and on that count must attract voter concern.

Voters have delegated the political class the supervisory authority over the military. If it is not carried out then voters must exercise their veto of choice between political parties. In the current case, the ruling party came to power with a claim to security mindedness. There appears to be like-mindedness between the government and the military on the score of hybrid war, reflected in the prime minister's boast in his recent visit to Jammu region that soon the back of terrorism would be broken by the might of the state. It can thus be inferred that the LWD has the blessings of the civilian masters, who are unable to see the distinction between militancy and terrorism.

This could be because LWD has proved persuasive, in which case it fails to provide the right perspective to the civilian masters. The army must know that terrorism is usually a tactic in insurgency. Therefore, even while the LWD refers to counter terrorism/counter insurgency operations, its fixation on hybrid war elevates the Pakistan angle, thereby downplaying the other strands of policy such as peace initiatives. Alternatively, the convergence could be if the LWD is mouthing what it believes its civilian masters wish to hear. It could be misrepresenting the problem in Kashmir to be consonance with its civilian masters, adopting their perspective.

There is an even worse possibility. If the individual level of analysis is kosher in light of the 'levels of analysis paradigm' in theory, the mind of the doctrinal entrepreneur is also a site to look for answers. Given the questionable relevance for the hybrid war template for Kashmir, particularly in light of the havoc it can potentially wrought for response options, it bears inquiry as to where it is coming from.
The hybrid war import is a contribution of the Army Chief to the discourse. (It resulted in a book by the other illustrious think tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses). Is the Chief riding his favourite hobby horse? Perhaps he wishes to use the year he retires to try for the only military honour that he has not yet received, the the Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal. (He received the Param Vishist Seva Medal this republic day in an innovative display of largesse in election year by the government. (Factoid: General Manekshaw received the Padma Vibhushan as chief in 1972.)) Tragically, some 250 Kashmiri youth were killed last year owing to this misinterpretation of the problem in Kashmir. (The number of Pakistanis dead in the figure was not released at year end; no doubt, to conceal the figure lest it reveal that the Pakistani angle is trifle exaggerated, at least for now.)

Allowing the hybrid war characterization as accurate for a moment, it appears from the LWD's take on operations at the conventional level that Pakistan is winning. The LWD has it that integrated battle groups (IBGs) are to be formed, pre-programmed to take out respective objectives. The Chief has let on that the current method of forming of combat command level task forces on the downward percolation of orders is inadequate guarantee that it would work in war. What this suggests is either that the Chief's exposure to an operational command on the western front did not give him the confidence that his subordinates of the mechanized forces know their beans or that their adeptness at mechanized warfare has indeed ossified. In both cases, it is concerning.

The Chief's inability to appreciate that mechanized forces do not need detailed orders is fallout of his insurgency bias. This insurgency bias has long afflicted India's conventional doctrine, confirming a doctoral finding of a don in Jawarharlal Nehru University (JNU) in his book, Fighting Like a Guerrilla. As to the mechanized forces missing their mojo, that it has taken a beating over the duration of India's Kashmir commitment is no secret. Two top members of their brass were overlooked at the government's last pick of army chief. The infantry and artillery lobby's foisting of caste system-like reservations in higher ranks has marginalized them. Mechanised troops serve tenures in Kashmir, making for a debilitating personnel and officer turbulence - not unlike in other arms. In short, India's Kashmir commitment has diluted its conventional war-fighting ability. In other words, Pakistan has won the hybrid war without firing a shot, if at the cost of ridding itself of a few thousand jihadis.

Here the nuclear level - not mentioned in the LWD - kicks in. The IBGs that are configured for the initial phase of a war are hardly likely to have the elan to form and reform as part of combat teams, groups and commands for mechanized battles in depth. The visualization of mechanized operations as an expanding torrent is therefore passé. The good news is that this means the nuclear threshold of Pakistan will not be pushed.

This makes the characterization of hybrid war so much more necessary. India can persist with the fiction, the good part being avoidance of
conventional war. Steam can be vented on the Line of Control through 'surgical strikes' - called fictional by the recipients - and, elsewhere, films like Uri - mostly fictional - can defuse passions. The possibility of escalation inherent in hybrid war - pointed out by another JNU don in his book, Line on Fire - may end up as scaremongering. Recall, orders by the prime minister were that the troops were to return without casualties by first light irrespective of whether the surgical strikes succeed or otherwise. While this no doubt imposes inordinately on Kashmiris, it preserves India and Pakistan from grievous - potentially nuclear - hurt. For these reasons, the surprisingly well written 13 pages of the LWD should find an audience in these parts.


Reference: Land Warfare Doctrine - 2018 (Interestingly, the link has been found removed from the army website on 7 February, though was available when accessed on 4 February.)
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https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/16224/New-Land-Warfare-Doctrine-May-Be-the-Garrulous-Army-Chiefs-Alone

The land warfare doctrine: The army's or that of its Chief?

The Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) was put out in the public domain rather quietly in mid-December. The non-descript manner of introduction of a significant output of the army was markedly different from the release in 2004 of its predecessor document, Indian Army Doctrine (IAD), that had been preceded by briefings to the media and was released as a book by the Army Training Command. The first version of the document was also brought out in a book format by ARTRAC in 1998, Indian Army – Fundamentals, Concepts, Doctrine. Curiously, this time round the army has settled for a release of the document only in soft copy and without any front matter, explanatory preface and introductory foreword.

There was no mention of it at the last army commanders’ conference, though the media carried details of the four high-level studies that were discussed at the conference. In 2004, on the other hand, the army commanders had discussed the doctrine in their spring meeting and the document was put out later at their meeting in autumn. Also, equally surprisingly, there has been no reference to the document either by the usually talkative Chief or any army commanders. What this points to is that the document likely did not command a consensus within the army.

This dissonance is easy to explain by going through the document. It has within it three favourite hobby horses of the Army Chief. The first is admittedly not his alone, but one inherited by chiefs since the turn of the decade. This is regarding ‘two front’ war. The second on the gray zone of hybrid war is the Chief’s contribution to management of the Kashmir conflict, one he presumably felt entitled to make since his elevation as chief was predicated on his supposed expertise in the subject having spent his last three command tenures involved in it. The third also goes back a long way to the 2004 IAD, that had spelt out the so-called Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) without putting a name to it.

The first controversial aspect, the ‘two front’ thesis, is referred to as ‘multiple fronts’ in the document, presumably to include the ‘half front’ that is the Chief’s personal contribution to doctrinal development as part of his hyping of hybrid war. Indelicately put, the half-front is apparently the potential front open to manipulation by the two adversaries, Pakistan and China, inside India: its Muslims (particularly Kashmiri) and Maoists respectively. On the back of a growing economy sometime in mid 2000s and increased interest of the United States in helping India get to great power status, the army sought to switch its focus from its western foe by measuring itself against a more respectable – size-wise – foe, China. There was also a lull on the western front owing to the peace process kicking in around then. The China threat was therefore timely, which if not for real was one that would have had to be conjured up.


26/11 brought the Pakistan threat back into the equation, making for the ‘two front’ threat thesis. Though officially adopted in end 2009, it did not lead to a tweaking of the IAD then, since it apparently did not carry the day with the national security establishment. That two successive governments have not bit into the army thesis is evident from the key take-away from the army’s closed door seminar of end 2009, the mountain strike corps, not receiving the kind of support the army has hoped for.

It can be inferred from the reiteration of the thesis in this document that this lack continues. By no means does this imply that the thesis lacks traction, but currently from a grand strategic perspective it would be untimely to name the collusive foes or create a self-fulfilling prophesy by doing to till the growing economy furnishes the means to take on both over time. This bit of good sense appears lost on the army that instead wishes to use the heightened threat to fight back the marked decline in defence budgets over the past two years. While for the ruling party it is to keep China placated till it gets another term soon, for the army it is to justify its share of the pie. In short, this is a temporary disconnect between the army and its civilian masters, while the thesis amounts to common sense within the army.

The second is the hybrid war hoopla. This is important to flag since it is evident that it is subscribed to by the national security establishment, so much so that the speech writer of the prime minister at his rally south of the Pir Panjals had the prime minister mouth bombast such as ‘We will break the back of terrorism with all our might’ or words to that effect. Rebuke from national security watchers was not long in coming with a senior commentator pointing out that terrorism and militancy are not quite the same.

Unfortunately, the hybrid war thesis in the words of the LWD has it that what is happening in Kashmir is a sponsored proxy war and trans-border terrorism. Such a reading leaves little scope for a peace process, notwithstanding the presence of the representative of the Union government for a year and half now and the recent appointment of a former bureaucrat, with experience at the Kashmir desk in the home ministry, as an advisor to the governor.

This is a self-serving interpretation of the problem since it leaves only the military template operational in Kashmir. It cannot be missed that this serves the interest of the army chief since it allows him scope to display his expertise in his final year as chief. Though not against the institutional interest of the army in terms of keeping it in the national eye – if through the recent hit, Uri - it is uncertain if it commands a consensus since the indefinite engagement it spells cannot but keep the army tethered to the twentieth century.

Finally, the LWD seeks to operationalise the CSD, one that the Chief was the first to acknowledge as the army’s doctrine, even though his predecessors had demurred from doing so as it neither had support of the ministry nor of sister services. There is no certainty that it has the missing backing now. This also impacts the ongoing cadre review of the officers at flag rank. The internal disagreement perhaps owes to IBG operationalising finding its way into the document, preempting the spring exercises at which the concept is to be tested.

In a way, the LWD appears to have jumped the gun and could be updated later in the year, which begs the question why was it not held back till then. Maybe the Chief was in a hurry to get it out for gaining a sense of ownership. It is almost certain that should there be a change in government, he is liable to have his wings clipped and will likely be serving out the balance of his tenure rather tightlipped.

All told, the LWD appears a self-centered exercise, put out the army’s perspective planning directorate and containing its Chief’s pet projects rather than as a document that has undergone the test of due diligence and due process – yet another piece of evidence on the manner of handling national security at the five year mark of this government.

https://thewire.in/books/book-review-the-dangers-of-media-fanned-nationalism

Book review

Happymon Jacob, Line on Fire: Ceasefire violations and India-Pakistan escalation dynamics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Happymon Jacob, an associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, is no stranger to the strategic community. He acquired a higher profile over the past couple of years through his column on strategic affairs in The Hindu and anchoring an interview-based program with The Wire. In his writings, he has capitalized on his engagement over the past decade with the Track II processes between India and Pakistan, having participated in the Chaophraya and Ottawa dialogues. He heads the independent research initiative to monitor ceasefire violations, the Indo-Pak Conflict Monitor. For the lay reader, this background places Jacob as a useful source to turn to for understanding the current impasse in Indo-Pakistan relations in the term of the present government, best illustrated by the reactivation of the Line of Control (LC).

Over the book’s 400 pages, Jacob makes the case that the tension along the Line of Control has potential to spiral into conflict, one that can go nuclear. He contests the prevalent opinion that ceasefire violations (CFVs) – the localized exchanges of ordnance along the LC - are manageable and are perhaps a useful vent. He believes this complacency is unmindful of what he calls ‘autonomous military factor’ (AMF), tendencies towards escalation arising from the institutional life of the military and in military culture. He believes that the media-fanned nationalism in society may tie down the political decision maker’s hands in case CFVs are aggravated by egregious violence. Forced to the up the ante in response – in a variant of the surgical strikes – the two sides may be faced with prospects best described figuratively as an escalation ladder or a slippery slope.

Some three decades into the heightened face-off between the two sides, readers are familiar with what could occur should the precarious situation deteriorate. The escalated exchanges on the LC could trigger India’s Cold Start doctrine, its military’s intention to launch proactive offensives at the conventional level in case of subconventional provocation by Pakistan. A plausible and much discussed scenario has it that these offensives could in turn cross the proverbial trip wires, leading to Pakistani nuclear first use. What might follow is conjectural, but India promises ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation to nuclear strike on it or its troops anywhere. Such retaliation might wipe Pakistan off the map and in its aftermath reduce South Asia to an environmental wasteland.

It is important that this horrific image be conjured up here to show up the dangers from the unwillingness of both sides to wrap up their seventy year old problem and, at a minimum, implement the plethora of already agreed confidence building measures on the LC. For starters, Jacob’s recommendation is that the understanding on the ceasefire on the LC dating to November 2003 be reduced to a written document for mutual implementation in letter and spirit.

Jacob is particularly interesting in his revealing chapter on AMFs, aptly titled ‘Military gamesmanship and moral ascendancy’. While these are generally known within the army, his book serves the purpose of wider dissemination. He includes ‘fun and gamesmanship’, ‘emotional state’, ‘personality traits of commanders’ and ‘revenge firing and ‘honour killings’’ in AMFs, to name a few. Amongst other reasons, such ground level impetus results in decapitations etc. He records the baleful effect such occurrence has on public perceptions on the villainy of the other side and the disruption in efforts to mend fences. His expectation is that knowledge of the internal workings of the two militaries and the resulting dynamics on the LC can lead to mitigatory action on this key escalatory variable.

He brings out a little known feature of the common border, that there are no mutual ground rules. The last inconclusive meeting on this issue of the border ground rules committee was in 1987. The two sides agreed at their third round of the expert level dialogue on conventional confidence building measures in 2006 to wrap up an agreement. Little has changed since on paper, while on ground the border guarding forces are exchanging mortar fire along the border (referred to as working boundary by Pakistan) in southern Jammu and Kashmir. What this tells of is the shirking of responsibility of the concerned bureaucracies and the lack of political oversight on both sides at the unacceptable cost of a reasonable working environment for the border guards and a modern repertoire of professional engagement between the two sides.

The release of Jacob’s book drew attention to the aspect of surgical strikes. Surgical strikes of late September 2016 have been kept in the public view by the ruling party attempting to gain electorally from its showing on national security, using the strikes as illustration. Jacob not only brings out that there was nothing original about these. In fact, his revelations on the aptly named operation, Operation Kabaddi, suggest that a previous government early this century had a much more ambitious trans LC operation up its sleeve, one it was forced to abort by the impact of 9/11 on the region. The surgical strikes of 2016 were different in that the previous trans-border forays were limited in scope to a single locale. Surgical strikes were instead executed over a wider front, at some eight separate locations. According to Jacob’s sources who include the army commander at the time and a tactical level commander charged with executing a portion of the operation, Operation Kabaddi was instead the planned capture of some 25 Pakistani posts.

What this suggests is that the military has a limited border war as an option. It’s the military’s job to present options for the political master to make a choice. Since the exercise of such an option is unlikely to remain unchallenged by Pakistan, it has potential so spill over onto the plains with the attendant dangers in the scenario mentioned earlier. This ought to energise readers and instigate them in their capacity as voters to exercise their power over the political class to, firstly, keep military options at bay, and, secondly, and more importantly, resolve differences that can lead up to conflict. What has been happening instead is that political formations are manipulating the nationalist instinct among people to keep from taking up the problems – border and territorial - to the logical end of conflict resolution. As a result, India has over 5000 km of unsettled borders with two of its significant neighbours. Lest it slip the mind, both happen to be nuclear armed. Under the cover of nuclear deterrence, rather than indulge in protracted conflict management, India would do well to meaningfully settle the hold over issues from last century.

Jacob’s cautionary book is timely. It expands on his earlier monograph on the issue at the United States Institute of Peace. He must be complimented for taking the painstaking research forward and, without institutional and financial assistance, running a civil society watch dog on CFVs. To the extent his initiative has found support on both sides, enabling his travel to both sides of the LC for a first-hand account, there appears to be silver lining. Through his travelogue that can be taken as an accompaniment to this book, The Line of Control: Travelling with the Indian and Pakistani Armies, the practitioners on the two sides appear to be sending a signal to citizens – the principals - to influence their agents – politicians – to set right the conditions that can lead up to our region going awry in short order.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/16539-george-fernandes-keeps-his-date-with-gujarat-carnage-martyrs

George Fernandes keeps his date with Gujarat carnage martyrs

At a time when plaudits are pouring in on the departure of George Fernandes to meet his maker, it appears churlish to join the chorus. Here a departure is made from the cultural practice of speaking good of the departed. Here Fernandes is not extolled; instead he is damned.

Readers of this publication would already be acquainted with the recent book by General ‘Zoom’ Shah. Shah in his book – The Sarkari Mussalman - recounts his challenges as commanding general of the formation earmarked by the army chief to respond to the outbreak of the Gujarat carnage. In his book, Shah recalls receiving a telephone call from the army chief on 28 February 2002 ordering him to proceed to Gujarat with his troops and quell the violence there. Taking the aircrafts positioned by the airforce at Jodhpur, where Shah’s division was deployed during Operation Parakram – the army mobilisation in wake of the terror attack on parliament – Shah landed by night on 28 February – 1 March at Ahmedabad. Even as his plane landed, he saw fires burning across the city.

Even as the rest of his troops were ferried in by night aboard the aircrafts from Jodhpur, Shah proceeded in a jeep he had got along with him on his plane to the chief minister’s residence. Along the route he observed the mobs at work, with the complicity police standing by if not actively participating in the ongoing pogrom. Arriving sometime at 2AM on 1 March at the chief minister’s residence, Shah was ushered into the presence of Narendra Modi, the then chief minister. Alongside Modi in the room was George Fernandes, the then defence minister.

It is clear that Fernandes had asked the army chief to have the army deploy to Ahmedabad and proceeded to Ahmedabad himself, whereupon he was in a position to receive Shah. Invited to dinner with the two – who were about to sit down to dinner – Shah used the opportunity to apprise the two on his arrival and request the usual support from the civil administration when the army deploys for aid to civil authority. He brought out that though his troops were fetching up, there was no one from the police or state administration on hand to liaise with and provide the briefing and vehicles necessary for the troops to get on with the task at hand. Assured of all help and reassured that his defence minister was at hand to ensure the same, Shah returned to the airfield to muster his troops.

Needless to add, the promised support from the civil administration under Modi did not turn up. Instead, on the following day – 1 March - a curious scene played out on the tarmac at the airport. George Fernandes turned up at the airport to address the troops in what is termed in army parlance as a Sainik Sammelan. This was followed by a ‘bara-khana’ or repast with troops in which reportedly old ‘George’ – as it now turns out he was known affectionately – squatted with the troops at lunch instead of sitting on a stately table with officers. All this within some 7 kilometers from the Gulbarg society, where in a massacre some 69 Muslims had been done to death; their leader, former parliamentarian Ehsan Jafri, killed in a particularly gruesome manner.

George has been ill for some years so his record of his days in Ahmedabad is not known. Perhaps he has shared it with Jaya Jaitley, who may have put it down in her aptly titled autobiographical book, Life Among Scorpions. It is not impossible that George was in the know of the indulgeneces by the supporters of his host in Ahmedabad, Narendra Modi. It is plausible that he had been put wise by Modi himself or else by the intelligence bureau and ministry channels. Modi may even perhaps have offered an alibi for not responding with due alacrity to the numerous calls Jafri placed even as he faced off against the mob, including to Modi himself. This is not an unreasonable conjecture. It is impossible to imagine that India’s defence minister, out to supervise the Union government’s response to an unfolding national shame, was unaware of the dimension of it. And yet, George went about the ‘tamasha’ at the airport the following day.

Asking ‘Why?’ is a fair question; even if the best person to answer it is now no more.

To be fair to those writing up his obituaries, he is described as a different George during his time in the Vajpayee administration from the George he was as a younger man. This is with good reason. Apparently, George was dispatched by Vajpayee to oversee the Center’s support to the Modi-led state government in its response to the Gujarat violence. Modi had precipitated matters in allowing the right wing extremist organizations take the bodies of the victims of the Sabarmati express fire in a procession all the way to Ahmedabad. Predictably, it inflamed passions, as no doubt it was designed to. Allegedly, the decision on this and a corollary decision calling on the police to lay off the ensuing violence was taken at a meeting at the chief minister’s residence at night on 27 February. The next day – 28 February – mobs took over the streets across Gujarat, some say as per a premeditated design.

George arrived in the midst of this, in time to prevail on Modi to do his constitutional duty – which no doubt was the message Vajpayee may have sent his defence minister to convey in no uncertain terms. Perhaps Vajpayee had an inkling of what was to unfold. After all, the intelligence bureau reports to the prime minister and he knew the chief minister rather well, having appointed Modi chief minister only in October the previous year. While George failed spectacularly on his errand, at the cost of some 1000 lives by the official count, this was not his failure alone. In India’s cabinet system of collective accountability, it was the failure of his prime minister and cabinet colleagues.

However, George fails on two further counts. Shah recounts that he at some point in the ordeal considered declaring martial law. Apparently, this is a little known provision in military law that enables the military to step in and clean up things the hard way in case the situation is getting out of hand. While Shah admits to being a bit confused on the provision, George – knowing the scale of what was unfolding – could have ordered him to proactively put down the perpetrators. George did no such thing. Instead, he whiled away the time on 1 March. Clearly, he too was waiting for the 72 hours that was allegedly given to the perpetrators of mass violence by powers that be to finish. Dot on time, the next day – 2 March – the state administration swung into action and let the army, that had twiddled its thumbs on the tarmac of the airport, have the requisite support – briefing, guides, transport, logistics etc – promised by George and Narendra Modi some 36 hours prior.

Second, since George was the cabinet representative on ground and an eyewitness to the national shame, did he go back and brief his boss accordingly? It is possible that he did, since - as may have been established in this telling by now – he was complicit along with the Government of India in looking the other way. Shah informs of tendering a detailed report of his formation’s work in restoring order through its launch of Operation Aman. It is unlikely that the Army Headquarters sat on the report. Good staff work would have entailed passing it on to babus under George’s supervision. George could not have but received it. Even if Vajpayee could not sack Modi for dereliction on rajdharma - since Modi got away with his mentor, Advani’s help - he could have proceeded to have Modi in the dock if George – leader of a coalition partner in government - had made an issue of the report. George did not, keeping silent instead.

Worse, the file was also not shared by the ministry with the Supreme Court-appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT) that went into the accountability aspect of the Gujarat carnage. Consequently, its report over the turn of the decade gave Modi a respite and virtual impunity to perpetrators. Calling the SIT report an eye-wash, Shah wonders in his book which ministerial cupboard the report is compiling dust in. It required the general to spill the beans on this after finally retiring some 16 years since the tragic events. In the interim, Mr. Modi was deposited in New Delhi by an eponymous wave.

George Fernandes must not only be remembered for his showing in the pre-Emergency and Emergency days. He must bear the cross for the Gujarat carnage, when as defence minister he had 3000 troops on hand and not only failed to employ them, but played an active role in diverting them from their task. George Fernandes must now settle with those he is culpable - through acts of commission – of dispatching to their maker. Others involved will no doubt do so in their turn, Amen.

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=87194

OPERATION KABADDI REVEALED BUT ONLY PARTIALLY

Operation Kabaddi has been revealed recently as an army planned operation for taking a few Pakistani posts along the Line of Control (LC), thereby affording it an advantage in the battles along the LC that characterized the turn of the century. Apparently, the military operation was intended to be launched sometime early October 2001. However, it was aborted owing to the 9/11 incident which veritably changed the verities of the post cold war era.

In his book, Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics, previewed recently in a national daily, the author, a Jawaharlal Nehru University professor, reportedly divulges the outline of Operation Kabaddi. He bases his revelations on interviews with two high ranking army officers, one of whom was then the operational level chief commander in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the other a tactical level commander. The then army chief, on being contacted, pleaded to have no recall of the period; in short, he did not deny the same. The tactical level commander – who went on to in his turn succeed the army commander in question - has gone on to record in his fortnightly column with a prominent website on the part his brigade played in the episode.

It appears that the army in end 2001 planned to hike the levels of violence that was routinely traded across the LC in those days in a case of ‘reverse Kargil’, administering the Pakistanis a taste of their own medicine. To recall, the period after the Kargil War had witnessed a severe spike in the proxy war in J&K, brought about in part by fresh infiltration of Pakistani - largely Punjabi - mercenaries and would-be jihadis into J&K under the cover of the Kargil War.

During the short border war, the army had concentrated its energy in evicting the Pakistani paramilitary troops from the heights they had surreptitiously occupied early summer that year. This was done by drawing in a division from north Kashmir, allowing for a temporary opening in the counter infiltration grid and drawdown in intensity of hinterland operations. Making use of this instability on the counter insurgency grid, Pakistan infiltrated its proxy war foot soldiers and potentially extended the life of the proxy war. Over the following couple of years, their proxy war tactics also changed, witnessing a flurry of fidayeen attacks. Alongside the ordnance traded across the LC also registered a spike, the army retaliating with an intention of causing equal pain on the Pakistani army deployed there.

It appears the army decided at this juncture to up the ante, taking a page out of the Pakistani book. In launching the Kargil operation, Pakistan had rendered askew the sacrality of the LC arrived at Simla in 1972. This provided the army with a precedent, enabling it to plan taking over of Pakistani posts along the LC that were either particularly dominating or along infiltration corridors. Alongside, no doubt, the prospective objectives would also have included posts the capture of which would have afforded the army a window to advance into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in case of escalation. Apparently, all the pieces were in place by September. Unfortunately, 19 Arabs under the spell of a certain Osama bin Laden pulled the curtains on Operation Kabaddi by crashing their planes into three of four intended targets in the United States (US).

The professor who revealed the story has done so believing that drawing attention to the delicacy of the stand-off along the LC would contribute to calming the situation along it. This is the second book dealing with the LC brought out by Professor Happymon Jacob, his earlier one, Travelling with the Indian and Pakistani Armies, being in the form of a travelogue on his travels on both sides of the LC as part of his stewardship of a two-year project, Indo-Pak Conflict Monitor, on the re-activation of the LC. The reactivation of the LC in the tenure of the current government has potential to set the region aflame, given its conduct and hyping thereafter of the surgical strikes of late 2016. Last year some 3000 LC incidents were recorded.

The recall of the then tactical level commander in his column appears to be to put the surgical strikes in proper perspective The general recounting his days as brigade commander on the LC, General HS Panag, appears to be miffed by the political hype surrounding the surgical strikes and wishes to record that at least one previous government had the gumption to go much further than the Modi-Doval combine did in late September 2016 in response to the terror attack in Uri in which some 19 soldiers died. It is clear that the political capital that is sought to be extracted from the military action as the nation heads into elections needs puncturing.

Brought out by one former commanding general in Srinagar in an ad-hoc film review, the depiction of the action in the recent release ‘Uri’ was rather wishful. The prime minister in his recent ‘interview’ with Asian News International instead let on that he had ordered that there be no casualties and the troops employed revert to own side of the LC prior to first light. This shows little stomach for a fight, since violence and bloodshed is intrinsic to military action. Having parameters that deprive military action of its staple implies both a lack of understanding of military action and an inability and unwillingness to withstand consequences.

To his credit, the prime minister was intent on the internal political dividend of the surgical strikes and - happily - was not insistent on sacrificing any troops at the altar of his party’s political benefit. More accurately, he perhaps did not wish to hold the can for a mission gone wrong. Either way, the revelations on Operation Kabaddi are timely and worth voter consideration as they each appraise the security relevant showing of this government.

Reverting to the period in question and the revelations, these are only the tip of the iceberg. Investigative journalists may spot an opportunity
in the coincidence in the timing of the terror strike on the J&K legislative assembly that accounted for 38 dead and the planned launch of Operation Kabaddi. It would appear that the timing was rather suitable, enabling India a casus belli for launch. Such a reading would amount to the legislative assembly attack being a Gulf of Tonkin like incident, the US intelligence-perpetrated attack on a US ship off the Vietnamese coast that provided the US cover to launch its Vietnam War.

India did not quite need the black operation, since it could have justified its attack by reference to the series of terror incidents within J&K that amounted to an ‘armed attack’, legitimizing use of force on its part in self defence. India could have pointed to its six month long cessation of offensive operations of the previous year – the so-called Ramzan ceasefire and its extension of year 2000. It could have shown that its efforts at dissuading proxy war had not yielded result; Pakistani President Musharraf departing the summit at Agra in a huff only in July that year.

However, Professor Happymon inadvertently lets the cat out of the bag. India was perhaps in the midst of paying Musharraf back in his own coin for nixing the Lahore summit, even as it invited Musharraf for a dialogue at Agra. Happymon dates the planning meeting for the operation in New Delhi to June 2001, whereas the Agra summit was in July 2001. It can be generously conceded that the plan was intended as a military riposte in case of diplomatic failure at Agra. In case Musharraf had played ball, it could have been shelved. In other words, it was to provide military muscle to the Agra diplomacy, in line with the adage that good diplomacy is backed by military might.

That neither the ceasefire nor the summit succeeded could well be attributed to Pakistani chicanery. They were out to milk the aggravated situation post-Kargil for its worth. However, there can also be a troubling reading to the sequence of events, and must not elide inclusion in possibilities on account of misplaced nationalism.

It bears considering that India for reasons of state may have intended to let the peace overtures flop in order to provide it a rationale and watertight case to go across the LC in Operation Kabaddi. Worse, even if the well-intentioned prime minister then, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had his heart and mind in the right place, were there other forces out to sabotage his intent and possible outcome of his goodwill? AG Noorani has a version of the Agra summit suggestive of subversion of the peace initiative from within. Were there forces – singed by Pakistani perfidy at Kargil – out to turn the tables on Musharraf, even if it amounted to war that could have turned nuclear?

These are not all idle speculations of the usual conspiracy theorists. Recall the questions (which even if raised by Arundhati Roy in The Hanging of Afzal Guru and the Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament do not on that account lack credibility) surrounding the parliament attack that followed two months later. 9/11 enabled the Pakistanis to get back into bed with the US. This left India high and dry. Unable to turn back, it (in the conspiracy theory) followed through with creating another chance to hit out at Pakistan. It did not reckon with the northern army commander then – one of the army’s most respected for integrity, moral courage and professionalism – turning down the opportunity to go across the LC. Currently, the grapevine has it that the army commander asked for more time for priming his troops. This begs the question why, considering that the revelations indicate that the troops were largely ready by September and on hand as part of aborted Operation Kabaddi. The answer might have to await the general’s memoirs, a whistle blower or a sting operation by an intrepid journalist.

From the gray zone in Kashmir, gray strategies are liable to emerge. It is not implausible that the conjectures above, arrived at on circumstantial evidence, may have a grain of truth. If so, it is time to roll back the grayness, if and since - among other reasons such as Prof. Jacob's apprehensions - it is misshaping our polity, making the intelligence function and community more prominent in national affairs than warranted in a democratic polity.

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/16082/What-Do-the-Echoes-of-Operation-Kabaddi-Really-Say

What do the echoes of Operation Kabaddi really say

Two unconnected headlines at the start of the week are connected in this article. In one, the spokesperson of the UN Secretary General expressed the limitations of mediation as a conflict resolution mechanism for the conflict in Kashmir, arguing that both sides – India and Pakistan - needed to be onboard for the secretary general to exercise initiative under his good offices mandate enabled by UN Charter Articles 98 and 99.

While Pakistan repeatedly brings the Kashmir question to the attention of the UN – most recently during the visit of the president of the General Assembly to Pakistan last week – India takes the cover of the Simla Agreement that buried the UN role in Kashmir by calling for bilateral settlement of the dispute. With India reluctant, there is little possibility of mediation figuring as a conflict resolution tool or the UN taking center stage in bringing to a closure its longstanding interest in the Kashmir question (To recall the second longest serving observer mission is along the line of control (LC)).

However, there is one situation that can potentially propel UN center stage. This would be so if actions hinted at in the second headline come to pass. Amongst the contents of a book by a Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) academic, Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics, is reportedly a revelation of an Indian plan to capture a few posts along the LC in late 2001 in a operation codenamed Operation Kabaddi. Apparently the operation was aborted by the intervention of 9/11 and onset of the United States’ led Operation Enduring Freedom in the region.

The book has it that the plan envisaged capture of some 25-30 Pakistani posts along the LC in order to prevent infiltration of terrorists into Kashmir, after completion of preparations in end September. In the event, the plan could not be actioned even though there was a possible incident on 1 October that could have triggered the multiple attacks across the LC: the terrorist strike on the Kashmir legislative assembly in which some 38 people were killed.

The plan is precursor to latter day surgical strikes of end September 2016. The surgical strikes did not have the same scope and magnitude and with good reason. Any operation – even if not as ambitious as made out in the book – would focus the Security Council on the escalatory possibilities connected with the outstanding issue that remains on its agenda as the ‘India-Pakistan question’ since the passage of its resolution 39 (1948) on 20 January 1948. Mindful of the possibility of being forced to the table by a Security Council resolution, India sensibly restricted the scope of the surgical strikes, assuring Pakistan the following day that the operation had ceased.

Even so, the army’s ongoing reforms reportedly cater for leveraging its conventional advantage. After playing footsie with Cold Start - the freshly minted doctrine in wake of Operation Parakram in 2002-03 – by acknowledging its existence in fits and starts over its lifespan, the army owned up to it definitively early in the tenure of the current army chief. The army is currently engaged in a reform initiative in which the integrated battle groups (IBG) that found mention in the doctrine are firmed in. The idea is to dedicate formations – likely heavier than brigade sized combat commands - formed for territory centric or destruction tasks. Pre-designated and programmed and having the requisite – firepower and engineer - resources intrinsic, these would be in a position for an early launch from a ‘cold start’, as envisaged in evocative, if colloquial, name of the doctrine.

The JNU academic and author of the book mentioned, Professor Happymon Jacob, hopes to focus attention on the continuing escalatory possibilities resulting from the LC incidents numbering some 3000 last year and the need for formalizing the ceasefire dating to November 2003. The ‘ceasefire’ was not the result of an agreed document, but is an understanding. This only reinforces his fears of escalation, apprehensions that in light of the nuclear dimensions to war can only bring the security minders of the international community – the Security Council – down on South Asia in quick time. The international community has a genuine interest in preventing nuclear war outbreak, since consequences are potentially global.

While India would press for having Pakistan in the dock for provoking the conflict in first place by a terror incident or a series of incidents that it could interpret as an armed attack, there is no guarantee that the Security Council stops at that. This could release the Secretary General from his limitation encapsulated in the first news article referred to above, that incidentally was also voiced once earlier in April last year. India would require then to engage with Pakistan meaningfully over Kashmir, something it is loathe to.

India therefore needs to reappraise its hardline in regard to Pakistan and in Kashmir. The hardline creates the conditions for a bust up over Kashmir. The army chief among his numerous media interventions has indicated that India has options up its sleeve along the lines of surgical strikes, but of a different sort and order that he, keeping surprise in mind, did not dwell on in detail,. Any future such strikes cannot be as tame as the surgical strikes, fobbed off by the Pakistanis as a non-event.

Future strikes would require being of the order of the hype that has since attended them, quite like these have been depicted in the somewhat misnamed recent release, Uri, that dramatizes the surgical strikes. If the up-gunned IBGs are up and running by then - the exercises to prove their new design are due this summer – then their employment would have to reckon with the unintended outcome – international attention forcing India to the table to discuss Kashmir meaningfully.

For India, meaningful talks imply getting Pakistan to vacate its occupation of areas of the erstwhile kingdom of the maharaja. Keeping its claims alive, only last week India protested a Pakistani court order extending its sway over Gilgit-Balitistan as interference in India’s internal affairs. Its chief objection to the Chinese lifeline to Pakistan - the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – is that it trespasses Indian territory. While India’s contention would no doubt figure in the talks forced on India, the casus belli, that would likely lie in the tinder accumulated in Kashmir, would have to be reckoned with. Though distasteful to India, it would be a consequence of any Indian military action.

Proceedings at a book release function over the week end in the national capital organized by the Center for Land War Studies do not lend confidence that there is enough appreciation of the unintended consequences of military response. A significant reservation voiced by the speakers comprising retired members of the military brass who contributed to the CLAWS publication – Military Strategy for India in the 21st Century - was there is little government-military interface on the nature of India’s military options.

That this is little different from the criticism governments have faced over the past indicates that this government’s security mindedness has been little different from its predecessors, notable in light of its assiduous distancing from the past and its tom-tomming of the same. The difference is its hardline that can land the region in a soup in quick time, absent mechanisms - other than routine diplomacy - for engaging Pakistan.

While to peaceniks the unintended outcome of military action, in line with Operation Kabaddi – meaningful talks perhaps mediated by the international community - is not unwelcome, this is perhaps not an outcome sought by Ajit Doval’s team. In which case, Doval is best advised to read up the CLAWS publication on military strategy and, mindful of the inadvisability of military options, preventively defuse the conditions that keep Operation Kabaddi plans well dusted.