India's Hard Power Options Considered

http://www.claws.in/1431/indias-hard-power-options-considered-ali-ahmed.html

				September 04, 2015
Publicity on release of a book by former Pakistan President Musharraf’s foreign minister Khurshid Kasuri refer to his recount of a meeting in the aftermath of 26/11. He claims to have been horrified of learning from American interlocutors of the possibility of India wanting to have a go with its air force at Muridke, Lashkar’s headquarters in Punjab. Kasuri apprehended Pakistan’s army would react and together with India’s counter, escalation would result. The situation and attendant fears have not changed much since. The recent attacks in Gurdaspur and Udhampur indicate that the Lashkar remains among the ‘good terrorists’ in Pakistan army’s book. As long as this is so, India’s position in the run up to the cutting off of NSA talks by Pakistan suggests that it is keeping its powder dry. What then are India’s options? How do these measure-up against Kasuri’s fears of escalation? ‘Do nothing’ was never an option. Now, the several cautionary words by this government to Pakistan clearly rule in hard power. Whereas warnings are a prudent exercise in deterrence, they also amount to burning one’s bridges. This time around, India is presumably better prepared. Alongside, internal political factors and individual biases of decision-makers will also chip in to drive an Indian response in favour of hard power. The parameters of such a response would be to visibly get back at the Lashkar. India would also not want to allow the Pakistan Army impunity behind ‘plausible deniability’. While at it, India would make a distinction of the army from the civilian government and people in Pakistan. Discriminating thus, it would get the international community alongside it diplomatically. Finally, a long-term perspective must attend exercise of hard power, including a political perspective on shaping the outcome. Whereas diplomacy, the promise of political engagement and economic incentives constitute soft power, military and intelligence operations are two hard power instruments. The hard power strategy options that best create conditions for reversion to soft power would be the more attractive. In terms of time, strategy orchestration would be such that the military and intelligence instruments would figure in the immediate and near term and diplomatic and intelligence over the near and middle term. The economic and political instruments will come in over the middle and long term, once the conditions have been created by the exercise of hard power. This entails a certain mix and match. The NSA, charged with thinking through the mix, can be expected to give intelligence operations greater consideration than hitherto. In a lecture,  prior to taking over the appointment, he had noted the principal advantage being, that these need beless cognizant of nuclear thresholds. Intelligence operations shall be sui-generis and inherent in all options. The response strategy options are essentially four: target the terrorist organization; target the terror organization along with the supporting elements of Pakistan army; targeting the Pakistan military directly; and, last, targeting Pakistan as a state. In terms of probability of India’s choice, the fourth is least likely since India makes a distinction between Pakistan as a state and the ‘deep state’ in Pakistan. It would not unnecessarily want to weaken the civilian government any further than it already is in relation to extremists in Pakistan and its military. It would also be mindful of international pressures wary of a nuclear war. The third – expansive targeting of the military - is less likely. Pakistani military counter could spell war. Not directly provoking this choice by attacking military targets outright, India would leave the choice of upping-the-ante to Pakistan. Preparedness to withstand the counter will help deter any non-commensurate Pakistani military reaction. The drawback is in India risking loss of initiative. Competitive mobilization liable to be misread, it has escalatory potential. The second – hitting at terrorist infrastructure that includes the army - is likely. Targeting the military implies activation of the Line of Control (LoC) to levels witnessed at the turn of the century. Hurting that military directly would be the aim. It also messages resolve. The underside is in the Pakistani military getting its ego in way of sound strategy and pushing of the two, terrorists and hardliners, together. The first – as Kasuri lets on - is most likely, in that targeting terror infrastructure in the first instance would be discriminatory, legitimate and easily justifiable. It is also de-escalatory, in that it would release pressures on India to ‘do something’. Whereas this can be done through intelligence means alone, these pressures may include a military punch or two. Preserving the Pakistan army from retaliation, does not compel any reaction on its part, thereby short-circuiting escalatory impulse. The disadvantage is that the aftermath of the strikes would witness an unsustainable premium on diplomacy to keep the pressure on Pakistan.  In all options, the escalation cannot be ruled out. In fact, some may argue that it needs to be ruled in subtly for  sending a message on escalation dominance, that a worse punishment is held in reserve. Thus far, Pakistan has been manipulating the threat of escalation. India, with more to lose, now that it is on a good economic trajectory, has rightly avoided distraction.The cautionary messaging has it that India will be less mindful of escalatory prospects. India may choose to actively manipulate risk. Since the first option is a ‘given’, the choice is between the second and third options. Which of the two enables manipulation of the escalation risk favourably? A bout of hard power application is to condition Pakistan army’s hardliners and terror proxies. The second option, that does not imply war, spells this out at lower cost and risk. However, it is also apparently an option already in play with the LoC active to a degree. On its effectiveness, precedence of the nineties does not enthuse. This leaves the third option – directing attacks on the Pakistan army. These attacks should be limited both in time and range of targets, backed by declaration of the limited intent publicly and through diplomatic channels. Alongside, partial mobilization, some in public domain and some covert, need being taken. Those taken publicly serve notice on Pakistan, even as those taken covertly are anticipatory. Such operations, perhaps some version of Cold Start lite and air power and confined geographically, do not in themselves flirt with nuclear thresholds but in their boldness and departure from past practice manipulate the risk. India’s military no doubt already has a menu up its sleeve. Finally, the hard power option is only as effective as its supplementing political incentives. India is committed to talks once the terror by proxy is turned off. Pakistan’s army appears to want indicators that India would not renege. This will need conveying through the diplomatic prong of strategy. However, with NSA talks aborted, this can serve as agenda for a subsequent - ‘first-ever’- round. India would do well to create conditions for such a round, without recourse to the third option chipping in - in the interim.

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India-Pakistan: With NSA Talks Aborted, What Next?

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/india-pakistan-with-nsa-talks-aborted-what-next/

Referring to a “whole history of unproductive dialogues with Pakistan,” Kanwal Sibal, a former Indian foreign secretary, reflects negatively on whether a “more resolute government as that of Modi (should) get into the rut of sterile dialogues with Pakistan.” Sibal need not worry. Talks between the two countries’ respective national security advisers were aborted just a day prior to their scheduled start.

The talks were first mooted in the joint press statement of the two foreign secretaries at the Ufa meeting of the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers. The two NSAs were to meet in Delhi, potentially clearing the way for the Indian prime minister to travel to Pakistan for the SAARC summit next year.

Skeptical reports in the run-up had hinted that the Pakistan army was bearing down on Nawaz Sharif, pressuring him to halt the meeting. This gave a window for Indian skeptics to snipe at the idea. This positioning prior to the talks had more or less ensured that they would have been, at best, as the Pakistani NSA Sartaj Aziz put it, “ice-breaking.”

That the naysayers on both sides managed to scuttle the talks underscores their hold over their respective security establishments. This mirroring is unlikely to go away any time soon.

This answers the question “Why were the talks called off?” The more important question remains: “What next?” It is here that Kanwal Sibal’s policy recommendation comes to fore.

Sibal, miffed by the two attacks by Pakistani proxies – one in Indian Punjab bordering Jammu and Kashmir and the other within Jammu and Kashmir itself – in the run-up to the talks, argues that India should first develop “levers to modulate Pakistan’s conduct” and “then agree to a dialogue should Pakistan seek it.”

With the talks called off, this is the only option India is left with. For that reason, it bears scrutiny.

The problem with Kanwal’s thesis – and he speaks for India’s Pakistan skeptics – is that it is without an end date or exit strategy.

Even had the exploratory talks at NSA level gone on to reopen the dialogue, India would have developed the levers to modulate Pakistan’s conduct. This would have been done both as a measure to keep up the pressure on Pakistan to stick to the table, as well as an insurance should the talks have failed to moderate Pakistan.

These levers are military, intelligence and diplomatic.

Militarily, India has been at it, ramping up its defense budget. A statistic from Modi’s first year in office was that India fast tracked 40 defense projects worth over Rs. 1 trillion ($15.1 billion), intended in part to increase the gap in conventional armaments with Pakistan’s army.

Over the past year, it has given the army liberty to give a “befitting reply” to provocations along the Line of Control and International Border. Pakistan has over the last month made two references to the firing along what it considers the “working border” to the UNMOGIP, the UN mission overseeing the ceasefire since 1949. Both countries have used embassy channels to record their displeasure at the other side’s aggressive firing.

On the intelligence front, India’s defense minister has hinted at proactive intelligence operations in Pakistan. Understandably, the NSA subsequently watered down the defense minister’s remarks and India has denied any proxy action. However, a rare complaint at the Pakistani corps commanders’ conference suggests otherwise – although proof is obviously hard to come by. In preparing for the NSA talks, Pakistan had compiled a dossier with its complaints of Indian “interference.”

Diplomatically, the visits of Obama and Jiang Zemin to New Delhi, though intended by India to suitably isolate Pakistan over the latter’s support for terrorism, can only have limited effect. Pakistan’s strategic location buttresses its indispensability to the eventual outcome in Afghanistan. Pakistan is looking to play the Russian card if necessary.

The call in India will be more of the same and for longer. But this is not without underside.

Militarily, the “two front” problem has already kicked in, with reports of India diluting its Mountain Strike Corps due to lack of finances.

Doctrinally, there is dissonance. While at the conventional level India intends to be on the offensive, its nuclear doctrine has not been able to come to terms with the problem posed by Pakistani nuclear first use in the form of tactical nuclear weapons. The devastating response that the current nuclear doctrine posits can hardly be risked in the face of Pakistan’s vertical proliferation of nuclear warhead numbers into the three digits.

On the subconventional front, Jammu and Kashmir, which has been relatively stable for more than a decade, could slide back into turmoil, offering a fertile ground for penetration of more radical ideologies, such as those of the ISIS. Indian responses and Pakistani reactions would then flirt with the nuclear threshold. Under the circumstances, it would not do to up the military ante.

The intelligence game of using proxies has an unremarked downside, in its impact on the domestic politics of both countries. Using Pakistani extremists against their own state – as Pakistan accuses India of doing – can only strengthen their hand.

The more significant effect is in India’s domestic politics. India’s Muslim minority will come under pressure as a potential conduit through which Pakistan could be expected to strike back. India’s majoritarian extremists, arguably already rampant, will use the canard of a Muslim fifth column to further raise their profile.

Diplomatically, it would be difficult for India to sell a zero-tolerance for terrorism strategy with India letting off “saffron terrorists,” even as it takes Pakistan to the UN sanctions committee. India’s inability to isolate Pakistan will make it more reliant on its military and intelligence cards, accentuating the risks.

Finally, eventually, as Sibal says, these levers will need to be exercised to bring Pakistan round. This will down the line be at an even higher level of risk and cost. Indeed, the NSAs would then have much to discuss but no forum in which to do so, the first ever NSA talks having been aborted at their very inception

http://www.claws.in/1419/nuclear-battlefield-preparedness-ali-ahmed.html

Nuclear Battlefield Preparedness

It is well known that in May 1998 India conducted five nuclear tests. One was reportedly of a nuclear weapon based on the 1974 test already in stock. The second was of a thermonuclear device with a fusion-boosted fission trigger with a potential yield of 200Kt. The other three were sub-kiloton fission devices.[i] Of the latter, writing ten years on in 2008, Dr. Chidambaram, the architect of the tests, wrote: ‘The sub-kiloton devices tested again had all the features needed for integration with delivery vehicles and were tested from the point of view of developing low-yield weapons and of validating new weapon-related ideas and sub-systems. Thus the carefully-planned series of tests carried out in May 1998 gave us the capability to build nuclear weapons from low yields up to around 200 kt. A great deal of further scientific and technical development work has taken place since then.’[ii] Whereas the 15Kt and 45Kt yield tests attracted due attention, the three tests that confer on India a tactical nuclear capability have been largely overshadowed. This perhaps owes to the principle that under-grids the declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003, that for India there is nothing known as TNW. However, it is not possible that three of five tests were without appropriate doctrinal pedigree. Consequently, the three have a rational basis that needs resurrecting. Clearly, another seven years since Dr. Chidambaram’s assessment, it can be plausibly assumed that India has the low yield weapons mentioned in stock. From declaratory doctrine it is not certain that these are TNWs. Since all nuclear weapons are for strategic use, and not military use, these weapons, even if of low yield, may have strategic utility alone. Good health of deterrence calls for reinforcing this line of argument. The nuclear enemy could erroneously assume that since India has low yield weapons it may undertake lower order retaliation. Such thinking may then tempt him to go first with TNW. Since Pakistan has proliferated vertically, it may reckon that it has in-conflict deterrence against higher order nuclear retaliation, thereby giving it confidence to use TNW. Pakistan therefore needs being constantly disabused of such thinking. The notion of TNW applicability in nuclear war has to be dispelled. For this reason India has abjured discussing TNWs. By this yardstick, even if low yield weapons exist, these are for strategic targets, such as nuclear command and control facilities or for counter force strikes. Their low yields can prevent escalatory collateral damage, particularly since the Indus Valley is densely populated. Since these low yield weapons have strategic utility, they are not meant as TNW for battle field use. That said, the fact is that the western adversary tacitly promises to ‘go first’ with TNW. Professional answer-seeking involves a look at the proverbial ‘worst case scenario’ of introduction of TNW into a conflict by the adversary. The military would then be able to focus on what to do and have the adversary in question know that it can follow through in a nuclear environment. Nuclear battlefield preparedness therefore has a two-fold logic. Firstly, battlefield nuclear preparedness enhances deterrence Whereas India has no intention of viewing nuclear weapons as having military utility even in the circumstance of nuclear first use by Pakistan, Pakistan will be skeptical of this. As has always been reiterated by India that its troops will not fight at a disadvantage, Pakistan in its assessment cannot rule out Indian TNW use, in addition to the strategic retribution involving higher order retaliation it promises. Consequently, knowing that any prospective gains will be denied and at a cost, an adversary, suitably impressed, will then hesitate with TNW first use. The bonus for India is that it raises the nuclear threshold for optimum use of its conventional advantage. Secondly, in any case, since the adversary tacitly promises to go first with TNW, a look at operational and tactical level implications is warranted as the battlefield could go nuclear. At the strategic level this implies the Strategic Planning Staff considering whether India’s strategic response needs an operational supplement. The contours of this are not dwelt on here as the declaratory nuclear doctrine already rules this out. At the operational level, there are three aspects. First, the initiative of TNW use being with the enemy, degradation through conventional means could prove preventive. To be sure, this runs the risk of occasioning nuclear first use by the enemy, triggering the ‘use them-lose them’ phenomenon. This risk may be inescapable since the enemy could employ the TNW more fruitfully later, such as on a bridgehead, if left unmolested. Second, is building in conventional responses, such as through having at hand reserves and their appropriate use; an example is forcing through another bridgehead thereby denying the enemy any gain from TNW use. If in a defensive mode, this entails sidestepping reserves to plug any nuclear hole the adversary may punch. The third is input for a nuclear response. Bottom-up options for this have to feed into considerations in the Strategic Planning Staff. In any case, operational fallout of any nuclear response options chosen need to be factored in. So that the nuclear dimension of conflict is not lost sight of in the melee of war, the operations staff corps level upwards can do with a nuclear operations cognizant adjunct. At the tactical level, the impact will be more psychological. Ongoing commentary from the centenary commemorations of the Great War invariably covers the impact chemical weapons had on the battlefield. A similar effect can be imagined, if in greater magnitude. Extant pamphlets no doubt cover decontamination and survival drills, and equipment is possibly stocked to a degree. Nevertheless, aspects such as cohesion, discipline, morale supports and perception management of troops need attention alongside. Defence lines and spearheads will be sorely tested, particularly horizontal subunit cohesion and vertical cohesion of command chains. An aspect warranting a closer look may be to have on hand military police and military law capabilities for speedy battlefield justice. Communication zone nuclear strikes could have front line effects, such as in case cantonments are targeted for their command and control and logistics facilities, with collateral damage on resident families. This may entail mobilization schemes from front line military stations also undertaking speedy vacation by troop families. This is a foreseeable measure to prevent inadvertent escalation. War games to simulate the complexity of the nuclear environment must include such non-kinetic effects. ‘A’ matters need a review in light of the tactical effects of nuclear impacts. Finally, incorporation into training needs moving from pamphlets and lecture halls to squad posts and exercise areas. Nuclear preparedness cannot be left to the Strategic Planning Staff, charged with serving the Nuclear Command Authority, and the Strategic Forces Command for executing nuclear retaliation. Operationalization of the deterrent involves the wider army too.

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India: Dissecting The Doval Doctrine – OpEd

http://www.eurasiareview.com/07082015-india-dissecting-the-doval-doctrine-oped/

Friday, August 7th, 2015

Ajit Doval’s appointment as India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) was among the first appointments made by Mr. Modi on becoming prime minister. That Doval was perhaps tipped off by Modi of post-election possibilities is evident form a lecture Doval delivered at the Sastra University in Tamil Nadu early last year in which he outlined his strategic world view. That he is now India’s NSA makes this speech consequential.

The speech has become infamous since for the wrong reason. Excerpts of the lecture having been uploaded on YouTube early this year, it has erroneously been reckoned that Doval as NSA has threatened Pakistan with losing Balochistan in case it triggers another Mumbai 26/11. While Doval did threaten as much, it was in his capacity then as head of the conservative think tank, Vivekananda International Foundation.

Nevertheless, Doval perhaps anticipating his next assignment used the opportunity of his lecture on ‘India’s Strategic Response to Terrorism’ to lay out his worldview. Since he has been India’s leading spook, with a penchant for the tactical, it is not unlikely that his strategic worldview goes no further than the intelligence domain covered in the lecture. This makes the lecture more important then merely yet another lecture by a think tank head.

That India’s current day strategy appears to be unfolding along the lines he laid out makes the lecture virtually a key statement of India’s strategic doctrine. Since Pakistan is taken as a state sponsor of terror, the lecture also goes some way in also explaining India’s Pakistan strategy. The lecture consequently bears critical scrutiny.

Doval restricted his counter terror strategy discussion only to terror incidents attributed to India’s largest minority, its Muslims. As he was head of IB when a spate of terrorism broke out in the Indian hinterland, dated by him to March 2005, he would know that not all incidents attributable to the minority have been perpetrated by Muslim terrorists.

The manner India’s current regime is covering its tracks in letting off majoritarian terrorists lately is suggestive of something to hide. In case the terror incidents Hindutva elements are responsible for is subtracted from the volume of terror India has been subject to, minority terrorism emerges as a bogey. No wonder the home minister has made a show of taking offence to the term ‘saffron terrorism’, hoping to marginalize such allegations and obscure any truth behind them.

This becomes clearer by dissecting Doval’s prescription. His strategic response to terrorism is, firstly, ‘smothering’ terrorist outfits; pitching nationalist Indian Muslims against the anti-national Islamists within their community; and making Pakistan hurt through a strategic doctrine of ‘defensive offense’.

Of the first, the smothering of terrorists by denial of arms, money and support, superficially, there is little to complain. The problem is when a distinction is not made between terrorists and common folk. Security forces are apt to see potential terrorists everywhere in Muslim ghettos.

Under the circumstance of right wing prejudice now mainstream, resulting impunity can only multiply this tendency. With tall tales of Daesh making a South Asian debut, rushing the home ministry into thinking up a counter radicalisation doctrine, surveillance of the community is not unlikely.

The second – ‘divide and rule’ by using the pro-national and anti-national Muslim against each other – smacks of Chanakyan cunning. Strategy is mistaken for cunning in light of the iconic status of home grown strategist Chanakya.

The association of cultural nationalists with the pro-national Muslims can only serve to marginalize them, leading to non-secular alternatives. Take for instance, Zafar Sereshwala, a Modi acolyte, hardly has a constituency. Instead, ever since mainstream parties were sidelined in the last elections, a firebrand party, the Hyderabad-based Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM), appears to be filling the vacuum.

Equally disturbing is Doval’s intent to buy terrorists: by paying out ‘one and a half times’ more of their price! His experience teaches him that since they are mercenaries, they can be bought and turned against theirs sponsors. Is it that this strategy is already in play?

If so it may account for some of the terror Pakistan is subject to and perhaps explains the defence minister’s cryptic remark of fighting terror with terror (‘removing thorns with thorns’). The rare complaint of Pakistan being subject to terror by proxy by India coming as a corps commanders’ conference outcome makes this a compelling possibility.

However, more disturbingly, terrorist turncoats can also be used for questionable strategic purposes. For instance, they can be used to attack Indian targets to project that such attacks are Pakistan perpetrated. The commentary in Pakistan questioning the antecedents of the Dinanager terror attack of last month is a case.

Terror attacks so engineered can enhance the case against Pakistan, enabling that state to be subject to Indian pressures with greater vigour. They can also be used to push India’s minority further into tis corner through manipulation of guilt by association.

Clearly, there is a case for political control of the intelligence apparatus. This cannot be entrusted to Mr. Doval, himself an intelligence czar. With a right wing regime in power, democratic control would instead of implying restraint, may imply quite the opposite.

Finally, and perhaps more importantly on account of the nuclear overhang, is Doval’s assertion that India can prise loose Balochistan. His assumption is that there would be no nuclear fallout, as this would not involve military engagement and the consequent need to be wary of nuclear thresholds

As current custodian of India’s nuclear doctrine in his capacity as head of the Executive Council, he is by now surely better briefed. He would know that Pakistan in an uncharacteristic fit of transparency had in 2002 let on that in case it is faced with internal destabilization on a large scale, it would resort to the nuclear weapon, implying it would up the ante perhaps by first going conventional. This puts paid to Doval’s notion that the military would not come into the equation.

Clearly, the Doval doctrine is problematic with cultural nationalism contaminating strategic rationality. And, worse, remedy is four years away.

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/07/29/india-pakistan-please-use-the-impending-opportunity-well/

India-Pakistan: Please use the impending 

opportunity well

July 29, 2015 

India’s actions on the Line of Control last year and its operations in pursuit 
of Naga militants who had ambushed its convoy inflicting heavy casualties 
on its troops this May together are being taken as indicators of India’s new strategic 
doctrine. Public statements by its leaders, in particular the defense minister’s on the
 use of proxy groups to fight terrorists, are another indicator.

Taken together the actions and the rhetoric can indicate India’s new strategic doctrine.
 Since India has not explicitly owned up to this yet, it has been variously termed as
‘disproportionate response’ in the media and as defensive offence’ by its National
 Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval.

Doval used the term in a lecture immediately prior to the elections early last year
 that has belatedly has become famous for his statement: ‘You can do one Mumbai,
you will lose Baluchistan.’ The lecture itself is important in reading as India’s current
strategic doctrine.

This is a step forward from earlier regimes that were coy of setting out where they
stood on defense and security. The resulting situation was such that analysts could
 be best visualized as ‘blind men of Hindoostan’ clustered around an elephant and
using whatever came within their grasp as the strategic doctrine of the state.

Since India has not published a white paper or strategic review paper, the
situation is not materially different but the advance this time round is that the
government owns up to being tough for both political and strategic reasons.

The political reasons for this are easy to see. Prime Minister Modi in an election
speech had referred to his 56-inch chest. A tough image is therefore one that he has
self-selected to. The ruling party subscribes to cultural nationalism. This ideology has
 it that India has neglected her defenses, leading to its subjugation not only by
colonialists but also by Muslims in the medieval ages. India has grown back its muscles
 which can now be unapologetically displayed to keep Pakistan on the backfoot.

Political utility apart, there are also strategic reasons for owning up to a more proactive
 and offensive strategic doctrine. It serves a deterrent purpose. The government having
prioritized is unwilling to see it thwarted by a mega terror attack originating in Pakistan. It therefore prefers to serve notice to Pakistan on the consequences.

It also has foreign policy benefit in that it enables it to then engage Pakistan from a
 position of strength. The preceding months of exchanges of firing on the Line of
Control serve to condition Pakistan that it is no longer business-as-usual.

Alongside, if a recent Pakistani corps commanders’ conference outcome is to be
believed, Indian intelligence has been fostering trouble in both provinces bordering
Afghanistan. A media report in the UK has revealed that the MQM party in Karachi,
currently commanding the attention of a disciplining sweep in Karachi, has reportedly
 received funding from Indian sources.

In so far as these lines of strategy are to sensitize Pakistan to its soft underbelly with
 the purpose of deterrence, they appear justifiable. Having pegged Pakistan down to
 an extent, India can then afford a measured reaching out.

Its new foreign secretary has put in place the possibilities for this with his early visit
to Pakistan on being handpicked for the assignment. The policy appears to be on
course, with Mr. Modi contemplating going to Pakistan on the invite of Mr. Sharif
for the next SAARC meet. More can be expected on this in case the two meet on the sidelines of the United Nations summit in September.

The problem is in between the cup and the lip. The recent terror attack in a border
 town in Indian Punjab which left ten dead is indicative. The attack is taken as having
 Pakistani imprimatur by many in India.

If so, then its choice of target in a relatively remote location suggests strategic
messaging: that Pakistan has assets it could use more dangerously in case India
were to twist the knife Pakistan alleges India holds at its underbelly. From this point
of view, the two intelligence establishments that have no illusions of each other can now desist from a worse joust.

This would however take political control. It is clear that in Pakistan the control is with the military. The Pakistani military would likely take its cue from India.

India is aware that as an interlocutor, Mr. Sharif, continues to have the same limitations
 he had when the previous National Democratic Alliance government in Delhi had attempted
 a reaching out through the Lahore process in 1999. Therefore, India has acceded to a
meeting between the National Security Advisers and the two military operations’ heads.

A frank exchange between the two sides at this meeting—the schedule of which is not
been reached yet—can prove useful in determining political will on both sides to exercise control over their respective proxies. It can then open up possibilities at the following meeting
between the principals.

The two sides bear reminding of the Indian NSA’s speech referred to earlier. He seemed
to think that Pakistan could be deterred, saying, ‘Once they know that India has shifted
its gear from a defensive mode to defensive offence they will find that it is unaffordable
 for them.’ He went on to say that since the two sides know each others ‘tricks’, they would be able to settle.

The danger is in what he went on to say. To him, since this intelligence agency-led
tussle would not involve military engagement; there would be no nuclear threshold to
 reckon with. Since the speech was prior to his being briefed on the nuclear equations
in his new capacity as head of India’s Executive Council of the Nuclear Command
 Authority, he is now presumably has a better nuclear picture.

Hopefully, he finds his statement as a naïve underestimation of nuclear dangers.
Only in such a case will he use the opportunity of the meeting with his Pakistani
counterpart usefully, as an opportunity for both to get off the escalator or slide.

Else, whichever the metaphor chosen, the net result could well be the same.

INDIA-PAKISTAN: CONTRASTING DOCTRINES

Agni, http://fsss.in/publications.htm

Introduction

Khalid Kidwai, after retiring end last year from his decade and half stewardship role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as head of its Strategic Plans Division, presented a holistic picture of Pakistan’s nuclear direction at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015.[2] He candidly admitted that Nasr, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear missile system, was part of its ‘full spectrum’ nuclear capability buildup designed to deter conventional operations by India, along with a ‘healthy’ conventional capability balance. In his view, it was to stump Cold Start since to him nuclear weapons were an extention of conventional weapons and would be used to supplement conventional capability. He rationalized this by referring to its deterrence value in this was aimed  at closing what was to India a gap below the nuclear threshold in which it could employ its conventional advantage. His emphasis on deterrent role of nuclear capability was probed by his interlocutor, Peter Lavoy, as to whether Pakistan would dissociate itself from militant groups since such linkages were destabilizing, as they prompted India to rely on its conventional forces.  In answer, Kidwai seemed to justify the connection between the military and militants.

This prelude brings out the linkage between Pakistan’s strategic doctrine and its military doctrines – subconventional, conventional and nuclear - as also brings to fore the interaction between the doctrines – strategic and military - of the two states, India and Pakistan. Clearly then, any examination of these doctrines cannot be done in isolation but instead has to be done collectively and in their interaction with the doctrine of the other side. This paper attempts to make such an examination. It first looks at Pakistani doctrine and the Indian perspective of the doctrines. It then looks at Indian doctrines and their inter-dependence with Pakistani doctrines. It finally tries to work out the opportunities that exist for doctrinal exchanges between the two states for strategic stability, conflict management and conflict resolution.

Pakistan’s doctrines

Unlike in most states in which strategic doctrine is a governmental prerogative, Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is one made by its military. The military aims to create the conditions for resolution of the Kashmir question, which to it is one of self-determination. With military deterrence in place, politicians are to get on with resolving the issue with India. Deterrence is therefore the declaratory strategic doctrine. The manner this is worked is by nuclear deterrence covering both nuclear and conventional levels. Nuclear weapons are to make up for the conventional asymmetry with India, even if a conventional balance, though not parity, is sought to be maintained. With deterrence in place at the conventional-nuclear level, at the subconventional level, proxy war through militants is to incentivize Indian interest in resolution of the Kashmir question. Strategic doctrine is therefore not merely one of deterrence as Pakistan presents it, but of offensive deterrence, with Pakistan being offensive at the subconventional level through use of proxies and at the nuclear level by a tacit ‘first use’ doctrine.

At the nuclear level, ‘full spectrum’ capability implies having second strike capability not in the traditional invulnerable sense of a ‘boomer’, but through other measures such as vertical proliferation, dispersion, secrecy, using diesel electric submarines etc. It also has nuclear weapons and delivery systems enabling operational level and a ‘shoot and scoot … quick response’ tactical level nuclear weapons capability. Not adhering to No First Use and intending to deploy its nuclear capability in conflict, it has different options of nuclear first use. This facilitates graduated escalation, thereby incentivizing avoidance of value targeting for India. A conflict going nuclear in this manner can, with minimum damage possible, be expected to focus international attention on its earliest termination. The post conflict phase would then inevitably include pressure for resolution of the ‘root causes’ that include Kashmir.

The nuclear doctrine is easily placed in the offensive category. It does not adhere to NFU; it deploys tactical level nuclear weapons and is a warfighting nuclear doctrine. In addition, the extension of ballistic missile ranges to about 3000m with the Shaheen III is intended to cover all of India’s landmass and its island territories, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands where Pakistan apprehends a prospective location for long range ballistic missiles and strategic submarines. Khalid Kidwai justifies this as an attempt to degrade India’s second strike capability.     

At the conventional level, the doctrine is not an offensive one. The conventional equation with India has changed over the past two decades with India having the edge of one strike corps over Pakistan. It can be argued that Pakistan’s was an offensive doctrine half a century ago, but no longer. In the 1965 War, it launched Operation Grand Slam and also the thrust by 1 Armoured Division into Khem Karan. However, in the 1971 War it was largely defensive and did not strike in the west in order to save its East, even though it could have done so in the west. In the seventies and eighties, it was credited with an offensive conventional doctrine and intent to make quick gains relying on interior lines of communication and proximity to the border of its military bases. However, conventional asymmetry under circumstance of US aid cut off in the nineties and a raging proxy war in Kashmir made resort to offensive respectively difficult and unnecessary. Pakistan’s conventional doctrine can therefore be seen to be one of defensive deterrence in that it maintains a capability to be able to blunt India’s conventional offensives, while attempting through strategic posturing to make quick gains of its own.

At the subconventional level its historical proxy war penchant easily enables characterizing of its doctrine as an offensive doctrine.  While it has for tactical reasons owing to the situation to its west restrained itself over the last decade, it has the capability to up the ante. This continues to exist due to the population in Kashmir continuing to be alienated from India to an extent. It has the capability to up the proxy war ante in India with mega terror attacks, witnessed twice over last decade. However, its alleged attempt at expanding proxy war possibilities in the Indian hinterland have not been met with any success, allegations of minority perpetrated terrorism in India being highly exaggerated. India’s subconventional response measures continuing in place and its counter infiltration posture strengthened by the LC fence have influenced Pakistan strategy (as distinct from doctrine). India has indicated no desire to settle outstanding differences Pakistan’s way and it has instead, in Pakistan’s view, subject Pakistan to a reverse proxy war. Pakistan’s subconventional doctrine has consequently shifted in its focus – temporarily – towards Afghanistan, launch pad of India’s alleged proxy war against Pakistan; but remains offensive. Even its subconventional level responses are offensive; witness Pakistan army’s tackling of terror in its west.

India’s doctrines

India’s strategic doctrine, though unwritten, can be seen to be moving from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence and in relation to Pakistan is arguably one of compellence. India, though pledged to a bilateral and peaceful settlement to the Kashmir dispute, is unable to countenance politically the implications for sovereignty over the Valley. It has therefore had to deter Pakistan from militarily changing the status quo. However, rising power asymmetry in India’s favour and its ambitions have led to India wanting to transcend the region. It is therefore moving from offensive deterrence to compellence, visible in the deepening conventional military asymmetry, intelligence-led reversal of proxy war at the subconventional level and a variegated nuclear capability enabling both first strike potential, if it’s BMD and spy satellite capabilities are taken seriously, and an invulnerable second strike capability by decade end. Pakistan, seeing the writing on the wall and going downhill, is expected to fall into line. This bespeaks of compellence and is reflected in its military doctrines. 

Whereas its conventional capability based on counter offensive capability enabled defensive deterrence, it was unable to extend conventional deterrence to the subconventional level. The nuclear factor had intervened with Pakistan checkmating India’s conventional capability and gaining thereby impunity at the subconventional level. India’s has been a defensive subconventional level response thus far aimed at containing the proxy war. It appears to have covertly launched its proxy war in Baluchistan as early as last decade. Pakistan’s complaint found mention in the Sharm es Shaikh joint statement and has more unambiguously been repeated half decade down the line with the Pakistan army leveling a direct accusation this year.

The shift to the offensive is readily visible at the conventional level. The Cold Start doctrine was advertised as ‘proactive strategy’. The capability has been created within the pivot corps for offensive operations with integrated battle groups. Strike corps continue to practice in exercises multiple obstacle crossings along multiple axes. The shift from defensive deterrence to offensive was to end Pakistani impunity at the subcoventional level. Pakistan’s nuclear cover is given short shrift with one chief saying that they are not for warfighting but are ‘a strategic capability and that is where it should end.’[3] There is a decided nonchalance in India’s reception of Nasr. The answer to it is taken to be at the nuclear level even as offensive conventional operations envisage even strike corps operations. In one report, a strategic command (as distinct from strategic forces command) is to be operationalised, perhaps based on Central Command, for coordinating deep battles of strike corps on enemy territory.

Counter intuitively the nuclear doctrine is offensive. The NFU in the doctrine is taken as reflecting defensive deterrence. However, since NFU is merely a declaration of intent and that the doctrine envisages ‘massive’ retaliation for inflicting punitive levels of nuclear damage make it less defensive than it is advertised. Taken in relation to the conventional doctrine it is decidedly more offensive than India would admit to. As seen, the conventional doctrine is an offensive one. In light of Pakistani projections of a low nuclear threshold, there is need to pull up the nuclear threshold so as to create the necessary gap for conventional operations below the threshold. This is attempted by promising a massive counter strike, presumably counter value to any form of nuclear use against India or its troops anywhere, including on enemy territory. Therefore, the declaratory nuclear doctrine in conjunction with the offensive conventional doctrine is offensive. Together they reflect and express a strategic doctrine of compellence.

Additionally, since both the subconventional doctrine of 2006 and conventional doctrine of 2004 were revised without mention in the open domain even by way of a press release in 2010 and 2013 respectively,[4] there is no guarantee that the declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 continues as India’s nuclear doctrine.[5] The logic of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation does not stand strategic scrutiny in the more likely circumstance of nuclear first use by Pakistan of lower order nuclear first use. The findings on the global climate effects of even a regional nuclear war since the doctrine was adopted in 2003 suggest that it is unimplementable (to use Admiral Bhagwat’s phrase). Therefore, it is well nigh likely that India may have an operational doctrine distinct from its declaratory doctrine. In effect, India may be contemplating a quid pro quo and quid pro quo plus response, for which it has the capability.

The doctrine-strategy link

There is apparently a doctrinal contest on between the two states. At the subconventional level, India has turned the tables on Pakistan, if Pakistan’s protestations of being on the receiving end of India’s intelligence operations are taken at face value. At the conventional level, India’s proactive doctrine has led to Pakistan reviewing its conventional counter in the exercise series Azm e Nau and going in for tactical nuclear weapons. The latter was to plug the gap between the subconventional and nuclear levels that India wanted to use for its conventional operations. At the nuclear level, both doctrines at a declaratory level continue as offensive doctrines.

India questions Pakistan’s resolve for lower order first use by continuing with its conventional exercises involving strike corps such the one this year that tested the integrated battle groups (IBG) of a pivot corps in South Western Command and a strike corps of Western Command. The exercise area being the same in general area Suratgarh and the dates in late April suggests that the two exercised together with the pivot corps providing the launch pads for the strike corps in the area captured by its IBGs.[6] This implies the strike corps, not needing to get involved in the break in battles, would be able with its complement of forces to strike deeper. This is to challenge Pakistan’s resolve to follow through on its deterrent promise of nuclear first use. Alongside, it can be imagined that the two other strike corps would also be in action and so would an assortment of pivot corps IBGs, such as Gurj Division that also practiced its paces this year.

In turn, Pakistan questions India’s threat to ‘call its bluff’ and its follow through with ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation. Pakistan’s coverage through Shaheen III of possible sites of strategic assets as far away as the Andaman and Nicobar islands is to degrade the ability and intent of ‘massive’ retaliation, thereby discouraging it. The interactivity between the two doctrines is evident. India’s ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation postulation has led to damage limitation thinking in Pakistan in its acquiring ballistic missiles of the appropriate range. The aim is perhaps to encourage a shift towards proportionate response on India’s part, thereby reducing any damage that may accrue on account of its nuclear first use. The unconsidered fallout of Pakistan’s action - advertised by no less than Khalid Kidwai as intended to deny India a second strike capability - is to make ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation appear more promising to India under the logic of ‘use them, lose them’.

More importantly, Kidwai’s reasoning betrays a gap in his cognizance of nuclear theory. He says that  this  is to ‘deny’ India a second strike capability, little realizing that this is inherently destabilizing since it would provoke India to go in instead for the ‘massive’ counter strike or indeed attempt a first strike of its own regardless at the crunch of its NFU pledge. In fact, mutually deterrence is based on mutually assured destruction ability on both sides. If one side attempts to deny the other side such an ability, it would impose pressure on the side so denied for being, to quote General Patton, ‘firstest with the mostest’ or be consider first strike (as distinct from first use).

Likewise, there is a flaw in India’s nuclear doctrine in its use of term ‘massive’ in first place. Since, as seen, such levels of attack on a nuclear power with nuclear weapons in three digits is not feasible, India by not undertaking a review of its declaratory doctrine even after a decade of its promulgation in 2003, is compounding the earlier error of inclusion of the term. If indeed it has reviewed its doctrine and has a different operational doctrine, then this lack of transparency on India’s part is leading to vertical proliferation on Pakistan’s part.

The interlocking of the doctrines of the two sides at all three levels – subconventional, conventional and nuclear – is not conducive to security for either state or the region. With Pakistan indicating that it is feeling the pinch from India’s intelligence operations, it has three options. One is to revive the Kashmiri insurgency, a problematic proposition in light of India’s control. Second, it could escalate the proxy war in Afghanistan in order to set the conditions for reverting its attention to its east. Third, it could resort to mega terror attacks, but runs the risk of India’s conventional counter. This counter need not necessarily be in the Cold Start mode, but may be infliction of harm by conventional forces to include air attacks and possible limited forays by an IBG or two with lightening retraction.

The prospects of escalation in this last scenario lend pause. Since Pakistan may not be able to respond in the air medium, being army dominated it may attempt do so on land. This could be in the Kashmir theatre so as to create a gap in the fence briefly for influx of terrorists to revive the insurgency. Its precautionary moves elsewhere could trigger the Cold Start timeline. Since Pakistan would be able to cope with IBGs by themselves, India may want to supplement with strike corps to come out on top of the engagement. Pakistan seeing this as a test of its resolve – India’s attempt at calling its bluff – it may be inclined from a future deterrence point of view to exhibit its tactical nuclear weapons. With the introduction of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, India may find itself in a commitment trap. Escalation can ensue, particularly if Pakistan also preemptively employs its Shaheen III. This may push India towards ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation, where it could otherwise have settled for proportionate retaliation under the ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliatory logic. Since nuclear confidence building measures have not proceeded to the required extent, de-escalation and exchange termination would be dependent on diplomatic resources of the international community.

Conclusion

Clearly, there is a case for a doctrinal exchange between India and Pakistan. Both have exhibited deficiencies in their understanding of nuclear doctrine with Khalid Kidwai not appreciating the criticality of second strike ability for stability and India promising unnecessarily a ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation and unable to step back from the commitment trap it is in even a decade since the gaffe. Pakistan’s projection of South Asia as a nuclear hotspot in its intent to go nuclear and  India’s show of nonchalance in contemplating first use by its adversary do not build confidence that  the two states are as responsible as they appear to themselves.

India cannot wait for its neighbor’s initiative. Pakistan is military ruled. It has less to lose. It is living in the past. India is the major power in the region. Its economic trajectory can certainly withstand limited war and may even stand to benefit by it, but even a limited nuclear war may be a little too much. India therefore must reconcile its strategic doctrine with its grand strategy. An economy-centric grand strategy is not in sync with a strategic doctrine of compellence. The strategic doctrine requires being tweaked to revert to deterrence, albeit offensive deterrence. This must then reflect in the military doctrines: nuclear, conventional and subconventional. The National Security Council has its task cut out.

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[1]Ali Ahmed is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge 2014), On War in South Asia and On Peace in South Asia (both CinnamonTeal 2015). He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in. 

[2] ‘A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai’, Monitor 360, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 March 23, 2015, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2015.

[3] Hans M. Kristensen ‘Indian Army Chief: Nukes Not For Warfighting’, available at

http://fas.org/blogs/security/2012/01/warfighting/, accessed on 14 May 2015.

[4] Ali Ahmed, ‘Opening up the doctrinal space’, available at http://www.claws.in/1375/opening-up-the-doctrinal-space-ali-ahmed.html, accessed on 29 April 2015.

[5] Ali Ahmed,  ‘This Year’s Maneuver Season In India’, available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/11052015-this-years-maneuver-season-in-india-oped/, accessed on 12 May 2015.

[6] Ali Ahmed, ‘What This Year’s Maneuver Season in India Tells Us’, available at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/05/12/what-this-years-maneuver-season-in-india-tells-us/, accessed on 14 May 2015.

What Does Khalid Kidwai mean?

http://www.claws.in/1404/what-does-khalid-kidwai-mean-ali-ahmed.html

#1404		42		July 08, 2015
There is (sic), of late, there have been reports of the Nicobar, and the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, being developed as bases, potentially as strategic bases … if those bases are not covered then inadvertently Pakistan will be allowing, so to say, a second strike capability            to India within its land borders ... it is now a comprehensive coverage of any particular         land area that India might think of putting its weapons. Khalid Kidwai, former head of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan Army, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf(p. 10). Even though the second incumbent following Khalid Kidwai’s departure is now in the chair that Kidwai held for over a decade in Pakistan’s National Command Authority, he is not quite history yet. Kidwai acquired early notoriety for little fault of his. During the Operation Parakram period, in an interview to a couple of researchers from an Italian think tank, Kidwai had given out the broad outlines of Pakistani thinking on use of nuclear weapons.[1] He had indicated that first use was possible and had given out Pakistani thresholds or redlines. Of the four parameters – territorial, attritional, economic and stability – he had used the term ‘large’ setbacks with three. This meant only if Pakistan lost large amount of territory or suffered large attrition to its forces or was destabilized considerably, either socially or economically, would it contemplate nuclear resort. Contrary to some Indian commentary on Pakistani redlines this exposition by Kidwai in a way set the Pakistani threshold reasonably high. The influence of Kidwai’s use of the term ‘large’ was such that on redeployment, India figured that the window for conventional operations existed below the nuclear level. This energized its formulation of what was colloquially called ‘cold start’ doctrine and which has now come to be termed the ‘proactive’ doctrine. Kidwai, in his latest statement, has attempted to link the evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and arsenal to India’s nuclear doctrine. In the main his thesis is that, whereas Pakistan originally had minimum credible deterrence as its nuclear doctrine, it has since shifted to full-spectrum deterrence. The implication of the former is that the arsenal is small and is largely for deterrence based on a city-busting capability. This explains Kidwai’s high threshold since counter-value targeting would require fairly high degree of provocation, such as ‘large’ loss of territory etc. Kidwai appears to suggest that, in light of the window of conventional opportunity India espied, Pakistan had to rethink its deterrence. As it is Pakistan, by not acceding to No First Use, was already subscribing to a different notion of nuclear deterrence than India. Whereas to India nuclear weapons deterred nuclear weapons and not war itself, to Pakistan nuclear deterrence was, as with the NATO in the Cold War, to extend to cover deterrence of conventional attack also. Therefore, to stymie India’s move away from deep battle by strike corps to shallow nuclear threshold cognizant operations by Integrated Battle Groups, Pakistan was forced to go in for tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Kidwai goes on to challenge India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine that requires a strategic, presumably counter-value, response to any sort of nuclear first use by an adversary on it or on its troops anywhere. He seems to be arguing against a position taken by some in India that there is nothing called TNW: all nuclear weapons are strategic. This echoes the very first debate regarding nuclear weapons, whether they are a wholly different category of weapons or are they just another weapon, if of a higher order of magnitude. This doctrinal interaction implies that if Pakistan initiates a TNW, India would be relieved of its NFU and would be liable to strike back to inflict punitive nuclear damage of unacceptable proportions. Therefore, if Pakistan was to contemplate using TNW, as evidently it does, it would require first catering for India’s strike back. This can best be by deterrence, failing which an ability for counter strike is thought necessary. Indeed the latter enables the former. An ability to degrade India’s arsenal is necessary to assure India that in case it was to strike back with its declared levels of nuclear violence, then Pakistan not only has the ability to hit back in kind but also to degrade India’s ability to continue in the exchange(s). This, in Pakistan’s thinking, would deter India from carrying through with its doctrinal promise. This would then incentivize Indian change of thinking in favour of TNW use to counter Pakistani introduction of TNW into the conflict. While making for a nuclear conflict it still had the potential of preserving Pakistan as a state and society since TNW exchange(s) would be at the lower end of the nuclear ladder. Militarily, Pakistan would have checked India’s conventional operations by using TNW but politically also would have brought down international pressure for conflict termination. Pakistan would thus be able to survive a nuclear war of its own making and its army would have a rationale to stay atop its internal power structure claiming to have won, or at least not lost, a nuclear war.  Kidwai, explaining the range of the Shaheen III set at 2750km, seems to suggest that India’s declaratory doctrine of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation entails Pakistan’s placing the entire Indian landmass and now its island territories under Pakistani ballistic missile coverage. To recapitulate his phrasing: “Pakistan will be allowing, so to say, a second strike capability (italics added)to India within its land borders … (and) any particular land area that India might think of putting its weapons.” The question is why does Khalid Kidwai, who has headed a nuclear war-making machine and presumably aware of nuclear theory, wish to deny India a second strike capability. The first destabilization connotation is that intent to deny second strike capability to an adversary is suggestive of an attempt to gain first strike advantage. It is unlikely that Pakistan can entertain any such hopes in light of India’s large and variegated arsenal, presumably ably spirited away by its Strategic Force Command. Escalation will likely result in case India perceives Pakistan is readying to hit its missile sites intended for furnishing India its second strike capability. India not wanting to ‘lose them’, may likely ‘use them’ and earlier than it might have planned for. Second, Kidwai rocks theory by not ‘allowing’ – a hubris laden word - India a second strike capability. It is often said that the Cold War remained ‘cold’ on account of mutual deterrence termed MAD (mutually assured destruction). Under the circumstance, a side would only go ‘firstest with the mostest’ (to paraphrase General Patton from a different context), if it believes that it can wrest a first strike advantage. MAD expelled any such notions; resulting in stability. Arguably, South Asia is in the MAD era with both states with both arsenals in lower three digits. Deterrence stability can be arrived at between the two states. Hopefully, Kidwai’s successor, Mazhar Jamil, knows better.

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