book review from The Hindu of my book

From ‘cold start’ to ‘limited war’, many unanswered questions

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-bookreview/from-cold-start-to-limited-war-many-unanswered-questions/article6824720.ece

N. SATHIYA MOORTHY

N. Sathiya Moorthy

As the author, a Political Officer with the U.N. after a stint in the Indian Army, concedes, the limitations of this book lie in the fact that it covers mostly the Army’s Doctrine, to the near-exclusion of those of the Navy and the Air Force . Again as acknowledged, it focuses almost exclusively on Pakistan, without much reference to China, the bigger of India’s two historic adversaries or both together in situations where the military may have to prepare for separate yet coordinated wars in the eastern and western sectors up North. In the 21{+s}{+t}century scenario of a rising China with the US already stirring the Indian Ocean waters, the need to include the airspace across the nation’s territory alone would complete a comprehensive and meaningful strategic-military doctrine.

Though limited to the Army, a book of this nature still raises as many questions as it answers for those outside the immediate realm of military planning, execution and academics. Given the increasing need for governments and militaries in the country to take the whole nation into confidence, such a near-lucid study (as can be possible for and in a book of this nature) can help inform the political class, the civilian administration and population, and more so, the emerging ranks of the strategic-thinkers, both within and outside the three Services, as to what wars and decisions are all about – and why are they so!

Ahmed focuses on two main recent concepts of India’s army/military doctrine, namely, ‘Limited War’ and ‘Cold Start’. The former is self-explanatory. The latter is a reflection on the alacrity with which the armed forces are able to mobilise for war within a short duration But neither is new concept, per se, in the global context. The author could have examined some precedents in greater detail so as to draw conclusions for the Indian forces.

The ‘Kargil War’ was a ‘limited war’, and involved Pakistan alone. The question remains as to who was the real instrument in keeping it a ‘limited war’ – the Indian defender or the Pakistani perpetrator. ‘Operation Parakram ’, when India mobilised armed forces along the Pakistan border at a relative short-notice after the ‘Parliament attack’, was a ‘Cold Start’. While the author has pointed to some of the mobilisation-deficiencies and consequent delays, and thus to the take-away from the exercise, he stops with saying that how in a ‘Cold Start’ , the military/army is seen as taking the initiative with the civilian leadership expected to go along.

One other shortcoming of the study is that it discusses the Indian Army’s thinking to the exclusion of what the adversary – Pakistan in this case -- may have in store. Much of it may relate to strategy and battle-front tactics under specific circumstances and ground situations, but as elements within, concepts such as ‘Limited War’ and ‘Cold Start’ cannot be unilaterally decided upon without thinking for the enemy, too.

The ‘Kargil War’ remained ‘limited’ because Pakistan did not take it beyond what it had already done – owning up, if at all, only the ‘sub-conventional’ insurgency, which it had employed earlier in 1948 and 1965. India is yet to find a suitable answer to the same. Post-Bangladesh, India is also yet to find an adequate answer to cross-border terrorism that Pakistan’s ISI has mastered and fine-tuned. .

If Operation Parakram was a step in a series of Indian efforts to transit smoothly from ‘deterrence’ to ‘defensive’ to being ‘offensive’ in terms of protecting national self-interest and security, it stopped just there. If anything, after the tri-Services Indian doctrines came to be discussed in public, Pakistani commentators are using the ‘offensive’ Indian posturing as being ‘provocative’ rather than the other way round .

There is also the underlying ‘strategic warfare’, meaning ‘nuclear war’. India has sworn to ‘no first-use’ of nuclear weapons. It has also vowed that its second-strike capability, when unleashed, would be of a “much higher order or at “massive levels” to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the adversary. Against this, even during the ‘limited’ Kargil War Pakistan declared that it would not flinch from deploying its ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons if the Indian Army crossed the international borders.

These raise uncomfortable questions. Pakistan not having gone back on its Kargil War declaration (about which there is no mention in the book), what’s ‘Cold Star’ all about, unless the Indian nation is prepared to let the other side to step up any combat to unacceptable levels of nuclear war? In strategising for such an eventuality, the ‘ Parakram ’ Cold Start showed that not only was the politico-administrative leadership possibly not fully prepared for what it was meant to be, and what its goals actually were, but there was more to it.

The IPKF deployment in Sri Lanka could be described as a ‘Cold Start’ that did not start off well, nor ended well. In a limited way, ‘Operation Bluestar’ was one such victim. Both operations were led by the late Army chief, Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji, the ‘thinking general’. As acknowledged later, both lacked minimal and critical inputs from other wings and agencies of the Government. Raw intelligence was only one of them.

Even the political goals that were set out along with the time available for the armed forces ahead of the ‘Bangladesh War’ were not clearly made out in the two cases. And the nation did pay a heavy price in both. With the result, the ‘Doctrine’ still remains a ‘puzzle’ despite the Army, Navy and the Air Force having theirs – and the Nation, possibly none, with the military as a whole too not having one!

Nationalism and Nuclear Risk

India and China: Nationalism and Nuclear Risk

http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/china-and-india-nationalism-and-nuclear-risk/

Following Gaurav Kampani’s recent essay inInternational Security, another paper by the author was published by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. This new paper is quite compelling and deserves a close look, especially where he notes two tendencies increasing deterrence instability between India and China. However, there may be a blind spot in Kampani’s analysis.

But let’s start with the first tendency noted by Kampani: As both militaries have entered nuclear strategic decision making – with the Indian military lagging behind by about a decade – there is a push to move from minimal to limited deterrence. This involves, in part, seeking to enhance deterrence by building in options for limited nuclear use. The second tendency is in the negative implications this carries for no-first use (NFU), which is currently the professed policy of both states. This was particularly evident in the now-defunct Indian debate on the expected revision of its nuclear doctrine.

Taken together, the two beget a situation of instability described by Kampani as: “… limited options render deterrence more credible and are more likely to achieve intra-war deterrence … The net strategic effect of these operational changes will be the lowering of the bar for nuclear weapons use in the future.” Kampani rightly notes that there are mitigating structural and institutional features, namely large and strong militaries and balancing institutional pulls from political and scientific establishments, that make for stability.

Kampani’s case is that while “there is reason for concern, the case for nuclear pessimism in the China–India nuclear dyad is overstated,” so can’t we, on account of that stability, leave well enough alone?

To be sure, the two states have considerable depth in both territory and forces, thus precluding the ready or early resort to nuclear weapons. However, nationalism is growing stronger in the politics of both states. Chinese nationalism is being fanned by the nationalist turns in Japan, and this year India elected a nationalist government.

The impact of nationalism on strategic rationality is to force everything towards the hard option. During crises or conflicts, there are also media-induced nationalist pulls and pressures magnifying this force. Of course, this force is further strengthened by both states being on the cusp of rising to the next echelon in power, with China poised to become a superpower and India a great power. The adverse effect of downward movement by either will be taken as impacting its standing. In India’s case this would include its regional salience in relation to Pakistan. Finally, while nationalism in both states can prove fatal, it is bad enough in just one as that would suffice to ensure a mirroring in the other.

The net effect of this is the escalation of the several border incidents in the recent past between the two states, such as the most recent, which coincided with the Chinese premier’s visit to Delhi. Clearly, there is nothing positive to be found here. A nudge is more liable to end up as a push, and a push more liable to transform into a shove. Nationalism and the cultural need to save face at this stage will likely kick in with greater gusto. The side that perceives itself to be on the losing end can be expected to escalate to escape disadvantage.

To be sure, escalation can very well occur. Indeed, directions in the military preparedness of both states betray as much. Even though there is only a border dispute between them, an incipient rivalry in the Indian Ocean is being played out. This horizontal escalation is building in scope. Coupled with the nationalist impulse in strategic thinking, vertical escalation is becoming a certainty where otherwise it would have remained a mere possibility.

What will vertical escalation look like? Nationalism-inspired strategies will place a premium on territory. With forces available and mobile thanks to increased investment in infrastructure and aerial transport fleets, the rapid concentration of forces can be foreseen. This might potentially set the stage for de-escalation, since neither would be able to claim an easy victory. In fact, precedence does favor this in that China withdrew after its earlier forays into India and Vietnam, and India has restricted its actions against Pakistan in Kargil to that theater itself. However, nationalism, with its effects on strategy, is the wildcard, making it difficult to rule out escalation.

Traditional nuclear strategists would claim that India currently lacks strategic deterrence, since its Agni series is not yet complete and the K series has not yet been tested from the nuclear submarine. Even so, India will likely have enough deterrence elements to please such strategists by the end of the decade. In the interim, it is exercising minimal deterrence, the effect of which cannot be discounted, as China values its economic trajectory. However, this can, at best, only ensure deterrence stability at the upper reaches of city busting levels.

As Kampani notes in his warning of military pushes in both states towards the operational – instead of political – utility of nuclear weapons, there will also likely be military pushes in both states for operational level leverage with nuclear weapons. Kampani admits to both militaries being capable of nuclear use from demonstration shots to shots across the bow.

A nationalist strategy, coupled with a military need to recuperate from a bad bargain, may foreshadow the operational use of nuclear weapons. Use of nuclear weapons will not necessarily bring about a doomsday scenario in that the choice of nuclear first use and its response will be in areas marginal to the territorial and socio-political heartland of both states. Nuclear first use of this kind would likely invoke the strategic benefit in the deterrence logic of the “threat that leaves something to chance.”

The scenario here relies on a factor usually discounted in traditional strategic analyses, which presume strategic rationality and have internal political factors as a blind spot. Consequently, though Kampani is right that the “competition is unlikely to assume the unbridled nature of the former superpower rivalry,” that is not quite the real fear.

India on the LC

A More Aggressive India

http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-more-aggressive-india/

Recent events along the Line of Control underline a new approach to defense.

By Ali Ahmed

November 07, 2014

With the dust having settled after the heaviest artillery and mortar exchange of the past decade on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, the situation is now clearer. India has intimated a change in policy, from merely having a shield to also wielding a sword. Defence Minister Arun Jaitley insisted that Pakistani “adventurism” would meet with “pain.” However, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval also promised that if Pakistan behaved then India would be willing to let the rising tide of its economy lift all regional boats.

For its part, Pakistan has used its prime minister’s foreign policy and the NSA to spell out that it will not accept India’s hegemonic designs and will settle only for “meaningful” talks that lead to a settlement on the outstanding issue of Kashmir. Its army chief has vowed an “effective” response, while the more colorful former military dictator General Pervez Musharraf called for “inciting” rebellion in Kashmir.

So, not much has changed.

One thing looks different, however: India appears more aggressive on the LoC, in one report firing more than1000 mortar rounds in one day. And the reasons for this go beyond a mere shift in policy.

First, the firing has been in response to Pakistan’s raising of the stakes. Since the beheading of an Indian soldier in early 2013, the Indian Army has the mandate of giving a “befitting reply” at a time and place of its choosing. This time, with a soldier reportedly killed in an IED attack in Balnoi sector, the opportunity presented itself.

Second, India is reporting more infiltration attempts, probably a result of the unprecedented rains on the anti-infiltration fence along the LoC. The Army’s spokesman in Kashmir explained the spurt as Pakistan preparing to disrupt the impending elections in Jammu and Kashmir and as the annual last-ditch infiltration before winter. Additionally, the firing sets the stage for the elections in Jammu and Kashmir by warning off Pakistan.

Finally, the Indian government has gained some electoral advantages in the run-up to provincial elections, during which Prime Minister Narendra Modi alluded to “shutting up” Pakistan’s army by leaving it “screaming.” Having demonstrated that this Indian government is different from its predecessor, there are hints of a revival of talks as early as the forthcoming SAARC gathering in Kathmandu in November.

The firing could also be said to have kicked-off India’s grand strategy, aimed at economic development over Modi’s ten-year timeline. In its initial phase, the government is focused on bolstering its position, taking political gains from projects already underway such as the recent test flight of the Nirbhay cruise missile or the launch ofthe Vikramaditya aircraft carrier. To quote the NSA at his address at the Munich Security Conference in New Delhi, it is India’s “effective deterrence” against terrorism.

All in all, whether it be in confronting Pakistan or China, this Indian government has adopted a more aggressive posture, even if in actual policy terms the changes are mostly subtle, such as rescinding environmental constraints on road building in the fragile Himalayas.

Strategic commentary by analysts ranging from realist theoretician Rajesh Rajagopalan to practitioner Ashok Mehta advises the government to tread more softly. Their arguments are based on the strategic logic that India can ill afford to be tested prematurely on either front. In the event of a conflict with Pakistan, it is India that has something to lose, not Pakistan. Against China, India might be able to give a credible account of itself, but the costs would be immense – the government has just set aside $13 billion of an intended $100 billion over the next ten years to plug the gaps the strategists have outlined.

However, the strategic commentary does not quite capture the ongoing change taking place. Previous governments have shown an admirable distaste for militarism. They might have played a strategic game, including, if Musharraf is to be believed, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Baluchistan, but it was more subtle and without the current grandstanding.

In contrast, the Modi government has interpreted firing episodes along the LoC as giving the military a free hand, a departure from the days when the military was stifled by bureaucratic layers and diplomatic niceties. Meanwhile, the government has agreed to a national war memorial and will also appease the military with the expected pay commission. It has kept the ministerial weight on the military light by persisting with a part-time defense minister, despite his ill health. This enables Modi to forge a direct relationship with the military himself through repeated visits, the most recent one being to Siachen.

The seeming responsiveness of Modi to the military can potentially transform civil-military relations from objective civilian control, relying on military professionalism alone, to subjective civilian control reliant on affinity. The goal could be to bring about a convergence of thinking between the political master and the subservient military.

Clearly, if the sociological perspective is adopted, there is more to the LoC firing and increased visibility of the military than strategic commentary lets on.

Modi and the Military

by Ali Ahmed   |  October 25, 2014

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/10/25/modi-and-the-military/

Universally, militaries are conservative-realist entities. India’s is no different. Therefore, though an apolitical one, it is probably not unhappy with the election of a conservative government to power in Delhi. Whereas other governments have been constrained by their parliamentary strength and have used the military sparingly, this government does not need to look over its shoulder. In fact, it is already delivering on several of the military’s long standing demands. Mr. Modi’s Diwali foray to Siachen suggests there is more to the Modi-military relationship than mere photo opportunities. What might this be?

Commentators, citing the recent disruption of the decade long ceasefire on the Line of Control (LOC), have it that India has changed its policy from passivity to greater aggressiveness. It is also being prickly on the China front, so much so that analysts have advised greater caution. While the army has been given a ‘free hand’ in one report on the LOC owing in the defence minister’s words to India having greater ‘conventional strength’, on the China front, since India has a lot of catching up to do, India is probably more restrained, even if it  is projecting a tougher  stance.

Assuming Indian strategy is, in the words of its National Security Adviser, ‘effective deterrence’, then India would have strengthened its fences early and then settled down to concentrating on its economic development. As a grand strategy, this is unexceptionable, even if the initial phase could well have been different with Mr. Modi following up on the promise of the meeting with Mr. Sharif in Rashtrapati Bhawan forecourt.

Mr. Modi rightly reasoned that Mr. Sharif was not the best interlocutor in Pakistan and that he could not deliver on what the only other credible interlocutor in Pakistan, its army, can possibly settle for. This best explains India’s strategic line taken. It has essentially told Pakistan off, even if has not ‘shut up’ that army as Mr. Modi imagines. Mr. Modi’s going to Siachen only strengthens this message, that even the supposed low hanging fruit, a solution to Siachen, is out of reach. By aggression on the LOC, Mr. Modi and his hard-line security adviser, Mr. Dovel, are messaging that if Pakistan does not accept the new status quo, then India can and will inflict ‘pain’ for ‘adventurism’ in the words of its defence minister.

Messaging thus can only be based on prior strategic calculation that the Pakistan army would play along. So while Pakistan’s army may use its former maverick chief, Musharraf, to plug the hardline for its part and have its spokesperson mimic India’s warning with his own on Indian ‘misadventure’, as a calculating strategic player, it will see the strategic imbalance and lay off India. In any case, it is somewhat busy warding off its own Jihadis. India can aggravate its western front at will through its higher profile in Afghanistan and proximity with the new government in Kabul. Will the Pakistan army see things this way?

India is no doubt aware that Pakistan’s army has proven irrational before, be it in 1971, when it lost half the country; and more recently, at Kargil. Therefore, if India is going in for an aggressive strategy, it is aware that Pakistan army may not get the message of deterrence and there could well be conflict.

This can also be taken as a form of deterrence in that it is India that is playing irrational. It is seemingly in the game of ‘chicken’ in which it has got into the car and stepping on the accelerator, has thrown away the steering. This way Pakistan will have to veer away lest it be crushed by the Indian juggernaut. This is indeed deterrence strategy of sorts.

Even if it does not work, India has readied itself over the past decade with its switch over and its practice of the ‘cold start’ doctrine. India has therefore catered for the worst case. While most would cry ‘watch out for the nukes’, India is perhaps banking on these not coming into the equation in a brief, limited war, irrespective of the spent-force, General Musharraf’s vainglorious threats.

While to most war spells economic downslide, to India’s decision makers it may well stimulate the economy. As it is, India is privileging the defence sector. It has opened it up to foreign investment. It is set to stay at the top of the arms importers table for the remainder of the decade. The US has displaced Russia as its largest supplier. More widely, the government is itself fronting for big corporations interested in the defence sector. The ‘make in India’ slogan can be defence sector led.

Therefore, the only restraint on war, the notion that it would be bad for the economy, is not one that the government may find overly persuasive. In fact, the political gains from a short, sharp war in which Pakistan is taught a lesson or two may be worth the risk. Externally, it may displace Pakistani military from the decision apex in Pakistan, enabling finally the ascendance of the peace lobby there. Internally, a victory would prove as good for the BJP as it was for Indira Gandhi.

Therefore, the Indian strategy is a win-win one—for itself. In case Pakistan takes the hint, then India can proceed with its economic trajectory unmolested. In case Pakistan does not play ball, then India can use the economic stimulus of a brief bout of hostilities to continue, after a short pause, down its economic trajectory.

As with any strategy, there is an element of risk. However, are assumptions such as of Pakistani rationality; on the economic fallout of war; and unlikelihood of a war going nuclear, one too many? Can it be that the conservative-realists, new to power and itsexercise, in presenting themselves as different from their predecessors, are stretching tad too far? Or are there military-societal explanations for the military-Modi chemistry on display that strategic analysts cannot quite capture? Answers will emerge, and hopefully not through a mushroom cloud.

The maulvi protests too much

Wearing religion on their uniform sleeves
4 October 2014, New Delhi, Ali Ahmed

http://www.millenniumpost.in/NewsContent.aspx?NID=71129

The Indian Army cannot afford a controversy where its secular credentials get questioned in the open.

If a recent newspaper report is to be believed, a Maulvi in the army has been censured for using the salutation ‘Jai Hind’. Reading the rest of the news story reveals that he declined to use the regimental salutations, Jai Mata Di and Ram Ram, in vogue within his regiment, the Rajputana Rifles. He preferred using Jai Hind instead, citing religious reasons. Media reports have it that the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) has alleged in his court submission that the army has denigrated Jai Hind as a greeting.

This is far from the truth since the salutation between officers in the army is Jai Hind. However, by not following the traditions in the battalion, the JCO is indirectly calling these into question. He not only thereby detracts from the entire edifice of regimental traditions but in his public challenge to this particular one brings a major issue to the fore, that of relationship of an orthodox version of religion with the military.

Regimentation is part of the course for members of fighting units which all frontline infantry units are, including 3 Raj Rif, the JCO’s current outfit. This is the difference between norms, ethics and the law. Norms go beyond the written word. Compliance is necessary since these units are not tasked for ‘normal’ activity. They are to go into battle, the daunting sounds and sights of which are familiar to all across the country post Kargil. This requires a bonding between members of the units and a horizontal cohesion in sub-units that will enable them to go the last hundred yards under fire.

While this can come about by shared dangers and privations of war as conscript armies have demonstrated in military history, our army has chosen the regimental system to keep the regimental spirit alive and well. This owes to undemarcated borders, unresolved disputes with neighbours and live insurgencies sometimes compelling sudden deployment in operations. In such situations, pre-existing bonds can sustain the fighting man. Such bonds are created in peace times through practices that go back three centuries such as eating the same food, speaking the same language, wearing the same uniform and sharing the same greeting.

His challenge to the salutation in his present place of posting has critical morale sapping connotations. A religious teacher (RT) is usually authorised where there is a company worth of troops from a particular religion. He has in his challenge adversely impacted the practices that the Muslim jawans are used to. In case they see their religious teacher not following traditions, they can begin to doubt these. This will bring about an avoidable divide between them and their Hindu comrades.

At one remove, Muslim soldiers who have gained immortality in fighting for the country, ranging from Brigadier Usman to Haneefuddin, are icons for their co-religionists. A commanding officer in Kargil swears by their role there. Such inspiring feats have wider repercussions, leading, for instance, to the politician Azam Khan in a display of patriotic fervour claiming the Kargil victory as a Muslim contribution to the nation! The prime minister was right in his observation that Muslims both live and die for the country. Such sacrifice is generated by the identification of soldiers with their comrades, sub-units and units, a sentiment that traditions help foster. The RT JCO in questioning traditions and practices is disrupting the harmony that gives rise to martial exploits. These are important not only in themselves but also serve as a building block for the the wider mosaic of Indian Muslim communities across India to identify with and be proud of their army and their country.

The RT JCO cites his religious convictions as standing in the way. Several Muslims, some of whom have been staunch believers and avid practitioners, have gone through service without having their religion come in way of their regimental duties. Aligarh Muslim University Vice Chancellor Zameeruddin Shah has acknowledged as much in a recent interview. At least one such Muslim with an unmatched reputation of never having missed a fast in the month of Ramzan, even when in exercises or operations, or his five-times prayer is Lt Gen Zaki, former vice chancellor of the Jamia Millia Islamia. He was from a regiment that continues to use Ram-Ram as its salutation.

Nevertheless, since India allows freedom to profess religion and followers of all faiths have the right to contribute to the country’s defence, the question is how can the RT JCO’s rights be preserved? He could well have been transferred out of his unit to another where the traditional greeting is Jai Hind. This would have preserved his religious convictions and prevented the cohesion from being threatened in his unit. Since he has chosen instead to go to the press, military justice must now take its own course.

However, the more significant point from this episode is of the relationship of extreme forms of religion with the military. In this case, it is possible that the RT JCO subscribes to an orthodox version of Islam that is seemingly less tolerant of the traditional face of subcontinental Islam. The eclipse of the greeting ‘Khuda-hafez’ by ‘Allah-hafez’ is symbolic and symptomatic of this version. He has perhaps been a victim of taking a particular trend in Islam as the correct and the only version of Islam. As a result his ultra-orthodox religious convictions have got better of his score years of military service and his sensitivity to the injunctions in Islam of service to the country.

The trend bears watching since in both majority’s religion, Hinduism, and Islam are each witnessing a tussle within, in which less tolerant forms are vying to be the dominant version of respective religion. The army cannot afford to serve as a site for such tryst. It cannot afford controversy in which its secular credentials are questioned. It is clear that the agenda of its Institute for National Integration in Pune that graduates religious teachers has suddenly got heavier. 

book extract

An extract from the book India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia:

http://www.thecitizen.in/NewsDetail.aspx?Id=541

The organisational culture has also been considerably influenced by the kargil war and the near-war situation of 2001–02. Just as the 1962 war prompted much internal tumult, the initial surprise (V.P. Malik) in kargil and later, the inability to deal Pakistan a return blow in 2002 despite the Parliament attack and later the kalu Chak incident, referred to in subsequent literature as the ‘twin peaks crisis’, has prompted much introspection. The military’s image and self-image was considerably dented. ‘Face’ has well-known cultural connotations. Thus it had to come up with an answer to the con- tinuing problem posed by Pakistan. The outcome was Limited war thinking (kapoor 2010: 3). A change in organisational culture per- ceptibly towards the offensive was the result. only a change from defensive mindset to offensive, from attrition orientation to maneu- verist thinking could operationalise the doctrine (kapoor 2010: 4). The internal measures taken to foster an offensive mindset are not dealt in detail here.

The defensive mindset has been partially ingrained by the foremost role of the military involving defence of national territory interpreted earlier as a need to defend ‘every inch’ has been over-shadowed instead by an inclination to undertake the same role differently by taking the offensive. Forces for this in pivot forma- tions have been created by thinning out on the defences and accept- ing the risk of loss of territory that this entails. earlier, loss was not possible to envisage as in a short duration war it was felt that losses in territory would serve as bargaining chips in adverse hands and would be politically costly. however, by taking to the offensive through building the capability and an enabling doctrine, the bar-gaining advantage would be with the side on the offensive. There- fore, by taking the offensive, this risk stands minimised.

General V.P. Malik recalls that he had mooted the idea of Limited war prior to the Kargil war but not been taken seriously (Basrur 2009: 328; Malik 2010). The Army, having been at the receiving end of the Pakistani intrusion at kargil, was determined to exploit the gap below the nuclear threshold for a limited conventional operation. The assumption was that Pakistan would be ‘finished’ in case of a nuclear exchange; therefore space existed for conventional operations (Basrur 2009: 328). This would have enabled it to deal decisively with the sub-conventional proxy war. its earlier doctrine involved not only deterring an enemy attack by being ready for it (‘deterrence by denial’) but also launching counter offensives in line with ‘deterrence by punishment’. The accent is now no longer on ‘deterrence by denial’. in fact, the troops for the new offensive tasks of pivot corps have been taken off defensive roles. The aim is to take the initiative and fight the war on enemy territory. The war intended as a short one, would not require defending one’s own territory to the extent once done. Therefore, thinning out is possible in the ground-holding role of forces in defence. This does not imply dilution of ability to defend, but a substitution of manpower by technology and firepower.

The earlier ‘deterrence by punishment’ was deterrence of conventional action by the enemy on the offensive. now ‘deterrence by punishment’ implies punishment for sub-conventional infringements. A shift has taken place in doctrine towards the offensive in the form of proactive operations. This is in keeping with organisational culture that favoured the offensive in any case, as evident from its earlier intent for prosecution of ‘deterrence by denial’ through counter offensives.

The apparent neglect of the nuclear context points to the working of organisational culture. That a blind-spot exists where dan- gers should otherwise be starkly visible, suggests the operation of culture. According to rajesh rajagopalan, the development of the doctrine is, ‘another indication of the indian effort to overcome the limits imposed by nuclearisation and the limitations of that effort’ (2008: 205). he thinks that success would increase Pakistani propensity for nuclear first use. he notes that, ‘whether it is possible to think in terms of military victory in a nuclearised environment is left unaddressed in this doctrine’ (rajagopalan 2008: 206). The military wishes to fulfill its obligation through doctrinal innovation in the direction of what S. Paul kapur calls, ‘Aggressive conventional posture’ (kapur 2008: 88), the dilemma of Pakistani nuclear response notwithstanding. rajesh Basrur asserts that, ‘The “lesson” of kargil — that force projection would work better than diplomacy — was a case of “incorrect learning”. in practice, the whole argument for limited war came to naught in 2002’ (Basrur 2009: 330). Yet, kapur notes, ‘Military thinking has not changed. General Malik continues to hold that “limited war was, and still is, a strategic possibility so long as proxy war continues in the sub- continent”’ (Malik 2009: 330). To Basrur, ‘This represents a military professional’s thinking, and does not reflect the perspective of political decision makers, who have been reluctant to return to the limited war logic that preceded the 2001–2002 crisis. The politicians, at least, seem to have learned the combined lesson of the two crises: that limited war is not a viable option in the nuclear context’ (Basrur 1998: 331).

This ‘learning’ has led to persistence of the ‘strategy of restraint’, despite the provocation of Mumbai attacks of 26/11. it is this that perhaps accounts for a distancing by the military away from Cold Start in favour for what it terms proactive ‘contingency’ operations. in terms of cultural theory, this can be explained as persistence of india’s symbolic strategic culture. despite having an offensive option as an artifact of parabellum or operational strategic culture, that it remains unexercised, indicates the scope of symbolic strategic culture of restraint.

India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia,

Ali Ahmed 

Routledge, 2014, pp. 240, Rs 695

India-Pakistan

Demystifying India’s Volte-Face on Pakistan

http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/demystifying-indias-volte-face-on-pakistan/

India’s new government has sprung two back-to-back surprises on Pakistan: the first was inviting Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the swearing-in of Prime Minister Narendra Modi; the second was the about-face on foreign secretary level talks upon the resumption of dialogue.

The first of these was seemingly couched in Indian regional diplomacy, but was mainly directed at Pakistan. The message was that with a new right-leaning government in New Delhi, Pakistan could expect bolder movement on the outstanding issues between the two.

However, the second stemmed from the new government’s reluctance to be brought to the negotiating table under Pakistani pressure. There were an estimated 95 incidents along the Line of Control (LoC) this summer, with 25 on the international border (or “working boundary,” according to Pakistan).

A strategic view of the increase in action along the LoC is that it is the Pakistani military’s attempt to get India to engage meaningfully. A political view is that it was intended to position the military favorably within Pakistan, to first gain credibility for the talks by pushing India to the table, and second to caution the Pakistani government against any “sell out.”

In this event, the Pakistani high commissioner’s meeting with Kashmiri separatists, something traditionally acceded to by India, provided the pretext for the cancellation. It was India’s message to Pakistan’s “miltastablishment,” to use former Punjab acting chief minister, Najam Sethi’s phrase, that force will not work, particularly on a new government with a “tough” self-image.

India’s outstretched hand in the Rashtrapati Bhawan (Presidential Residence) forecourt appeared promising for the peace constituency in Pakistan, which comprises liberals and the business lobby. It is a longstanding Indian policy to expand the peace constituency by holding out economic benefits as an incentive for Pakistan to go beyond the Kashmir question. Cancelling talks was unhelpful in empowering the peace lobby relative to India-skeptics in Pakistan.

It is apparent that India’s strategy does not rely on this constituency’s ability to marginalize hardliners. The cancellation and the manner it was done together suggest India’s intent to bring about change through other means.

In a speech to troops while in Leh, Modi pointed out that the Pakistani military’s shift to a proxy war was due to India’s conventional advantages. Obviously these advantages have not been so overwhelming they could deter a proxy war.

The ability to administer military punishment was found wanting when it was tested during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Even though India has had a conventional doctrine for the nuclear age, called Cold Start, since the attack on India’s Parliament in December 2001, the military’s wherewithal to execute its policy could not keep pace given the strained economic circumstances during the later part of the last decade.

Deterrence deemed insufficient, India is now attempting to compel.

India is expected to import $250 billion in arms over the next ten years. It is filling in the gaps in its conventional inventory, such as artillery, to remove any doubt of credibility about its conventional deterrence. The amount of foreign investment allowed in defense manufacturing has been upped to 49 percent. Since assuming office, the prime minister has visited Jammu and Kashmir twice, addressing troops on both occasions. Additionally, keeping the defense portfolio without a full-time minister has allowed Modi to keep a closer eye on it.

Three warships have been commissioned in close succession, although two of them are reportedly not quite ready. The buildup on the Chinese front, reviewed most recently by the part-time defense minister in August when he visited the mountain strike corps forming there, could prove useful on the western front too. Carte blanche has been given to the Army and the Border Security Force by respective ministers to administer a “befitting reply” on the LoC and international border.

Within this flurry of activity is couched a message for Pakistan. Thus far, Pakistan has been upping the ante in the hope of getting India to move on Kashmir. This time around, India hopes to increase pressure to get Pakistan to forget Kashmir.

Will this strategy succeed?

Pakistan, for its part, has a counter-strategy of ensuring that it is always in a position to credibly show itself in conflict with India. All it needs to do to win is to avoid losing. Further, its moves on the nuclear front are meant to convey the threat of escalation. This places India’s conventional threat in question, as it is based on keeping any conflict non-nuclear.

Indeed, a paradox emerges in that the more successful India is in its armament program, the greater is the probability of Pakistan’s proxy war challenge heightening at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and the nuclear shadow lengthening at the upper end.

In Rawalpindi’s perception, with the U.S. set to exit Afghanistan and “good behavior” on Kashmir over the past decade not having “worked,” it may be back to business. Besides, it might be better for Kashmir to act as a sink for surplus Islamist energy than Pakistan’s cities and Punjab. The spike in firing incidents since talks were cancelled suggests as much.

India could also undertake a proxy war itself, an accusation Pakistan has made before, most notably at the Sharm-el Sheikh joint statement in Egypt. The appointment of an intelligence czar as India’s national security advisor is an indicator. Afghanistan readily lends itself as a suitable site for such an endeavor. Any such conflict would certainly spill-over into Pakistan. In India’s calculation, placing Pakistan on its back foot could make it less adventurous in Kashmir.

A strategy of overawing Pakistan is dangerous. Four potential proxy wars threaten: in Afghanistan, its spillover into Pakistan, in Kashmir, and in Islamist terror in India; this last heightened by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahari’s latest video. At the same time there would be conventional and nuclear muscle-flexing by both sides.

Given such dangers, India and Pakistan would do well to restart the peace process at the earliest opportunity, during the two prime ministers’ appearances at the U.N. at the end of next month. At the least, it would reinsert a buffer between crisis and conflict.

Realistically, this may not be on the cards. India, set on upping the ante, may have decided to hold course no matter what. In this game of chicken, it hopes Pakistan’s army will be the first to blink. This is a touching, if entirely unfounded, faith in Pakistan’s army.