https://www.indianewsstream.com/kashmir-pakistan-national-security-options-before-next-government/

Pakistan: Post poll national security options before present or next ‘chowkidar’

In history, ‘chowkidar’ will forever be associated with the 2019 elections. In Prime Minister Modi’s appropriation of the term, it signifies an alert, anti-corruption watchdog, somewhat personified by none other than himself.

Though the term dates to the 2014 elections, when Modi presented himself as out to clean up the stables of United Progressive Alliance’s malfeasance, the term has expanded in its current avatar post-Balakot to depict Modi as the one to be entrusted with national security.

While different people would say differently on Modi’s claim in regard to the first version of the term , the second, recent, version of the term needs detain us longer. This owes to the electoral agenda featuring national security for the first time, distracting from more significant issues as joblessness and farmer’s plight.

To begin with, the Balakot aerial strikes, now considerably politicized, not least because of ruling party first making the claim of 300 dead. The effects of the strikes are not of much consequence. The key question instead is on the outcome of the strikes.

This is yet to play out and would be evident in the coming summer when India would be faced with holding assembly elections in Kashmir. Simultaneous elections to the parliament and assembly being ruled out on security grounds by the election commission, a decision on the assembly elections will be the first challenge facing the new government. Its choice would be dependent on the expectation of voter turnout that would likely be so bleak as to expose the underbelly of Indian democracy.

In case the Modi government is returned to power, it will be happy to postpone assembly elections indefinitely with security indices in support of its decision. Its recent political actions of banning the Jamaat and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front have set the post-national election agenda. The advantage it would seek would be in enabling the military template another summer to wrap up the insurgency.

Since the indigenous wellsprings of insurgency may dry up if another cohort of Kashmiri youth is killed in the bargain, Pakistan is unlikely to watch from the sidelines. The ceasefire violations testifying to an active Line of Control provide it cover to infiltrate terrorists and send in weapons. In short, Modi would have set up the conditions for another Pulwama-like incident.

India’s response – and the Pakistani counter – can both prove escalatory. Having exhausted the surgical strikes option after the Uri attack and forewarned of the escalation potential of aerial strikes by the Balakot-Naushera tit-for-tat exchange, Modi may settle for lobbing missiles across.

The missile threat figured in the immediate aftermath of the Pakistani aerial bombardment in Naushera, on the day following the Indian Balakot strike. Reportedly, India readied its short range missiles for launch, apparently to force Pakistan to treat its pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman in their custody, as per the Geneva Conventions and return him safely.

Pakistan, for its part, threatened to hurl back thrice the number of Indian missiles. Elsewhere, the numbers involved have been reported as 9 Indian and 13 Pakistani missiles readied for launch. While there was no indication of the intended targets on either side, these could well have been escalatory in themselves, besides the fact that missiles crossed the Radcliffe line for the first time since their advent in arsenals in the eighties.

Fortunately, President Trump’s second Singapore meeting with the North Korean dictator had aborted by then, enabling the Americans to step in with their class monitor act. In short, the step up the escalatory ladder was avoided.
The question that needs asking is whether the Indian reaction to Naushera – aborted by timely American intervention – and the inevitable Pakistani counter would not have precipitated matters that were already at a boil in the recent crisis? How could the missile strikes have secured India?

The answer is fairly self-evident. A source reported in the media has it that the Indian side was willing to up the ante into the uncertain terrain of missile exchanges merely to force the Pakistanis to treat one of its combatants in Pakistan’s custody in keeping with international humanitarian law. That Pakistan would have had no other choice but to play by the rules of the Geneva Convention since it had released the visuals of the pilot on social media and officially admitted to his capture was overlooked by Indian decision makers.

This over-solicitousness for the well being of the serviceman even when engaged in the life threatening part of his occupation is part of a pattern.

During the surgical strikes, the prime minister admitted in an interview that troops had been asked to return prior to first light irrespective of their task being successful or otherwise. A report on the air force’s aerial strike has it that the air force had similar parameters to contend with in that the planes were not to venture too far on to the other side but to launch a stand-off attack.

This caution is perhaps understandable. With elections approaching, the political decision maker perhaps did not want to hold the can for casualties. The strictures also suggest dampening of escalation possibilities – which is all for the good – but put a question mark on the chest thumping ongoing since then.

More gravely, it indicates that the prime minister and his national security minders are not aware of what military action – essentially a bloody enterprise – entails. They need acquainting with one of the insights of the doyen of military strategists, the great Prussian general, Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote:

Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until someone steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.”

Alternatively, it is well nigh possible that the missiles were readied not so much for securing the release of Abhinandan – as the news report has us believe – but as cover to follow up on any Pakistani counter to Balakot.

In the event, firstly, the readying of the missiles did nothing to deter the Pakistanis – if they picked up the messaging – and, secondly, India did not follow through with the launch. The missiles-to-help-free-Abhinandan story in this reading is a post-facto rationalization, meant to kill two birds with one stone: one, take credit for Pakistan’s release of Abhinandan, and, two, to explain the climb down from missile readiness to missile stowage.

This has implications for the future.

The scores of the Balakot-Naushera episode are not unambiguously in India’s favour. Pakistan by its brazen daylight attack forced a draw of sorts on a more powerful adversary. To realists, this required India to have upped-the-ante, for, not having had the last laugh, it has instead conceded the moral ascendancy to Pakistan.

If Modi returns to power, to compensate for this, he – more likely than not – will overreact to the next terror outrage. This can potentially set the region afire, as there is a nuclear button at an uncertain rung up the escalation ladder.

The second post election possibility needs examining. In case of a change in government, there is likelihood that anticipating a foreign policy shift Pakistan may hold its horses in Kashmir. This would prevent the triggering event; thereby allowing the new government to conduct the elections – even if the president’s rule is extended by another six months in Kashmir. A different direction in the Kashmir and Pakistan policy may follow.

This is a policy shift which even Narendra Modi if re-elected can equally choose to pursue. Now that he has demonstrated his strength, he could opt for the softline – of parallel though separate talks with Pakistan and Kashmir.

It is apparent that there are other ways to beget national security. Hopefully, the next government – of whichever hue – would choose the path that less imperils national and regional security.

Nuclear Retaliation Options

Debates on Nuclear Doctrine

- See more at: http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/22/strategic-affairs/nuclear-retaliation-options.html#sthash.4uI2sAhU.dpuf

(unedited version)

The last thrust for revision of India’s nuclear doctrine was in the run up to the national elections of 2014 when the BJP manifesto stated that the party intended to, ‘Study in detail India's nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times (BJP 2014:  39).’ The latest impulse towards review of nuclear doctrine was in April at a seminar of the Indian Pugwash Society, incongruously organized at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi (Indian Pugwash Society 2016).

In discussions on nuclear doctrine, there is a consensus on the need for periodic review. While on that count most agree that a review of the current doctrine adopted in January 2003 (Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) 2003) is long overdue, disagreement is over two issues. Firstly is whether the No First Use (NFU) posture should be retained, and secondly, if NFU stays, what is the best manner of retaliation, not only to deter but also to follow through in case deterrence fails to work. While agreeing on the need for review and for continuing with ‘retaliation only’ (National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) 1999) doctrine, this commentary questions the nuclear retaliation options under discussion.

Higher order retaliation

Nuclear retaliation options can be classified according to the levels of retaliation envisaged: higher order and lower order retaliatory options. Higher order options in turn are pitched at two levels: ‘massive’ and ‘unacceptable damage’. The phrase ‘massive’ figures in the 2003 doctrine (CCS 2003). Its progeny, the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine favoured ‘punitive retaliation’, presumably with lesser warhead weight and numbers, to inflict ‘damage unacceptable’ to the enemy (NSAB 1999).

Higher order nuclear retaliation votaries rely on arguments from the early nuclear era in South Asia. Then, India had only a few bombs in the basement and a rudimentary delivery capability. Deterrence was understandably based on dropping these on cities. India was constrained to go in for counter value targeting, colloquially called ‘unacceptable damage’. This phrase has since become a mantra (gospel), though much water has flown down both the Ganga and Indus.

Today, India has moved from a defensive conventional military doctrine based on counter offensives by strike corps to an offensive doctrine envisaging proactive offensive operations by both, border guarding - pivot - corps and offensive - strike - corps. India’s conventional war doctrine - that is not explicitly one for limited war (Ahmed 2014: 71) - has potential to nudge Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. In effect, India is to kick off the conventional war in double quick time, even as Pakistan promises to reach early for the nuclear button.

Under the current nuclear doctrine, this would to trigger ‘massive’ retaliation. Its expansive interpretation involves both counter value and counter force targeting, while a more moderate interpretation restricts itself to only counter value targeting (Nagal 2015). Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, now numbering in the lower three digits, confer on it a second strike capability or ability to strike back even in case of higher order attack on it. With both states having second strike capability in terms of numbers of warheads that would survive a higher order strike, India and Pakistan are now in a stage of ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD) (Lavoy 2015: 4). Taken together, the tonnage involved in the retaliatory exchanges would result in an environmental disaster on a global scale. Clearly, ‘massive’ is unthinkable and a review to excise it from the nuclear doctrine is indeed overdue.

The favoured option to replace the guiding formulation - ‘massive’ - is ‘unacceptable damage’ or retaliation with ‘sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable’ (NSAB 1999). While the phrase already figures in the doctrine (CCS 2003), its votaries wish it to have pride of place through a review. To votaries of ‘unacceptable damage’, when less is enough, going ‘massive’ can only make rubble bounce.

However, Pakistan has put the cat among the pigeons by acquiring tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence’ (Dalton and Krepon 2015: 3). India’s conventional offensive could trigger Pakistani nuclear first use in the form of TNW (Lavoy 2015: 8-9). Indian retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage would not only be disproportionate, but would open India to receiving unacceptable damage in return. This impacts the credibility of ‘unacceptable damage’ to deter. Believing its nuclear numbers have checkmated higher order retaliation, Pakistan may up-the-ante in face of Indian conventional attack at a lower order level with TNW. Therefore, ‘unacceptable damage’ is no advance. 

There are two other disadvantages. Firstly, both higher order options – massive and unacceptable damage - pressure a first strike attempt on Pakistan’s part. First strike is an attempt to disarm an enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Pakistan apprehending higher order retaliation from India could well go first - not with TNW - but with higher order nuclear first use, intended to set back India’s retaliatory capability. Secondly, NFU is further threatened with abandonment. Higher order options are predicated on a belief that India can survive nuclear war, while Pakistan cannot. This induces a belief that it might be prudent to get a grievous nuclear blow in first. Doing so would set back Pakistani counter strike that would be further degraded by India’s missile shield, enabling India to survive. Such thinking contributes to the arguments against NFU and to technological thrusts that making this possible – ballistic missile defences, surveillance, accuracy, multiple warheads.

The assumption that India can survive, needs debunking. Along with the environmental and economic consequences, the likely socio-political effects have to also be factored in. To illustrate with a scenario, a nuclear war could see its largest minority, its Muslims, further beleaguered. The magnitude of the Gujarat pogrom of February 2002 was aggravated by the context of the then-ongoing crisis in wake of the 13 December terror attack on parliament. A decade and half down the road India’s minority is in more dire straits. Under the circumstance, should Pakistan use nuclear weapons, the minority would end up a readily available scapegoat. In effect, the fallout of nuclear war would be in a reinforcing of the right wing in policy, of authoritarianism in governance and of militarization of society. Manifestly, even if Pakistan is ‘finished’, India as we know it would be too. Hence, higher order options are just as suicidal as are genocidal.

Lower order retaliation

This brings to fore the lower order retaliation options. Higher order nuclear first use is ruled out by onset of MAD. For Pakistan, its graduated deterrence posture serves to extend nuclear deterrence cover to the conventional level by signaling crossing of thresholds by India’s conventional operations. The most likely nuclear first use scenario is of Pakistani TNW against India’s conventional forces. This can be at two levels: one targeting Indian offensive forces and the second as nuclear messaging. The first requires many warheads and would cause considerable collateral damage. The second may be for catalyzing international intervention by signaling onset of nuclear war. The latter is the more likely manner of nuclear first use by Pakistan.

Lower order nuclear first use in this manner can best be answered by lower order retaliation. This option abjures higher order retaliation and is escalation control friendly since it incentivizes restraint by Pakistan. In-conflict deterrence does not suffer since higher exchanges remain a threat-in-being. Critics however could argue that it risks inducing a belief that Pakistan could get away lightly for the temerity of violating the seven decade long nuclear taboo. However, the converse is equally true: since it provides a credible answer to Pakistan’s TNW, it strengthens deterrence.

The second criticism is of the potential arms race impacting ‘minimum’ in India’s doctrine of ‘credible minimum nuclear deterrence’ (NSAB 1999) and knock-on nightmares for operationalisation and civil-military relations. As seen, Pakistan’s use of TNW would most likely be for nuclear messaging, rather than in a massed mode to stop India’s conventional forces. Since three of five of India’s nuclear tests eighteen years back at Pokhran II were of sub-kiloton variety, India likely has the nuclear ordnance. Therefore, a lower order response does not imply acquiring TNW in large numbers, but employing existing capability in selective, non-escalatory targeting. This could induce a possible reversion to strategic sanity and at the least possible cost in terms of nuclear damage sustained and inflicted.

However, lower order options assume escalation control. The charged atmosphere of a war gone nuclear can be expected to put paid to political rationality and strategic thinking. Escalation control therefore requires prior arrangements with doctrinal exchanges between the two sides as a first step. Escalation control mechanisms can even be tacit and reliant on foreign powers trusted by both sides. However, in a circumstance as currently obtains with the two not even talking to each other, creating such mechanisms can be ruled out. The paradox is that where trust levels enable such mechanisms, then such mechanisms would not be required in first place.

Caveated proportionate retaliation

In case India has to persist with its nuclear doctrine of higher order retaliation, it has to wind down the offensive content of its conventional doctrine. With no reflexive Indian conventional offensives, there would be no crossing of redlines. There would be no need for punitive retaliation that can only draw like punishment on India in turn. However, India wishes to keep its conventional advantage honed, to tamp down on Pakistan’s propensity for proxy war. India cannot have its cake and eat it too. It requires tempering its nuclear doctrine. Proportionate retaliation fits the bill. It deters higher order nuclear first use and to lower order first use, enables lower retaliation.

However, proportionate retaliation needs a caveat. As seen lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan would be less to halt India’s armoured thrusts, than for nuclear messaging to warn off India and bringing international conflict termination pressures. Proportionate retaliation in a lower order mode to this most likely scenario may not be the best response. It would imply shooting back, with attendant escalation risks. The more appropriate response to this most likely manner of Pakistani nuclear first use is nuclear non-retaliation. This is the caveat to proportionate retaliation.

Nuclear non-retaliation appears to be an oxymoron when deterrence is taken as obtaining from credibility, predicated on capability and intent. However, nuclear non-retaliation is compatible with the concept of existential deterrence, which posits that the very possession of nuclear weapons deters. There is no compelling need for displaying a resolve and will and building a variegated nuclear arsenal. It is in line with the two pillars of the nuclear doctrine that command a consensus, NFU and minimum deterrence. Absence of nuclear retaliation from India in such a case would be de-escalatory, reducing the premium on escalation control.

By abjuring nuclear weapons, India can capture the political and moral high ground. It would put Pakistan’s leadership in the dock. It can continue applying its conventional military advantage, since international pressures would be on Pakistan. The military exercises this year, Exercises Shatrujeet and Chakravayu II, testify that India’s military is well practiced, even though the separate press releases on the exercises carefully omit mention of any nuclear backdrop (Press Information Bureau 2016 (a), (b)).

The effect of the caveat – nuclear non-retaliation - is that the bets are off in case Pakistan persists or escalates. Deterrence is not absent since any nuclear action enhances the probability of escalation. Pakistan cannot persist with strikes since the caveat only covers nuclear first use and not subsequent strikes, deterred by proportionate retaliation.

The best option of all

The aim in a war gone nuclear should be to heed General Sundarji who had it that nuclear exchanges must be terminated at the lowest threshold of nuclear use (Sundarji 2003: 146-153). He further went on to say that this must be done for the conflict itself, if necessary by unilateral politically feasible concessions. Instead of his sage arguments voiced in the discussion, the debate is confined to realists arguing over which of the two higher order options is better: ‘massive’ and ‘unacceptable damage’. In a MAD situation, both being insane, proportional retaliation enabling lower order retaliation is a contribution from the liberal perspective. This enables Sundarji’s stricture that a nuclear war be brought to end straight at its very outset. The caveat of initial non-retaliation is one such measure.

Voices other than of realists need to be heard in the debates on nuclear doctrine. The realists underemphasize the equalizing effect of nuclear weapons. Strategists of the liberal perspective are wishful in believing escalation control is possible. The anti-nuclear community is missing in action in the debate. Here non-retaliation is taken as a caveat. An abolitionist’s contribution to the debate could well be that non-retaliation is the best option across the board; indeed, to even higher order nuclear first use. This is strategically sustainable, even if deterrence heresy. It can yet carry the day since nuclear employment strategy – to be used when the balloon goes up - is distinct from nuclear deterrence doctrine – to keep the balloon tethered in peacetime. Nuclear abolitionists’ avoiding the nuclear deterrence debate is well founded in the fear that deterrence discussion legitimizes nuclear weapons and deterrence is a false god. However, such avoidance is not without a price. Thinking about the least damaging way nuclear weapons can be employed may prevent worse outcomes inevitable when their use is hijacked by nuclear hawks.  

References

BJP (2014): Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat: BJP Election Manifesto 2014: New Delhi, 26 March 2014, accessed on 1 May 2016, http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf

Indian Pugwash Society (2016): Panel Discussion Report On “Future of India’s Nuclear Doctrine”: New Delhi, 25 April, accessed on 5 May 2016 http://pugwashindia.org/pdf/Report-Final-panel.pdf

Cabinet Committee on Security (2003): Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on Operationalisation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03: New Delhi, Press Information Bureau, 4 January 2003, accessed on 23 April 2016 http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html

National Security Advisory Board (1999): Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine: New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 17 August 1999, accessed on 3 May 2016, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine

Ahmed, Ali (2014): India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia, New Delhi: Routledge.

Nagal, Balraj (2015): “India’s Nuclear Strategy to Deter: Massive Retaliation to Cause Unacceptable Damage”, Center for Land Warfare Studies Journal, Winter 2015, pp. 1-20, accessed on 20 April 2016,  http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/440323975_balrajnagal.pdf

Lavoy, Peter (2015): A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, 23 March, accessed on 15 April 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf

Dalton, Toby and Michael Krepon (2015): A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, Washington D.C.: Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed on 4 May 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf

Press Information Bureau (2016 (a)), “Chief of Army Staff Reviews Exercise Shatrujeet”, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 22 April 2016, accessed on 5 May 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=139079

Press Information Bureau (2016 (b)), “Exercise Chakravyuh-II”, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 6 May 2016, accessed on 7 May 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=145047

Sundarji, K (2003): Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty First Century; New Delhi: Konark Publishers. 

Kashmir: Potentially back with a bang

http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/kashmir-potentially-back-with-a-bang/

In his book, The Future of Land Warfare, Brookings’ expert, Michael O’Hanlon uses an illustrative scenario to argue for maintaining a U.S. land warfare capability. To O’Hanlon, one utility of land forces would be in “handling the aftermath of a major and complex humanitarian disaster superimposed on a security crisis – perhaps in South Asia.”

In O’Hanlon’s scenario, India and Pakistan come to the threshold of all-out nuclear war. He considers this scenario “all too plausible” and a “real possibility today.” O’Hanlon is right that a nuclear confrontation would be devastating to South Asia, for the global economy and environment, and for “loose nukes.” While its probability is an open question, O’Hanlon presents the threat for his own purposes: to get the U.S. to maintain a large standing army.

Of consequence for South Asia is O’Hanlon’s belief that a nuclear exchange would result in a changed political scenario in which international intervention, with U.S. participation, will be eminently justifiable and therefore is well nigh plausible. A nuclear conflict could trigger external intervention in the form of a UN mandated international force to help stabilize the situation, being deployed in Kashmir. To him, India may be amenable to this if it “seemed the only way to reverse the momentum toward all-out nuclear war in South Asia.”

What this suggests is that a war would bring Kashmir center stage as nothing else would. This brings into question why India is leveraging hard power – intelligence and military – in its Pakistan strategy.

India is widely taken as the status quo power since it has the prize, Kashmir. Pakistan is considered revisionist, since it wishes to overturn the status quo on Kashmir. As the status quo power, keeping Kashmir off the radar screen is in India’s interest. For Pakistan, keeping Kashmir in the news for the wrong reasons is enough. A war would concentrate international attention like nothing else.

There is convincing evidence to suggest that even a regional nuclear conflict with just a few weapons opens up the possibility of environmental catastrophe, potentially causing more than a billion casualties worldwide. Therefore, if Kashmir is at the root of a conflict that threatens such a prohibitive cost, calls for forceful international intervention would be justifiable.

It can be argued that a war such as Kargil did not catalyze the international attention Pakistan expected. Instead it redounded on Pakistan, enabling India to over time dehyphenate from Pakistan.

However, the two countries’ nuclear arsenals were then in their infancy. Today the numbers are not only in the triple digits for both sides, but there are elaborate doctrines and structures in place. Nuclear weapons have to be usable to deter. The readiness to use nuclear weapons is useful in so far as deterrence goes, but it is also the Achilles heel of the whole deterrence enterprise.

Pakistan for its part has proclaimed that it would be quick on the draw. India’s response promises to be fast and overwhelming. The two doctrines are like the interactions of two unstable substances.

India has lately shortened its fuse. By calling off the National Security Adviser talks last month, India has chosen remove negotiations as a buffer. It can no longer call off talks to show it is “doing something.” Instead, it will have to actually “do something,” using its hard power, in the face of any Pakistani provocation.

This can serve to deter the rational element in the Pakistani establishment. However, it is well known that there are contending power centers in Pakistan. There is the “deep state,” the “rogue elements” and “good terrorists.” These stand to expand their power base under the shadow of crisis and chaos of war.

That India does not rule out future provocation is evident from the extraordinary lengths it has been going to deter such provocations over the past year. At a joint services seminar commemorating the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, India’s Army chief said that the Army is prepared for a short, sharp war to be launched in quick time. As O’Hanlon reckons, this will drag Kashmir center stage.

There is another “pull factor” in play.

In case of war, India can at best get back at Pakistan. It cannot get Pakistan to roll back elements that, in striking India, have endangered Pakistan. Such a roll back cannot be in the face of visible Indian military coercion and would not be achieved without something on offer.

In effect, Kashmir stands to figure twice over in the denouement. India will have to throw in a “solution” to Kashmir as an incentive for Pakistani action against terrorists who have gone over the top. And, second, India may be forced to use Kashmir as a de-escalatory chip. This is the price for having gone nuclear.

Kashmir would be back on the agenda, something Pakistan could not manage after either the war fifty years ago or the more recent Kargil War.

Pakistan’s ruling out talks without Kashmir figuring in them leaves India with only one choice: hard power. Whereas India justifies this as essential for deterrence, it bears reminding that if deterrence fails, Kashmir will be back on the agenda and with a bang. If this is not to be a nuclear one, India had better get those “first ever” NSA level talks back on track sooner rather than later

India on the LC

A More Aggressive India

http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-more-aggressive-india/

Recent events along the Line of Control underline a new approach to defense.

By Ali Ahmed

November 07, 2014

With the dust having settled after the heaviest artillery and mortar exchange of the past decade on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, the situation is now clearer. India has intimated a change in policy, from merely having a shield to also wielding a sword. Defence Minister Arun Jaitley insisted that Pakistani “adventurism” would meet with “pain.” However, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval also promised that if Pakistan behaved then India would be willing to let the rising tide of its economy lift all regional boats.

For its part, Pakistan has used its prime minister’s foreign policy and the NSA to spell out that it will not accept India’s hegemonic designs and will settle only for “meaningful” talks that lead to a settlement on the outstanding issue of Kashmir. Its army chief has vowed an “effective” response, while the more colorful former military dictator General Pervez Musharraf called for “inciting” rebellion in Kashmir.

So, not much has changed.

One thing looks different, however: India appears more aggressive on the LoC, in one report firing more than1000 mortar rounds in one day. And the reasons for this go beyond a mere shift in policy.

First, the firing has been in response to Pakistan’s raising of the stakes. Since the beheading of an Indian soldier in early 2013, the Indian Army has the mandate of giving a “befitting reply” at a time and place of its choosing. This time, with a soldier reportedly killed in an IED attack in Balnoi sector, the opportunity presented itself.

Second, India is reporting more infiltration attempts, probably a result of the unprecedented rains on the anti-infiltration fence along the LoC. The Army’s spokesman in Kashmir explained the spurt as Pakistan preparing to disrupt the impending elections in Jammu and Kashmir and as the annual last-ditch infiltration before winter. Additionally, the firing sets the stage for the elections in Jammu and Kashmir by warning off Pakistan.

Finally, the Indian government has gained some electoral advantages in the run-up to provincial elections, during which Prime Minister Narendra Modi alluded to “shutting up” Pakistan’s army by leaving it “screaming.” Having demonstrated that this Indian government is different from its predecessor, there are hints of a revival of talks as early as the forthcoming SAARC gathering in Kathmandu in November.

The firing could also be said to have kicked-off India’s grand strategy, aimed at economic development over Modi’s ten-year timeline. In its initial phase, the government is focused on bolstering its position, taking political gains from projects already underway such as the recent test flight of the Nirbhay cruise missile or the launch ofthe Vikramaditya aircraft carrier. To quote the NSA at his address at the Munich Security Conference in New Delhi, it is India’s “effective deterrence” against terrorism.

All in all, whether it be in confronting Pakistan or China, this Indian government has adopted a more aggressive posture, even if in actual policy terms the changes are mostly subtle, such as rescinding environmental constraints on road building in the fragile Himalayas.

Strategic commentary by analysts ranging from realist theoretician Rajesh Rajagopalan to practitioner Ashok Mehta advises the government to tread more softly. Their arguments are based on the strategic logic that India can ill afford to be tested prematurely on either front. In the event of a conflict with Pakistan, it is India that has something to lose, not Pakistan. Against China, India might be able to give a credible account of itself, but the costs would be immense – the government has just set aside $13 billion of an intended $100 billion over the next ten years to plug the gaps the strategists have outlined.

However, the strategic commentary does not quite capture the ongoing change taking place. Previous governments have shown an admirable distaste for militarism. They might have played a strategic game, including, if Musharraf is to be believed, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Baluchistan, but it was more subtle and without the current grandstanding.

In contrast, the Modi government has interpreted firing episodes along the LoC as giving the military a free hand, a departure from the days when the military was stifled by bureaucratic layers and diplomatic niceties. Meanwhile, the government has agreed to a national war memorial and will also appease the military with the expected pay commission. It has kept the ministerial weight on the military light by persisting with a part-time defense minister, despite his ill health. This enables Modi to forge a direct relationship with the military himself through repeated visits, the most recent one being to Siachen.

The seeming responsiveness of Modi to the military can potentially transform civil-military relations from objective civilian control, relying on military professionalism alone, to subjective civilian control reliant on affinity. The goal could be to bring about a convergence of thinking between the political master and the subservient military.

Clearly, if the sociological perspective is adopted, there is more to the LoC firing and increased visibility of the military than strategic commentary lets on.