nuclear doctrine review

India’s Nuclear Doctrine Review: Don’t Leave It to the Hawks!

by Ali Ahmed   |  July 11, 2014Share on email

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http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/11/indias-nuclear-doctrine-review-dont-leave-it-to-the-hawks

That the BJP government will carry out a nuclear doctrine review as it stated in its manifesto is certain. This is not least because credibility, taken as central to nuclear deterrence, can be bolstered by demonstration of the government’s resolve to follow through on promises. Since nuclear doctrine is about the promise of nuclear retribution, the ‘will’ to do so needs to be in evidence. Doctrinal revisions are opportunities to show this.

Therefore the nature of retribution assumes importance. Currently, the doctrine has it that India will go ‘massive’ in retaliation to Pakistani nuclear first use. Since Pakistan now has an arsenal numbering in the lower three digits, it will have enough left over for a counter strike of equal proportions. This means that the age of MAD, mutual assured destruction, is here. Any new doctrine must take this into account.

Whereas the doctrine in the nineties promised ‘unacceptable damage’, in 2003 this was upped to ‘massive’, implying perhaps intent to set back Pakistan’s retaliatory capability alongside. With Pakistan’s numbers going up, this can no longer be guaranteed. Some, believing that India can withstand such punishment while Pakistan cannot, may plug for retaining the promise.

They argue that India’s missile shield will prevent loss of Delhi and Mumbai and India can sustain nuclear punishment elsewhere. Firstly, as with Reagan’s Star Wars program, the missile shield may be more hype than reality. And secondly, even if India is not ‘wiped off the map’ as Pakistan, it would be set back enough to give up any dreams of catching up with China, other than in population numbers of course. In any case, India as we know it would disappear as it has several times through the millennia. This wishful assumption cannot be allowed to inform the new doctrine.

Since India cannot any longer punish Pakistan for the temerity for nuclear first use the way it might like to, it may have to settle for less. To be sure, this may not deter well enough, but then, Pakistan’s resort to the Nasr missile, that is suggestive of a lowering of the nuclearthreshold, implies that our threat of going ‘massive’ does not either. Since even a bunch of jihadis can spark off the regional tinderbox, India has to move beyond the Cold War logic of deterrence, a position it has paid only lip service to so far.

Currently, the debate is only between defenders of ‘massive’ and challengers in favour of ‘flexible’. The latter want a step back from ‘massive’ but are willing to settle for ‘unacceptable damage’. The former believe that a limited nuclear war is an oxymoron; the latter while allowing for limited nuclear operations do not dwell on escalation control and exchange termination. Votaries of ‘massive’ therefore win out since the ‘flexible’ camp does not have an argument to counter the ‘inexorable’ inevitability of escalation in nuclear exchanges.

That nuclear outbreak is not impossible is clear. Mr. Modi has built an image of being strong on defence and of decisiveness. When and if challenged by terrorist provocation, he may give the military a go-ahead to teach Pakistan a lesson. This may not involve a release of India’s armoured might and air power in line with the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine of proactive offensive. It will likely be more nuanced than that since Pakistan has unveiled the Nasr, a battlefield nuclear missile system.

Pakistan, suitably deterred and reasonably mature, is also unlikely to go nuclear straight off. Nevertheless, nuclear dangers persist, particularly those stemming from misperception and autonomous action by commanders in the heat and fog of war.

The new nuclear doctrine must therefore also have answers for this albeit remote, but most likely circumstance of nuclear outbreak. There is one formulation, best articulated by General Sundarji, catering for this. He had wanted any nuclear exchange terminated at the lowest threshold by political and diplomatic engagement for conflict termination earliest.

This is counter-intuitive and therefore has not received the attention it deserves. His argument is that even though at war, both states will have enough reason to cooperate to ensure respective survival. Nuclear war will also focus minds in a manner no other circumstance can, enabling the mutual concessions for ending the war and on the original disagreement that  led up to it. The international community, alarmed by possible environmental consequences of a regional nuclear war, will surely help ease any such engagement.

Saner models need to figure in the discussion in the run up to doctrine review. Leaving it to the ‘experts’ will only give us ‘more of the same’. One such expert is arguing for numbers in the middle three digits! In combating the hawks, the hands-off posture of nuclear activists to the nuclear doctrine review is hardly helpful.

While they are right that the best way is to get rid of nuclear weapons, it is, to put it mildly, highly unlikely that the review will recommend that the government abandon nuclear weapons. Obama acknowledged the degree of difficulty best in accepting that he cannot envisage nuclear weapons free world in his lifetime. The fastest the world will get rid of nuclear weapons is when these have been used and found counter-productive, if not downright useless. That may be too late for India and the region.

Ideas on ensuring that such use will be least damaging for India, only possible in case it inflicts least damage on its nuclear adversary, need airing now. In circumstance in which the No First Use dictum is itself under threat, it will be uphill but a battle worth it.

pakistani nuclear first use, Strategic Perspectives, USI

The Aftermath of Pakistani Nuclear First Use
Ali Ahmed

 http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=40&ano=2672

Thinking about the aftermath of Pakistani nuclear first use is not a vote on India’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. While India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine of January 2003 is for nuclear deterrence, it is based on India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999. It bears recall that the Draft had used the phrase ‘peacetime posture’ in reference to measures taken to reinforce deterrence including the warning of punitive retaliation. By using the phrase ‘peacetime’ it enables flexibility for wartime, the context in which deterrence breakdown cannot be ruled out.

It is not necessary for a state to have its operational nuclear doctrine, or nuclear doctrine in case of deterrence breakdown, in the open domain. Therefore, even as the declaratory nuclear doctrine is taken as sacrosanct, the existence of an operational nuclear doctrine cannot be ruled out. It can reasonably be taken that the two – declaratory and operational – nuclear doctrines may be one and the same. However, that they can be distinct and with substantial differences cannot be ruled out. The fact that the Draft used the term ‘peacetime’ and the 2003 doctrine is based substantially on the Draft suggests the possibility that India’s nuclear doctrine for the contingency of breakdown of deterrence, or its operational nuclear doctrine, may be different. Therefore, for visualizing Indian responses to Pakistani nuclear first use, there are two possibilities.

In the case of declaratory doctrine, deterrence breakdown in the form of nuclear first use by Pakistan would invite ‘massive’ punitive retaliation by India inflicting unacceptable damage. Visualizing this for higher order Pakistani nuclear first use, such as on Indian soil and its urban centers is easy. However, doing the same for lower order first use options taken by Pakistan is relatively difficult. This owes to the problem of disproportionality.

Higher order retaliation by India to lower order first use by Pakistan may result in Pakistan resorting to equally pain inflicting counter strikes. Vertical proliferation in its case enables it have a second strike capability in place for this. India’s ‘massive’ strike would require being of considerable proportions to take out this capability. Doing so could result in environmental consequences that India would not be able to sustain. A panicked global reaction may intervene to halt such a response.

Therefore, conceding that Pakistan will have  enough left over to inflict pain on India or that it has a second strike capability in terms of numbers may be a useful start point to rethink the ‘massive’ retaliation formulation once the nuclear doctrine comes up for review. India would therefore need to as part of the review think along the lines of limited nuclear operations in case of deterrence breakdown.

While it may already have such an operational doctrine in place but has sensibly kept it confidential, it is for consideration if this needs to continue to be so in the event of Pakistani projection of a low nuclear threshold. The assumption behind the Nasr missile is that Pakistan can get away with nuclear first use in the belief that India cannot follow through on its declaratory nuclear doctrine.

In Pakistani thinking this may owe to self-deterrence by India, forceful intervention by foreign powers catalyzed by Pakistani first use threat or its going first and lack of Indian lower order response options. It is a misinterpretation that Pakistan intends using the Nasr for anything other than strategic purposes, in particular nuclear signaling and to catalyse foreign conflict termination intervention.

Deterrence of Pakistani first use at higher order levels can be taken as granted since India has the capability and in case it is recipient of such a strike will unlikely be self-deterred in its response. However, for lower order first use India could think of lower order nuclear response. By no means does this mean indulging in nuclear exchanges and going up the proverbial Kahnian ladder. It is only to strike Pakistan back for in-conflict deterrence and to gain time for nuclear exchange termination effort, if not conflict termination itself. Since such a strike back cannot risk exposing India to greater threat, as would a ‘massive’ retaliatory strike as discussed above, lower order strikes may require to be thought through.

Such thinking can be done in the run up to the review along three lines. The first is the effect on deterrence. In case India gives itself limited nuclear retaliatory options for lower order threat with conflict termination intent, then it would rule out Pakistan’s notion that India lacks options. This will reinforce deterrence, even while ensuring escalation control. An operational doctrine as this for the period post deterrence breakdown can complement the declaratory doctrine aimed at deterrence.

Second is the effect on conventional operations underway. Conventional operations may require continuing to achieve political aims that in turn may in the event of nuclear use be modified suitably.  Operations would need a suitable deterrent cover. This is best provided by operational doctrine including limited nuclear options. 

Third, limited nuclear operations entail escalation control. Whereas conflict termination is the best measure towards escalation control, the next best is exchange termination at the lowest possible threshold of nuclear exchange. If measures towards this need to be in place prior so as to withstand not only the charged environment of conflict but the heightened tension stemming from nuclear dimension of the conflict, these would require contemplation as part of the forthcoming nuclear review.

A nuclear review’s start point has to be the possibility of nuclear use. Concentrating on deterring this is useful, but not enough. India needs to also have limited nuclear response options up its sleeve. Letting Pakistan know of this will reinforce deterrence and in the event of its breakdown, will leave India with the flexibility to choose to either go ‘massive’ or proportional, or indeed, if strategy so warrants, even choose to keep Pakistan in the political and moral dog house by conventional response to lower order nuclear first use. 

Col Ali Ahmed is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge, 2014). 

(Article uploaded on May. 23, 2014).