conventional operations in nuclear conditions

At the Conventional-Nuclear Interface

 

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/idr-issues/?issue_id=116

9 August 2014

Conventional backdrop to nuclear foreground

Accustomed to the phrase ‘nuclear backdrop’ as the army has been over the past two decades, the title may require explaining. The assumption is that in case of introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict, even at the lower order levels of nuclear first use and retaliation, the conflict is dramatically transformed from its original scope. The understanding that informs the pre-nuclear use situation, specifically conventional operations in a nuclear backdrop, has therefore to change to one in which conventional operations form the backdrop for a nuclear foreground.

The political and diplomatic dimension will be dominant and nuclear operations will supersede conventional operations, making the latter recede in significance, urgency and importance to the background.

This implies that conventional operations will require deferring to nuclear operations and would be subject to a greater stringency in so far as supporting the political and diplomatic dimension goes. Clearly, military aims and conventional objectives would require review. Since this can be anticipated, the contingencies can be thought through for early and speedy realignment of conventional operations.

There are two conceivable directions along which this could proceed. Operations duly tweaked for the nuclear situation could either proceed with greater vigour exploiting the nuclear shock or they could be more restrained and cautious since nuclear operations may proceed apace. In either case, the endeavour will be to gain a favourable position for conflict termination since this could, under the nuclear circumstance, be sooner than later in light of international conflict termination initiatives.

The latter may be more likely since quickening operations under conditions of mobility and logistics under nuclear conditions may not be readily possible. Also, the slow-down, to include tactical pauses, may help create the conditions for nuclear retaliatory strikes. Since counter strikes can be expected, caution in movement and particularly in reconfiguring of the communication zone may be necessary to prevent targeting from counter strikes.

On the other hand, the former – speeded up operations – may be more dangerous in a nuclear situation since, firstly, the enemy may get into a ‘use them-lose them’ dilemma; and secondly, his resulting conventional paralysis may make him rely more on the nuclear card. Also, own nuclear retaliatory strikes will require space for execution, uncluttered by ongoing conventional operations.

However, in case of enemy lower order nuclear first use or demonstrative strike, there could be a case for postponing nuclear retaliation and proceeding with conventional operations at a heightened tempo. As has been argued on the IDSA website in 2008 and recently in 2014,[1] India’s nuclear doctrine lends itself to be interpreted accordingly. Since it states that nuclear retaliation will be of unacceptable levels in case of ‘first strike’, if India is to interpret ‘first strike’ as a higher order first use aimed at degrading India’s retaliatory capability, then India’s nuclear retaliation can be flexible – later and/or lesser. In case lower order strikes are met with a lower order nuclear retaliation the scope for conventional operations potentially enlarges.

From a politico-diplomatic point of view, India’s position to press on conventionally will be unassailable since Pakistan will be in violation of the nuclear taboo. India can retain the choice of punishing it either by nuclear means, by conventional means or both. In such a case, the retaliatory strike can be reconfigured to suit the conventional battle so as to together shape conflict termination.

Anticipating other down-flow effects from the nuclear level to the conventional level enables preparing for them. This collapsing of the two levels – nuclear and conventional – seen as distinct in the spectrum of conflict into one with the disappearance of the nuclear firebreak will require factoring into planning and preparation. As seen above, conventional operations will require playing second fiddle to nuclear operations and the military plane to the politico-diplomatic one, but not necessarily so such as in the case of lower order first use and proportionate retaliation.

Which of the two – speeding up or slowing down – suits the military is the input that the military needs to make, not only at the crux in face of enemy first use, but also in the discussion stage of doctrine formulation. Since both doctrines are up for revision – the nuclear doctrine being 11 years old and the conventional doctrine 10 years – the ongoing, run-up or warming-up stage, is the time for doctrinal free thinking.

Given that Pakistan will play the asymmetric card there will also be a collapse between the conventional level and the subconventional level. The Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (ARTRAC 2006) stops at the border. It does not talk about stabilisation operations that will be akin to low intensity conflict. In case of nuclear incidence, then the conventional-subconventional interface can be expected to be much more violent. Clearly, even subconventional doctrine that is closing on ten years may require being part of this doctrinal upheaval.

Since higher order nuclear retaliation risks stabilisation operations, this is an input that the military alone can provide. Such input tends to tilt the consideration towards ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliation. Alternatively, in case of default higher order nuclear retaliation, then the army may well require recoiling to the border so as to cauterise the social and humanitarian effects. In case it is in vicinity then the onus may fall on India to respond to the catastrophe, one it cannot meet in light of the subconventional challenge its conventional forces can be expected to meet.

The exercises have had the nuclear dimension as background. This needs reimagining so as to come up with operational level options in a war gone nuclear. One way to do this is to cease beginning exercises with an ‘I’ Day scenario in which ‘I’ stands for a mass terror incident. Instead, exercises could begin with an ‘N’ Day scenario in which ‘N’ stands for day of nuclear first use. Preparedness such as this helps with deterrence as also with its breakdown.

Effects on the conventional level of nuclear operations

In an op-ed piece in the New Indian Express (24 July), Manpreet Sethi of a sister think tank writes that, ‘it should also be made widely known that Indian troops have the ability to fight through tactical nuclear use.’ To her, this is necessary to, ‘send a message of preparedness to handle such use without bringing conventional operations to a halt or even confronting the political leadership with the choice of war termination, as assumed by Rawalpindi.’ This is to strengthen the present concept of deterrence that India subscribes to: deterrence by punishment.[2]

Irrespective of how the competing concepts of deterrence influence the new nuclear doctrine when it emerges from an impending review, the point Sethi makes, that conventional operations cannot remain unaffected by advent of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, is of consequence. This part deals with possible implications of nuclear operations on conventional operations.

That there is a mutually influential relationship between the two levels – conventional and nuclear – has been recognised fifteen years ago in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine. The Draft had required India to maintain highly effective conventional military capabilities to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons. Further, defence forces are to be in a position to execute operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation. Since, barring the exceptions in the official doctrine of January 2003, the Draft has been adopted as the nuclear doctrine. These stipulations of nuclear doctrine therefore are operative for conventional operations.

That the army is cognisant of this is clear. Take for instance its turn from defensive defence to active deterrence with the reconfiguration for the eastern front. It has enhanced conventional deterrence and in the event of its failure, it can undertake operations without India resorting to the threat of use of nuclear weapons. This is to keep the NFU inviolate. In so far as continuing operations in a nuclear environment is concerned, the press reports from the generally well covered corps level exercises indicate that nuclear dimension, both conceptual and physical, is incorporated in these exercises.

However, as with everything, there is a room for improvement. What direction this should take would be dependent on visualising the nuclear battlefield. There are two ways this has been done. The first is in anticipating the manner Pakistan may resort to first use. Since India has second strike capability, that will with the operationalisation of the Arihant be unassailable soon, Pakistan will unlikely go for first strike. Therefore, lower order options are ruled in.

The Nasr, its tool for this, has two possibilities of employment. One could be as a shot across the bow, for strategic signalling. The purpose would be catalytic, to use the term of Vipin Narang, in order to energise foreign, read US, conflict termination efforts. This may well be in the form of a ‘green field’ option with no Indian military targets. The second could be more widespread in case India’s proactive offensives threaten to overwhelm the Azm-e-Nau-honed preparedness of Pakistani forces with Nasr and other nuclear weapons for operational level employment. This may be to stop an armoured formation in its tracks by either hitting spear heads or the shaft or support bases including fire support bases, logistics and supporting airfields.

The former will unlikely have any immediate effect on conventional operations. However, increased caution in terms of nuclear preparedness of troops in the combat and communication zone would require to be incorporated in operations, necessarily slowing these down. The effect of breaking of the nuclear taboo would be such as to make the diplomatic prong of strategy the more significant one. Operational level military moves would be conditioned by the need to support the diplomacy predominant action at the strategic level. Two options present themselves: either proceed with greater vigour under cover of the fact that Pakistan is in the nuclear doghouse; or be more cautious lest conventional moves complicate the political positioning at the strategic level or, worse, trigger avoidable nuclear escalation.

In case of the latter, more widespread use but at the operational level to redress emerging conventional disadvantage, India would be contemplating nuclear retaliation. The conventional moves would therefore yet again take second place, this time in relation to the nature of the retaliation. The nature of India’s retaliation and likely counter by Pakistan, alongside the intensified politico-diplomatic activity, would determine the direction of conventional operations. Next, there is also the possibility that has found mention in strategic circles that the international community may intervene more forcefully to include with military muscle, such as declaring no-fly-zones, for escalation control. This has increased in likelihood with the publication of the report in late 2013 that even a regional nuclear war would have global environmental consequences.

In this case, the tempo of conventional operations will be considerably degraded. While there would be immediate nuclear effects to cope with, shifting of gears in the form of rethinking priorities, weight along thrust lines, tactical pauses etc. may be required. The priorities will rearrange around the nuclear retaliatory strikes and the communication zone will have to be reconfigured to prevent targets for Pakistani counter strike. In this consideration, while in-conflict deterrence will be pre-dominant, the anticipated fallout on conventional operations requires feeding in.

Two concluding points emerge. Firstly, in case this inter-face is not in the ambit of the Strategic Programs Staff of the NSCS, a mechanism located in HQ IDS needs being created. The SFC, concerned with nuclear operations, cannot be the site for this. Secondly, the principal effect is that in both cases of lower order first use – catalytic and operational – the conventional level is superseded by the state of play at the nuclear level. Therefore, how the nuclear doctrine shapes up is of consequence for the military. It would require inputting the endeavour, lest the traditional distinction between the nuclear and conventional sphere in India continues unwarrantedly.

Reference:

[1] http://idsa.in/idsacomments/RevisitingIndiasNuclear Doctrine_gbalachandran_200614.html and http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheNeedForClarityInIndiaSNuclearDoctrine_AAhmed_111108.html

[2] http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Counter-Pak-Nuke-Tactics/2014/07/24/article2345369.ece

eurasia review article

http://www.eurasiareview.com/08082014-india-mean-massive-retaliation-oped/

WHAT DOES INDIA MEAN BY ‘MASSIVE’ RETALIATION? – OPED

AUGUST 8, 2014 EURASIA REVIEW 

http://www.eurasiareview.com/08082014-india-mean-massive-retaliation-oped/

By Eurasia Review

By Ali Ahmed, PhD

India’s nuclear doctrine promises 'massive’ retaliation. It may not be of the order of ‘assured destruction’ as visualised in the cold war. It could mean much less, after all even a town less would amount to a ‘massive’ loss. India certainly wishes ‘punitive’ retaliation to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. Therefore, when India promises that its nuclear retaliation will be ‘massive’, it may not be all that bad. After all it would not wish to send Pakistan back to the stone age since the nuclear fallout will affect India directly.

Therefore what India means by ‘massive’ retaliation is that it would resort to a city busting nuclear strategy in case of nuclear first use by Pakistan against it or its forces anywhere. This means that even if Pakistan was to use nuclear weapons defensively on its own territory and against advancing Indian forces, it would stand to lose a town or two.

Let us visualise the scenario. A mega-terror incident occurs in India in which Pakistan’s establishment is implicated. India resorts to its ‘cold start’ doctrine and sends its integrated battle groups across to teach Pakistan a lesson and end the perception of impunity of its military. Pakistan in panic, anger and fear, fires off a nuclear tipped missile against an advancing Indian column.

It is reckoned that it takes several warheads to stop an advance of mechanised forces that are fairly well spread out while advancing in a potentially nuclear battlefield. Therefore, it is unlikely that Pakistan would be trying to stop this column with its nuclear attack.

Instead it would likely be sending a warning signal that the conflict could get worse. It could be prompting the international community to intervene and stop the conflict. However, India would be reluctant to allow Pakistan to get away with nuclear murder. It would want to exercise the right of reply.

Nuclear pundits in India recommend that India follow through with its nuclear doctrine in such a case and take out a Pakistani town or two at the very least. If the war were to end at this juncture, then it would be the ‘best case’. It is not an unreasonable juncture to end the conflict in that Pakistan would have been punished adequately for its temerity to break the nuclear taboo. Pakistan may get the message loud and clear finally. The international community would clamp down in double quick time.

India’s nuclear doctrine being one of nuclear deterrence is designed to stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand. Any reasonable Pakistani decision maker, knowing that Pakistan stands to lose a town or two, or perhaps a city, may not want to chance it. Also, it could end up losing more, if not all, since escalation could take place.

However, Pakistan may believe that since it has nuclear weapons in sufficient numbers it can get back at India. If India was to take out one of its cities then it would be at the risk of an Indian city or two falling to a counter strike. In Pakistan’s calculus, this may check-mate India into self-deterrence. India may not go for counter-city retaliation since it stands to lose as much as Pakistan.

This may embolden Pakistan to go first. This means India’s nuclear deterrence can potentially fail since it may appear less than credible to Pakistan.

Therefore, there is a chance of Pakistan going for the nuclear button. India in this case will be faced with a choice of how to respond. In case it goes as per its doctrine and reduces a town to nuclear cinder, it requires ensuring that a like counter strike does not occur.

It has three ways to do this. One is to rely on the international community to stop Pakistan. The second is that the strike on the town is deterrence in itself in that Pakistan would receive the message loud and clear that its remaining urban pockets could face like punishment unless it desists. The third is by targeting Pakistan’s retaliatory capability by both nuclear and non-nuclear means to ensure that Pakistan cannot counter strike even if it wants to.

Relying on the first would be useful since the international community will pull out the stops to halt a regional nuclear war as global climate stands to be affected. However, having failed to stop India’s ‘massive’ retaliation, it cannot be guaranteed as a success.

The second, in-conflict deterrence, may work, but for the fact that the tendency to vengeance would be strong, particularly if Pakistan perceives India’s retaliation as disproportionate. It may wish to get even, believing that with over a 100 weapons it too has in-conflict deterrence capability by holding Indian cities hostage to future strikes in case India keeps up the nuclear exchange.

The third is difficult to visualise but not impossible. India’s nuclear decision makers may want to protect Indian cities and towns and therefore when advised to go in for retaliation they may pose the question to their nuclear advisers on how can a Pakistani counter be guaranteed against. They may receive the recommendation that while India takes out a city or two in retaliation as per its doctrine, it may be necessary for it to also take out Pakistani retaliatory capability alongside. This may lead to counter-force targeting alongside a city busting attack.

The last is a less likely manner of ‘massive’ retaliation since this would kick up enough nuclear dust to bring on the nuclear famine environmental scientists visualised in their report on climate affects of regional nuclear war in 2013. While the international community may permit India to retaliate it would not want this option.

Therefore, if India wants to have its cake and eat it too, it should work to ensure that Pakistan does not counter strike under international pressure. However, as seen, Pakistan, believing that it too can play the in-conflict deterrence game, may not oblige.

Therefore, India must be prepared to absorb a counter strike.

It is at this juncture that both India and Pakistan, satiated after taking out a city or two of the other side and worried by the capability of the other side to take out more such cities, may be prepared to settle for a nuclear draw. Not only must pressure of the international community culminate at this point, but the two states must be willing to forego the satisfaction of ‘winning’ the exchange.

What is in it for the two states? India would have been hit twice over and got back but once. This may seem a gain for Pakistan. However, Pakistan by going first would be in the nuclear dog house. India by stopping the exchange would be on a higher ground, even though it would have targeted people first.

This ‘best case’ scenario will likely be taken as relatively in favour of Pakistan since Pakistan would have escaped at a low cost. Therefore, the idea of ‘massive’ that may be projected is that India should make Pakistan pay a higher cost, in one estimate up to five or six cities. The problem with this push would be that with Pakistan’s warhead numbers having crossed into three digits, it can hit back to inflict equal pain on India. To deter India from such a volume of retaliation, Pakistan could be thinking on a disproportionate counter strike, knowing that India, being larger, requires more damage to hurt equivalently. Such an exchange amounts to the prohibitive environmental costs that the 2013 report informed about. In other words, genocide would amount to suicide for India.

Therefore, India must clear to itself what it means by ‘massive’, ‘punitive’ and ‘unacceptable’ retaliation. There are two ways round the problem. One is that it moves away from this terminology by changing its doctrine for ‘flexible’ retaliation to include thinking about proportionate retaliation and graduated response.

Alternatively, if it persists with this doctrine, then it must spell out how it wishes to avoid escalation. The best exit point identified is after the first nuclear exchange. It is to exit at the lowest threshold of nuclear use. The international community’s good offices would be readily available to ensure this at two exit points: one is after India’s retaliation and the second is after Pakistan’s counter strike.

Clearly, this cannot be done in isolation. There has to be a modicum of doctrinal exchange with Pakistan. After all, Pakistan’s counter strike could itself be ‘massive’ plus, fearing an Indian wargasmic strike back. To halt this, not only must the caveat of stopping any exchange at the lowest level be part of the doctrine, but this must be made known to Pakistan. Even so, it may not be enough.

Two things additional require doing. One is, as mentioned, a doctrinal exchange with Pakistan. For this the mechanism of talks on nuclear matters already exists. The second is to create a nuclear risk reduction center in peace time with the intention of escalation control in which both states will have common interest in war time.

This is easier said than done. The former has not happened, other than at a rudimentary level in the six rounds of talks over the past decade. The latter is too much to expect at this stage of talks about resumption of talks. Also, there may be reluctance on this score stemming from conveying the impression to the other side that there are reservations on the health of the deterrence. Preparing for its breakdown can be taken as discrediting it.

Therefore, while the former may happen, the latter is less likely. Therefore, while the NRRC may not be put in place, there are two options. One is to have contingency plans drawn up in the talks for this to be put in place in case the balloon goes up. The second is that this can be put in place by a third country, say, the US, and offered for use to the two belligerents in case terrorist push comes to conventional shove.

Clarity in visualising a nuclear conflict such as attempted here can bring out the direction to go. As India embarks on nuclear doctrinal revision, here is a recommendation worth considering.

Ali Ahmed is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge 2014). He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in.

Political level considerations of nuclear use

INDIA - ARTICLES
#4596, 5 August 2014
Nuclear Use: Need for Thinking on Political-Level Considerations Ali AhmedIndependent Analyst http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/nuclear-use-need-for-thinking-on-political-level-considerations-4596.html In a recent op-ed, 'Counter Pak Nuke Tactics', nuclear strategy expert Manpreet Sethi rightly states in the conclusion that “The purpose of the Indian nuclear weapon is narrow and limited to safeguarding the country against nuclear coercion, blackmail or its possible use.” Sethi, a long time Pakistan military-watcher, is spot-on in her understanding that Pakistan’s military is using the Nasr nuclear missile system to deter India from exercising its conventional advantage in case push comes to shove in the form of a mass terror attack, a’la Mumbai II. It would like to use this to catalyse foreign intervention into moderating India’s nuclear response. Many analysts advocate that, faced with this challenge, India needs to reinforce its existing nuclear doctrine. The existing nuclear doctrine calls for inflicting unacceptable damage in retribution for Pakistani nuclear first use, even if this in the form of a lower order tactical nuclear strike. While many want to strengthen its credibility, a few, such as professors Basrur and Rajaraman, want a shift in thinking on what deters. There is a consensus among the competing schools that nuclear retaliation must greet nuclear first use. The difference is in the nature of the nuclear retaliation. If Pakistan resorts to ‘asymmetric escalation’, to use Vipin Narang’s phrase for escalation across the nuclear firebreak between conventional and nuclear levels of war, the former school argues for holding out the threat of escalation. The argument goes that India can withstand the loss of a couple of cities; Pakistan having just a few, cannot. This will stay Pakistan’s nuclear finger, the objective of deterrence. All India needs to do is to ensure that it unmistakably conveys to Pakistan its implacable intention, even if it is at the risk of a few Indian cities. However, with nuclear warheads in the lower three digits, Pakistan may venture bold to get even. Taking this seriously, the ‘flexible’ response school does not rule out consideration of proportionate response. They believe that the credibility of disproportionate response is questionable. But a proportionate response can be assured and serves to deter equally.  As can be seen, both sides base their arguments on strategic level considerations focused on deterrence. Strategists dealing with deterrence are at a level lower than the political, at which the political decision-maker functions. For a political decision-maker, theirs’ is an important input to inform the nuclear decision but not to determine it. At the political level there are also other considerations over and beyond deterrence. These must override input from the strategic level on the nature of nuclear response.  First are political consequences. The Indian way of life and India as we know it cannot be endangered inordinately. Losing a few cities can perhaps be absorbed, but the communities that have lost cities lose out on life chances. This is particularly so in relation to relatively unscathed neighbours. Perceiving that India has let them down, sub-nationalisms may come to fore. Next are social consequences. These will be long-term from the perspective of environmental effects. The number of nuclear mushrooms that need to sprout across Pakistan to deprive it of a retaliatory capability, stashed away at locations numbering in two digits, will be at least 30. Since Pakistan has second strike capability, the ability to fire back even after receiving a debilitating nuclear strike, it would be able to lob back at least 20. Fifty bombs going off is half the total of the 100 that formed the basis for 2013 estimate by environmental scientists of two billion casualties from nuclear winter induced famine. The price will be paid at the cost of inter-generational equity. Finally are strategic consequences. Winning the war is seldom as important as winning the peace. Though Pakistan will not be on the map, it will remain as a piece of land with severely disadvantaged people. India will have to bear the additional burden of its recuperation for its own stability. It will consequently have to abandon its dream of parity with China for at least half a century. Given these political level considerations, the political decision-maker will have to outthink his strategic advisers. Strategists have a role to play. Their discharging this role is good for deterrence. They keep nuclear dangers at the fore, lest the adversary take these as bluff. However, political level considerations trump strategic level input. Nuclear doctrine is primarily meant for deterrence. The ‘massive’ retaliation school emphasising the dreadful possibilities helps deter, since inexorable escalation can well occur. However, for an NFU abiding power such as India, nuclear employment will be when deterrence has failed. Therefore, a deterrence doctrine can at best inform, but not determine, nuclear weapons employment decisions. Eschewing Cold War thinking helps in sealing off a particular direction, but does not tell which direction to go. While deterrence relevant considerations have found reflection in the discourse, missing is thinking on what the content and checklist political level considerations needs to be for India

Book Review - COIN in Sri Lanka

Conflict Resolution As Janus-faced?

Ali Ahmed 

WHEN COUNTERINSURGENCY WINS: SRI LANKA’S DEFEAT OF THE TAMIL TIGERS 
By Ahmed S. Hashim 
Foundation Books, Delhi, 2013, pp. 267, Rs. 850.00

VOLUME XXXVIII NUMBER 7 July 2014
http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-3460/2014/July/7/conflict-resolution-as-janus-faced.html

The author has impressive credentials. With a doctorate from MIT, he has taught at the US Naval War College and lectured at Harvard’s Kennedy School. He is currently Associate Professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The catch is that an American of Turkish-Egyptian origin, he served three terms advising the US command in Iraq after the fall of Saddam. His earlier book Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq carried his impression of that conflict. His service in Iraq perhaps explains the term ‘defeat’ in the title. To him, Sri Lanka’s ‘defeat’ of the LTTE is without a doubt ‘the first counter insurgency victory of the twenty-first century’ (p.2). This fixation with ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ is a conceptual error that Americans have been guilty of across many conflict theatres. It can be be attributed to their strategic thinkers, such as the author; but then, the author’s interest itself can be attributed to socialization in the American school of war fighting.

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In all fairness to the author, it must be acknowledged that he has taken care to caveat his title and effusive introductory lines covering the death of Prabhakaran by highlighting that military victory is but a step towards conflict resolution. His concluding chapter does justice to the miles that remain for the Sri Lankan state to traverse out of the post-conflict environment it is in. He brings out the important point that victory can be lost in case the politics does not keep pace. That this is not happening in Sri Lanka is apparent with its latest stricture in the UN Human Rights Council which decided with a vote of 23 to 12 and 12 abstentions to investigate Sri Lanka’s record during the final stages of the conflict. It is clear that Prabhakaran may yet have the last laugh with the three Rajapakses—the President, the Defence Minister and his advisor—possibly being arraigned in front of the International Criminal Court at curtains to the conflict. That would indeed be a befitting end, not least from poetic justice point of view but as instruction to governments that watched, and prefer to continue to do so, with hands firmly behind their backs, not excluding the Indian Government. As the regional power, it is curious that Ahmed barely notes India’s role. India was in the midst of its last elections in 2009. This was the critical ingredient in Rajapakse’s timing of his offensive. An Indian Government distracted by national elections, fearful of the implications for the Tamil vote and encumbered by the Gandhi family’s grip on the ruling party, was unable—and perhaps unwilling—to force moderation on the Sri Lankans.

The latter is more likely given India’s extensive commitment to training of the Sri Lankan army for almost two decades, largely, incidentally in conventional operations. Knowing Tamil sensitivities, voiced now and then by their competing politicians, Karunanidhi and Jayalalitha, India was averse to large scale counter insurgency training. It therefore concentrated on training the Sri Lankan Army extensively on conventional operations. This turned out to be very useful as the LTTE itself transformed into a ‘hybrid’ force with capabilities across the insurgency spectrum from terror through guerrilla tactics to conventional operations, brought out very well by the author. However, his coverage of the Sri Lankan Army’s transformation neglects the Indian hand in it. (Incidentally, this reviewer was in the very first training team for Sri Lankans involved in training of junior leaders by the Indian Army as early as immediately following the exit of the IPKF from Sri Lanka.)

The book misses also a look at the LTTE perspective. Acknowledging a lack of access to the Tamil camp, the book is unable to tackle crucial questions as to why the LTTE chose to take a stand, that in the event turned out its ‘last stand’. The author restricts himself to apprehending a profound misreading of the international opinion by the LTTE. The LTTE assumed international pressure for yet another pause in fighting after it yet again fought the Sri Lankan Army to a standstill. In the immediate aftermath of the Bush era, this was a misreading of international opinion on terrorism. Also, interventions for peace such as from Nordic countries were fatigued by the mid-decade failure of the Norwegian mission. As mentioned, India too kept a distance and the Tamil parties, divided in the run up to the elections, could not force India’s foreign policy in an interventionist direction.

While true, India’s sitting on fence then, as now, owes also, not so much to its view of national sovereignty, as much as the possibility of resorting to such measures in case of any future politico-military challenge it may itself face. Its enabling of the Sri Lankans and keeping a reticent position thereafter is supposedly for geopolitical reasons that include a need to balance Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean and Sri Lanka. However, the danger is in its learning the wrong lessons and believing that the Sri Lankan model holds any water in democratic societies. India has left itself open for an option of similar action in case any challenge acquires the magnitude of that faced by Sri Lanka.

This brings one to the core issue of the place of violence in counter-insurgency. In Clausewitzian terms, the dialectic between two opposing forces, representing the wills of the two sides in conflict, is such as to tend towards ‘absolute war’. In internal conflict, this implies an annihilatory tendency; only to feed the contest making for a closed loop as obtained in Sri Lanka. Allowing the military logic to take its course is what ensures that the politics of the conflict are locked out, even after the opponent is overthrown, as is the case obtaining in Sri Lanka. This means that a glib reversion to politics at the end of the military tryst in internal conflict, such as usually attends international conflict, is seldom possible. Therefore, to advance theory, the expectation of reverting to politics once the military prong has done its bit is fallacy. Consequently, the search for ‘victory’, as has been the American lodestar over the past decade and half, is chimera. In trying to use the Sri Lankan case, the author is attempting to reinforce an American-led global strategic culture.

In any case, if the problem can only be fixed by a political solution—as is invariably the case in internal conflict—then there is no need for a military dominant interregnum. It needs fixing straight off, without the contest of wills and the inevitable ‘collateral damage’ suffered by the human terrain of internal conflict. In fact, it is the temptation to go for the military option that creates the conditions for its employment. This needs being the take away from the book and not what the author has it: a political turn once the military has done its bit. His take has not succeeded in Iraq, where he spent time; in Afghanistan now; and—what he stops short of predicting—will not succeed in Sri Lanka. One hopes India—sitting on the fence—is listening.

nuclear doctrine review

India’s Nuclear Doctrine Review: Don’t Leave It to the Hawks!

by Ali Ahmed   |  July 11, 2014Share on email

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http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/11/indias-nuclear-doctrine-review-dont-leave-it-to-the-hawks

That the BJP government will carry out a nuclear doctrine review as it stated in its manifesto is certain. This is not least because credibility, taken as central to nuclear deterrence, can be bolstered by demonstration of the government’s resolve to follow through on promises. Since nuclear doctrine is about the promise of nuclear retribution, the ‘will’ to do so needs to be in evidence. Doctrinal revisions are opportunities to show this.

Therefore the nature of retribution assumes importance. Currently, the doctrine has it that India will go ‘massive’ in retaliation to Pakistani nuclear first use. Since Pakistan now has an arsenal numbering in the lower three digits, it will have enough left over for a counter strike of equal proportions. This means that the age of MAD, mutual assured destruction, is here. Any new doctrine must take this into account.

Whereas the doctrine in the nineties promised ‘unacceptable damage’, in 2003 this was upped to ‘massive’, implying perhaps intent to set back Pakistan’s retaliatory capability alongside. With Pakistan’s numbers going up, this can no longer be guaranteed. Some, believing that India can withstand such punishment while Pakistan cannot, may plug for retaining the promise.

They argue that India’s missile shield will prevent loss of Delhi and Mumbai and India can sustain nuclear punishment elsewhere. Firstly, as with Reagan’s Star Wars program, the missile shield may be more hype than reality. And secondly, even if India is not ‘wiped off the map’ as Pakistan, it would be set back enough to give up any dreams of catching up with China, other than in population numbers of course. In any case, India as we know it would disappear as it has several times through the millennia. This wishful assumption cannot be allowed to inform the new doctrine.

Since India cannot any longer punish Pakistan for the temerity for nuclear first use the way it might like to, it may have to settle for less. To be sure, this may not deter well enough, but then, Pakistan’s resort to the Nasr missile, that is suggestive of a lowering of the nuclearthreshold, implies that our threat of going ‘massive’ does not either. Since even a bunch of jihadis can spark off the regional tinderbox, India has to move beyond the Cold War logic of deterrence, a position it has paid only lip service to so far.

Currently, the debate is only between defenders of ‘massive’ and challengers in favour of ‘flexible’. The latter want a step back from ‘massive’ but are willing to settle for ‘unacceptable damage’. The former believe that a limited nuclear war is an oxymoron; the latter while allowing for limited nuclear operations do not dwell on escalation control and exchange termination. Votaries of ‘massive’ therefore win out since the ‘flexible’ camp does not have an argument to counter the ‘inexorable’ inevitability of escalation in nuclear exchanges.

That nuclear outbreak is not impossible is clear. Mr. Modi has built an image of being strong on defence and of decisiveness. When and if challenged by terrorist provocation, he may give the military a go-ahead to teach Pakistan a lesson. This may not involve a release of India’s armoured might and air power in line with the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine of proactive offensive. It will likely be more nuanced than that since Pakistan has unveiled the Nasr, a battlefield nuclear missile system.

Pakistan, suitably deterred and reasonably mature, is also unlikely to go nuclear straight off. Nevertheless, nuclear dangers persist, particularly those stemming from misperception and autonomous action by commanders in the heat and fog of war.

The new nuclear doctrine must therefore also have answers for this albeit remote, but most likely circumstance of nuclear outbreak. There is one formulation, best articulated by General Sundarji, catering for this. He had wanted any nuclear exchange terminated at the lowest threshold by political and diplomatic engagement for conflict termination earliest.

This is counter-intuitive and therefore has not received the attention it deserves. His argument is that even though at war, both states will have enough reason to cooperate to ensure respective survival. Nuclear war will also focus minds in a manner no other circumstance can, enabling the mutual concessions for ending the war and on the original disagreement that  led up to it. The international community, alarmed by possible environmental consequences of a regional nuclear war, will surely help ease any such engagement.

Saner models need to figure in the discussion in the run up to doctrine review. Leaving it to the ‘experts’ will only give us ‘more of the same’. One such expert is arguing for numbers in the middle three digits! In combating the hawks, the hands-off posture of nuclear activists to the nuclear doctrine review is hardly helpful.

While they are right that the best way is to get rid of nuclear weapons, it is, to put it mildly, highly unlikely that the review will recommend that the government abandon nuclear weapons. Obama acknowledged the degree of difficulty best in accepting that he cannot envisage nuclear weapons free world in his lifetime. The fastest the world will get rid of nuclear weapons is when these have been used and found counter-productive, if not downright useless. That may be too late for India and the region.

Ideas on ensuring that such use will be least damaging for India, only possible in case it inflicts least damage on its nuclear adversary, need airing now. In circumstance in which the No First Use dictum is itself under threat, it will be uphill but a battle worth it.

india's doctrine puzzle: limiting war in south asia

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Contents
List of Abbreviations ix
Foreword by Lt Gen (retd) V. r. raghavan xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgements xix
1. introduction 1
2. The Limited war Concept 22
3. doctrinal Change 36
4. The Structural Factor 74
5. The Political Factor 115
6. The organisational Factor 151
7. Conclusion 189
References 211
About the Author 00

Index 00

Extract of Foreword by Lt Gen VR Raghavan

Nuclear weapons generate a voluminous output of books, research 
papers and estimates of their impact on national, regional and 
international security. The nuclearisation of india and Pakistan 
have had a similar impact with strategic analysts the world over 
trying to assess the future use, misuse or abuse of these strategic 
assets by the two countries. 
India published its nuclear doctrine not long after acquiring 
nuclear weapons. while the doctrine was not specifically directed 
against Pakistan, it also left no one in doubt about the immediacy 
of indian planners’ strategic concerns of a future with nuclear 
weapons. Since China had committed itself to a no First Use policy, 
india’s nuclear doctrine was a clear enough statement on how it 
would respond to a nuclear weapons exchange on the indian Sub 
Continent. while nuclear weapons are unambiguously viewed 
by india as strategic assets, their operational use as war fighting 
instruments have been ruled out. Their use is predicated on another 
country using nuclear weapons against india.
The longstanding india — Pakistan confrontation turned into 
military conflicts after Pakistan linked terrorist attacks in india. 
The intrusion into kargil and the attack on indian Parliament 
created the possibility of a conventional large scale military conflict, 
which ran the serious risk of turning into a nuclear standoff. indian 
military planners adapted to this experience to evolved responses in 
the operational domain, to offset conditions created by the presence 
of nuclear weapons, albeit as strategic assets.
india and Pakistan have been in a state of confrontation since 
1947. on occasions when the confrontation turned into a military 
conflict, the purpose of operations was more to force a change of 
outlook amongst Pakistan’s leadership than the destruction of that 
state. Military operations were thus limited both in the objectives 
to be attained and the scope and intensity of force to be applied. 
nuclear weapons changed the old premise into one of placing 
further limits on operational thresholds which can and cannot be 
crossed. ...

Extract from the Preface

Preface
The genesis of this book was atop a canal obstacle somewhere 
in the western sector in 2006. i was then commanding an infantry 
battalion that was deployed as exercise enemy, or the nark force, in 
a corps exercise meant to put to a strike corps through its paces. The 
exercise ‘enemy’, Swarg’s strike corps, chose that stretch of the canal 
as site of its break- in battle. it was fore-ordained that they were 
to break out by first light, for if they were still in their bridgeheads 
then they would be ideal targets for an enemy air attack or worse, 
a nuclear strike. According to the exercise umpire’s timetable, my 
unit was to be cut to pieces in a heavy breakthrough within three 
hours. i did not have much to do thereafter since i was presumed 
exercise dead or prisoner. i was able to witness the proceedings over 
the remainder of the exercise as a bystander. The exercise timings 
were truncated to depict the first week to ten days of the mock war. 
The strike corps ended up in its ‘projection areas’ across multiple 
obstacles true to plan. The final touch was capture of an airfield 
deep in enemy territory by paratroops. Presumably, the strike corps 
would be provisioned via an air bridge for subsequent operations 
further in enemy interiors. i wondered as to what a nuclear armed 
enemy would make of all this. This prompted a question in my 
mind: Why has India gone in for an offensive conventional doctrine 
despite nuclearisation?
ideally, the investment in nuclearisation should have made 
india ‘feel’ secure, if not ‘secure’ itself. The Bomb had been much 
advertised by its votaries as a ‘weapon of peace’. Their argument 
was that it would enable india to sit down and talk with its 
adversaries. instead, Pakistan launched operation Badr in kargil 
within a year of both states, india and Pakistan, going nuclear. Soon 
thereafter was the kandahar hijack. Later, the proverbial indian 
‘threshold of tolerance’ was sorely tested with a dastardly terror 
attack on the Srinagar legislative assembly and soon thereafter on 
Parliament in 2001. The popular narrative has it that a defensive 
and reactive india was caught flat footed. Consequently, in the 
wake of operation Parakram it was forced to move towards a 

military doctrine reportedly more ‘proactive’, colloquially dubbed Cold Start......