review of my book

From Denial To Coercion Yogesh Joshi  INDIA’S DOCTRINE PUZZLE: LIMITING WAR IN SOUTH ASIA By Ali Ahmed Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, pp. xix 240, Rs. 695.00 VOLUME XXXIX NUMBER 2 February 2015 http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-4371/2015/february/2/from-denial-to-coercion.html Six years after India conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998, strategy the Indian Army issued its conventional war fighting doctrine called the Indian Army Doctrine 2004. The doctrine, which later came to be known as ‘Cold Start’, drew a lot of attention in the strategic circles. Moving away from its decades old defensive posturing along the international border with Pakistan, the Army now adopted a more offensive approach. The shift was palpable: from deterrence via denial to coercion via offence. The shift is also puzzling because it occurred in a nuclear backdrop. If nuclear weapons bolster deterrence, then offensive conventional military doctrines, prima facie, appear anachronistic. [ihc-hide-content ihc_mb_type=”show” ihc_mb_who=”reg” ihc_mb_template=”1″ ] Ali Ahmed’s The Doctrine Puzzle: Limited Wars in South Asia attempts to explain the above-mentioned puzzle and does that exquisitely. For the author, causation behind the shift exists at three different levels of analysis. The first was India’s strategic environment in the aftermath of the nuclear tests. Under the shadow of nuclear weapons, Pakistan intensified sub-conventional warfare against India, evident first in the 1999 Kargil war and the attack on the Indian Parliament, a couple of years later. Even when conventionally superior to its western neighbour, the presence of nuclear weapons ensured that India’s response remains limited. India faced a serious dilemma: the presence of nuclear weapons had actually decreased its deterrence potential vis-a-vis sub-conventional threats from Pakistan. To break out of this stranglehold, the need was to create space for limited conventional probes while avoiding a nuclear response. If the strategy of massive retaliation increased the threshold of nuclear use, a limited conventional war could, in theory, allow New Delhi to inflict punishment on Islamabad for its many subversions. The Indian Army Doctrine 2004, therefore, was a response to this strategic conundrum. However, the two operative conditions—nuclearization of South Asia and Pakistan’s support for sub-conventional warfare—were present since late 1980’s. By 1988, Pakistan’s nuclear capability was an open secret. Since then, it was also actively supporting terrorism in Kashmir. Structural reasons pertaining to strategic environment therefore cannot explain the delay in formulation of a limited war doctrine. As the author rightly contends, it is important to open the black box of the state and find reasons within. Here, domestic politics or the second of level analysis comes handy. Availing the analytical apparatus offered by theory of ‘strategic cultures’, Ahmed contends that the coming of the BJP marked a shift in India’s strategic culture and therefore, the shift from defensive conventional deterrent to an offensive mindset. Strategic environment and domestic politics notwithstanding, institutional interests are equally important. Militaries, like other organs of the state, are also driven by narrow bureaucratic interests as well as organizational processes. Even when the strategic environment and domestic politics favour shift in doctrinal ethos, ultimately the motivation has to come from within the organization. First, doctrinal change should be accompanied with various incentives for the service. A limited war doctrine is premised on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and adoption of an offensive doctrine would have ensured speedy modernization of the force. Second, in the conflict within services, such doctrinal changes increased the relevance of the Army. Lastly, if the primary mandate of standing armies is to fight conventional wars, nuclear weapons have rendered their entire rationale redundant. Military professionalism is poised towards breaking out of this dilemma. An offensive conventional doctrine, therefore, helps to promote military’s long held ethos. Only expert diagnosis and explanation of the problem can lead to perceptive prescriptions and Ahmed’s study is no different. His policy recommendations however are counter-intuitive. On one hand, he finds an offensive conventional doctrine as highly destabilizing and on the other, he argues that India’s nuclear doctrine should be modified on the principles of ‘flexible response’. His argument is contentious but given the problem of credibility in India’s declared nuclear doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’, he may well be right. The biggest import of this study is for students of strategy; a field still struggling in Indian academic discourse. Though scholars like Srinath Raghavan have left a deep imprint, their inquiries are largely historical and focus upon grand strategy, rather than specifically focusing on military doctrines. It is important to understand this distinction because of many difficulties associated with such a sensitive yet contemporary field of study. First, information is always at a premium when it comes to issues of national security and especially, military doctrines. Second and the more difficult problem to overcome is the fact that the Army itself has been in denial over the existence of the ‘Cold Start’. In other words, the concept suffers from definitional clarity. Therefore, undertaking such an enterprise demands being theoretically sound, conceptually clear and methodologically inventive. Theoretically, the author exhibits a robust understanding of strategic studies literature: the chapter on the concept of ‘limited war’ can be easily recommended as a text book reading for students of strategic studies. Also, in the strategic discourse, terms such as ‘doctrine’, ‘strategy’, ‘deterrence’, ‘compellence’ and ‘coercion’ are commonly used but often remain undefined. The author does well to explain these terminologies in the very first chapter, bringing much needed conceptual clarity. Lastly, the methodological novelty, both in the application of the ‘levels of analysis’ framework and evidence gathering is astute. Its simplicity notwithstanding, ‘levels of analyses’ is a difficult framework to operationalize especially in multivariable research. The author does well to find the third level of analysis not in the ‘individual’ but within the military organizations, hence avoiding serious pitfalls. In the bibliography: almost all official avenues of military publications, including the dissertations at the National Defence College, have been perused for evidence. However, there is an over-emphasis on domestic politics and organizational cultures at the expense of structural factors. The argument that the BJP ushered in a change in India’s strategic culture is a little far-fetched. First, this change was not reflected in other avenues of national security decision-making such as nuclear force structures. Even after conducting the tests, the BJP settled for a minimalistic nuclear posture which had been decided under the Rajiv Gandhi Government in 1985. Second, ‘culture’, in general, is a resilient structure; to argue that ‘strategic culture’ could undergo a substantial shift in such a short period of time runs against the dominant academic literature on the subject. Lastly, if the shift was instigated by the BJP, no policy reversal occurred with the coming of Congress-led government in 2004. In fact, for the entire first term of the UPA, as Walter Ludwig’s piece amply demonstrates, the Indian Army was busy perfecting its new doctrinal mandate. Also, discussion on RMA and its influence is limited. Ahmed largely views it as an organizational incentive. By doing so, he discounts the changing nature of global warfare and its impact on military thinking. Prospect theory suggests that decision-makers are much more influenced by high probability of success compared to high probability of defeat. Did the RMA help instill a belief in the Indian Army that complexities of a limited war could be easily overcome? RMA therefore has to be viewed through a structural lense; not as a mere incentive. Yogesh Joshi is a PhD candidate in School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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The organisational culture has also been considerably influenced by the kargil war and the near-war situation of 2001–02. Just as the 1962 war prompted much internal tumult, the initial surprise (V.P. Malik) in kargil and later, the inability to deal Pakistan a return blow in 2002 despite the Parliament attack and later the kalu Chak incident, referred to in subsequent literature as the ‘twin peaks crisis’, has prompted much introspection. The military’s image and self-image was considerably dented. ‘Face’ has well-known cultural connotations. Thus it had to come up with an answer to the con- tinuing problem posed by Pakistan. The outcome was Limited war thinking (kapoor 2010: 3). A change in organisational culture per- ceptibly towards the offensive was the result. only a change from defensive mindset to offensive, from attrition orientation to maneu- verist thinking could operationalise the doctrine (kapoor 2010: 4). The internal measures taken to foster an offensive mindset are not dealt in detail here.

The defensive mindset has been partially ingrained by the foremost role of the military involving defence of national territory interpreted earlier as a need to defend ‘every inch’ has been over-shadowed instead by an inclination to undertake the same role differently by taking the offensive. Forces for this in pivot forma- tions have been created by thinning out on the defences and accept- ing the risk of loss of territory that this entails. earlier, loss was not possible to envisage as in a short duration war it was felt that losses in territory would serve as bargaining chips in adverse hands and would be politically costly. however, by taking to the offensive through building the capability and an enabling doctrine, the bar-gaining advantage would be with the side on the offensive. There- fore, by taking the offensive, this risk stands minimised.

General V.P. Malik recalls that he had mooted the idea of Limited war prior to the Kargil war but not been taken seriously (Basrur 2009: 328; Malik 2010). The Army, having been at the receiving end of the Pakistani intrusion at kargil, was determined to exploit the gap below the nuclear threshold for a limited conventional operation. The assumption was that Pakistan would be ‘finished’ in case of a nuclear exchange; therefore space existed for conventional operations (Basrur 2009: 328). This would have enabled it to deal decisively with the sub-conventional proxy war. its earlier doctrine involved not only deterring an enemy attack by being ready for it (‘deterrence by denial’) but also launching counter offensives in line with ‘deterrence by punishment’. The accent is now no longer on ‘deterrence by denial’. in fact, the troops for the new offensive tasks of pivot corps have been taken off defensive roles. The aim is to take the initiative and fight the war on enemy territory. The war intended as a short one, would not require defending one’s own territory to the extent once done. Therefore, thinning out is possible in the ground-holding role of forces in defence. This does not imply dilution of ability to defend, but a substitution of manpower by technology and firepower.

The earlier ‘deterrence by punishment’ was deterrence of conventional action by the enemy on the offensive. now ‘deterrence by punishment’ implies punishment for sub-conventional infringements. A shift has taken place in doctrine towards the offensive in the form of proactive operations. This is in keeping with organisational culture that favoured the offensive in any case, as evident from its earlier intent for prosecution of ‘deterrence by denial’ through counter offensives.

The apparent neglect of the nuclear context points to the working of organisational culture. That a blind-spot exists where dan- gers should otherwise be starkly visible, suggests the operation of culture. According to rajesh rajagopalan, the development of the doctrine is, ‘another indication of the indian effort to overcome the limits imposed by nuclearisation and the limitations of that effort’ (2008: 205). he thinks that success would increase Pakistani propensity for nuclear first use. he notes that, ‘whether it is possible to think in terms of military victory in a nuclearised environment is left unaddressed in this doctrine’ (rajagopalan 2008: 206). The military wishes to fulfill its obligation through doctrinal innovation in the direction of what S. Paul kapur calls, ‘Aggressive conventional posture’ (kapur 2008: 88), the dilemma of Pakistani nuclear response notwithstanding. rajesh Basrur asserts that, ‘The “lesson” of kargil — that force projection would work better than diplomacy — was a case of “incorrect learning”. in practice, the whole argument for limited war came to naught in 2002’ (Basrur 2009: 330). Yet, kapur notes, ‘Military thinking has not changed. General Malik continues to hold that “limited war was, and still is, a strategic possibility so long as proxy war continues in the sub- continent”’ (Malik 2009: 330). To Basrur, ‘This represents a military professional’s thinking, and does not reflect the perspective of political decision makers, who have been reluctant to return to the limited war logic that preceded the 2001–2002 crisis. The politicians, at least, seem to have learned the combined lesson of the two crises: that limited war is not a viable option in the nuclear context’ (Basrur 1998: 331).

This ‘learning’ has led to persistence of the ‘strategy of restraint’, despite the provocation of Mumbai attacks of 26/11. it is this that perhaps accounts for a distancing by the military away from Cold Start in favour for what it terms proactive ‘contingency’ operations. in terms of cultural theory, this can be explained as persistence of india’s symbolic strategic culture. despite having an offensive option as an artifact of parabellum or operational strategic culture, that it remains unexercised, indicates the scope of symbolic strategic culture of restraint.

India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia,

Ali Ahmed 

Routledge, 2014, pp. 240, Rs 695

india's doctrine puzzle: limiting war in south asia

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Contents
List of Abbreviations ix
Foreword by Lt Gen (retd) V. r. raghavan xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgements xix
1. introduction 1
2. The Limited war Concept 22
3. doctrinal Change 36
4. The Structural Factor 74
5. The Political Factor 115
6. The organisational Factor 151
7. Conclusion 189
References 211
About the Author 00

Index 00

Extract of Foreword by Lt Gen VR Raghavan

Nuclear weapons generate a voluminous output of books, research 
papers and estimates of their impact on national, regional and 
international security. The nuclearisation of india and Pakistan 
have had a similar impact with strategic analysts the world over 
trying to assess the future use, misuse or abuse of these strategic 
assets by the two countries. 
India published its nuclear doctrine not long after acquiring 
nuclear weapons. while the doctrine was not specifically directed 
against Pakistan, it also left no one in doubt about the immediacy 
of indian planners’ strategic concerns of a future with nuclear 
weapons. Since China had committed itself to a no First Use policy, 
india’s nuclear doctrine was a clear enough statement on how it 
would respond to a nuclear weapons exchange on the indian Sub 
Continent. while nuclear weapons are unambiguously viewed 
by india as strategic assets, their operational use as war fighting 
instruments have been ruled out. Their use is predicated on another 
country using nuclear weapons against india.
The longstanding india — Pakistan confrontation turned into 
military conflicts after Pakistan linked terrorist attacks in india. 
The intrusion into kargil and the attack on indian Parliament 
created the possibility of a conventional large scale military conflict, 
which ran the serious risk of turning into a nuclear standoff. indian 
military planners adapted to this experience to evolved responses in 
the operational domain, to offset conditions created by the presence 
of nuclear weapons, albeit as strategic assets.
india and Pakistan have been in a state of confrontation since 
1947. on occasions when the confrontation turned into a military 
conflict, the purpose of operations was more to force a change of 
outlook amongst Pakistan’s leadership than the destruction of that 
state. Military operations were thus limited both in the objectives 
to be attained and the scope and intensity of force to be applied. 
nuclear weapons changed the old premise into one of placing 
further limits on operational thresholds which can and cannot be 
crossed. ...

Extract from the Preface

Preface
The genesis of this book was atop a canal obstacle somewhere 
in the western sector in 2006. i was then commanding an infantry 
battalion that was deployed as exercise enemy, or the nark force, in 
a corps exercise meant to put to a strike corps through its paces. The 
exercise ‘enemy’, Swarg’s strike corps, chose that stretch of the canal 
as site of its break- in battle. it was fore-ordained that they were 
to break out by first light, for if they were still in their bridgeheads 
then they would be ideal targets for an enemy air attack or worse, 
a nuclear strike. According to the exercise umpire’s timetable, my 
unit was to be cut to pieces in a heavy breakthrough within three 
hours. i did not have much to do thereafter since i was presumed 
exercise dead or prisoner. i was able to witness the proceedings over 
the remainder of the exercise as a bystander. The exercise timings 
were truncated to depict the first week to ten days of the mock war. 
The strike corps ended up in its ‘projection areas’ across multiple 
obstacles true to plan. The final touch was capture of an airfield 
deep in enemy territory by paratroops. Presumably, the strike corps 
would be provisioned via an air bridge for subsequent operations 
further in enemy interiors. i wondered as to what a nuclear armed 
enemy would make of all this. This prompted a question in my 
mind: Why has India gone in for an offensive conventional doctrine 
despite nuclearisation?
ideally, the investment in nuclearisation should have made 
india ‘feel’ secure, if not ‘secure’ itself. The Bomb had been much 
advertised by its votaries as a ‘weapon of peace’. Their argument 
was that it would enable india to sit down and talk with its 
adversaries. instead, Pakistan launched operation Badr in kargil 
within a year of both states, india and Pakistan, going nuclear. Soon 
thereafter was the kandahar hijack. Later, the proverbial indian 
‘threshold of tolerance’ was sorely tested with a dastardly terror 
attack on the Srinagar legislative assembly and soon thereafter on 
Parliament in 2001. The popular narrative has it that a defensive 
and reactive india was caught flat footed. Consequently, in the 
wake of operation Parakram it was forced to move towards a 

military doctrine reportedly more ‘proactive’, colloquially dubbed Cold Start......

india's doctrine puzzle

India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia
http://www.tandfindia.com/books/search/author/ali_ahmed/

1. India's Doctrine Puzzle

   Limiting War in South Asia

   By Ali Ahmed

   The book examines the impetus behind India’s conventional military doctrines in the light of nuclearisation. Through a multi-level and multidimensional approach, it seeks to understand the reason behind India going for a proactive offensive doctrine. The Indian war doctrine is examined at the...

   Published 24th March 2014 by Routledge India