Yoga as prelude to politicization of the military

http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/11/commentary/yoga-prelude-politicisation-military.html

Unedited version

This January, 250 army men of Western Command attended the Yoga Teacher's Training Course organised by Ramdev's Patanjali Yogpeeth in Haridwar. They are the first lot of 1000 yoga trainers who are then to return to barracks and conduct yoga for troops. That the media finds this association between the army and Baba Ramdev’s outfit as news worthy suggests the link needs further query.

The aim ostensibly is to de-stress the army in cantonments in Western Command’s peace stations before they return for yet another tour of duty in some or other counter insurgency area or high altitude picket.

Superficially, this is for the good in so far as physical and mental fitness goes. The army has figured in the news earlier for the wrong reasons: soldier suicides, fratricide and affrays between officers and men. Among the enabling conditions for such avoidable incidents is stress. Yoga is meant to mitigate such stress.

Yoga caught on in the military long before the three chiefs along with a brigade of Delhi based troops lined up behind the prime minister on the Raj Path for yoga last June. It has been in practice for about a decade, with the army turning its attention to the psychological scars of countering insurgency once the situation in Kashmir started stabilizing mid last decade. Art of Living had also made an advent at about the same time for similar reasons.

The problem is not so much yoga as much as the army’s institutional association with Baba Ramdev’s organization. The Baba is controversial with his business deals having come in for investigative scrutiny. The premises in Haridwar where army men spent couple of weeks hosted a convention for the RSS year before last. The Baba is a known cheerleader for Prime Minister Mr. Modi.

Such proximity is not without its underside. Yoga is enwrapped in a cultural context. Cultural transmission can be expected, such as of ritual, intonations and interpretation of Sanskritic texts. Since the program requires residence on campus, dietary mores and ashram routine would also be conduits.

A right wing associated organization is not about to pass up an opportunity for influencing the army with its world view. Even if tacit, the exposure of 1000 troops this training year, and perhaps more to follow in subsequent years, will enable a window of penetration of the right wing perspective into the army.

This raises the question as to why this apprehension escaped the army’s exercise of due diligence in going about its yoga training program.  

I suggest that the impetus is from both directions. While it can be expected that right wing organizations are interested in the military, counter intuitively, it appears that the military is not averse to such attention.

The growing grip of Hindutva forces across polity and into society, such as over the education sector, the army should be alert to the possibility that it cannot escape like attention. This should have made it defensive, if not prickly, so as to reduce the politicization and corresponding effect on professionalism that penetration of cultural nationalism entails.

Its yoga program does not suggest that it is mindful of the otherwise obvious dangers. Since these are easy to apprehend, a plausible inference is that the army is courting Hindutva. Since it takes two to tango, are there are elements within the military opening the door wider?

An illustration is the appearance of articles on Vedic leadership in military publications, specifically in the Infantry Journal and on the website of the army think tank. This is of a piece with a leadership in the nineties by the Army’s Training Command on the leadership philosophy of the controversial godman, Sai Baba.

Is politicization underway? This is not in the usual sense of the term in a convergence of institutional and political interest of the military leading to its displacing of the government, as in Pakistan. This is better described as incidence of subjective civilian control in which the civilian ruling dispensation connects with the military by ensuring that the military shares its world view, in this case, of Hindutva, such as is the case in communist states.

This is as against objective civilian control in which the military is rendered politically inert by being left to its professional devices. The difference between the two is that where objective civilian control is exercised, the military not a political player. Where the military is under subjective civilian control, the military is kept out of politics because, in subscribing to the dominant perspective, it does not feel the need to intervene.  

Such a move by Hindutva forces can be expected. Once they go about their reset of India in right earnest, they would prefer to keep the military to its professional till. Whereas the mechanism of objective civilian control is available to this end, the ambitious Hindutva agenda for India forces a preference for a tighter embrace of the military. This will ensure, firstly, that it can be kept out by decree and does not feel the need to intervene, and, secondly, that it can be made to weigh in on the side of Hindutva, in case Hindutva forces find the going tough over the longer term.

In light of Indian military’s apolitical record, it can be argued that such apprehensions of convergence of interest are outlandish. This is true in so far as the military’s interest, unlike that of its peer militaries in developing states, was never in a takeover of the state. This would continue to be so, the difference this time round is that the military will increasingly subscribes to the world view of the regime in power.

This is not troubling in so far as the paradigm is a conservative-realist one that militaries, universally, subscribe to. However, the makeover of India in the image of majoritarian nationalism is unlikely to remain a political and democratic exercise. Aware of this, Hindutva forces would like a placid military when they contrive to remain in power and their agenda goes beyond governance.

On this count, the army’s association with Baba Ramdev is only superficially innocent, to do only with yoga. The army is not so politically innocent as to be unaware of the upfront social and political changes ongoing in India. Its choice of Baba Ramdev suggests that it needs watching as much as the moves of the Hindutva combine to influence it.     

 

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Book Review

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=49951

Vivek Chadha, Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A Perspective on Human Rights, Occasional Paper 2, IDSA, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 40

In the IDSA monograph under review, Chadha brings out the current status of army’s approach to human rights. The army’s record has been chequered, but the limitations of space in a monograph length work have led to Chadha’s looking at only the positives. The good news is that the current day army appears suitably impressed by the need to keep human rights to fore in subconventional operations.

Since the army is not particularly challenged today in any theater of subconventional operations, be it J&K or North East, it is easier for the army to maintain a credible record on human rights. That it is has used the letting up in operations for taking a closer look at human rights is altogether heartening. The test of whether it has suitably internalized this can only come up with the next test.

Such test does not appear on the horizon. The situation in J&K while being delicate politically and simmering in terms of popular disaffection is unlikely to escalate militarily owing to the massive deployment of the army continuing along the borders and within the ‘hinterland’. The Udhampur, Gurdaspur and Pathankot incidents suggest the difficulties terrorists are having in using Kashmir as site for their action. In the North East, a series of suspension of operations agreements are in place, the most significant of which in Nagaland has recently be strengthened by a framework agreement. The Central Indian theater of operations has been consigned to the paramilitary since the levels of violence are relatively low and access to sanctuary abroad the missing element.  

As for the possibility of being faced with subconventional operations outside of the borders, this can only be in wake of conventional operations against Pakistan. The likelihood of this has thankfully been appreciably set back by the upward trajectory, albeit a hesitant one, in Indo-Pak relations of late. Stabilisation operations in which human rights would have a place appear remote. Another farfetched site for subconventional operations could be if India joins a multinational force in wrapping up the ISIS in an indeterminate future. 

The upshot of this survey is that after a long while the army is not faced with subconventional operations of any notable intensity. Does Chadha’s work lend confidence that the army will pass when tested?

It would be as easy as unfair to dismiss Chadha’s word as coming out of a ‘sarkari’ think tank, the IDSA, and being from a former military man cannot but be biased. However, it best to give him a hearing for as once an infantry colonel he would know where the shoe pinches. His first hand knowledge is from participation in subconventional operations in Sri Lanka, J&K and North East. He is also author of the heavy tome Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis in which he laid out a brief history of India’s showing in countering insurgency in various theaters.

Chadha believes that the army’s human rights approach has not received due attention in the human rights discourse otherwise crowded with the works critical of the state and its agencies. His claim is that the army has at least over the last decade spruced up its understanding of and record on human rights. He uses its work in J&K as a case study.

In J&K, the statistics are clear. The human rights record of the army has improved to an extent that incidents such as at Machil stand out as aberrations. Further, the positives are in the army’s own attempt at house cleaning such as in its punishing perpetrators for the Machil and follow up in the mistaken opening up of fire at a road block in Chhatargam in which two youth died.

There are two explanations for this. One is that Pakistan has indeed turned off the tap to a large extent in terms of infiltration, leading to an improved security situation. Consequently, the army has rightly tuned down its operational tempo, leading to an improved human rights record. The second is that it has also had an enlightened leadership in Kashmir, appointing figures with a credible spoken reputation. It needs noting that the current theater commander General Hooda has embellished his credentials by his actions on this front.

In the bargain, Chadha’s work appears to have profited with Northern Command furnishing some figures to help his case. Even if these are critiqued - as they should be - by human rights defenders in J&K, the gainer would be the human rights discourse having something more that a straw man to grapple with and reflexive military bashing.

Chadha’s vantage point does not allow him to engage with the items at the forefront of the human rights agenda in J&K. The issue of justice is critical. The figure of disappeared at close to five figure mark; the resurfacing of the Kunan Poshpora incident in the judicial agenda; and the attempted closure by the army to the Pathribal case are prominent cases.

Chadha, for his part, attempts to bring out that judicial and human rights activism can result in miscarriages in terms of making soldiers acting in good faith victims. The reminder is that intensive operations also have a psychological war angle, which human rights defenders must also for their part be objective about. Chadha also reveals the processes by way of which the ministry approaches its role in respect of Article 6 (in case of J&K, Article 7) of the Armed Forces Special Power’s Act. But, he takes the safe way out in being descriptive, rather than self-critical.

In a reference to the infirmities in the western record in Iraq and Afghanistan, Chadha brings home an inescapable fact: that collateral damage and human rights infringement is intrinsic to military operations. There is no ‘zero casualty’ war. The human environment of combat severely tests pious intentions: both at the strategic and tactical levels. The ‘zero tolerance’ to human rights abuse policy inevitably acquires caveat.

The seeming logic is that this is for the eventual larger good. This explains India’s parameter: human rights infringement is tolerable only if it is operationally justifiable. The problem is that the military sits in judgment on its own action, in that verdict on operational justification cannot, of necessity, have civilian imprimatur. 

Though outside the scope of Chadha’s reflection, if and since subconventional operations have human rights consequences, the state (and civil society) must not only look at mitigation. The state must be preventive and political.

For instance, in the case in J&K, it is not enough for the army to be working on its human rights record. Firstly, howsoever well intentioned, this would always leave much to be desired when, for example, the ‘Do’s and Dont’s injunction against torture implies that it is excusable short of maiming and causing death! Secondly, kinetic subconventional operations outsourced these days the army’s engagement with human rights becomes academic, if not diversionary. The case in Imphal of ex PLA fighter Sangit Meitei’s killing by Herojit Singh on orders of the police Additional SP and the manner of paramilitary’s sway in Central India make their human rights approaches more significant.

Wishfully speaking, the state must work more diligently in taking forward the promise of Modi’s 

Lahore stop over externally, and, internally, creating the political conditions speedily for removal of troops. If the misplaced sloganeering in Delhi’s Press Club and JNU on 9 February is to have any value, it is to wake India up to this finally. If two tenures of a UPA government could not bring this about, it cannot happen any time soon.

Consequently, the verdict is that whatever the human rights spin/situation - such as currently - it cannot but be impacted when push comes to shove. This inevitability opens the human rights space to instrumental use as part of policy and strategy, by both sides. Chadha’s is a tragic insight: this is at best subject to mitigation, never to elimination. In J&K, the resulting satisficing leads to the circular argument: since the situation is tolerable now, the army can be removed, but since the army is tolerable now, it can remain indefinitely.

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For India to be off to Levant now would be premature

http://www.eurasiareview.com/03022016-for-india-to-be-off-to-the-levant-would-be-premature-analysis/

India’s Former National Security Adviser and foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon in a lecture in New Delhi argued that, “sooner rather than later India will have to make real political and military contributions to stability and security in this region (West Asia) that is so critical to our economy and security.”

He takes India’s “high stakes”, specifically its oil being sourced to West Asia, the presence of an Indian diaspora and remittances, as its national interest, and advocates that “our approach and behavior should change in defense of our interests.”

That India is not part of the ongoing four powers’ peace initiative closer to home in Afghanistan suggests prudence in casting out wider. Further afield in West Asia, our power is greatly diluted by distance. As a recent study points out, India does not currently have the capacity to sustain such operations, even if it would be able to do so in future.

At best India can reinforce the peace frameworks being put in place under US-Russian aegis. Militarily, it can participate in any subsequent peacekeeping, but, as pointed out by its defence minister, only under the ‘UN flag’.

The catch is in going further in terms of rolling back the ISIS by going beyond peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

As the foreign office spokesperson Vikas Swarup hastily clarified, this is a “hypothetical situation”. Menon, who plugged the liberal-realist perspective while at the helm of the national security establishment, is unlikely to have had this in mind.

What can India do? India has rightly ruled out a military solution to the conflict and backed the conference that is currently bringing all actors to the table. Interestingly, its statement in the UN makes no mention of its position on ISIS.

In standing up against regime change in Syria, the line favoured by Russia, China and Iran, India stands to be at odds with the West, Arab regimes and Israel that have consistently sought the exit of Basher al Assad. India’s stakes – oil, diaspora and remittances – being largely on the Arab side of the divide and its tilt towards Israel, act as constraints to actively standing up against regime change in Syria.

Therefore, India cannot be expected to ‘do more’ at this juncture. It can await fruition of the UN led peace initiative currently underway, whereupon it can participate more broadly including in any peacekeeping dimension that emerges.

However, tacitly in what Menon says, and explicitly in the words of other commentators, there is a belief that India, as part of its ‘great power’ march can, indeed must act, in the defence of what it defines as its national interest.

In regard to West Asia, a leading strategic commentator, Manoj Joshi, puts it thus: “If  our oil supply lines or  citizens working in the Gulf are threatened,  or hundreds and thousands of Indians are being radicalised by the Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, India should certainly consider intervention, with, and if it has the gumption, without, UN authorisation.”

Although Joshi’s is rather a high – almost hypothetical level – of Daesh tentacles, even so, interventionist thinking needs contesting.

The first problem is political, on the question of legitimacy. Menon appears to suggest that since traditional security providers in the region – read the US and UK – are less than effective, India must sign-up rather than continue as a free-rider.

Menon appears to justify prospective military action by saying India’s transformation depends on flow of oil. Interference in its flow would require Indian military response to defend the status quo. The argument smacks of neo-colonial logic in which oil dependency of the West requires them to back repressive Arab regimes.

Arab nationalism that has been discounted in the media fixation with the religious dimension to the Daesh challenge, has been air brushed out of the frame. This has enabled the unchallenged Western, and now Russian, military approach in West Asia. In effect, India would end up backing a status quo in favour of the mix of repressive regimes that have between them succeeded in stymieing the promise of Arab Spring.

Scope for ‘doing more’ is in pointing this out course correction by Arab regimes in internal reform and their Western backers in shedding militarized templates. However, in having the French President over for its Republic Day, India appears instead to be painting itself into the same corner as the West.

The second reason is military. An ‘all of government’ response would be called for. The response to the terror attack on Pathankot airfield does not lend any confidence that the national security establishment can pull it off.

An external – military – consequence of India’s military proactivism could be with Islamists fetching up at the door step. The Pathankot episode suggests that the border fence, even if shored up with gadgets and tactics of Israeli provenance, cannot be relied on.

Menon discounts such a scenario, saying that the “risks of the (India-Pakistan) relationship deteriorating into open conflict are slight.” With the Daesh having already fetched up in Afghanistan, in case of India’s military involvement in the Levant it could provide a fillip to anti-India groups in Pakistan.

The internal political consequence of this would be the benefits for the right wingers in India. It would buoy majoritarian extremists who misrepresent the Islamist threat as the threat from Islam.

Therefore, any thrust for a greater role in West Asia needs to be contested. The liberal realist argumentation can be easily manipulated by cultural nationalists at the helm of national security affairs to depict an emerging consensus in favour of intervention. That an Akshay Kumar starrer Airlift is ruling at the box office suggests such a thrust.

As Menon points out elsewhere, the timing of when to make the move from a regional player to a ‘great power’ is a delicate one. Clearly now is not the right time and this is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Security demands strategy before action

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/security-demands-strategy-before-action/185506.html

Accounts of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval, as a man of action have only been reinforced by his response to the terrorist attack at the Pathankot airfield early this month. While a laudable quality in an operational-level commander, however, when this trait (to take action) is present in abundance in a person required to function at the strategic level, it may be problematic. 

 

Perhaps, the most onerous responsibility of the NSA is his duty as Secretary to the Political Council of India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and as Chair of its executive council. The appointment requires a cool, reflective, person to tenant it. The Pathankot episode throws up the question: Whether Doval is the best man for this sensitive job.

 

On this score, the criticism attending the response to the Pathankot terror attack should not be spin-doctored into oblivion. The Prime Minister on a visit to the site, and the Army Chief in his Army Day press conference, have tried to restore confidence in the system. Acknowledging a few home truths would better serve the system. 

 

A key point was brought forth by the previous NSA, Shivshankar Menon. He observed the cancellation of the NSA’s trip to China for strategic-level talks, implying this was an instance of misplaced priorities. Second, an NSA getting involved in essentially a tactical-level operation is liable to miss the wood for the trees. Third, the NSA's bypassing of institutions such as the Home and Defence Ministries and the military serves to sap traditional chains of command and constitutionally ordained authority. 

 

Since the NSA is at the fulcrum of India's nuclear command and control, these observations have implications for India's nuclear command and control. 

 

India's NCA already has glaring lacunae. As revealed in the commentary in the aftermath of the Pathankot episode, India's National Security Council (NSC) system has been created through an executive order in 1998. It has not been institutionalised and sanctified by an Act of Parliament ever since. As a result, the NSA is an oddity in the parliamentary system, only owing accountability to his appointing authority, the Prime Minister. This further empowers the Prime Minister's Office, detracting from India's parliamentary democracy by making it resemble a presidential system. 

 

The NSA serves as link between the Political Council of the NCA that comprises the Prime Minister and principal ministers, and the Executive Council, comprising of the significant officials, military chiefs and scientific heads. Even this responsibility of the NSA has no legislative authority underwriting it. The press release of January 3, 2003, from the Cabinet Committee on Security that met to operationalise India's nuclear deterrence policy at best serves to inform. It cannot be taken as sanctioning this role of the NSA. The responsibility needs being invested with legal content. 

 

The insertion of the NSA in the nuclear command loop is such as to act as a buffer between the political head and the military chiefs. To fulfil this function, the NSA has the support of the NSC Secretariat (NSCS), which is under the Deputy NSA and part of the PMO. The strategy programme staff that informs decision-making and implements nuclear deterrence and employment strategy is, however, not under him directly, but is in the NSCS.

 

The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) commands the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) that is in charge of India's crown jewels, its nuclear arsenal. The staff support of the Chairman COSC is the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. Further, the Chairman COSC receives his marching orders not from the Prime Minister or Defence Minister, but the NSA. Since the Chairman COSC is himself double-hatted, also serving as head of his service, the NSA’s role assumes a greater significance. In effect, the general commanding the SFC is willy-nilly reporting to two heads: the bona fide military chain of command and the more significant, but civilian, NSA. 

 

This reveals a structural problem in India's nuclear command and control in which accountability is with the military, but the authority is with the NSA. Governments in this century, including the current one, have promised to create the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A CDS, with executive teeth in the nuclear realm, would ensure convergence of accountability and authority. That the reconstitution of the dysfunctional National Security Advisory Board has been held up for close to a year now does not lend confidence on this score. 

 

The deficiencies of this system are such as to preclude buffeting from the angularities of personalities. As demonstrated on other occasions such as the Special Forces operation in Myanmar in the middle of last year, the NSA has a tendency to join the action. Conflict will serve up temptations aplenty for him to roll up his sleeves. The NSA would be better advised to exercise considerable self-restraint and allow the national security institutions to work their mandate, to enable him to take a wide-angled view of crises and conflict. Servicing the NSC in a sober manner would enable him to give relevant inputs as the fulcrum of the NCA.

A conflict strategy for India in the TNW era

http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/644372525_AConflictstrategyfoIndiaintheTNWera.pdf

Why rule in TNW

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) use considerations in an India-Pakistan conflict are usually held hostage to the optimist-pessimist debate. To deterrence optimists, nuclear deterrence will hold and therefore there is little to discuss. To pessimists, deterrence could break down and therefore there should be options up one’s sleeve. To the former, the existence of such options makes deterrence more liable to breakdown in first place. To the latter, the options reinforce deterrence in that the ability to respond in a situation of deterrence breakdown, prevents deterrence breakdown. A second line of argument between the two is in pessimists insisting that once breakdown is incentivized thus and occurs, then escalation is ruled in; making TNW irrelevant after the initial exchange(s). Pessimists believe that the idea of escalation is so horrendous to contemplate that escalation may not readily result, with the exchange(s) liable to be halted at the lowest threshold. Optimist would say that is impossible and therefore there is no call to make any effort to make nuclear war appear fightable; but to pessimists it is only impossible if no attempt is made to limit escalation and de-escalate prior and during hostilities.  The debate is liable to continue as it has since the seventies during the Cold Warbut in the regional setting in South Asia.

Understandably, in light of their security competition and largely adversarial relations, India and Pakistan appear on different sides of this debate. It would appear from India’s declaratory doctrine that it is informed by deterrence optimism; while Pakistan’s unstated nuclear doctrine seems to be based on deterrence pessimism. India’s declaratory doctrine posits unacceptable damage in return for nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. Logically, its use of the phrase ‘massive’ seems to be to reinforce deterrence in that it brings home to Pakistan the unwelcome prospects of escalation for that state. This explains India’s leveraging of its conventional advantage in its ‘proactive’ conventional doctrine. The optimistic understanding seems to be that deterrence will hold sufficiently for a measured conventional punishment of Pakistan.

Pakistan, for its part, appears nonchalant in pursuing tactical nuclear weapons as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence’ formulation in keeping with its concept of deterrence which covers not merely the nuclear level but also the conventional level. It believes that this enables deterrence against war, even while it races to restore the strategic balance seemingly in favour of India in terms of second strike capability. Pakistan’s deterrence pessimism comes through from its TNW turn in that it hints at its apprehensions that its extension of nuclear deterrence to cover the conventional level may not hold, forcing nuclear first use on it. That it hopes for a graduated escalation is seen in its emphasis on TNW, hoping thereby to preclude escalation by nuclear first use at the lowest escalatory threshold and with the lowest opprobrium quotient.

Since there is no initiative so far, despite the possibility having been bandied about in election time last year of a nuclear doctrine revision, at the declaratory level India persists with nuclear optimism. However, it cannot be said with conviction that this will remain the case with India’s operational nuclear doctrine. India’s operational nuclear doctrine may well be different and more responsive to nuclear developments on the Pakistan front, even if India chooses not to advertise any shift from its position based on nuclear optimism. Therefore, there is a possibility that India’s operational nuclear doctrine may have an element of nuclear pessimism. India has possibly taken care not to own up to this so as not to incentivize Pakistani nuclear first use in the belief that it can get away with a lower and therefore tolerable punishment. India requires cauterizing its conventional level from Pakistani nuclear first use. Any hint of its own contemplation of TNWs in response may incentivize Pakistani TNW use, thereby placing India’s conventional forces in harm’s way and with the challenge of facing a nuclear conflict.

However, it is clear that India’s resort to its declaratory doctrine for informing its nuclear strategy in a conflict gone nuclear exposes India to strategic exchange(s). Compared to this, tactical nuclear exchanges may not harm mainland India to a similar extent. Between the two – having armed forces face up to nuclear conflict and the population face up to a strategic nuclear exchange(s) – it can be expected that the democratic government in India may settle for the former. Therefore, it makes as much strategic sense for India to have tactical nuclear response options up its sleeve as an unstated operational nuclear doctrine as to alongside keep quiet on any departure from its declaratory nuclear doctrine this entails.

What the discussion above suggests is that TNW use cannot be ruled out. In any case, this is not for India to legislate on since it is a decision Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, serving Pakistan’s National Command Authority, has arrogated to itself. What has been established in the discussion here is contrary to strategic commentary in India that rules out TNW use by India, there is a possibility of India to respond in a ‘tit for tat’ manner since it makes strategic sense to do so. Doctrine can only inform strategy; it cannot dictate it. This suggests that a future conventional conflict can go nuclear with the resort to TNW by both sides.

What TNW use entails

Nuclear level

An appreciation of how this would play out is necessary at all three levels: nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional. At the nuclear level, the aim for India’s NCA would essentially be to modify the war aims for a war that has gone nuclear in light of preexisting and longstanding grand strategic aims. India would not like any of its three revolutions being undertaken simultaneously – economic, political and social – be upturned or inordinately set back. A nuclear war has potential to set these back considerably. India as a rising power may like to cauterize the long term effects of nuclear conflict. In this it would not be alone, in that Pakistan would also like to play along, aware that it would suffer disproportionately. The twin aims of the two states would have the facilitative weight of the alarmed international community. Therefore, the reflexive escalation that finds usual mention in strategic literature is unlikely to happen without a sufficient window for escalation control and bargaining.

At best any exchanges in this window as the political and diplomatic de-escalatory game plays out would be of TNW. The Indian nuclear logic in this initial exchange(s) should follow game-theory-endorsed mirroring strikes. TNW use for Pakistan would have two objectives: at the political level, it would be in a de-escalatory mode to message the crossing of thresholds and that India must desist from cashing in on the gains that have provoked the strike(s). At the operational level, the objective would be to redress any operational level asymmetries India’s offensives have generated. For India, TNW use would be to reflect its resolve. It would like to convey two messages simultaneously: one of determination not to be second best in any nuclear exchange(s) and second a willingness to discontinue these in case Pakistan throws in the towel first. These would entail TNW strikes that are quid pro quo or a tad quid quo pro plus.

Since the scenario usually imagined is of Pakistani TNW use in a low opprobrium mode on its own territory in a defensive manner, India’s reply would be also on Pakistani soil. This would be in effect a double whammy for Pakistan. It can only get out of this bind by escalating exponentially, a suicidal action. It would therefore be boxed into proportional escalation with the certainty that should it touch Indian soil in this, it would risk strategic exchange(s) – a slower but equally sure way to national suicide. What emerges is that even though the TNW genie is out of the bottle, TNW is what Pakistan would be restricted to and that too most likely on its own soil or at best in conflict zones on India’s territorial periphery. India can thus afford to mirror Pakistan in TNW exchanges. The strategic level at which the nuclear exchanges are playing out would then be in conformity with the political level at which the politico-diplomatic de-escalatory moves are in play. A pitch that India’s restraint will enable it at this level is that it be allowed to continue conventional operations to sufficiently punish Pakistan for its busting of the nuclear taboo, while an international clampdown on Pakistan’s nuclear use is enforced.

Conventional level

There are three options for conventional strategy: one is to rely that nuclear deterrence will hold; two is preparedness to modify conventional strategy in face of deterrence breakdown; and last is to have conventional operations proceed under the assumption of Pakistani nuclear first use with TNW. The first is somewhat wishful. While the good health of India’s deterrence is not in doubt, the strategic sense of the Pakistani leadership certainly is. The Pakistan army has blundered before and can do so at the crunch. The second is desirable in that it caters for both a deterrence breakdown and has contingency plans in place prior for coping timely. Since national war aims may be adjusted in face of nuclear first use, so would military objectives and plans.

The third, proceeding with the assumption that Pakistan means what it says, may make the military over-cautious, leading to it pulling its punches. The down-side of this is in India not exercising its conventional advantages, gained at the cost of national treasure, optimally. The up-side is that a cautious war strategy and plans would put Pakistan in a political spot if were to nevertheless break the nuclear taboo despite India’s restrained conventional strategy. It would put Pakistan in the political doghouse and enable opening up Pakistan to military punishment. Such a prevents nuclear first use and in case of nuclear first use enables using the political leverage so gained to advance military objectives.

This article is not the space for dilating on how such a conventional strategy needs working out. However, a barebones sketch is that India could unleash stand-off conventional punishment, not amounting to a Cold Start of Pakistan’s nightmares. It could do creeping and selective mobilization behind this, to both be in conformity with a crisis management profile of the run up to conflict as also up the ante in case of failure of crisis diplomacy. Pinprick Cold Start offensives, such as by an Integrated Battle Group or two, can serve notice on Pakistan. It could have a Cold Start lite up its sleeve in case Pakistani counter moves gain threatening proportions. Allowing Pakistan’s counter moves to play out may be useful alibi from a political casus belli point of view. The offensive punch of strike corps can be in reserve, awaiting a ripe moment for launch of Cold Start, even if no longer ‘cold’.

It can be envisaged that Pakistan’s nuclear moment is not when it is at the receiving end of stand-off missile, air, artillery and naval fire operations. The threshold is also unlikely to be crossed in case of pinprick IBG offensives. But it gains plausibility in case of Cold Start lite and increasingly so in case of strike corps operations. In case of TNW advent in face of Cold Start lite, the opportunity presents itself for strike corps to follow through. At the political level, space must be created for military punishment of Pakistan. This is possible in case of demonstrated conventional restraint as depicted here, followed by nuclear restraint in a ‘tit for tat’ TNW response. Strike corps can then operate with relative impunity in the dust of initial TNW exchange(s). Relatively bold gains can be made in the mountain sector employing the mountain strike corps, since TNW employment is unlikely in these areas owing to proximity of the national capital region of Pakistan and the water flow considerations. What this discussion suggests is that India’s plans must be less of Cold Start and more of slow boil and be capable of acceleration once Pakistan’s TNW gambit is revealed as having less conflict ending potential than it hopes.

Subconventional level

After the Gulf War II experience it is clear that hybrid wars are what a state must prepare for, especially when forces are deploying in areas that have potential for Islamism. Pakistan has been at war with extremism, albeit a selective and partial one, for about a decade. Indian offensives will eventually find Indian troops in occupation of Pakistani territory, and reclaimed Indian territory in J&K. It can easily appreciated that they will face an irregular warfare backlash. In case this is compounded by prior nuclear outbreak, there is likely to be a political and leadership vacuum in Pakistan, particularly at lower levels of administration. A clue to this can be seen in the manner the extremists managed to fulfill the requirements of an absent state when Pakistan was struck by the earthquake in 2005 and by floods later. Therefore, stabilization operations will have a subconventional operations bias. As to how this will be accentuated by the nuclear factor may have figured in formation wargames, but has escaped discussion in the open domain so far.

India has two options: one is to persist in Pakistani territory and second is to retrieve to Indian territory, other than in J&K, earliest. The former has its basis in war aims, which may be to stabilize Pakistan in order that it does not continue to pose a post war threat to India. This may be in league with right thinking elements in Pakistani polity and society, including factions within its military. This may include those in charge of its nuclear arsenal. This may be in conjunction with international organisations and key actors, including the US and China, lending a helping hand to stabilize Pakistan. On the other hand, the latter may be on account of prudence dictating that there is no reason to offer a magnet for terrorist impulses of extremist forces in Pakistan. In right thinking forces are at low ebb in Pakistan, there may be little that India can do but to contain a truncated, nuclear contaminated Pakistan. 

In either case, and during the course of conventional operations, India would in any case have to contend with an Islamist counter. Alongside, would be societal effects of TNW use, such as refugee flows and heightened civil-military issues such as disaster management. There would therefore have to be three lines of action. One is that the offensive formations will have to undertake their own anti-terrorist measures. Second is in additional formations, possibly Rashtriya Rifles, to undertake communication zone pacification. And last is paramilitary for handling the increased population control measures. Clearly, both RR and paramilitary, will be at a premium, particularly as calls from disaster management priorities within India, especially those stemming from nuclear blasts, will assume priority. Therefore, the army’s contingency plans will need keying in prior to operations itself. A major facet of these will be to sensitise soldiery of the need to distinguish between the extremists and people. Any identification between the two should not owe to India’ssubconventional operations. This has been the principal take away from wars this century.

Conclusion

Thinking about TNW use has been drowned out by the dominant narrative in nuclear strategic discourse in India that there is there is no such category. All nuclear weapons are strategic weapons. This is to serve India’s declaratory deterrence doctrine that any nuclear weapons use against India or its forces anywhere would meet with nuclear retribution. The problem with this postulation is that it prevents thinking such as carried in this paper that could productively inform conflict strategizing within the military. Whereas the military may be undertaking such thinking independently and confidentially, there is no reason for a blackout in strategic literature. In fact, loud thinking such as here, may help with deterrence, in that in communicates to Pakistan’s SPD that its expectations of nuclear stumping of India may be unfounded in light of India’s thinking through its responses prior and being prepared accordingly. An Indian military that is prepared for undertaking conventional operations in nuclear conditions will enable greater flexibility to the Political Council of India’s Nuclear Command Authority. It then does not reflexively have to approve a nuclear strategy based on the declaratory doctrine. India’s operationalization of the nuclear deterrent, which involves a greater military input and interface than hitherto with the nuclear field, must also push for an operational nuclear doctrine, which even if kept secret, is a departure from the declaratory doctrine.

A nuclear strategy that envisages TNW employment as depicted here must follow game-theory endorsed ‘tit for tat’ exchange(s), at least at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum. This will convey resolve and allow Pakistan a face saving exit. In being de-escalatory thus, it will create a political and moral high-ground for India to continue conventional operations. Conventional operations must first be premised on caution and second must be capable of upgrading in violence once international political-diplomatic pressures ensuing on induction of TNW succeed in restraining Pakistan. Conventional forces can expect a subconventional backlash from Pakistani extremists. Conflict strategy must have an exit game-plan in play. If persisting on occupied territory is required then it must be in conjunction with right thinking elements in Pakistan polity, society and its army.

TNW are here to stay. As other weapons they cannot be uninvented. Consequently, discussion on their effects and the possibilities and options they open up must be part of the professional regimen. The current silence on such issues is untenable and can prove paralyzing later. There are issues that have not been covered here but warrant equal attention, such as the effects on fighting troops’ morale and discipline, on management of families in cantonments close to the border etc.Approaching nuclear conflict as a different conflict environment enables clarity in such matters. Even if in the event it turns out that the nature and character of conflict does not really change, nuclear conflict will make demands that can be expected to put our earlier experience of relatively gentlemanly wars in the subcontinent to shade. 

Information operations in Limited Nuclear War
http://www.claws.in/1485/information-operations-in-limited-nuclear-war-ali-ahmed.html

It is a cliché that deterrence is a mind game. Clearly then, information operations that affect the mind of the adversary nuclear decision maker are critical. In peacetime and conflict, they need to be so directed that deterrence is strengthened. 

In conflict, it is not infeasible that deterrence may break down. However, nuclear first use does not entail abandonment of deterrence. In-conflict deterrence will need support of information operations in order to limit the war gone nuclear. Alongside coping with nuclear use, consequences will add to the targets of information operations that would require being directed also at one’s own military and people. 

The aim would continue to be deterrence in all phases: peacetime, pre-conflict, conventional operations stage and, even, post-nuclear first use. This article posits an interesting shift in the peacetime, pre- and post-nuclear use phases. 

In peacetime, the emphasis would be on nuclear escalatory possibilities, projecting these as inevitable. This can already be seen in play with the latest salvo on this score being from Amb. G. Parthasarathy writing: ‘Pakistan will be very foolish to test out Indian resolve to respond massively to its use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).’ 

This echoes Amb. Shyam Saran’s earlier warning on the same lines: ‘Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do ….’ 

However, on conflict outbreak and in its pre-nuclear first use conventional operations phase, there needs to be greater subtlety. Even as the escalation potential is accentuated, the narrative could include the ability, if not the intent, for nuclear response in kind (quid pro quo and quid pro quo plus). 

While the latter – escalatory potential - will influence the mind of the civilian part of Pakistan’s NCA, the former – limiting nuclear war possibilities - will play on its uniformed side. Together, they would help stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand, i.e. deter. Building in subtlety is necessary on two counts. 

The first is to prevent nuclear ‘first use’ (introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict) in the form of a ‘first strike’ attempt (to take out India’s nuclear retaliatory potential in a higher order strike). Since India follows a No First Use policy, it needs to insure against first strike. While second strike capability is the best manner of doing so and efforts to this end are in hand, information operations serve to supplement. 

The second, correspondingly, is to deter Pakistan’s lower order first use, as its foreign secretary recently promised. Information operations would need to be subtle here: not only must they help deter TNW use, but also to incentivise TNW in battlefield mode over any other Pakistani nuclear first use option. 

That all corps and command exercises have a nuclear adjunct suggests this scenario can be coped with. Peacetime information operations have hitherto emphasised this preparedness; thereby sending the message that TNW will not serve any military purpose. 

In a shift since 2012 when the nuclear dimension found mention in Exercise Sudarshan Chakra, the usual nuclear aspect has been left out of the press briefs in subsequent years such as for Exercise Shoor Veer and Exercise Panchjanya. So has been the case this yearwith Exercise Brahmashira by a strike corps, though ‘full spectrum of operations’, presumably including nuclear, found mention in the brief on Exercise Akraman II of the pivot corps (Baatcheet April 2015, p. 11). 

The message - perhaps inadvertent - was that India is sanguine that deterrence works and it incentivises Pakistan to keep the battlefield non-nuclear. 

However, more significant is the strategic outcome with silence on the ‘nuclear backdrop’ keeping diplomatic attention away to counter Pakistan’s constant projection of a ‘pink flamingo’ - a predictable but ignored possibility – in South Asia. 

However, it can be reasonably adduced that Pakistani TNW resort would not be so much to stop a strike corps in its tracks, but as nuclear messaging. From India’s point of view, nuclear first use against its troops anywhere, being least hurtful, would be preferable to such use against any other category of target: military installation, industrial, infrastructure or civilian. To incentivize this - as against the undesirable mode of first use - information operations must flexibly make a switch. 

From pre-war positing of Armageddon (for Pakistan) for any nuclear first use, they must switch to projecting that India has lower order nuclear retaliatory options. This way, in case of an itchy nuclear finger, Pakistan reaches for the lower order nuclear first use button. 

Once the ‘nuclear taboo’ – global nuclear non-use norm - has been breached by Pakistan, information operations have an exponential increase in the task at hand. Not only must they keep the Pakistani NCA from escalating by working on its mind, but multiple targets have to be influenced in myriad ways. 

Within Pakistan’s NCA, a debate can be imagined between those wanting a more robust go at India. In light of India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 - ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation – there would be a ‘use them or lose them’ dilemma. 

The saner element - from which the Pakistani military cannot be excluded - may pitch for non-escalatory options. Indian information operations will have to target the NCA in a manner that the latter wins the debate. In this, information operations will play second-fiddle to the nuclear retaliatory strategy in play. 

Depending on the retaliatory option chosen, information operations will require supplementing the message. 

It would appear that retaliatory options that leave open the possibility of de-escalation can be better supported by information operations. While diplomacy does its bit, information operations would need working on the international media to underscore legitimacy of India’s war waging options – nuclear and conventional. 

However, more importantly, these would need to play on the mind of the Pakistani NCA, in particular its civilian element. This can be done indirectly, by pressing Pakistani people to get the leadership off the nuclear ladder, not so much by instilling fear as by conveying India’s benign intent. It would be important to keep this message simple, loud and direct to cut through ‘noise’ and the ‘fog of war’. At this juncture, any blame-game can wait. 

The multiple targets for information operations in this post nuclear use phase would include India’s military and people. Both would require reassurance. The latter would additionally require informing of emergency and population control measures. Transparency would have to be tempered by the need to ward off panic and disorder that tend to worst affect the most vulnerable. Here the static formations' ‘A’ staff need to be suitably exercised, especially those covering metropolises. 

The doctrinal effects of the loud thinking here are of import. The open domain doctrine, Indian Army Doctrine (2004), does not carry a section on information operations. Information operations can figure in a separate joint information warfare doctrine, as also as be included as distinct chapters in the service doctrines. 

Since only the gist of the nuclear doctrine was carried in the 2003 press release on its operationalisation, hopefully the operational doctrine has a more variegated discussion on inter-linkages between information and nuclear operations. 

Clearly, the Information Warfare staff, currently available down to Corps level, has its task cutout.   - 

See more at: http://www.claws.in/1485/information-operations-in-limited-nuclear-war-ali-ahmed.html#sthash.VjhaGsQ1.dpuf

India-Pakistan: Ties Finally Looking Up?         http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/12/09/india-pakistan-ties-finally-looking-up/                                                                       The joint statement of the National Security Advisers (NSA) of India and Pakistan at the end of their secret meeting in Bangkok on 6 December has buoyed expectations. Not only does it closely precede the visit of India’s foreign minister to Islamabad for the Heart of Asia conference on Afghanistan this week, but it also heralds the visit of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Islamabad for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit.

The initiative was result of the short informal meeting between the two prime ministers at the climate change summit in Paris. It retrieves the ground lost since the last minute cancellation of the NSA meeting in August over a disagreement on whether the agenda should include Kashmir or be restricted to terrorism. Pakistan wanted to undo what had been agreed at the meeting in Ufa, Russia, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) between the two prime ministers reflected in the joint statement of the two foreign secretaries that left out mention of Kashmir. That both terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) were discussed at Bangkok shows the two are beyond this particular hurdle.

The canceled meeting of August was in wake of two terror attacks that were taken in India as the Pakistani army’s manner of registering its disapproval of its government’s agreement to an agenda without Kashmir. Pakistan soon thereafter replaced its national security adviser with a former military man. This switch incentivized India in that it could now consider dealing with a credible interlocutor.

The secret meeting also shows a shift in India’s strategy. The early promise of the Modi government of better India-Pakistan ties, evidenced by Modi’s invite to Nawaz Sharif to attend his swearing in in May 2014, was dissipated in the cancellation of foreign secretary talks soon thereafter in August of the same year.

India kept up the pressure with partial activation of the Line of Control by fire assaults by India, seemingly in response to spurt in infiltration bids from across. These duels spread to the international border sector also. This year has seen India exercise elements of all three of its geographic field armies facing Pakistan, including two strike corps. There were also insinuations in Pakistani media of covert Indian assistance to dissident militant groups in Pakistan.

This phase of strategy can now be seen to be shoring up of its fences by the new Indian government before it ventured to mend these. The idea appears to have been to go in for talks from a position of strength. For its part, Pakistan has gained confidence in setting back, through military and ranger operations in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and in Karachi,  elements it alleges have had Indian intelligence backing and gains the Taliban, allegedly with its backing, have made in Afghanistan.

The very fact that the talks have taken place in secret and outside the region suggests that even a conservative-realist government in Delhi needs to tread pragmatically. While the talks have been a step ahead, it is only the first. The vision of the two prime ministers for a ‘peaceful, stable, and prosperous South Asia’ requires many more steps to follow.

What should these steps be?

The first steps would necessarily be on atmospherics. The visits by the foreign minister and prime minister in quick succession can revise the tone of the relationship. Since the Pakistan army appears to be on board this time, India has the assurance that there would not be another Kargil-on-the-make as was the case last time when the last BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee went to Lahore to fix the relationship in 1999.

A resumption of cricketing ties, awaiting a green light from India’s foreign ministry, can now be expected. The two teams have been poised lately to play a short one-day series, but in Sri Lanka.However, on atmospherics, the more important front is to manage the internal perceptions of the ‘Other’ state.

In Pakistan, the extremist leader Hafeez Sayeed has already chipped in with his criticism. In India, the Congress opposition, while overall supportive of improved ties, has registered its reservation on the unpredictability in the government’s Pakistan policy.

More significant in India are the voices in the government’s own camp that require managing. Lately, there have been several statements by right wing politicians dragging Pakistan into their point-scoring against India’s largest minority, its Muslims. This has prompted the ongoing ‘intolerance’ debate in India.

From the ‘intolerance’ debate, the prospects of this do not appear bright since Modi has chosen not to rein in the cultural nationalists, his support base. It is possible he might choose to keep silent, since it would also enable him an alibi against moving further than he might like on repairing fences with Pakistan.

Among the final steps figures a return to the start point made available by the back channel in the first tenure of the predecessor government of Manmohan Singh. The memoirs of Pakistan’s foreign minister in the period, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, reveal the possibilities. However, ‘resolution’ along those lines, may not be the destination either Modi or his National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, have in mind. As hardliners, they may believe that India does not need to make any concessions to buy peace, preferring Pakistan fall in line overawed by India’s rise.

In the interim, both governments would likely consolidate the beginning made. At a minimum, India would be looking to keep a mega-terror attack from diverting its economic trajectory into a conflict with nuclear portents. Pakistan for its part would like  India to ease up on intelligence, diplomatic, and military pressure. That the two foreign secretaries were also present at Bangkok suggests a broader agenda than merely security.

Therefore, it is clear that Modi’s next, if yet-to-be-announced, foreign stop Islamabad would likely be his most important. It remains to be seen if, as has been his wont in using his numerous foreign visits for positioning India favorably, he is able to finesse Pakistan.