| Hatf IX and possible Indian responses
|
1830 |
||
| claws.in | |||
Pakistan has recently demonstrated the short
range SS Hatf IX or the NASR claiming it is nuclear capable. The test was
reported on 19 April in media networks across the region. Its nuclear capability
depends on the miniaturisation achieved since the Chagai tests at which three
low yield (sub-kiloton) devices are said to have been detonated. Analysts in
Pakistan have described this as the country’s answer to ‘Cold Start’, espoused
by the Indian Army.
The surface-to-surface (SS) tactical nuclear capability of Pakistan came from a need to deter any conventional attack by India. Over the last decade, India had shifted to a conventional doctrine of ‘Limited War’ in which it intended to launch multiple shallow thrusts to keep below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. The SS missiles have been depicted as serving to deter even such shallow depth attacks in a low nuclear threshold mode. Implicit analysis is the intent of nuclear first use. So, what is the effect of this development on Pakistani nuclear doctrine? The doctrine is generally taken as effecting first use, in the absence of Pakistan’s espousal of ‘no first use’ or NFU. It must be acknowledged that absence of explicit doctrine of NFU does not imply ‘first use’. Since Pakistan has not brought out a declaratory doctrine, preferring ambiguity, it is not known for certain as to what its doctrine is. In other words, Pakistani operational doctrine could well be of NFU. However, consensus has it, based on its actions and statements of personages that the bias in Pakistan’s case is in favour of ‘first use’. Pakistan seeks to ‘do more’ with nuclear weapons than is usually credited to them. Like the NATO in the Cold War period, it also employs its nuclear deterrent to cover the conventional level. This it does in the belief of conventional asymmetry with India. The ‘first use’ threat is to deter India from leveraging its conventional advantage. India has anticipated such a posture and gone in for a Limited War doctrine. The doctrine taking cognisance of possible nuclear thresholds, stipulated multiple-pronged offensives by integrated battle groups over a broad front keeping below any appreciated thresholds. Pakistan, in demonstrating its SS tactical nuclear capability has attempted to depict a lower threshold so as to restrict further the scope of these limited offensives. Knowing that Pakistan relies on information warfare to enhance the credibility of its deterrence to cover the conventional level, there is little reason to take Pakistan at its word. Shallow thrusts do not do much damage to Pakistan. At best it would suffer infrastructure damage along the border and require managing refugee flows. Air operations would likewise be circumspect in the extent of attrition they inflict on strategic reserves. This would be a more consequential threshold and therefore airpower will have to be more carefully calibrated. Since the political and military aim in a limited war would be to keep the conflict restricted in scope, time and intensity, Pakistan has the conventional capacity to respond adequately without having any deficiency being compensated by nuclear weapons. Given this, the utility of nuclear first use is less in order to deter shallow depth offensives, but more to deter possibility of launch of strike corps in wake of shallow depth offensives. India’s conventional doctrine lends India the flexibility to fight a wider war since it reckons with strike corps employment in war. Strike corps could use any of these shallow depth offensives as launch pads for deeper objectives. In the words of the conventional doctrine they, ‘should be capable of being inserted into operational level battle, either as battle groups or as a whole, to capture or threaten strategic and operational objective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the enemy’s reserves and capture sizeable portions of territory (Indian Army Doctrine, 2004: 55-56).’ While Pakistan has practiced its counter to ‘Cold Start’ in the Azm-e-Nau III exercises last year, it may not prove equal to stemming India’s strike corps, particularly if more than one of the three, are employed simultaneously. In the event, it may have to react with the SS missile against threatening pincers. The missiles therefore under-grid Pakistan’s first use posture described by one analyst as ‘asymmetric escalation’. The Hatf IX therefore attempts to extend the cover of the nuclear overhang more credibly to cover the conventional level. In the current scenario of Pakistan’s strike reserves being also employed for counter-insurgency tasks and into the near future, they may have to reel in and then deploy into action. While they are doing so and traversing to battle stations, they would be subject to attrition by airpower. They would thus be sub-optimal and may not be able to stanch India’s conventional inroads. Implicit in building the NASR is the threat of first use on elements that do not have a conventional counter or reserves suitably positioned for reaction. There are three options at which India could prove responsive to the threat. One is in the additional step it has built in at the sub-conventional level before resorting to the conventional level. This may be seen in the recent distancing from the ‘Cold Start’ theory through launch of proactive contingency operations calibrated to Pakistani proxy war provocations. The second is by going in for a ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy. This would mean retaining the strike corps in a posturing role geared to escalation control by deterring conventional escalation by Pakistan. This builds in two fire breaks prior to the more credible possibility of nuclear first use by Pakistan. The last is in extending nuclear deterrence to cover the low threshold mode. Presently, the doctrine of assured retaliation posits that such retaliation must be to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. However, Pakistan may delude itself into believing it can get away with lesser punishment in the event of a strike with low opprobrium quotient. It may be prompted towards this by its risk taking capability, deficiency in strategic sense and a military dominant aggressive strategic culture. India could in such a circumstance resort to a quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus strike. This may mean a departure from ‘unacceptable damage’, but the threat of the same remains to deter nuclear escalation. Even if India’s declaratory doctrine meant for nuclear deterrence and in tune with India’s interpretation that nuclear weapons are political weapons is retained as such, this shift can be done in India’s operational doctrine. This would deter Pakistani first use even in the low threshold mode as suggested by the development of NASR. The window that Pakistan has tried to reopen for continuing its proxy war taking advantage of the stability/instability paradox can thus be slammed shut once again. Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi | |||
Friday, 1 June 2012
| The Sino-Pak ‘collusive’ threat |
1794 |
||
| claws.in | |||
The flavour of the season last year was the
emerging threat from an ‘assertive’ China. This perhaps partially accounts for
India’s overtures of this week in terms of reaching out once again to Pakistan.
Pakistan PM Mr. Yousuf Raza Gilani graced the India-Pakistan cricket match,
while the High Commissioner in Pakistan has been asked to explore the
possibility of interfacing with the Pakistani Army at long last. The ambitious
idea is to ensure that a ‘collusive’ threat does not develop between the two
neighbours. This article explores the dimension of such a threat and arrives at
a conclusion that, contrary to some commentary on the subject, it is not a
‘ready and waiting’ possibility in the future.
As with militaries anywhere, the worst case scenario of a collusive threat does lend pause to the Indian military. Such a threat has not transpired historically and has not developed so far. The closest it has been is during the 1971 war and its run-up. But Indian measures such as waiting till winter to launch operations and getting into a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union did much to make such a threat recede. While not a ‘clear and present’ danger today, the fact that the military pays it some attention has been brought out by the former army chief in his remarks that attracted some controversy in late 2009. The ‘threat’ has been envisaged owing to the infrastructure developments in Tibet, taking over of transport corridor projects by the Chinese in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Chinese assertiveness in terms of ‘intrusions’ and ‘transgressions’ along the LAC, strategic power-play in terms of visa issues etc. Also, India’s growing power and liaison with the US has made Chinese more attentive to the region, improving the profile of its link with Pakistan. What are the chances of a twin face-off in the north and how will it manifest? First is a look at the possibilities. China is unlikely to be drawn into a South Asian situation since it is concentrating on its economic trajectory and equates itself with the US. Any distraction is unaffordable. Such a possibility comes to fore only if the economic situation worsens or there is internal political instability for which there is a need to create nationalist cohesion and divert attention. Pakistan for its part, being military led, is only too cautious of India’s conventional deterrent. It would at best use the possibility to tie Indian forces down, rather than materialize such a threat. Doing so has the advantage of lowering conventional asymmetry, thereby allowing it to proceed with proxy war. Secondly, it knows that it would be independently tackled by India’s armoured might since this capability is not relevant to the northern borders. In short, the ‘threat’ is a remote. Second, as for how it could manifest in terms of scenarios, it could be either Pakistan led or China led. Alternatively, it could be with either state taking advantage of an adverse situation for India brought on by the other state. Lastly is a grand strategic design between the two to do India down. From this emerge five possibilities: China instigated, Pakistan instigated, Chinese hyena act, Pakistan’s hyena act and lastly a planned twin strike. Since China can act on its own, it does not need Pakistani collusion. In fact it may find such collusion escalatory since it would place India in a worse position, from which India would only want to come out fighting. On the other hand, Pakistan can do with Chinese support. Yet, China would not want to be physically drawn in though it could use the transport corridors being developed in the Gilgit-Baltistan region to send in logistic support. In a China-led case, a twin threat could be in case of Chinese designs to the east. These could be grandiose in terms of seizing limited territory such as Tawang or the whole of Arunachal, or to ‘teach India a lesson’. This may entail tying India down in the western sector by having Pakistan make diversionary moves in Siachen or Kargil. This could result in 14 Corps in Ladakh being forced to look backwards even as the Chinese threat along the Indus or the lakes unfolds. The possibility of Chinese participation with movement through the Gilgit axis is possible, but the logistics and possibility of Indian air interdiction makes this unviable. A Pakistan-led case is difficult to visualize since China would unlikely want the ‘tail to wag the dog’. China could nevertheless participate in such an adventure if it were to set India back and restrict India’s strategic space to South Asia. Towards this end, it could make moves that tie down Indian mountain strike forces being created in the North East to that theatre. Dual use formations that could tilt the balance in India’s favour would then not be available, making for greater symmetry with Pakistan. A ‘hyena act’ by Pakistan is easier to visualize than on China’s part since China is more likely to be able to place India at a military disadvantage than Pakistan. In such a case, with India military distracted in an engagement with China, Pakistan could try and gain psychological ascendance, remove vulnerabilities through military action or recreate proxy war conditions. The last possibility of a concerted twin strike is the ‘most threatening-least likely’ one. It has potential for expanding beyond the region in terms of the US unwillingness to lose a strategic partner in India. Besides, the current order of Pak-US interaction precludes such levels of collusion. In such a case, India may turn its attention and weight first to Pakistan while it holds to the North. This serves as deterrent to Pakistani participation in such an enterprise. Since India would be greatly imposed upon, the possibility of going beyond the ‘limited war’ profile exists. India could legitimately rescind its NFU in such circumstance as a clear signal. The collusive threat must be approached realistically. Responding in anticipation where little threat exists would lead to its materialization in a time frame that finds India underprepared. Instead, diplomatic moves, such as one currently underway with Pakistan and over the longer term with China, must be deployed and progressed sensibly to their logical conclusion. Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi | |||
| Building India’s Strategic Culture: A Roadmap | ||
| Ali Ahmed | ||
| Research Fellow, IDSA | ||
| E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com claws.in | ||
As befits a rising power, the strategic community
in India is slowly coming of age. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, who has earned a
Padma Bhushan for a lifetime contribution to strategic affairs, opines that
perhaps 30 think tanks are needed in Delhi alone to cope with the range and
diversity of subjects subsumed under the discipline of national security these
days. Services affiliated think tanks have been a path-breaking feature of this
decade. Many new publications on the security sector, risk assessment groups,
companies with interest in the defence budget and increasing media and think
tank interest has made strategy a ‘happening’ field. Increasing scope for
greater interface between think tanks, the academia and the military would
enhance the trend. While strategic culture, of course, would be furthered most
by the impending establishment of the National Defence University, this article
dwells on further ideas that could enhance this aspect.
Firstly, there is scope for increasing the interaction between the academic and the strategic community to mutual benefit. They have the advantage over military men in their engagement with strategic and international relations theory and in keeping up with international discourse through a better access to quality journals. Their lack of experience can be made up by association with military men and thinking in the military, mediated by think tanks. A long term investment is in think tanks employing research assistants, fresh from universities. Libraries of think tanks are open to students from relevant faculties. Enabling greater participation of faculty from universities in think tank deliberations would require working round work schedules. Having at least one academic as discussants and peer reviewer would be a useful way to increasing their contribution. Attendance and interaction at various commemorative lectures and seminars has increased testifying to the strides made already. Secondly, there is a system of guest lectures in place at all military training institutions in which seasoned speakers are invited. This exposes those undergoing courses to the wider discourse. There is a case to improve on this by having scholars in residence, particularly at War Colleges and the Staff College. These could be for semester length durations at a minimum. There could also be chairs created for attracting mid-career academics for a year-length sabbatical at the institution. This would enable ease of access to resource persons by students on courses. Their interaction with the military faculty would instill an academic approach to military pedagogy. They would not only be on hand for lectures in their speciality, such as area studies, international law, defence economics and nuclear strategy among others, but also for interaction on student dissertations. The scholar would benefit from a first hand look into service ethos and concerns and form life-long affiliations with the service fraternity. The knock-on effect on strategic culture is easy to imagine. Military institutions in the US are a step ahead and have a permanent faculty of civilian experts and veterans with civilian doctoral degrees in addition. Thirdly, increasing transparency is enabling educated discourse on matters military. Knowledgeable military watchers comment on military affairs for the media, even if some times critically. This deepens the democratic credentials of the state and strategic culture. The services think tanks are at the fore front of shaping the discourse through their publications. Directed by veterans of the strategic circuit, their input is useful in moulding public opinion. The impact on policy makers is not directly discernible. Enhancing this would require openness by the services and perhaps less intimate control over respective think tanks. This is not to say that this is not the case presently, but it is an ideal that requires constant reminding and working towards. An example of greater openness would be in directly mailing select service publications - such as publicly released services and joint doctrines – to all think tanks, instead of waiting to be approached. This would be a proactive intervention in the discourse; tacitly encouraging commentary over succeeding weeks to be focussed on an agenda set by the service. The services would in turn require being tolerant of dissent, to the extent of transgressions. It is only axiomatic that the strategic discourse would reflect the kind of society and democracy India is. There would be voices in favour of reservations, greater civil control, demilitarisation, human rights assertion, increasing openings for women etc. The level of challenge to the mainstream is indicative of the good health of strategic culture, and indeed may be index of the good health of democracy itself. Fourthly, cross-fertilisation would help build the knowledge base of academics and commentators in particular. In the post-war period, the effervescence in strategic studies in the US and UK owed to civilian academics who had participated in the war bringing their talent to bear on strategy, in particular nuclear strategy. The lack of first hand experience can be made up by enabling a structured engagement of the academic developing expertise in military affairs with the military. This could be as guest faculty at the various institutions, with the junior ones going to arms specific institutions, the middle piece ones affiliating with institutions training middle piece officers as Staff College and the Junior and Senior Command Wings of War College, and the senior once being engaged at War Colleges. Their attending the initial phase of discussions in war games, focused on the opening narrative, would enhance the credibility of the exercise and quality of the debate. Think tank members and academics could be taken on media tours organised by the Public Information Directorate. Those outside Delhi need to be consciously networked by education corps staff at Command HQs level to enable an even and non-Delhi centric expansion of strategic culture. Developing a strategic culture requires imaginative interventions. Several initiatives are underway, some in gestation, and many not yet thought of. Cross fertilisation in keeping with India’s power credentials would enable future Indian comfort levels with power and its usage. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies). |
| India’s North East: Insurgency and civil services reform
|
1543 |
||
| Ali Ahmed | |||
| Research Fellow, IDSA | |||
| E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com | |||
The situation in the North Cachar Hills district
is representative of the North- East. The DHD (Jewel) faction having come
over-ground last year, the Army, supplemented by the para-military, remains
deployed with a ceasefire in place and rebel groups placed in camps. The talks
process has been initiated with former IB chief, PC Haldar, being appointed as
the Centre’s interlocutor. The two projects of some importance – four-laning of
the National Highway and broad gauge conversion – proceeding uninterrupted, it
would appear that the internal situation at that remote location has turned a
corner.
Two events with wider regional implications testify to such optimism. The first is the arrest and return to India from Bangladesh of top ULFA leaders including Arabinda Rajkhowa, and second are talks between the Naga leadership and the Centre at New Delhi. The former owes less to Indian diplomacy than to a change of regime in Bangladesh. The latter owes to the Home Minister viewing negatively the preceding twelve years of talks handled by the interlocutor, former Home Secretary, Padmanabhaiah. Nevertheless, as seen with Indian hockey during the recent World Cup, India may manage penalty corners, but its ability of converting them into goals remains in question. The thesis here is that state incapacity, that debilitates the North-East, owes to the manner the All India Services are structured. The capacity and performance of the civil services – IAS, IPS and IFS – are crucial to countering insurgency. Diplomats are required to help cauterise insurgency areas from external sanctuary and assistance. India has been unable to ensure this with both Myanmar and Bangladesh to any degree of satisfaction. That the IFS has only a 700-strong cadre with attendant problems, as captured in Daniel Markey’s work at the Council on Foreign Relations, may be a reason for lack of vigour on this score. The cadre is set to increase by a mere eight officers yearly to cope with the growing demands of diplomacy for a billion people in an age of globalisation and interdependence! That development does not have the required drive is evident from the fact that the NC district in Assam referred to has only two IAS officers, even though there are over 50 officers from the security forces deployed there. Ajai Sahni, of the Institute of Conflict Management, in an insightful article, had earlier pointed out how most of the central services officers spend most of their career away from the region. This is testimony to the lack of balance between development and security. Likewise, there is only one IPS officer in the district, even though it is affected by both insurgency and ethnic conflict. The levels of supervision and monitoring, leave alone implementation, involved in both development and policing cannot be taken on by such a meagre grassroots presence of officers from the elite services. Central services are configured so as to provide officers at the upper end of the policy and decision-making hierarchy. For instance the role of the IPS is to ‘supervise’. This gives the subordinate staff of questionable competence, commitment and character greater leeway to the detriment of governance. Central services officers are rotated through their field postings in their initial years for exposure. However, whether this results in adequate insight to tenant higher level appointments thereafter is questionable. Given their absence at the grassroots level, the developmental prong of national strategy in insurgency areas suffer. As General Stanley McChrystal of the ISAF reminds, a ‘civil surge’ is an essential complement of a military surge in case insurgency is to be busted. In the North-East, existing state structure, already weighed down by routine matters, is expected to also deliver development with equity and justice. No wonder an ‘insurgency economy’ prevails, with lack of oversight and accountability. A recent charge-sheet filed by the NIA into alleged diversion of public funds to insurgent groups has revealed manipulation to the tune of Rs 20 crore in the last two years from the Public Health Engineering and Social Welfare departments in North Cachar. Clearly, the nation is paying a rather high price for keeping the civil services ‘elite’. Their small yearly intake results in a cylindrical hierarchical structure with most retiring in the higher ranks, levels at which they spend two thirds of their careers. Contrast their intake with that of the Army. While the Army commissions 1700 officers a year, the IAS takes in about a 100, the IFS one fourth the number, the IPS now raising its intake levels from 120 to 150. It is obvious then that the requisite energy, attention to detail and very presence of quality officers is absent at the grassroots where it matters most. Take the case of the IPS. Among the 99 who passed out in April 2010 from the Sardar Vallabhai Patel National Police Academy at Hyderabad include 33 engineers, five doctors, three management graduates, three law graduates, five M Phils and nine doctorates. Such candidates are relatively older, and have less capacity for the rigours of service, look for speedy induction into higher ranks, settle early into domesticity and make a quick exit from field work for desk appointments. Such a cadre cannot command the moral authority necessary to lead the force. This deficit of leadership can only be cured by a redefinition of leadership in the police. The state of police leadership is lamented by senior police watcher, RK Raghavan: “Demoralisation in the ranks is inevitable. This has serious implications for the credibility of the police leadership. The fact that a majority of policemen killed in Naxalite violence come from the lowest ranks and that the supervisory levels are relatively unharmed will not go unnoticed.” Clearly, there is a case for an overhaul of the civil services. A more pyramidal structure would build in competition, increase numbers in lower ranks and enable consequential presence of the state at lower levels. For the short term, given the requirement of furthering development in the North-East, either induction or deputation from the military be resorted to into all three services. Only then can the multi-pronged strategy for the North-East, otherwise impressive on paper, be converted into reality. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies). | |||
| Dealing with Two Fronts Needs Matching Capabilities | India Strategic | |||
| ||||
| New Delhi. The emerging consensus, voiced by the Army Chief, is that a conventional war under the nuclear overhang can only be a Limited War. This only increases the onus on orchestration of the different components of the military instrument. | ||||
| Given the known lacuna in higher military management in India of lack of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), coping with this imperative is difficult. The assumption is that a CDS could help resolve any inter-service matters. However, if Clausewitz’s principle precept that if the nature of the conflict being embarked upon is done correctly, then this problem is reduced considerably. At the outset, it must be pointed out also that India wants and needs peace for its own economic development. Shiv Shankar Menon, as Foreign Secretary, told a select gathering at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) that “peace within and around India is imperative for India’s own development and that of the countries around it for everyone’s benefit.” But that unfortunately is not a view shared particularly in Islamabad which attacks India through proxy and terrorism. There could be three conflict scenarios. In the first, the outbreak of conflict in the immediate aftermath of another 26/11-type attack may be with the aim of inflicting decisive punishment on the adversary. In such a case the weight of the effort will be with the Air Force launching ‘surgical strikes’. The Army in such a case would posture for deterrence purposes, so as to preclude escalation. To this end, a repeat of the mobilisation like Op Parakram would not be required. However, the Army may make precautionary troop inductions into vulnerable areas so as not to lose them to enemy pre-emption. Air action will be to reinforce a diplomatic offensive to coerce Pakistan to finally acceding to India’s long standing demand of an about-turn on its policy of supporting terrorists as ‘strategic assets’. In fact, even foreign strategists say that it is time that India made it clear that ‘Enough is Enough.’ The Second scenario could involve resorting to pre-emption as part of policy of active defence emanating from a deliberate decision taken at the highest level. This may be a considered response to prior provocative ‘Kargils’ and ‘26/11s’. The scenario’s probability increases in case of any implosion in Pakistani polity resulting in the seizure of power by religious extremists. In such a case, the military objectives of the three Services in the war effort acquire significance. The respective positions of the Air Force and the Army, on occasion at variance, have been reflected in many papers written on the subject since early last decade. The general consensus is that the lead service in the various phases of the conflict may shift depending on the conflict circumstances. In the early stage, the Air Force taking advantage of its flexibility would be the lead Service, as it is only an air force which can take the battle to an enemy territory or an area of hostilties. The Army and Navy would chip in with offensive forces immediately available while the remainder is mobilised. The Army’s early offensives being launched under the air cover should be adequate. With additional resources becoming available to support the Indian Air Force (IAF), it would also be possible for it to address its own and Army’s concerns simultaneously. The Navy would mount pressure in the Arabian Sea to address Pakistan’s economy, war potential in terms access to fuel and bring about the incidental political effect of disruption of life in its largest city. The Army promises to be off-theblocks in double quick time in its Cold Start doctrine as reported in a recent newspaper report: ‘The (Cold Start) plan now is to launch selfcontained and highly-mobile ‘battle groups’, with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours.’ The Air Force’s doctrine is known to have been formed by study of the emerging pattern of war over the past two decades. Therefore, gaining air dominance along with destruction of enemy infrastructure, particularly of military significance such as transport, communication and power, would be its primary objective in the opening phases. Demands of net-centric and information war, where India has made considerable progress, would be fulfilled in a tri-service offensive in respective domains. IAF has quietly worked for the past few years to achieve air dominance capability. The third scenario is one that was averred to by the Army Chief as a ‘two- front’ one. The mediainduced controversy around this misses the point that this has been a preoccupation with the Army dating to the Thorat report on organising defences on the China front of the 1950s. It was central to the defining engagement in India’s civil-military relations in which the political head deferred to General Sam Manekshaw’s persuasive case in avoiding a two-front situation by attempting to liberate East Pakistan while the passes towards China were open. In the mid-1990s also, the threat was acknowledged by one of India’s leading defence analysts, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director IDSA, who had advised in the context of the times of straitened financial circumstance that China be managed till the capability to cope is built up. Anticipating the demands of a ‘twofront’ situation, capabilities are, if slowly but steadily, being put in place. But a lot needs to be done in double quick time if this two-front doctrine is to become credible to our competitors and even likely allies. And that means building up strength dissipated after 1989 following allegations of corruption in Bofors gun acquisition. The major difference in this conflict scenario is that the national effort would have to be of a higher order. This would require recourse to the Blue Book, which was avoided even during Op Parakram. So as to prevent simultaneous strain on two fronts, a call by the political head informed by the military-strategic perspective would need to be taken early. Sticking with the choice thereafter would fulfil the requirement of selection and maintenance of aim, the foremost principles of war. The resulting sequencing of effort would help increase the military weight being brought to bear. The lessons from the two World Wars may be worth a recall on this score. The Germans, the British and the US had to make a grand strategic decision early on in the war. The failure of the Germans to stick with their decision, due to leadership and organisational deficiencies of Hitler and his Reich, led in substantial measure to their loss. The nuclear overhang is now a permanent presence in South Asia. While in Scenario One, it does not come to the fore, it serves as a backdrop to Scenario Two. Every effort of Pakistan would be stay India’s conventional hand through foregrounding its nuclear card. As earlier in Op Parakram with posturing in relation to strike corps, the conflict will throw up new lessons in nuclear signaling for their exists no precedence yet of a wider, yet limited, conflict between two nuclear states. The earlier such episodes along the Ussuri and at Kargil are instructive, but not very much so. The third scenario would require a deliberate effort at decreasing the visibility of the nuclear card even as it is not hobbled. The Chief’s reference to ‘two-front’ possibilities has only and actually served a purpose in initiating this discussion.
BUILDING CAPABILITIES
But then it is the delays in building up of capabilities all across the Services which would have a telling effect on realisation of both the single front or two-front scenarios.The Army continues to suffer from delays especially in artillery modernisation and to an extent in armour modernisation. Acquisition of network centric capabilities in the Army has also not kept pace. Since January 2008, the Ministry of Defence has issued three global tenders for 155MM howitzers for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials were expected to be completed last year but they are still to commence. It was hoped that with commercial negotiations proceeding smoothly, contract/s could have been completed by the first half of 2010. The artillery modernization includes off-the-shelf purchase of 200 155mm/52-calibre mounted gun systems to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 614 such howitzers under transfer of technology (ToT). The 17-tonne motorized howitzers will arm 40 regiments. Another major project includes the purchase of 100 155mm/52-calibre self-propelled tracked guns for five artillery regiments. India is also looking to finalize the Rs 8,000 crores project to buy 400 155mm/52-calibre towed artillery guns, which is to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,180 howitzers. The major contenders are the BAE Systems, ST Kinetics of Singapore and Israeli Soltam. However, the bottlenecks in procurement may not be cleared even by the new procedure promulgated in 2009. Another negative feature of procurement process has been the inordinate delay in acquisition through Fast Track Procedure (FTP). This was introduced for the first time in DPP-2002 to meet the urgent requirements emanating from operational imperatives. Under FTP, the stages of procurement like issue of Request for Proposal (RFP), technical evaluation and trial evaluation were to be skipped to provide a tested and established product. A system under this procedure was to be provided within the maximum time limit of 12 months. But a performance audit of Army has revealed that at least in eight cases, it has taken much more time than mandated. For instance, weapons and equipment for Para Security Forces, the demand for which was initiated in September 2003 under FTP, took almost 29 months to sign the contract for the same in February 2006. Similarly, Electronic Warfare System for the Army approved in the wake of Kargil conflict took 75 months for the signing of contract under FTP. In case of acquisition of Extended Range Rockets it took over 40 months for the FTP to be completed. In the case of Remotely Operated Vehicle, Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Sights for T-72 tanks and UAVs purchased through FTP, the CAG’s audit report has pointed out that there was no need to adopt the FTP, and that normal procedure would have sufficed. The need for acquisition of these items existed since long and these could have been procured without resorting to FTP. UAVs have been under indigenous development since the 1990’s but have had to be imported by the three Services from Israel since 1996. FTP not only compromised on competitiveness but in the instant case, failed the intended purpose of acquiring the capability within the shortest possible time. The new DPP-2006 and 2008, which has been modified again in November 2009, mandates that the application of FTP will be approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and that contract should be signed within five months of intimation and delivery should be completed within three to 12 months. Hopefully, with these timelines, FTP would live up to its terminology and fulfill the purpose of its formulation. Some of the ills pointed out by the Comptroller and Auditor General in our procurement system, especially in case of the Naval equipment, are illustrative of the lack of capacities and capabilities for forging a modern force required to deal with a two front situation. CAG has noted that “the objective of inducting an aircraft carrier – Gorshkov – in time to fill the gap in Indian Navy has not been achieved. The cost of acquisition has more than doubled to USD 2.3 billion in four years. At best, the Indian Navy would be acquiring, belatedly, a second-hand ship with a limited life span by paying significantly more than what it would have paid for new ship.” Further, despite Indian Navy’s depleting force level, the Ministry of Defence took nine years to conclude a contract for the construction of six submarines. The inordinate delay led to enormous increase in the project cost to the extent of Rs. 2,838 crore. And perhaps more. The procurement procedure has had problems and the technical evaluation conducted for a particular type of submarine including the missile to be fitted on-board was not comprehensive and reportedly “biased” in favour of the vendor. Contractual provisions have resulted in undue financial advantage to the vendor to the minimum extent of Euro 58.20 million (Rs. 349 crore) besides other unquantifiable benefits. In addition, “five radars imported at a cost of Rs. 24.88 crore could not be installed for more than three to five years after their acquisition. In the process the radars have not only lost 50 percent of their life but also remained unavailable for operational purpose. The Navy failed to persuade a foreign firm to replace unsuitable items supplies. As a result, the expenditure of Rs. 385 crore on their import was yet to yield any operational benefit to the Navy.” Similarly, for the IAF the long pending acquisition of MMRCA and then bringing up the required strengths of number of Air Force squadrons to the sanctioned level will not be achieved in a hurry. Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that talking about two-front situations requires strong capabilities, inducted timely, clarity of purpose and a strong political leadership. So far diplomacy and wisdom have prevented the eventuality of a twofront scenario. But the geo-political and geo-strategic environment is under flux and the glacial pace of developing such force capabilities would leave gaping holes in our security shield. An extensive political-military interaction that this necessitates in peace needs now to be pursued. | ||||
| © India Strategic |
Solving Kashmir:
Feasible?
Kashmir Times
- Published:10/19/2011 11:50:00 AM
- Updated: 10/19/2011 9:58:31 AM
- By: BY ALI AHMED
- Filed Under: opinion
Confidentiality gives the government breathing space to digest its contents and once its position is formed, either release it in whole or selectively. The idea is perhaps to defuse the inevitable brickbats it would receive from those either not represented, such as separatists who kept away, or those who believe their views were neglected in some measure. The issue of greater concern is the implication of lack of political strength. If the government was seriously thinking of engaging meaningfully with the issue then it would release the report, even if with redactions, witness the debate it generates and proceed to implement the ‘doable’ portions. The unpalatable parts of the report, if any, can then be contested politically in the open domain, both in Delhi and in J&K. The democratic advantages of this are obvious. Not doing so indicates hesitation on part of the government in facing up to the challenge.
This conveys the impression that the interlocutor’s appointment was an exercise to help tide over the summer of discontent in Kashmir. The summer having been quiet, it would appear that there is little necessity to follow up. This is where New Delhi would be making a mistake in losing yet another opportunity. As was the case with the Justice Jeevan Reddy committee report on the AFSPA in the North East, the report could well be consigned quietly to history. But as the Telangana agitations remind us, reports have a tendency not to be forgotten by affected people. This may not be how the Center intends to play its hands, but it would be better advised not to even consider inaction as an option.
Why?
Firstly, the visible strategic factors indicate decline in insurgency in Kashmir. The turnout of over a million tourists over the year is best indicator of this. The problem is this being mistaken as the end of militancy. There is the ever present possibility of revival of Kashmiri angst. The winds from the Arab Spring have been strategically kept at bay so far by the interlocutors being engaged in their mission. However, in case the people get the impression that that Center was less than serious then they will feel let down and are likely to express it. The armed phase of the militancy is thankfully over but the power of peaceful demonstrations, reinforced by Anna’s anti-corruption movement, has not been lost on the youth. They have three summer’s of experience in this. Liberal application of the PSA has kept the lid on tight this time, but India, poised on the cusp of great power status, stands to be embarrassed in case aspirations remain unaddressed.
Secondly, the physical attack on the eminent lawyer, Prashant Bhusan, in the premises of the Supreme Court ostensibly for comments in favour of resolution in Kashmir, was a demonstration by forces that stand for the status quo. The timing of the attacks indicates the message that the Center will be challenged if it were to pursue a reconciliatory course in Kashmir. In case the Center was to remain reticent, then it would only encourage such anti-democratic forces. They have a constituency in Jammu region, as the blockade of 2008 during the Amarnath land issue related crisis demonstrated. They have the capability of holding up initiatives, if emboldened. Therefore, rapid and purposeful follow up of the practicable recommendations of report will be useful, even if more politically sensitive portions are released for wider debate.
Lastly, the international factor needs keeping in mind. The pressures on Pakistan from the US endgame in Af-Pak are evident. The visit of Karzai to Delhi and the resulting ‘strategic partnership’ that envisages increased Indian involvement in training and capacity building of Afghan security forces, among other aspects, will have fallout in Islamabad. While Pakistan cannot dictate India’s regional engagement, its ability to influence events in Kashmir is inescapable. In awareness of this capacity, India must try and reduce any intention it might have to interfere. The propensity to interfere can be reduced in case Pakistan sees that India is taking action internally. It will also reduce any support base that Pakistan commands in Kashmir. By implementing the report, even if in part, Pakistan can be kept at bay. It can restrain its proxies by pointing out the gains of Kashmiris benefiting by Indian initiatives. The second round of talks due soon can be used to reinforce the message of India’s good intent and further distance Pakistan from its ‘core issue’, Kashmir.
Even if desirable, is this feasible?
The government has been under siege through the year. This hampers bold initiatives. The ruling party is looking to the hustings in UP in which the next generation leadership is to prove its worth. This priority will keep it from initiatives that could prove politically difficult. It would be shy of handing the opposition, currently in equal disarray, an issue to create and capitalise on a ‘nationalist’ high ground. However, the government has in its earlier tenure defied expectations in pushing through the Indo-US nuclear deal. An internal Kashmir settlement is an appropriate issue to display equal sense of conviction and despatch.
Next, the view that if the internal dimension of the problem is solved, the external becomes amenable to resolution is itself a contested one. The input of security forces would can be predicted to be that unless the terror infrastructure in Pakistan and its support base in the Valley is not dismantled, the problem will persist. The military for instance is wary of suggestions even on partial rolling back of the AFSPA. The commentary currently is on a ‘collusive threat’ from India’s neighbours that will obviously manifest in Kashmir, indicating that even if the problem is resolved, the need for troops in location remains. There is little call then in this version to let the guard down now. It would require political will and a grand strategic vision to prevail over objections.
Therefore, despite the desirability for resolution, India may well have to live with the twin Kashmir and Pakistan problems for longer. The understanding is that the costs have been affordable so far and can be paid up indefinitely. With India on the seeming upswing in the strategic trajectory, there is little reason to placate any adverse interests, either internal in the form of separatists or external in the form of ISI. G Parathasarathy, a formidable strategic mind, has opined, ‘Indian “intellectuals” and bleeding heart liberals have zealously believed that “dialogue” alone can address the animosity of the Taliban and its ISI mentors towards India…’. The subtext is that dialogue does not and cannot work. This suggests that India is headed for another lost opportunity, which, hopefully, will not end up as the last.
(The author is Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)