http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/12/13/indias-nuclear-doctrine-coming-out-of-the-closet/

India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Coming Out of the Closet

Indian defence minister’s penchant for verbal gaffes has acquired respectability. One strategic community stalwart has suggested that the defence minister’s voicing of his ‘personal opinion’ on India’s No First Use (NFU) pledge is designed to build in ambiguity in India’s nuclear posture. He suggests that for deterrence, it is necessary to keep the nuclear adversary guessing.

Releasing itself from the NFU pledge will enable India to build-in the option of nuclear first use in its nuclear preparedness and posture. A nuclear adversary (read Pakistan) would be fearful that its nuclear preparations might trigger off India’s preemptive strike(s). For India, the advantage in Pakistani hesitation to reach for its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is in enabling India to employ its superior conventional forces to wrap up the Pakistani military, pinch back territory in J&K and make territorial gains elsewhere.

Currently, India is stumped by Pakistani brandishing of its TNW. India is hesitant to use its conventional advantage honed at considerable cost. This has forced India to be boxed-in. The situation in J&K has turned a full circle back by a couple of decades when conventional forces were locked in trading blows across the Line of Control. India would instead like to make its conventional preparations on the doctrinal, organizational and equipment fronts, count. The latest controversy over India’s NFU is an instance of India attempting a doctrinal breakout from the cul-de-sac of Pakistani TNWs.

Analysts have pointed out that an Indian nuclear posture that is readier-to-go could prove counter-productive. It would induce Pakistan to go first instead, fearing it would lose its nuclear capability if were to wait for India’s nuclear first use. Presently, the major threat India faces is from TNW being used against its forces in case of incursions that flirt with Pakistani nuclear thresholds. It is not a bolt-from-the-blue attack or a first strike attempting to degrade India’s nuclear strike back capability. However, in case India was to rescind NFU, the latter would emerge as a grave threat.

Therefore, if India wishes to jettison NFU then it would have to reassure Pakistan that should India resort to nuclear first use, it would not be in the form of higher order nuclear strikes. This may be counter-intuitive, but it is well known in strategic theory that nuclear deterrence and reassurance go together.

Currently, India’s deterrence is predicated on a ‘massive’ counter strike. India professes to believe nuclear weapons are political weapons meant for nuclear deterrence and not war-fighting. This means its nuclear forces are configured for higher order nuclear retaliation – counter city and counter force and not counter military targeting. Since higher order strikes are liable to being countered equally vehemently by Pakistan, higher order nuclear first use by either side would amount to all-out nuclear war.

This helps with deterrence at the upper end of the spectrum; that of higher order strikes. However, the promise of higher order strikes is taken as incredible against TNW use. This is the conundrum India is in. If India rescinds its NFU without a corresponding change in its philosophical approach to nuclear weapons - that is, if it continues to believe these are not for war-fighting - then espying Pakistan reaching for its TNWs, it will likely go in for higher order - preemptive - first use of its own.

India promises being ‘punitive’ as to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. This might not be possible any longer in light Pakistan also maintain strategic weapons, available for higher order strike back. To ensure that fewer of these get to India, India’s nuclear first use would require being of first strike levels of attack – first strike defined as an attempt to tamp down on Pakistani retaliatory capability.

Pakistan is reportedly a step ahead of India in nuclear numbers and in the variegation of its missiles. It thus has a second strike capability, enough to deter India’s first strike levels of nuclear first use. South Asia is in its era of ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD). Therefore, if Delhi is to give up NFU, a pillar of its nuclear doctrine, it would also require giving up the other pillar of its doctrine – higher order nuclear use. In a state of MAD, nuclear weapons no longer deter nuclear weapons but deter only higher order nuclear use.

This means that in case of nuclear first use preparation by Pakistan, India could get its nukes in first, but at levels duly cognizant of escalation dynamics. The ability for lower order strikes does not preclude possession and use of strategic weapons for higher order nuclear use. Thus, deterrence at the upper end of the nuclear use spectrum is assured, even as escalation control is enabled by lower order nuclear use. It would be easier to stop a nuclear conflict before cities have started being consumed.

As for ambiguity, it is intrinsic to the nuclear domain. Tom Schelling’s deterrence concept of ‘leaving something to chance’ implies that since no war has witnessed a nuclear exchange, it is a domain of which much has been written about, but only vicariously.  Going in for overkill in terms of ambiguity can lead to self-delusion that deterrence will work.

Ambiguity increases the threat of nuclear first strike under the logic of what Tom Schelling termed, the ‘reciprocal fear of nuclear attack’, defining it inimitably as, ‘he thinks, we think he'll attack; so he thinks, we shall; so he will; so we must.’ Consequently, reassuring one’s own population and the adversary’s nuclear decision maker is also important. Jettisoning default higher order nuclear use is one such measure.

India’s current government has questioned many verities of India’s nationhood – such as secularism - and is known for taking what its supporters regard as ‘bold’ decisions. The Modi government can and should overturn India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine. The makeover is in a sense is to move towards nuclear war-fighting. The advantage of this is in enabling an end to nuclear war at its lowest threshold. South Asia can only then hope to get away at affordable – even if avoidable - levels of nuclear war. 

India's NFU: The Political Advantages of Sticking with it  

http://www.claws.in/1663/indias-nfu-the-political-advantages-of-sticking-with-it-ali-ahmed.html

The defence minister has given voice to at least two constituencies that are not comfortable with India’s ‘No first use’ (NFU) pledge. The first is a segment of the strategic community, some of whom believe - to quote a stalwart - the pledge is ‘not worth the paper it is written on’. The second is a segment of military opinion which is averse to the threat of fighting under what is perceived as an adverse situation developing in case of Pakistani first use against conventional forces. This article deals with the latter concerns.

Analysts have been at pains to point out that the Pakistani brandishing of the Nasr tactical nuclear weapon system is chimerical. It cannot stop an Indian conventional attack in its tracks since far too many would require to be used. Neither does Pakistan have such numbers, nor can it spare the many required for a tactical level strike with uncertain results. Further, it has no doubt intimately watched Indian strike corps exercises with their accent on fighting through nuclear conditions and is advisedly unlikely to tie down its limited fissile material in overkill with TNW. It is also aware that India’s economic liberalization enabled platform acquisitions have the capability of conventional degradation of TNW platforms and sites.

Consequently, Pakistan will more likely milk TNW for their deterrence benefits, one of which in Pakistani nuclear thinking is to extend the nuclear cover to also cover the conventional level. It also has political use of TNW for in peace time projecting South Asia as a ‘nuclear flashpoint’ and in conflict to catalyse external conflict termination intervention. In conflict, in light of limited numbers of both warheads and short range missiles, it could employ TNW as a tripwire, to project that its threshold has been breached so as to affect the trajectory of India’s conventional operations. In other words, though employed at the operational level of war, TNW use would be with a strategic purpose of nuclear signaling, indicating imminence of escalation, and thereby the necessity of war termination.

An opening nuclear salvo by Pakistan of a strategic attack to include counter military, counter force and counter city targeting is unlikely in light of India’s credible second strike capability. Pakistan would not delude itself that it would be able to decapitate India in such a strike or that India lacks the gumption for sound retaliation. To hit Indian strategic targets would be akin – to borrow Thomas Schelling’s words – lobbing their bombs at their very own targets, for it would be only a matter of time before India’s retaliation would take these out.

Also, the case for lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan is enhanced by the discussion on the lack of credibility of India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine promising higher order (massive) nuclear retaliation. Pakistani nuclear numbers are sufficient for putative second strike capability. Even a broken-back response by the balance of its nuclear forces after an Indian ‘massive’ nuclear retaliatory strike as promised, will set India back inordinately. While the assumption that India will survive even as Pakistan will not is a fair one, the kind of India that would survive is a consequential political consideration in staying India’s retaliatory hand in the manner promised by its official nuclear doctrine. Therefore, if higher order Indian nuclear retaliation acquires a question mark over it in case of lower order Pakistani first use, Pakistan might just chance reaching for TNW.

The greater likelihood of TNW as the form of Pakistani first use places India’s conventional forces under added nuclear threat. As seen, the TNW would unlikely impede the conventional forces inordinately, even if they may help Pakistan stymie an adverse situation developing by deft employment in conjunction with counter maneuvers by Pakistani ground forces. They can at best help wrest the initiative in a combat zone or two from India’s forces pursuing operations under the Proactive Operations doctrine. The depth in quantum and quality to India’s strategic reserves – and its partially on-road Mountain Strike Corps – lends confidence that such reverses would not unduly deflect the army from its objectives and India from its war aims. In other words, the TNW threat must be met by leadership and planning capability, i.e. operational art. The equipment profile of offensive formations must continue to measure up to attendant demands. 

Enhancing the conventional forces’ capability to cope with nuclear conditions would ease the premium on nuclear level retaliation considerations. Since these are currently predicated on strategic nuclear attack, and - as seen above - this might be inadvisable from an escalatory point of view, reducing pressures for recourse to such retaliation is sensible. Doing so enables in-lieu resort to conventional degradation options against the TNW threat. These include conventional tipped short range ballistic missiles, high accuracy cruise missiles, long range artillery, area saturation rocket artillery, Special Forces’ operations, allied proxy forces and air power. The ability for continued conventional operations in a nuclearised environment has multifaceted benefit. A host of political and diplomatic tools can be employed to take advantage of Pakistani breach of the nuclear taboo for gaining the political and moral high ground. Consequently, there is no compulsion to bottom-up demand that India rescind its NFU.

Further – as an aside here - while India’s nuclear retaliation to TNW may be useful for reinforcing deterrence by announcing India’s resolve and willingness for nuclear retaliation, there is also a counter-intuitive case for nuclear non-retaliation in case of lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan. The political benefits would be worth it. Whereas initial de-escalatory pressure would be on India to refrain from or moderate its nuclear retaliation, Indian nuclear non-retaliation will shift the focus on to Pakistan. This might help restrict further nuclear resort by it, enabling Indian conventional forces to wrap up what they might have set out to do, including conventional retaliation to TNW strikes. Post-conflict advantages would be in continued international engagement to roll back Pakistani nuclear capability. Internal to Pakistan, such reticence could provoke an accounting on the advisability on its military leadership’s decision that placed Pakistan untenably in harm’s way. This could serve to bring down the military to levels the Hamoodur Rahman commission report was unable to four decades back.

Rescinding the NFU for creating options against Pakistani TNW use is not worth it. NFU can be abandoned in the unlikely case if India is forced to preempt Pakistani first strike levels of attack designed to set back India’s retaliatory capability. Since in international law no state can be held to its international obligations in case national survival is at stake, India cannot be held to a unilateral pledge. India has no reason to ‘go first’ with nuclear weapons. This was written into the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 thus: ‘Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.’

Cumulatively, these arguments spell that if at all the nuclear doctrine needs to be tweaked, it is not NFU, but the term ‘massive’ used in relation to India’s retaliatory intent that needs excising

http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/indias-no-first-use-does-the-defense-ministers-personal-opinion-matter/

India’s Defense Minister on No First Use: What Did He Mean?

Manohar Parrikar admitted he personally questions the wisdom of NFU.

November 16, 2016

Speaking at a book release function, India’s defense minister, expressing his personal opinion, questioned India’s No First Use (NFU) pledge. Manohar Parrikar suggested that it would be sufficient for India to maintain that it would use its nuclear weapons responsibly rather than being tied down by an NFU policy. This, to him, did not imply that India would use its nuclear weapons first, and further, he clarified, that his words did not amount to a change in the nuclear doctrine.

Parrikar is reported to have stated, “I am not saying that you have to use it first just because you don’t decide that you don’t use it first. The hoax can be called off.” His argument against NFU is not entirely clear. However, even if this is a personal opinion, given that he sits in on the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority in his capacity of defense minister, his is a consequential view.

India’s Political Council is charged with nuclear decision-making, the input for which is provided by the Executive Council headed by the national security adviser. The exact composition of the Political Council is not known, though it is believed to comprise of members of the National Security Council. The defense minister would be required to provide his considered view, one dependent on the coordinates of the developing conflict situation. This is unexceptionable since strategy is distinct from doctrine, and, though informed by doctrinal tenets, strategy is not necessarily dictated by doctrine.

In case India’s NFU pledge is in question, its doctrinal benefits and its effect on nuclear strategy should be differentiated to understand whether it serves India’s purpose or needs being abandoned.

In peace time, NFU has fulfilled the purpose of projecting India as a responsible nuclear power. Though there is a nuclear arms buildup in South Asia, the pace does not amount to an arms race; this can be attributed in part to the benign effects of India’s NFU policy. It is also useful in relation to China, since China is also pledged to NFU. For these reasons India has persisted with NFU despite periodic challenges from within India’s strategic community questioning its utility.

The primary argument against NFU is that in conflict it allows the nuclear initiative to be seized by Pakistan, thereby placing India and its forces in an adverse situation. Since Pakistan has not subscribed to NFU and has by acquiring tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) projected a low nuclear threshold, Pakistani first use could blunt India’s conventional advantage. To deter Pakistan and (in case deterrence appears to be failing) preempting Pakistani nuclear first use, India would need to abandon NFU.

Currently, NFU requires a configuration of India’s nuclear forces in accordance with the retaliatory philosophy written into the official nuclear doctrine adopted in January 2003. India’s formulation is that retaliation would be “massive” and aimed at inflicting “unacceptable damage.” The phraseology is suggestive of counter value targeting. This implies a nuclear force configuration largely comprising strategic weapons. This leaves India with little choice but to escalate, even in face of the more likely manner of Pakistani nuclear first use with TNW.

Rescinding the NFU would enable an option of India nuclear first use in the form of preempting TNW use by Pakistan. Stalling Pakistan’s resort to TNW would require similar TNW use by India. This would enable both states to keep any ensuing exchange(s) non-strategic. Even if this implies a breakdown in deterrence, escalatory use can be prevented. In-conflict deterrence would remain in place, with the threat of higher-order, more hurtful, strikes held in reserve, akin to the “no cities” option of nuclear use advocated once by Nobel prize winning game theorist, Thomas Shelling.

This could furnish an exit point in the conflict, permitting nuclear exchange termination and conflict termination at a lower threshold of nuclear destruction than would otherwise be the case should India opt for default strategic strikes as currently envisaged in its declaratory nuclear doctrine.

The problem with this line of argument is that a non-strategic response does not require stepping away from NFU but can be better provisioned by instead tweaking the “massive” nuclear retaliation tenet in favor of proportional response. Thus it would appear that the NFU withstands scrutiny both in peace time and in conflict scenarios.

However, for the defense minister to worry over Pakistani nuclear first use and wish to preempt it is understandable. He is responsible for the defense services and the refrain within the military is that its conventional operations would be subject to asymmetric escalation from Pakistan. This may wrest the initiative away from the invading Indian forces and force them to fight under nuclear conditions, seen as favoring the defender. Given this, even as Pakistan readies to undertake TNW attack in a hypothetical contingency, Parrikar can be expected to be pressuring the Political Council to undertake a preemptive nuclear attack.

In case India distances itself from NFU prior to a contingency, it would have its nuclear forces duly configured to be responsive to such a nuclear decision by its Political Council. In case it has not already abandoned NFU, then the NFU would require being abandoned in conflict. This would tax the flexibility of India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC), unless it has already war-gamed the contingency and created the capability for the shift. It can reasonably be expected that the SFC has an operational doctrine envisaging such a contingency, even though it places the operational nuclear doctrine at odds with the declaratory nuclear doctrine.

From the discussion here, it appears that Parrikar might be engaging in nuclear signaling. He may be tacitly conveying to Islamabad that Pakistan’s proactive posturing of its first use intent and capability has serious implications for India’s nuclear doctrine. Though a trifle untimely amidst the current day-to-day instability in South Asia, brought about by the Uri terror attack and India’s reprisal via “surgical strike,” the positive aspect of Parrikar’s comments are that they serve to refocus attention on potential nuclear dangers in South Asia.

India’s NFU: Does the Defence Minister’s personal opinion matter?

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/nfu-personal-is-political/321875.html
Published under title - Personal is political

Speaking at a book launch in New Delhi, the defence minister is reported as having voiced his ‘thinking’ on one of the pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine, India’s No First Use (NFU) pledge. Though he reaffirmed there was no change in the nuclear doctrine dating to 2003, Mr. Parrikar reportedly said, ‘I am also an individual. And as an individual, I get a feeling sometime why do I say that I am not going to use it first.’ A defence ministry spokesperson clarified that alongside the defence minister confirmed that this was his personal opinion.

The defence minister’s questioning the NFU pledge appears to place him in the camp within the strategic community which advocates rescinding of India’s NFU pledge. The last time their argument came to fore was in the run up to last national elections when the BJP manifesto said that it would ‘revise and update’ India’s nuclear doctrine if it came to power. In the event, then prime ministerial candidate Mr. Modi put a lid on the matter saying that, ‘No first use is a reflection of our cultural inheritance.’

The argument in favour of junking NFU is that this would strengthen deterrence by dampening Pakistan’s nuclear ardour. Pakistan has advertised its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), conveying its intention to ‘go first’ with nuclear weapons. Pakistan hopes this would deter India’s conventional forces from making rapid and significant gains and in case deterrence fails, may help redress the conventional imbalance it views as favouring India.

In the argument against NFU, an India without NFU shackles could preempt Pakistani nuclear use, thereby preserving its forces and gains they may have made in conventional operations from Pakistani nuclear attack. An intention and capability for this would deter Pakistan from initiating steps towards nuclear first use. With Pakistan deterred, India would not need to ‘go first’ since it has the conventional wherewithal to gain its war aims. This would keep the war from going nuclear and expand the window below Pakistani nuclear threshold for conventional operations.

Those arguing for continuing the NFU opine that India’s readiness to ‘go first’ might have the reverse effect on Pakistan. Rather than deterring its TNW use, it might provoke Pakistan under ‘use them or lose them’ pressures. Its monitoring of India’s nuclear preparations might stampede Pakistan into nuclear first use.

Nuclear first use might in such a case not be with TNW against invading Indian conventional forces alone, but might be in a counter force mode, targeting nuclear forces that India might be readying for its own nuclear first use. This would in turn amount to pressure on India for a wider opening salvo, taking out Pakistani nuclear forces mounting the preemptive strike. It appears that while the current threat is of Pakistani TNW use against India’s conventional forces, removal of its NFU by India prompts a wider nuclear threat.

Between the two arguments, while rescinding NFU helps with deterrence, maintaining NFU prevents an escalatory spiral. Even if India maintains its NFU in peace time, the Political Council of India’s Nuclear Command Authority would be presented with such a choice early in an India-Pakistan conflict.

With India’s conventional forces making headway and with Pakistan preparing to blunt them with TNW, the NCA would require deliberating whether to abandon NFU and preempt Pakistan. It might not be possible to in the fog of war to discern whether Pakistan restricting itself to only to TNW or preparing for a wider first salvo. This may push the decision in favour of preemption and that too in a wider strike taking out Pakistan’s nuclear capability. It is for this reason that some analysts dismiss No First Use pledges in general and Pakistan purports to find India’s NFU pledge less than plausible.

While this might stall the immediate and present danger of first use by Pakistan, it would open up India to a similarly violent strike. Whereas India may have done counter force targeting in its nuclear first use, Pakistan retaliating with a diminished nuclear force may include counter city strikes to inflict greater pain. The end of such exchanges would of course find Pakistan worse off, but the moot question is whether the knowledge would provide India any satisfaction in light of the blows it might itself have suffered.

This brief scenario building exercise suggests that while deterrence is useful, warding off tendencies towards escalation is better. Since maintaining NFU lowers escalatory likelihood, it is better than rescinding NFU even if the latter helps with deterrence somewhat. What this suggests is that not only must NFU be maintained in peace and all indicators towards that end projected for enhancing its plausibility, it must continue to hold even in face of the inevitable spike in Pakistani first use threat in conflict.

It is for this reason that the defence minister’s personal opinion counts. He is part of the Political Council of the NCA and in that capacity would require providing his considered input. Mr. Parrikar might like to revise his opinion prior to the contingency arising.  

What Does Khalid Kidwai mean?

http://www.claws.in/1404/what-does-khalid-kidwai-mean-ali-ahmed.html

#1404		42		July 08, 2015
There is (sic), of late, there have been reports of the Nicobar, and the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, being developed as bases, potentially as strategic bases … if those bases are not covered then inadvertently Pakistan will be allowing, so to say, a second strike capability            to India within its land borders ... it is now a comprehensive coverage of any particular         land area that India might think of putting its weapons. Khalid Kidwai, former head of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan Army, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf(p. 10). Even though the second incumbent following Khalid Kidwai’s departure is now in the chair that Kidwai held for over a decade in Pakistan’s National Command Authority, he is not quite history yet. Kidwai acquired early notoriety for little fault of his. During the Operation Parakram period, in an interview to a couple of researchers from an Italian think tank, Kidwai had given out the broad outlines of Pakistani thinking on use of nuclear weapons.[1] He had indicated that first use was possible and had given out Pakistani thresholds or redlines. Of the four parameters – territorial, attritional, economic and stability – he had used the term ‘large’ setbacks with three. This meant only if Pakistan lost large amount of territory or suffered large attrition to its forces or was destabilized considerably, either socially or economically, would it contemplate nuclear resort. Contrary to some Indian commentary on Pakistani redlines this exposition by Kidwai in a way set the Pakistani threshold reasonably high. The influence of Kidwai’s use of the term ‘large’ was such that on redeployment, India figured that the window for conventional operations existed below the nuclear level. This energized its formulation of what was colloquially called ‘cold start’ doctrine and which has now come to be termed the ‘proactive’ doctrine. Kidwai, in his latest statement, has attempted to link the evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and arsenal to India’s nuclear doctrine. In the main his thesis is that, whereas Pakistan originally had minimum credible deterrence as its nuclear doctrine, it has since shifted to full-spectrum deterrence. The implication of the former is that the arsenal is small and is largely for deterrence based on a city-busting capability. This explains Kidwai’s high threshold since counter-value targeting would require fairly high degree of provocation, such as ‘large’ loss of territory etc. Kidwai appears to suggest that, in light of the window of conventional opportunity India espied, Pakistan had to rethink its deterrence. As it is Pakistan, by not acceding to No First Use, was already subscribing to a different notion of nuclear deterrence than India. Whereas to India nuclear weapons deterred nuclear weapons and not war itself, to Pakistan nuclear deterrence was, as with the NATO in the Cold War, to extend to cover deterrence of conventional attack also. Therefore, to stymie India’s move away from deep battle by strike corps to shallow nuclear threshold cognizant operations by Integrated Battle Groups, Pakistan was forced to go in for tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Kidwai goes on to challenge India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine that requires a strategic, presumably counter-value, response to any sort of nuclear first use by an adversary on it or on its troops anywhere. He seems to be arguing against a position taken by some in India that there is nothing called TNW: all nuclear weapons are strategic. This echoes the very first debate regarding nuclear weapons, whether they are a wholly different category of weapons or are they just another weapon, if of a higher order of magnitude. This doctrinal interaction implies that if Pakistan initiates a TNW, India would be relieved of its NFU and would be liable to strike back to inflict punitive nuclear damage of unacceptable proportions. Therefore, if Pakistan was to contemplate using TNW, as evidently it does, it would require first catering for India’s strike back. This can best be by deterrence, failing which an ability for counter strike is thought necessary. Indeed the latter enables the former. An ability to degrade India’s arsenal is necessary to assure India that in case it was to strike back with its declared levels of nuclear violence, then Pakistan not only has the ability to hit back in kind but also to degrade India’s ability to continue in the exchange(s). This, in Pakistan’s thinking, would deter India from carrying through with its doctrinal promise. This would then incentivize Indian change of thinking in favour of TNW use to counter Pakistani introduction of TNW into the conflict. While making for a nuclear conflict it still had the potential of preserving Pakistan as a state and society since TNW exchange(s) would be at the lower end of the nuclear ladder. Militarily, Pakistan would have checked India’s conventional operations by using TNW but politically also would have brought down international pressure for conflict termination. Pakistan would thus be able to survive a nuclear war of its own making and its army would have a rationale to stay atop its internal power structure claiming to have won, or at least not lost, a nuclear war.  Kidwai, explaining the range of the Shaheen III set at 2750km, seems to suggest that India’s declaratory doctrine of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation entails Pakistan’s placing the entire Indian landmass and now its island territories under Pakistani ballistic missile coverage. To recapitulate his phrasing: “Pakistan will be allowing, so to say, a second strike capability (italics added)to India within its land borders … (and) any particular land area that India might think of putting its weapons.” The question is why does Khalid Kidwai, who has headed a nuclear war-making machine and presumably aware of nuclear theory, wish to deny India a second strike capability. The first destabilization connotation is that intent to deny second strike capability to an adversary is suggestive of an attempt to gain first strike advantage. It is unlikely that Pakistan can entertain any such hopes in light of India’s large and variegated arsenal, presumably ably spirited away by its Strategic Force Command. Escalation will likely result in case India perceives Pakistan is readying to hit its missile sites intended for furnishing India its second strike capability. India not wanting to ‘lose them’, may likely ‘use them’ and earlier than it might have planned for. Second, Kidwai rocks theory by not ‘allowing’ – a hubris laden word - India a second strike capability. It is often said that the Cold War remained ‘cold’ on account of mutual deterrence termed MAD (mutually assured destruction). Under the circumstance, a side would only go ‘firstest with the mostest’ (to paraphrase General Patton from a different context), if it believes that it can wrest a first strike advantage. MAD expelled any such notions; resulting in stability. Arguably, South Asia is in the MAD era with both states with both arsenals in lower three digits. Deterrence stability can be arrived at between the two states. Hopefully, Kidwai’s successor, Mazhar Jamil, knows better.

- See more at: http://www.claws.in/1404/what-does-khalid-kidwai-mean-ali-ahmed.html#sthash.jMVcGogy.dpuf

EPW - NFU existential crisis

No First Use Nuclear Policy

An Existential Crisis Ahead

http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2014_49/20/No_First_Use_Nuclear_Policy.pdf

Vol - XLIX No. 20, May 17, 2014 | Ali Ahmed

• Commentary

That India's No First Use policy is under threat of the axe in any future review of the nuclear doctrine is apparent from the election time controversy over the mention of a nuclear doctrinal review in the manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The reference - subsequently toned down - was possibly an attempt by the conservative party to live up to its image as a strategically assertive replacement of the Congress Party.

No First Use (NFU) is taken as among the cardinal principles of India’s nuclear doctrine; the o­thers being “credible” and “minimum”.¹ Even as developments in India’s deterrent posture, specifically, in the number of warheads, its variegated missile capability and operationalisation of the deterrent, have led to the “credible” potentially superseding the “minimum”, the NFU is also seemingly under threat of eclipse. This is best evidenced by the recent controversy that attended the release of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) manifesto promising to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine. While the manifesto did not anticipate which pillars of the doctrine would face the axe, the very mention led alert nuclear commentators to pre-emptively pitch for continuation of I­ndia’s NFU.²

The reaction was prompted by BJP functionaries initially alluding to the NFU as a prospective area of change.³ The BJP probably was reacting to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s call at a Pugwash-Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) conference in New Delhi for adoption of NFU as a new “global no-first-use norm”.⁴ Since the speech was the government’s swan song on nuclear matters, it is possible that the BJP was reluctant to have its strategic space tied down by the Congress-led administration’s last minute initiative. In the event, the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, seemingly in response to the criticism in strategic circles,⁵ put a lid on the topic by maintaining that he would give NFU credence since it had the imprint of the BJP stalwart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose moder­ate image he, Modi, was emulating during the electoral campaign under way.⁶

FOR FULL ARTICLE SEE http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2014_49/20/No_First_Use_Nuclear_Policy.pdf

http://www.epw.in/commentary/no-first-use-nuclear-policy.html

The pre-editing full version submitted is below: 

NFU: An existential crisis ahead

By Ali Ahmed

(Ali Ahmed, PhD (JNU) is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge 2014). He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in.)

Summary

That India’s NFU is under threat of the axe in any future review of the nuclear doctrine is apparent from the election time controversy over the mention of a nuclear doctrinal review in the BJP manifesto. The reference was possibly an attempt by the conservative party to live up to its image as a strategically assertive replacement for the effete incumbent. Nevertheless, the juncture provides an opportunity to revisit NFU. Though it is taken as a pillar of the declaratory nuclear doctrine, India has hedged its NFU pledge. The direction of India’s deterrent has been such that rescinding NFU can easily be done, for the structure of a ‘first use’ posture is partially emerging. This article is a timely biography of India’s NFU that may well end up serving as it epitaph.

No First Use (NFU) is taken as among the cardinal principles of India’s nuclear doctrine; the others being ‘credible’ and ‘minimum’.[1] Even as developments in India’s deterrent posture, specifically, in numbers of warheads, its variegated missile capability and operationalisation of the deterrent, have led to ‘credible’ potentially superseding ‘minimum’, the NFU is also seemingly under threat of eclipse. This is best evidenced by the recent controversy that attended the release of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) manifesto promising to ‘revise and update’ India’s nuclear doctrine.[2] While the manifesto did not anticipate which pillars of the doctrine would face the axe, the very mention led alert nuclear commentators to pre-emptively pitch for continuation of India’s NFU.[3]

The reaction was prompted by BJP functionaries initially alluding to the NFU as a prospective area of change.[4] The BJP probably was reacting to the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh’s call at a Pugwash-Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) conference in New Delhi for adoption of NFU as a new ‘global no-first-use norm’.[5] Since the speech was the government’s swan song on nuclear matters, it is possible that the BJP was reluctant to have its strategic space tied down by the Congress led administration’s last minute initiative. In the event, BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Mr. Modi, seemingly in response to the criticism in strategic circles,[6] put a lid on the topic by maintaining that he would give NFU credence since it had the imprint the BJP stalwart, Mr. Vajpayee, whose moderate image he, Modi, was emulating during the electoral campaign underway.[7]  

While a review by itself is unexceptionable, the concerns voiced in wake of the manifesto owed in part to the precedence of the reference in the BJP manifesto of March 1998 to a strategic review including India’s nuclear path. Then, the nuclear tests of May 1998 took the world by surprise by short circuiting the promised strategic defence review.[8] Therefore, the BJP’s utterance set off a small storm in strategic circles. Consequently, the BJP, having gained mileage as a party attuned to national security, but wanting to project a sober image on that score, has stepped back.

Nevertheless, the contretemps indicates the shadow over NFU. While NFU in the declaratory doctrine is useful, it is more important that the posture must itself be evident in the operationalisation of the deterrent. There are apprehensions that developments in nuclear technology and direction of operationalisation make NFU less than credible. The problem this gives rise to is that it would make nuclear trigger fingers itchy in case the recurrent ‘push’ of subcontinental crises comes to conventional war ‘shove’.

NFU was first broached in the strategic context of thinking in the sixties on whether India should go nuclear. Writing anonymously in the late sixties on a ‘strategy for India for a credible posture against a nuclear adversary’ for the IDSA, the writer, possibly K. Subrahmanyam, then director of programs at IDSA, advocated a push for delegitimizing nuclear weapons use.[9] The measure to this end was to be an NFU treaty for all nuclear powers, requiring their combined response to any breach of the treaty by any nuclear power. It is notable that four decades on the prime minister’s Pugwash-IDSA speech reiterates this idea of a multilateral framework by all nuclear weapons possessing states.   

Today, as a reckonable nuclear power, the NFU has come to the ‘central tenet’ in its doctrine. Shyam Saran, currently head of the National Security Advisory Board, in his ‘Subbu lecture’ in April 2013 in honour of late K. Subrahmanyam, describes it thus: ‘… India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but that if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary.’[10] This formulation echoes the Draft Nuclear Doctrine put out by the 1998-99 edition of the Advisory Board that had been chaired by Subrahmanyam which stated NFU as: ‘India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail (Para 2.4).’[11]

While seemingly straightforward, ambiguity crept in with the Draft adding a caveat: ‘India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon power (emphasis added to its Para 2.5).’[12] The intrusion of the caveat referring to nuclear use against a non-nuclear state aligned to the hostile nuclear power also contradicted India’s ‘unqualified’ negative security assurance further down in the Draft (Para 8.2). In effect the caveat qualifies both the NFU and the negative security guarantee.

The NFU in the 2003 official nuclear doctrine is phrased as: 'A posture of "No First Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere (Para 2 ii).’ However, NFU was yet again with a caveat, specifically: ‘…in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons (Para 2 vi).’ This can be attributed to the influence of global strategic culture with India emulating the US which had stated something similar in the run up to the Iraq War II.[13] It bears noting that a decade on, Shyam Saran in his lecture retains this caveat, stating that nuclear retaliation would be against use of ‘such’ weapons, meaning weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons.

These caveats suggest a discomfort with NFU. This is best evidenced by psychological slips such as the National Security Advisor’s gaffe in his 2010 address to the National Defence College fraternity at its golden jubilee. He worded NFU as: ‘No first use against non-nuclear weapons states.’[14] Vipin Narang, a knowledgeable nuclear watcher, dismissed this as significant, stating, ‘the most plausible explanation is that the NDC formulation was simply the product of an innocent typographical or lexical error in the text of the speech.’[15] The point is telling slips like this are one way to gain a measure of India’s nuclear policy.[16]

Adversaries are surely alert to these. They also no doubt listen in on the debates within the strategic community where there are strong voices for jettisoning NFU altogether.[17] Karnad argues that attempting to fashion a counter strike after receiving a debilitating first strike may be too much to expect from an India that even faces problems from the monsoons! This would be inevitably so for any country on the receiving end of a first strike attempt. However, first strike – the attempt to degrade enemy counter strike ability - is not the only manner of first use. Therefore, a counter strike is very much possible. Recognising this enables preserving the utility of NFU.

Currently, NFU suits India strategically since there is little incentive for India to use nuclear weapons. The Draft of 1999 had required India to maintain ‘highly effective conventional military capabilities’ in order to raise ‘the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons (Para 2.7).’ There is an internal contradiction in this requirement. India’s conventional strength when leveraged by its limited war doctrine has led to Pakistan’s lowering of the nuclear threshold.

For Pakistan, nuclear weapons are also meant to deter conventional war, in the fashion of the NATO in the Cold War era. This is distinct from India’s concept that these deter not war, but nuclear weapons, as was articulated most recently by the prime minister, thus: ‘that the sole function of nuclear weapons, while they exist, should be to deter a nuclear attack.’[18] Being at variance conceptually, Pakistan has emulated the NATO in its induction of the Nasr,[19] a tactical nuclear weapon to attempt checkmate India’s ‘Cold Start’.

Raising the threshold entails getting Pakistan to accede to NFU. It is possible that India’s efforts since early nineties in this direction are prompted by this need. Since Pakistan has studiously avoided such commitment, India may be using the threat of abandonment of NFU as last ditch pressure to get Pakistan to sign on. In a hark back to the 1994 non-papers by JN Dixit, then foreign secretary, one of which was on NFU,[20] most recently India reiterated the NFU in Saran’s offer that stated, ‘An agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons would be a notable measure….'[21] His warning alongside of ‘inexorable’ escalation, yet another hangover from the Subrahmanyam era, is to use India’s doctrine of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation to bring to bear on Pakistan the dangers stemming from introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. Since the threat held out first in the 2003 official nuclear doctrine has not worked, perhaps India is using NFU abandonment as pressure tactics. 

Pakistan, by not adhering to NFU rules in ‘first use’; thereby, worrying India. This brings to fore the option of ‘first use’ for India since Pakistani first use preparations may prompt pre-emptive nuclear strike thinking on India’s part. Among the implications is a jettisoning NFU. Arguably this is when NFU would be most needed, so as not to be stampeded into nuclear decisions by possibly false or misleading intelligence of Pakistani preparations. Also, a display of nuclear preparation will form part of nuclear signalling in conflict. An NFU can tide India through, with the risk being worth bearing.

The thrust in India may however be towards yet another possible next step out of the strategic cul-de-sac. The possibility has been brought out by a former chief of the Strategic Forces Command: ‘This (introduction of tactical nuclear weapons) provides the incentive for use and a reactionary (sic) generation of a first strike capability or an anti-ballistic missile competence or counter-force potential on the part of the adversary.’[22] The three capabilities he mentions are not necessarily acquired in reaction. India has been variegating its arsenal and structure even prior to Pakistani introduction of TNWs. What Pakistani action provides is a handy rationale for a capability for all three: first strike, ABM and counter force. The third feeds into the first, forming a closed loop, with the ABMs providing a nuclear shield to attempt escape the target state’s nuclear counter strikes. Given the precedence in India going overtly nuclear when it was technologically able to do so,[23] India could also move away from NFU when all the pieces are in place.  

For India that ‘credible’ supersedes ‘minimum’ is already apparent.[24] It is in the middle of demonstrating technological capability in all dimensions: missile defence, nuclear submarines, submarine launched ballistic missiles, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, ballistic missiles, command and control measures such as the national command post, warheads ranging from 200Kt to sub kiloton levels, cold tests, silo based and mobile delivery systems, miniaturisation, military surveillance and communication satellites etc. Though a step behind in numbers, it has the capacity for a warhead surge, given that it has over eight tons of reactor grade plutonium that can also be used to fashion warheads.[25] The surveillance capability and the numbers of warheads it could reach when combined with the missile defences and an invulnerable nuclear submarine based second strike capability enables a potential first strike capability. This by definition impacts NFU negatively, enabling abandonment when India gains a sense of escalation dominance through these efforts. 

The impending review will at best be an interim one and will cover the pros and cons in relation to India’s security interests. Among the advantages of retention is, firstly, NFU is morally compliant and can help retain the moral, and at one remove, the political high-ground once a nuclear conflict is terminated. It has strategic dividend in that India could keep a conflict non-nuclear and thereby use its conventional power to its advantage. NFU can also serve as a buffer that can be rescinded at an opportune time. Doing so at the crunch can be useful to convey a message that escalation could result if a conflict continues in a direction unfavourable to India.

But, ironically the instrumental uses of NFU for national security institutions makes it more saleable. It provides cover for simultaneous nuclear and conventional preparation. Conventional preparedness can continue under the rationale that since nuclear weapons are not to be considered, strategic aims have to be met by non-nuclear means. Nuclear build up can keep pace with the excuse that given that the enemy has the nuclear initiative India has to cater for the worst case which could be a first strike attempt, defined as an attempt to take out one’s retaliatory capability. A second strike capability can then be pursued involving both vertical proliferation and sub-surface capability, besides missiles defences. This will permit a distancing from NFU if and when needed.

On the cons side of the equation, militarily, NFU is seen as positioning military forces at a disadvantage. They would not only require bearing the burden of a strike in case they are targeted but to also continue operations in a nuclear environment. In the run up to such a situation, the military would certainly bid for a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the threatening nuclear assets being readied by Pakistan for first use. India is attempting to gain the capability for such detection and targeting. In the event of a conflict, it will likely pursue non-nuclear measures to degrade tactical nuclear weapons with Pakistan, which can prompt its nuclear first use under the ‘use them or lost them’ logic. India’s discarding of NFU would help alleviate this problem in the expectation that Pakistan would be less inclined to be nuclear trigger happy. This would reduce India’s pursuit of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons through conventional means.

Politically, it is seen as an expression of India’s strategic culture that has been overly restrained. This is taken as emboldening India’s adversaries. Fashioning of a new strategic culture has been underway over the past quarter century involving a move towards an assertive India that is not averse to proactive and offensive deployment of military power. The NFU has faced attacks from the segment of strategic community so inclined. Reportedly the C. Rangarajan headed 2003 NSAB had recommended a move away from NFU.[26]

Though important to retain so as to prevent the aggressive subculture in India’s strategic culture from gaining an upper hand, this subculture is likely to be energised with the possible advent of the Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, in government. The last time it was at the helm it moved India’s strategic culture further towards assertion, best exemplified by its banging its way into the nuclear club. This time round it would likely want to make similar waves since its leader, Mr. Modi, may wish to project his ‘56 inch’ chest. The NFU is a readily available issue that also provides an opportunity for adherents of the assertive subculture to take over the reins of strategic policy and the dominant position in the strategic community. Declaring NFU void will be a consequential signal to Pakistan that India means nuclear business. 

India’s NFU pledge is therefore in an existential crisis. While BJP may not abandon NFU since escalation dominance capability is not quite in place yet, a review is certain since India’s nuclear doctrine saw two iterations in its last tenure as against none during the Congress reign and the changed circumstance since its adoption entail review. Since there are two potential areas of change over: a distancing from ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation and the NFU, it is possible that both may be done simultaneously. In order to keep deterrence on even keel, a step back from ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation can be compensated by abandoning NFU. What needs doing alongside is reminding the nuclear establishment that even if NFU does not figure in the declaratory doctrine, it could continue to inform operational doctrine. This will preserve the one element that could preserve South Asia from a nuclear fate brought on by Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling’s conceptualisation famously put as: ‘He thinks we think he thinks… he thinks we think he will attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must.’[27]

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[1] The press release from the Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Cabinet Committee on Security reviews progress in operationalising India’s nuclear doctrine’, widely taken as India’s official nuclear doctrine, is available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html (accessed on 10 March2014).

[2] The BJP manifesto is available at http://www.bjp.org/manifesto2014 (accessed on 16 April 2014).

[3] Vipin Narang, ‘Why India must stay the nuclear hand’, Indian Express, 12 April 2014, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/why-india-must-stay-the-nuclear-hand/ (accessed on 15 April 2014).

[4] Sanjeev Miglani and John Chalmers, ‘BJP puts ‘no first use’ nuclear policy in doubt’, Reuters, 7 April 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/india-election-bjp-manifesto-idINDEEA3605820140407

(accessed on 10 April 2014).

[5] Dr. Manmohan Singh, ‘Inaugural Address by Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India on A Nuclear Weapon-Free World: From Conception to Reality’, 2 April 2014,

http://idsa.in/keyspeeches/InauguralAddressShriManmohanSingh (accessed on 13 April 2014).

[6] Jayanth Jacob, ‘BJP Manifesto: ‘No-first-use policy to continue’’, Hindustan Times, 8 April 2014,  http://www.hindustantimes.com/elections2014/election-beat/no-first-use-policy-to-continue/article1-1205874.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014).

[7] Douglas Busvine, ‘India's Modi says committed to no first use of nuclear weapons’, Reuters, 16 April 2014,

 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/16/uk-india-election-nuclear-idUKBREA3F11B20140416 (accessed 18 April 2014).

[8] PR Chari, ‘India’s nuclear doctrine: Confused ambitions’, Non Proliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, p.124,   http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/73chari.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2010).

[9] Anonymous, ‘A strategy for India for a credible posture against a nuclear adversary’, New Delhi: IDSA, 1968. It is fairly certain that the anonymous writer was Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, who as a serving IAS officer was director of programs at IDSA was perhaps not permitted by the government in the context of the debates in the run up to the non-proliferation treaty to voice the strong view for nuclearisation carried in the monograph.  

[10] Shyam Saran, ‘Is India’s nuclear deterrent credible?’, Lecture at India International Center for the Subbu Forum Society for Policy Studies on 24 April 2013, available at http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2014).

[11] NSAB, ‘Draft report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian nuclear doctrine’, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99 (accessed 3 March 2014)

[12] Scott Sagan, ‘Evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrine’ in Scott Sagan et al (eds.), Inside Nuclear South Asia, Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 247.

[13] Scott Sagan, ‘Evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrine’ p. 248. The US in the classified National Security Presidential Directive 17 in September 2002 reportedly stated that "the United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force--including potentially nuclear weapons--to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies." See, ‘U.S. "Negative Security Assurances" At a Glance’, Factsheet, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/negsec (accessed on 25 February 2014).

[14] Speech of NSA Shivshankar Menon, ‘The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs’, delivered on 21 October 2010 is available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/798/Speech+by+NSA+Shri+Shivshankar+Menon+at+NDC+on+The+Role+of+Force+in+Strategic+Affairs (accessed 17 March 2014).

[15] Vipin Narang, ‘Did India change its nuclear doctrine? Much ado about nothing’, IDSA Comment, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DidIndiaChangeitsNuclearDoctrine_vnarang_010311 (accesssed 17 March 2014).

[16] Firdaus Ahmed, ‘One gaffe too many’, http://indiatogether.org/gaffes-in-india-s-nuclear-doctrine-op-ed (accessed 17 March 2014).

[17] For instance, Bharat Karnad says that ‘NFU is not in the least credible…’. See his, ‘Minimum deterrence and the India-US nuclear deal’, Seminar, January 2007, http://www.india-seminar.com/2007/569/569_bharat_karnad.htm (accessed on 15 April 2014).

[18] Dr. Manmohan Singh, ‘Inaugural Address’, op. cit.

[19] Press release, Inter Services Public Relations, 19 April 2011, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721 (accessed on 10 February 2014).

[20] Ibid. Subrahmanyam records that his suggestion for a mutual NFU treaty with Pakistan in the mid-eighties was not taken up, only to be taken up later in the JN Dixit non-papers.

[21] Shyam Saran, op cit p. 16.

[22] Vijay Shankar, ‘India-Pakistan: Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures’, IPCS Article 10 February 2014, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-pakistan-nuclear-risk-reduction-measures-4301.html (accessed 3 March 2014).

[23] K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Narasimha Rao and the Bomb’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28 (4), October 2004, http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/NarasimhaRaoandtheBomb_ksubramanyam_1004 (accessed 20 April 2014). Subrahmanyam records Rao keeping India’s nuclear secrets close to his chest in the mid eighties, when capability was being acquired in order not to alert the world to these developments.

[24] Rajesh Basrur states that minimum deterrence in India ‘has tended to lose its moorings’. See his, Minimum Deterrence and India’s National Security, Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 2.

[25] Zia Mian and MV Ramana, ‘Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S. Nuclear Deal With India’, Arms Control Today, 36: 1, 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IndiaFeature (Accessed on 10 April 2014). They estimate that 1100 bombs can be made from this material since India has reportedly tested a bomb made from this in May 1998.

[26] The Rediff Special, ‘Abandon No First Use policy, experts tell government’, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/09ia.htm (accessed 2 March 20140).  However, Air Marshal Patney, who was member of the NSAB then, dismisses this (intervention at a lecture attended by this author in New Delhi in circa 2010) stating that the matter never came up for discussion.

[27] Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 207.