A call for nuclear sanity rather than retaliation

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/call-for-nuclear-sanity-rather-than-retaliation/162858.html

26 November 2015

Amb. G Parthasarathy’s opinion piece in The Tribune (19 November 2015) argues that, ‘Pakistan should be presented a stark picture of what would happen to its Punjab province, if it resorts foolishly to nuclear adventurism, whether tactical or strategic.’

He prefers that India respond to any Pakistani use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, with ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation in keeping with India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine. To him, holding densely populated Pakistani Punjab hostage would deter Pakistan from going nuclear.  

He is not alone in holding such a position. Amb. Shyam Saran also made the same point in his Subbu Forum Society lecture in New Delhi in 2013, when he was Chair of the National Security Advisory Board. Saran said, ‘if it (India) is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary… the label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant.’

That India continues with its declaratory nuclear doctrine that dates to 2003 implies that it is a widely held view. It is easy to see why this is so. The prospects of near certain destruction can only serve to deter.

However, since 2003, much water has flown down the Indus. The subcontinent has witnessed vertical proliferation, with Pakistan reputedly having 140-160 nuclear warheads. India is not far behind.

What this suggests is that Pakistan has the capability to retaliate in kind in case India was to massively counter Pakistan’s introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. Since India stands to be grievously hurt, it may be unwilling to follow through on its promise of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation.

This may embolden Pakistan to go nuclear. Consequently, India would do well to arrive at safer and saner options than the one it has currently.

Amb. Parthasarathy in his article points to Pakistani Punjab as offering plentitude of nuclear targets for retaliation even if Pakistan’s nuclear first use only targets Indian troops operating under its ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.

However, if India was to target west Punjab, then its own border areas in proximity starting from Rajouri, through Jammu and onwards via Amritsar down to Ganganagar stand to be effected by direct and long term environmental consequences.

Even areas further away will not be spared. The usual autumnal media story is that burning of paddy stubble in fields in Punjab invariably chokes Delhi with its pollution. On Diwali, the figures for pollution in Delhi were 23 times WHO’s permissible limit. It can only be imagined what the environmental fallout from the burning of even a couple cities would entail.

There would also be socio-political fallout. The ongoing refugee crisis in Europe suggests multiple problems and dangers. Population movements will be akin to those witnessed at Partition. These will not necessarily be towards the west since across the Indus begin deserts. Afghanistan is also an unlikely prospect as destination. India may well be where these flows will head.

The refugees in Europe today are unlikely to be going back any time soon. Similarly, those who gatecrash India’s border fence will be here for the long term. As the Paris attacks show, their influx will not be without dangers.

They would be in addition to India’s own border populace who would likely have fled inwards. This is in addition to the internally displaced people India may have to cope with in case any of its cities are hit in counter retaliation. Many would flee cities such as Delhi, fearing such targeting.

The civil administration that at the best of times find coping with monsoons difficult will be unable to rely on the military to bail it out. The military will be busy inside Pakistan. A proportion of the paramilitary have relieved the army to stanch possible resurgence of insurgency in Kashmir.

Further, there are also imponderables such as effects of the contrived identification of Indian Muslims with Pakistan. The latest manifestation of this was in the BJP president saying that in case the party loses in Bihar, there would be celebrations in Pakistan. Some have interpreted the reference to Pakistan to mean a reference to India’s internal ‘Other’, its Muslims. Given extant conditions of polarization, it is not impossible to visualize a communal carnage within India in case of war going nuclear with its largest minority as scapegoat. 

Clearly, with such scenarios easy to visualize, it is strange that India persists with the logic of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation. On these counts, Pakistan will unlikely be deterred by this formulation, knowing India cannot follow through.

Consequently, India needs to reframe its nuclear doctrine, moving away from ‘massive’ to a more credible ‘tit for tat’. Such exchange(s), albeit avoidable, will yet keep Indian cities safe.

The rumours of impending nuclear doctrine revision that attended the BJP election campaign last year must be taken to the logical conclusion in a revised nuclear doctrine. The revised one must be predicated on preserving India from nuclear damage to the greatest extent possible; feasible only by a ‘city avoidance’ strategy in first place.

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eurasia review article

http://www.eurasiareview.com/08082014-india-mean-massive-retaliation-oped/

WHAT DOES INDIA MEAN BY ‘MASSIVE’ RETALIATION? – OPED

AUGUST 8, 2014 EURASIA REVIEW 

http://www.eurasiareview.com/08082014-india-mean-massive-retaliation-oped/

By Eurasia Review

By Ali Ahmed, PhD

India’s nuclear doctrine promises 'massive’ retaliation. It may not be of the order of ‘assured destruction’ as visualised in the cold war. It could mean much less, after all even a town less would amount to a ‘massive’ loss. India certainly wishes ‘punitive’ retaliation to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. Therefore, when India promises that its nuclear retaliation will be ‘massive’, it may not be all that bad. After all it would not wish to send Pakistan back to the stone age since the nuclear fallout will affect India directly.

Therefore what India means by ‘massive’ retaliation is that it would resort to a city busting nuclear strategy in case of nuclear first use by Pakistan against it or its forces anywhere. This means that even if Pakistan was to use nuclear weapons defensively on its own territory and against advancing Indian forces, it would stand to lose a town or two.

Let us visualise the scenario. A mega-terror incident occurs in India in which Pakistan’s establishment is implicated. India resorts to its ‘cold start’ doctrine and sends its integrated battle groups across to teach Pakistan a lesson and end the perception of impunity of its military. Pakistan in panic, anger and fear, fires off a nuclear tipped missile against an advancing Indian column.

It is reckoned that it takes several warheads to stop an advance of mechanised forces that are fairly well spread out while advancing in a potentially nuclear battlefield. Therefore, it is unlikely that Pakistan would be trying to stop this column with its nuclear attack.

Instead it would likely be sending a warning signal that the conflict could get worse. It could be prompting the international community to intervene and stop the conflict. However, India would be reluctant to allow Pakistan to get away with nuclear murder. It would want to exercise the right of reply.

Nuclear pundits in India recommend that India follow through with its nuclear doctrine in such a case and take out a Pakistani town or two at the very least. If the war were to end at this juncture, then it would be the ‘best case’. It is not an unreasonable juncture to end the conflict in that Pakistan would have been punished adequately for its temerity to break the nuclear taboo. Pakistan may get the message loud and clear finally. The international community would clamp down in double quick time.

India’s nuclear doctrine being one of nuclear deterrence is designed to stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand. Any reasonable Pakistani decision maker, knowing that Pakistan stands to lose a town or two, or perhaps a city, may not want to chance it. Also, it could end up losing more, if not all, since escalation could take place.

However, Pakistan may believe that since it has nuclear weapons in sufficient numbers it can get back at India. If India was to take out one of its cities then it would be at the risk of an Indian city or two falling to a counter strike. In Pakistan’s calculus, this may check-mate India into self-deterrence. India may not go for counter-city retaliation since it stands to lose as much as Pakistan.

This may embolden Pakistan to go first. This means India’s nuclear deterrence can potentially fail since it may appear less than credible to Pakistan.

Therefore, there is a chance of Pakistan going for the nuclear button. India in this case will be faced with a choice of how to respond. In case it goes as per its doctrine and reduces a town to nuclear cinder, it requires ensuring that a like counter strike does not occur.

It has three ways to do this. One is to rely on the international community to stop Pakistan. The second is that the strike on the town is deterrence in itself in that Pakistan would receive the message loud and clear that its remaining urban pockets could face like punishment unless it desists. The third is by targeting Pakistan’s retaliatory capability by both nuclear and non-nuclear means to ensure that Pakistan cannot counter strike even if it wants to.

Relying on the first would be useful since the international community will pull out the stops to halt a regional nuclear war as global climate stands to be affected. However, having failed to stop India’s ‘massive’ retaliation, it cannot be guaranteed as a success.

The second, in-conflict deterrence, may work, but for the fact that the tendency to vengeance would be strong, particularly if Pakistan perceives India’s retaliation as disproportionate. It may wish to get even, believing that with over a 100 weapons it too has in-conflict deterrence capability by holding Indian cities hostage to future strikes in case India keeps up the nuclear exchange.

The third is difficult to visualise but not impossible. India’s nuclear decision makers may want to protect Indian cities and towns and therefore when advised to go in for retaliation they may pose the question to their nuclear advisers on how can a Pakistani counter be guaranteed against. They may receive the recommendation that while India takes out a city or two in retaliation as per its doctrine, it may be necessary for it to also take out Pakistani retaliatory capability alongside. This may lead to counter-force targeting alongside a city busting attack.

The last is a less likely manner of ‘massive’ retaliation since this would kick up enough nuclear dust to bring on the nuclear famine environmental scientists visualised in their report on climate affects of regional nuclear war in 2013. While the international community may permit India to retaliate it would not want this option.

Therefore, if India wants to have its cake and eat it too, it should work to ensure that Pakistan does not counter strike under international pressure. However, as seen, Pakistan, believing that it too can play the in-conflict deterrence game, may not oblige.

Therefore, India must be prepared to absorb a counter strike.

It is at this juncture that both India and Pakistan, satiated after taking out a city or two of the other side and worried by the capability of the other side to take out more such cities, may be prepared to settle for a nuclear draw. Not only must pressure of the international community culminate at this point, but the two states must be willing to forego the satisfaction of ‘winning’ the exchange.

What is in it for the two states? India would have been hit twice over and got back but once. This may seem a gain for Pakistan. However, Pakistan by going first would be in the nuclear dog house. India by stopping the exchange would be on a higher ground, even though it would have targeted people first.

This ‘best case’ scenario will likely be taken as relatively in favour of Pakistan since Pakistan would have escaped at a low cost. Therefore, the idea of ‘massive’ that may be projected is that India should make Pakistan pay a higher cost, in one estimate up to five or six cities. The problem with this push would be that with Pakistan’s warhead numbers having crossed into three digits, it can hit back to inflict equal pain on India. To deter India from such a volume of retaliation, Pakistan could be thinking on a disproportionate counter strike, knowing that India, being larger, requires more damage to hurt equivalently. Such an exchange amounts to the prohibitive environmental costs that the 2013 report informed about. In other words, genocide would amount to suicide for India.

Therefore, India must clear to itself what it means by ‘massive’, ‘punitive’ and ‘unacceptable’ retaliation. There are two ways round the problem. One is that it moves away from this terminology by changing its doctrine for ‘flexible’ retaliation to include thinking about proportionate retaliation and graduated response.

Alternatively, if it persists with this doctrine, then it must spell out how it wishes to avoid escalation. The best exit point identified is after the first nuclear exchange. It is to exit at the lowest threshold of nuclear use. The international community’s good offices would be readily available to ensure this at two exit points: one is after India’s retaliation and the second is after Pakistan’s counter strike.

Clearly, this cannot be done in isolation. There has to be a modicum of doctrinal exchange with Pakistan. After all, Pakistan’s counter strike could itself be ‘massive’ plus, fearing an Indian wargasmic strike back. To halt this, not only must the caveat of stopping any exchange at the lowest level be part of the doctrine, but this must be made known to Pakistan. Even so, it may not be enough.

Two things additional require doing. One is, as mentioned, a doctrinal exchange with Pakistan. For this the mechanism of talks on nuclear matters already exists. The second is to create a nuclear risk reduction center in peace time with the intention of escalation control in which both states will have common interest in war time.

This is easier said than done. The former has not happened, other than at a rudimentary level in the six rounds of talks over the past decade. The latter is too much to expect at this stage of talks about resumption of talks. Also, there may be reluctance on this score stemming from conveying the impression to the other side that there are reservations on the health of the deterrence. Preparing for its breakdown can be taken as discrediting it.

Therefore, while the former may happen, the latter is less likely. Therefore, while the NRRC may not be put in place, there are two options. One is to have contingency plans drawn up in the talks for this to be put in place in case the balloon goes up. The second is that this can be put in place by a third country, say, the US, and offered for use to the two belligerents in case terrorist push comes to conventional shove.

Clarity in visualising a nuclear conflict such as attempted here can bring out the direction to go. As India embarks on nuclear doctrinal revision, here is a recommendation worth considering.

Ali Ahmed is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge 2014). He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in.

the sundarji model for nuclear doctrine review

INDIA - ARTICLES
#4410, 30 April 2014
An Indian Nuclear Doctrine Review: A Third Model Ali AhmedIndependent Analyst Email: aliahd66@gmail.com http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/an-indian-nuclear-doctrine-review-a-third-model-4410.html The reference in the BJP manifesto to a review of the Indian nuclear doctrine has had the salutary effect of keeping the nuclear issue in the public mind. It has also made the possibility of a review of the doctrine, even if the BJP does not come to power, more likely. The discussion the reference provoked suggests that there are two models of deterrence that would vie for adoption during the review. While the ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation model is already the declaratory nuclear doctrine, the challenger model is ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliation. The debate between votaries of the two has had ‘flexible’ votaries pointing out that ‘massive’ is incredible. ‘Massive’ votaries have in turn critiqued the ‘flexible’ model for being weak on escalation control. While ‘massive’ pitches for strengthening deterrence by reinforcing capability and resolve to visit unacceptable damage on the enemy, ‘flexible’, wary of deterrence breakdown, caters for an appropriate response. For ‘flexible’ votaries, ‘massive’ has the drawback of inviting an equal counter-strike from Pakistan since Pakistan now has the numbers. This would make for self deterrence for India. Consequently, India would water down its nuclear response. Doing so would impact India’s projection of resolve, effecting in-conflict deterrence. India should therefore go for a ‘flexible’ model whereby its response would be tailored to the manner of Pakistan’s nuclear first use and cognisant of in-conflict deterrence, escalation control and war termination compulsions. ‘Massive’ votaries argue that this would water down deterrence, making nuclear first use more likely. Also it is unmindful of the inexorable escalation that would inevitably ensue from nuclear first use and proportionate retaliation under the graduated deterrence concept. ‘Massive’ has global environmental consequences in light of recent studies that indicate that even a regional nuclear war can trigger nuclear winter. ‘Flexible’ has potential to go the ‘massive’ route. A third model, the Sundarji nuclear doctrine eliminates the drawbacks mentioned. In Sundarji’s words, it states: ‘Terminate the nuclear exchange at lowest level with a view to negotiate a politically acceptable peace; riposte commensurate with strike received –quid pro quo option; a punitive element may call for response at a higher level than strike received – quid pro quo plus option; a need on occasion to degrade to maximum extent the adversary’s ability to continue with the exchange – spasmic response option; a need to minimise casualties among foreigners and innocents for post war rapprochement.’ By its focus on political negotiations for war termination, it caters for escalation control; thereby eliminating the problems posed by the other two models. However, the criticism this articulation may receive is that under the circumstance of nuclear use, the possibility of political and diplomatic engagement for nuclear exchange termination and for war termination will be severely negatively impacted. Since a nuclear exchange is the ultimate expression of distrust, making a two-way street of escalation control would be through the exercise of power to hurt and generating fear in the enemy of the power held in reserve in relation to potential targets yet to be addressed. Therefore, this is an almost wishful formulation. The counter to such a critique is that instead of an emotive nuclear decision-making environment in which vengeance and in-conflict deterrence will be to fore, it is instead equally plausible that the first nuclear explosion will ensure a quick return to strategic sense since survival would be at stake. As this would be the case on both sides, there would be the necessary element of cooperation that can enable a negotiated end to the exchange in the first place and to the nuclear conflict next. Effort to this end would also be greatly facilitated by the international community, energised by the fear of implications for escalation for the global environment.  Clearly, this will call for mechanisms to be in place prior, forged in peace time. This implies not only doctrinal transparency and doctrinal exchanges, but also mechanisms of assured interface in the trying conditions of nuclear conflict outbreak or nuclear outbreak in a conventional conflict. This would entail creation of a nuclear risk reduction mechanism. Currently, India and Pakistan have hotlines as part of CBMs (confidence building measures) between the two. Going beyond CBMs to NRRMs (Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures) is necessary for working the Sundarji doctrine. Since this cannot be done in crisis period or in war time, it is best to recognise the necessity for escalation control communication in conflict and emplace the mechanism. A counter-point would be that to create such a body means to tacitly admit a lack of faith in deterrence. This should not hold up the initiative since when and if this faith is on the rocks, it may prove too late. However, in case of hesitance the two States as part of doctrinal exchange can cater for the contingency and materialise the mechanism in case a sub-conventional push comes to a conventional shove. Any impending review must therefore cast its net wider and look beyond the two mainstream models – ‘massive’ and ‘flexible’ – at play. The Sundarji model is also a candidate for consideration in the review.

post conflict factor in nuclear decision making

Article No.:	2479	Date:	11/10/2013
The Post Conflict Factor in Nuclear Decision Making
Col Ali Ahmed
E-Mail- aliahd66@hotmail.com http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=1480&u_id=218
Nuclear decision-making is only partially dependent on the doctrine. While the operational as against declaratory doctrine will inform such decision making, since doctrine by definition is to serve as guide, the significant coordinates of the conflict circumstance, the opponent’s manner of nuclear first use and conflict termination strategies that would inevitably kick in with introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict will be equally significant. This article makes the point that along with these very pertinent considerations must also be factored in the post conflict scenario as a second order consideration.  The nuclear strategy chosen as response to the adversary’s nuclear first use will determine not only subsequent conflict strategy, end game and outcome, but also the nature of the post conflict future. This article examines two nuclear strategies that form potential options for India’s nuclear response: massive punitive retaliation and flexible nuclear retaliation. It argues that from a perspective of a post nuclear conflict future, the former suffers in comparison to the latter. This needs to inform nuclear retaliation considerations. Nuclear use considerations usually limit themselves to what would deter best. They are formulated in order to prevent the nuclear use. India’s nuclear retaliation doctrine has it that India would respond with punitive retaliation to any form of nuclear use against it or its forces anywhere. In the declaratory nuclear doctrine, this would be of ‘massive’ levels. The threat of this, in an India-Pakistan conflict, is to stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand. It is not impossible to visualize that the operational nuclear doctrine could well be different and that in the event of enemy nuclear first use, the nuclear strategy might well be different. Some analysts say that India must fulfil its promise in case Pakistan tests India’s resolve. Not doing so will reveal a chink in India’s resolve thereby subjecting it to further attacks. Punitive retaliation will return Pakistani decision makers to their senses. Others maintain that the circumstance of introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict must dictate India’s response. While the deterrence doctrine will inform India’s response, it will not dictate it. Disproportionate response would be escalatory, opening up India to like retaliation. What has not informed the debate so far is the factor of post nuclear conflict circumstance. Pakistan has not ruled out nuclear first use. The two approaches differ on the importance of the type of first use: whether this will be at a higher order in the form of an attempted first strike or a counter value strike or a lower order strike such as on India’s military formations on its territory. For the former – punitive retaliation – the type of nuclear first use does not matter. India’s response will be a heavy one. In case of the latter – flexible retaliation, this would be consequential to shaping India’s response. From the perspective of a post nuclear conflict future, which of the two make better sense? Punitive ‘massive’ retaliation makes sense in the circumstance of an attempted first strike by Pakistan. India will give back as good as it receives with a higher order strike. However, to the more probable manner of Pakistani nuclear first use – a lower order strike – this may be disproportionate. Even if the response sets back Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal considerably, of the 100 or so weapons it has, there would likely be some left over to damage India. While some analysts are sanguine that a large country like India can ‘take’ the loss of a couple of cities or so, they point out that Pakistan would be ‘finished’. This possibility would stay Pakistan’s hand and is therefore better for deterrence. What of the aftermath? Firstly, are the environmental consequences; not only to Indian border-states, but possibly also globally. Secondly, there would be an accounting for the harm received by India. Blaming Pakistan may not be enough in the post mortem, since India’s own actions would be under scrutiny. This would be both internal and very likely also external. Internally, it is quite clear that the India’s disaster management capability would be overwhelmed. Externally, this may even take a legal turn with the decision makers being held responsible for their decision. Thirdly, there would be economic fallout. States not persuaded by India’s logic may make it an object of sanctions, effecting India’s recovery. Fourthly, politically, coping with these consequences may push into an authoritarian regime. Lastly, strategically, the expending of nuclear ordnance on Pakistan and the damage sustained by India’s nuclear and military infrastructure would push India back a generation in respect of China. On the contrary, the flexible retaliation strategy predicated on proportional response in the initial stage of the nuclear part of the conflict does not suffer these disadvantages. In case of escalation, control is exercised and speedy conflict termination arrived at, the nuclear damage can be kept minimal. Environmentally, economically, diplomatically and politically this would be more sustainable. Its unanticipated consequence may even be benign in a speedy mutual nuclear disarmament by both states. Having sustained nuclear damage, they would be more realistic on the utility of nuclear weapons to security. India would under the circumstance not have China’s retention of weapons detain it down this road. Globally, nuclear disarmament would receive a boost, making it a possibility in ‘Obama’s lifetime’. Nuclear strategy making must go beyond deterrence and the conflict circumstance it is to prove responsive to. It has to also be informed by a vision of the post nuclear conflict circumstance. Such consideration reveals that ending the conflict earliest and with least damage sustained or inflicted makes strategic sense.   Col (Dr) Ali Ahmed (Retd) is a Delhi based strategic analyst.   He blogs at ali-writings.blogspot.in.