https://southasianvoices.org/agni-prime-and-the-two-front-war/

Agni Prime and the Two-Front War

The Agni Prime (also known as the Agni-P and Agni-IP) has been tested thrice off the Odisha coast in under two years, with its first test in June 2021. The third, most recent test on October 21 came during  India’s defense expo in Gujarat, allowing India to demonstrate the Agni Prime as the sixth successful missile from the Agni series.

The Agni Prime is a step up for the Agni series: it is canisterized, road-mobile, and has multiple reentry vehicle capability. With a range of 1000-2000 km, it is geared to target Pakistan and may supplement or substitute the Prithvi II, Agni I and Agni II missiles.

The accuracy of Agni Prime – reportedly in the lower two digits – has created speculation that it confers a counterforce capability and reenergized discussion over whether India has counterforce intentions. Analysts discerned as much from the technological trajectory of India’s deterrent, fearing that this renders India’s “No First Use” (NFU) pledge shaky.

One can expect India to profit from the debate generated. India’s nuclear doctrinal movement of ambiguity lately builds uncertainty on India’s intentions and action. In the current context of the  two-front war threat, nuclear ambiguity helps India leverage its nuclear deterrent – without actually resorting to nuclear weapons. The Agni Prime launch and the subsequent debate it generated compensate for India’s challenges in coping with the two-front threat posed by China and Pakistan.

The Catalyzing Two-Front War Factor

Over the last two years, India has already taken diplomatic steps to confront its vulnerability to a two-front war scenario. After the 2020 Galwan clashes, India has managed to partially roll back Chinese intrusions in Ladakh through military-level discussions and quiet diplomacy. India also agreed to a ceasefire on the Line of Control with Pakistan in secret, third-party facilitated talks.

India has taken steps at the conventional level, including a pivot of its conventional forces from its western to its northern borders. It has also started to reorganize its forces on both fronts into integrated battle groups (IBG). It is appraising reorganization with front-specific Integrated Theatre Commands.

On the nuclear level, India continues to incrementally put together the earlier envisaged elements of its triad. But its seaborne leg would not be potent until the K-4 ballistic missile, which had two back-to-back test firings from a submerged platform in January 2020, is fired from either nuclear submarine, the INS Arihant or soon-to-be-commissioned INS Arighat.

The Air Force’s concentration on winning the air war under two-front war conditions places a premium on air-delivered nuclear ordinance, since such operations divert a high number of aircraft from its primary role.

India’s nuclear triad places greater emphasis on land-based systems due to the sea leg being a work-in-progress and its air-leg’s availability only at a premium. The technological edge in the Agni IV and Agni V missiles, meant to deter China, has been transferred to Pakistan-centric Agni Prime. India has also substituted the Pakistan-specific Prithvi series with the Prahaar, Pralay, and Shaurya missiles, which all have varying ranges.

Agni Prime in the Two-Front War Scenario

In a worst-case scenario of a two-front war, the Indian military  would find itself stretched with its current capabilities. Consequently, India may have to compensate by leveraging its nuclear-level to deter and, if need be, redress potential conventional imbalances and quandaries. The nuclear signaling between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at multiple junctures in the ongoing Ukraine war has loosened the constraints on nuclear posturing, allowing India to leverage its prevailing doctrinal ambiguity to good effect in a short timeframe.

The Agni Prime missile was under development before the Ladakh crisis, with its conceptual inception beginning sometime mid-last decade. However, even at the time, the two-front war thinking in India was over half a decade old. Whereas technological advance has taken their course, doctrinal thinking has not been far behind. 

An accurate, canisterized, road-mobile missile has the advantage of speed of response against point targets. This development has fueled apprehensions of a destabilizing shift in India’s nuclear posture, given that it is now able to take out hardened targets housing Pakistan’s strategic systems comprising Pakistan’s second strike capability.

India has done little to forestall the fears, with successive defense ministers making loose statements on NFU. India has thus used the fears generated to cover its nuclear intentions with ambiguity. The  Agni Prime has validated the perspective on India’s nuclear capability that it is shifting away from traditional moorings towards jettisoning NFU and contemplating counter-force options; this helps India’s shift towards deterrence leveraging ambiguity over its earlier preference for transparency.

Prosecuting a Two-Front War

Indian strategists would designate a priority front (also referred to as the primary front) and a secondary front, fighting to stabilize or generate a favorable outcome on the priority front while keeping the secondary front as dormant as possible. India could subsequently switch the designation once the primary front has stabilized or if, in the interim, developments on the secondary front compel greater attention and devotion of resources.

If Pakistan is designated initially as the priority front, then India’s new-fangled IBGs could be unleashed on the border to keep it in check. The popular scenario has it that a conventionally-disadvantaged Pakistan could resort to nuclear weapons as part of its full spectrum deterrence doctrine, by way of either signaling with or introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the conflict.

Even if Pakistan is initially not the primary front, since India would be keeping up a holding action, it could complement its hard-put conventional forces efforts with nuclear warnings, thereby deterring Pakistan from taking advantage of its psychological ascendancy.

In a two-front war scenario, Pakistan, as one part of a collusive alliance, will be fairly confident of taking on India. However, it is unlikely that nuclear weapons will likely figure in its war repertoire. Besides, with considerable dilution in India’s Pakistan-specific forces after the Chinese intrusion, Pakistan may be better positioned conventionally than India.

Consequently, India might require leveraging nuclear weapons to stabilize the front quickly before it could revert its attention to the China front. Bringing nuclear weapons into the foreground through nuclear signaling will help concentrate minds. India has already set the stage by building in ambiguity and generating nuclear fears in third parties, incentivizing them to intervene with de-escalatory initiatives.

 Nuclear signaling on the Pakistan front will also put China on notice: cautioning it against crossing Indian redlines, slowing operations by necessitating protective measures, and forcing a reevaluation of its war aims in light of nuclear dynamics. Agni Prime’s utility is not without relevance on the China front with its range encompassing portions of the Tibetan plateau, allowing for counter military options in the worst case of conventional asymmetry with China and Chinese military break throughs, necessitating Indian reconsideration of its NFU.  

 

Conclusion

The configuration of Agni Prime and the subsequent discussion it has instigated on nuclear dangers helps India with navigating the challenges it might face in a two-front war scenario. In war, national security concerns dictate the use of all instruments, including the appropriate employment of nuclear weapons. The appropriate use for nuclear weapons is to strengthen in-conflict deterrence. Escalation prevention is made possible by brinkmanship, the instigating and deploying of a fear of a war going nuclear.

Pre-conflict ambiguity surrounding the deterrent posture enables shifting the nuclear goalposts in war. India’s intent to stay in Pakistan’s nuclear hand will be better met by conveying its abandonment of nuclear sobriety. The Agni Prime lends credibility to India’s shift to nuclear brinkmanship in case confronted with the worst-case scenario of a two-front war.

 

 

what does india mean by 'two front' problem?

WHAT DOES INDIA MEAN BY ‘TWO FRONT’ PROBLEM? – OPED

AUGUST 26, 2014 EURASIA REVIEW

http://www.eurasiareview.com/26082014-india-mean-two-front-problem-oped/

The phrase ‘two front’ was firmly placed in Indian strategic discussion by its army chief referring to it in a closed-door meeting of army brass at the turn of the decade in the context of Chinese presence in Gilgit. The ‘two front’ reference was to the ‘collusive threat’ from China and Pakistan seen as developing along the Himalayan watershed. While the term may be new, India has long been sensitive to the threat. In the April 1971 considerations of a military response to troubles in East Pakistan, India had refrained from action wary of the second front. Today, India’s naval exertions have expanded the scope of the term to the maritime domain.

The article examines what India means by the term by discussing it in its two connotations: one in peace time, and the other in its implications in conflict. The latter while hypothetical, is not on that account insignificant. It informs the ‘worst case’ that best explains the monies to the tune of $250 billion set to be expended by India over the coming decade.

Peacetime connotations

The prime minister while commissioning India’s largest indigenously manufactured destroyer, INS Kolkata, indicated India’s strategic doctrine as one of deterrence. The military prong is in being able to respond militarily to offensive action. This will reduce any incentive for aggressive behavior, leaving the diplomatic route open for dispute settlement. The diplomatic prong is in external balancing, for instance in the just-completed strategic dialogue with the US best signified by the US taking over as India’s largest defence supplier. Taking advantage of deterrence, India continues to engage diplomatically with both neighbours.

The prime minister has indicated that sufficient monies are being set apart for deterrence, with the 12 per cent increase in defence budget illustrating the government’s seriousness. On the China front, improved Tibetan infrastructure has given China the theoretical ability to launch 30 divisions. China has practiced rapid trans-regional mobilization in the Chengdu and Lanzhau military regions to enable this. India in rebound has shifted from a defensive to a posture of active deterrence on the China front by expanding airfields, placing strike aircraft forward and rescinding environmental rules for developing border roads at a gallop.

The Pakistan part of the ‘two front’ has stabilized since India rejigged its conventional doctrine. It was able to convert from its Second World War style conventional doctrine to one more appropriate for the nuclear age. It has reappraised the manner in which it will use its three strike corps in light of Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. The raising of one of the two divisions of the mountain strike corps in Pathankot on the Pakistan border suggests that the corps advertised for the China front can be dual-tasked for the Pakistan front. This suggests that India has an offensive capability for the Pakistan front. ‘Deterrence by punishment’ is being worked towards in order to be able to respond on the conventional level in case of subconventional terror provocation.

Connotation in conflict

The second connotation, that of how the ‘two front’ concept could manifest in conflict, is indeed difficult to visualize. China would not want to get into a conflict with India since it would not like to divert its energy and attention from its emergence at the global level as the main challenger. An India-China conflict itself being remote, the ‘second front’, on the west with Pakistan, is unlikely to materialize.

Reversing the consideration, in any future India-Pakistan conflict, China may side with Pakistan without necessarily opening up a ‘front’. However, in case of a conflict originating in terror provocation, China will unlikely weigh in on Paksitan’s side. Besides, from China’s past record in India-Pakistan wars, though India has kept a watchful eye on it such as in 1971, China has remained dormant.

India’s conflict options

Therefore, a two-front consideration in conflict can only be hypothetical. India would essentially have three options: the first is to hold on both fronts and the second is to progress matters on one front while holding on the other front. That latter has two variants – hold on the Pakistan front and progress matters on the China front and vice versa – leading to three Indian options.

The first – holding on both fronts – is feasible in terms of India having the requisite defensive capability for both fronts. The option enables time for strategic partners to step in on India’s side. This is the dividend India seeks in its current day diplomacy’s targeting of democracies. The second – hold on the China front while progressing matters on the Pakistan front – is feasible since India has the capability for offensive on the Pakistan front with mechanized forces that does not affect its capacity on the China front. This may be in Chinese interests in that it would leave Pakistan to dissipate India’s military might. Consequently, the third – to progress operations against China while holding on the Pakistan front – cannot be ruled out. China, the major opponent, would require India to have singularity of aim and concentration of effort for a credible showing. Success in this will also prevent any hyena-act on Pakistan’s part.

However, the ‘two front’ problem would tend to converge in the J&K in which there could be one theatre but two opponents. India has advantages of inner lines and that mountains favour defence. It’s location of an armoured brigade in Ladakh and presence of five divisions of the paramilitary, the Rashtriya Rifles, in Kashmir, indicates resilience. India may require spreading the adversaries’ attention and dissipating their strength to the other theatres/sectors, such as the plains sector in case of Pakistan and the eastern sector in case of China, by posturing respectively of its strike corps and the mountain strike corps.

The nuclear dimension

Such a discussion cannot be in isolation of the nuclear factor. India is relatively well placed conventionally not to dislodge the No First Use pillar of its nuclear doctrine. There is also the buffer on the maritime front available for pressuring China in case India is adversely placed on the Himalayan waterfront. India has only recently pointedly commissioned India’s aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, INS Kolkata and the antisubmarine warfare ship, INS Kamorta. On the Pakistan front, since India has the mechanized forces with a single front applicability, it would not be India that brings the nuclear factor into the reckoning. It would be Pakistan.

Pakistan has been projecting a low nuclear threshold since its 2011-introduction of and late 2013 testing of the tactical nuclear missile system, Nasr. In a ‘two front’ scenario, it can be assumed to be acting as a junior partner to China, so it would not be able to consider its nuclear actions without recourse to China. Therefore, how China appreciates the nuclear factor is a key question. China is in the game with global power stakes. Any action against India can at best be with a preventive intent. This limited aim can do without the complications of a nuclear dimension. Therefore, in a two-front scenario, China will likely dampen any Pakistani propensity to reach for the nuclear button.

Pakistan, with China alongside, is also unlikely to need to do so. Nuclear dangers on the China front are minimal since both India and China have an NFU in place as also have sufficient conventional forces for enabling respective aims. The nuclear dimension will unlikely figure unless any of the three is gravely conventionally disadvantaged. All three are aware that a nuclear power is never to be pushed into such a corner.

The future

The ‘two-front’ formulation has not outlived its utility. Deterrence is in any case always a work-in-progress. Therefore, while finishing touches are being made, the time is ripe for shifting from the military to the diplomatic prong of its ‘two front’ strategy. India is apparently making such a shift. India could aim at achieving a position of greater proximity with either state than each has with the other. It could consider such proximity with China so as to displace Pakistan from its favoured position. Precedence exists in the changed equations in the US-India-Pakistan triad.

India’s approach to the ‘transgressions’ on the Line of Actual Control has drawn positive comment with China calling it ‘objective’. It is set to receive Chinese premier. On the Pakistan front, however, India is being ‘tough’, having put off a promising beginning in the recent calling off of foreign secretary level talks with Pakistan. It is also engaging in firefights, termed as ‘befitting reply’ in press handouts, along the Line of Control.

Summing up, it can be said that India has a differentiated ‘two front’ policy. While on the China front it has defensive deterrence in place behind which it is engaging China diplomatically, for the Pakistan front it is reliant on offensive deterrence and has a harder diplomatic line. This suggests India’s strategy to be one of mitigating the ‘two front’ problem by isolating Pakistan. This sets the stage for it to tackle Pakistan more forcefully in case of terror provocation, without China weighing in.

Echoes from first world war

South Asia: Echoes From Across a Century

http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/south-asia-echoes-from-across-a-century/

15 August 2014

Recent commentary on the outbreak of the First World War has highlighted the link between the political and military spheres, in which military mobilization timetables exercised a negative influence over the political positions of governments. Interestingly, there are echoes of the same phenomenon in South Asia today. Moreover, India’s “two front” problem is similar to the problem faced by Germany when it felt the need to first defeat France, before turning its attention to the slower and more removed mobilization of Russia. Could the dangers of South Asia today be echoes of those a century ago?

First, consider the issue of mobilization schedules. With Serbia and Austria-Hungary squaring off, their respective allies, Russia and Germany, went into a competitive mobilization that culminated in the outbreak of war. South Asia is presently experiencing some aspects of this narrative. India is today looking to review its conventional doctrine adopted a decade ago. The doctrine called for swift mobilization in order to be able to react to terrorist threats from Pakistan, as in the case of the attack on Parliament in December 2002. On that occasion, India was not able to respond swiftly – its strike corps took three weeks to get into position. So India chose to go in for coercive diplomacy rather than attacking Pakistan militarily. The latter would have proven costly and there was also the nuclear threat to consider.

This led to the “cold start” doctrine, in which India shifted its reliance from strike corps to smaller, swifter formations closer to the border that could react quickly. A critique of this doctrinal innovation was that it reduced the time window for crisis diplomacy, a harkening back to the Guns of August, which expertly describes the political-military gap leading to the Great War.

The problem, as it was a hundred years ago, remains the military’s interest in full preparedness. For instance, if India was to launch a portion of its combat-ready integrated battle groups into Pakistan in response to a terror attack, they could face a piecemeal response from Pakistan’s army. For that reason, the troops cannot be sent across the line of control in isolation, but would require at least partial mobilization from the rear so as to either deter or respond to Pakistan’s military counter. In light of this mobilization, the Pakistanis, uncertain as to India’s intent, would likely race to follow suit, leading to a national mobilization of both sides quite in the tradition of the First World War. During the Kargil War, though it remained localized, the Indian army partially mobilized and kept a portion of its troops at the border elsewhere, in a defensive position.

Even as these two militaries theoretically make their moves, diplomacy would be underway. In light of the nuclear backdrop, international pressure would be considerable. Some of the moves by both countries would be directed at the international community, in order to pressure the other side to either slow down or back off. Thus, in the initial period, the contest would be between the two diplomatic-military strategies. While the new dimension, the nuclear component, could be expected to bring about a different outcome from that in the summer of 1914, the feature of “saving face” that existed then may continue to complicate matters now.

During the Kargil War, the distinction in Pakistan between its civilian government and the military enabled the civilian government to wash its hands of the military’s actions. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went across to Washington to organize a de-escalation. In 2002, the U.S. presence in the region was great enough to prevail upon General Pervez Musharraf to do an about turn with his January 12 speech, in which he promised a crackdown on extremists. These fortuitous circumstances may not exist in future. Therefore, there is a case for South Asia to move beyond conditions reminiscent of Europe a century ago.

The second issue is the one in which India may perceive itself to be in Germany’s “two front” situation. In the First World War Germany had the Schlieffen Plan, designed to knock out France. India’s strategic writing talks of “a collusive threat.” On its Chinese front, mobilization schedules play a role in that China’s infrastructure building in Tibet has prompted India to change from a defensive strategy to one of active deterrence. Over the past half-decade, India has given itself the wherewithal to cope with both fronts. Its three strike corps have been deemed effective on the Pakistan front. It can now square off defensively while also having a countervailing capability in the form of a mountain strike corps on its China front. Given that operations are slower in the mountains, the possibility of India first achieving victory on its western front and then turning its attention to the east is a possibility. Alternatively, since China is a stronger opponent, India may hold on the western front and put its weight into warding off China.

India’s ability to counter Pakistan was found wanting in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Some of the $350 million in military spending that India has recently approved is for equipping itself for these alternatives. It is likely therefore that by importing more than three times the amount of Chinese and Pakistani arms (which are the next two largest importers), combined with these additional monies, enable both alternatives. This is yet again reminiscent of the arms race of a hundred years ago that preceded and enabled the muscle flexing of 1914.

The difference this time is nuclear weapons. Their presence should imply that aggressive strategic doctrines do not coexist with offensive military doctrines. That, however, is apparently not the case in South Asia. The region’s militaries are still in the modern age. The might be cognizant of the revolution in military affairs and the nuclear age, but so far at least they have been only partially responsive to it.

Dealing with Two Fronts Needs Matching Capabilities	India Strategic
	By Brig Vinod Anand and Ali Ahmed Published :January 2010
	New Delhi. The emerging consensus, voiced by the Army Chief, is that a conventional war under the nuclear overhang can only be a Limited War. This only increases the onus on orchestration of the different components of the military instrument.
	Given the known lacuna in higher military management in India of lack of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), coping with this imperative is difficult. The assumption is that a CDS could help resolve any inter-service matters. However, if Clausewitz’s principle precept that if the nature of the conflict being embarked upon is done correctly, then this problem is reduced considerably. At the outset, it must be pointed out also that India wants and needs peace for its own economic development. Shiv Shankar Menon, as Foreign Secretary, told a select gathering at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) that “peace within and around India is imperative for India’s own development and that of the countries around it for everyone’s benefit.” But that unfortunately is not a view shared particularly in Islamabad which attacks India through proxy and terrorism. There could be three conflict scenarios. In the first, the outbreak of conflict in the immediate aftermath of another 26/11-type attack may be with the aim of inflicting decisive punishment on the adversary. In such a case the weight of the effort will be with the Air Force launching ‘surgical strikes’. The Army in such a case would posture for deterrence purposes, so as to preclude escalation. To this end, a repeat of the mobilisation like Op Parakram would not be required. However, the Army may make precautionary troop inductions into vulnerable areas so as not to lose them to enemy pre-emption. Air action will be to reinforce a diplomatic offensive to coerce Pakistan to finally acceding to India’s long standing demand of an about-turn on its policy of supporting terrorists as ‘strategic assets’. In fact, even foreign strategists say that it is time that India made it clear that ‘Enough is Enough.’ The Second scenario could involve resorting to pre-emption as part of policy of active defence emanating from a deliberate decision taken at the highest level. This may be a considered response to prior provocative ‘Kargils’ and ‘26/11s’. The scenario’s probability increases in case of any implosion in Pakistani polity resulting in the seizure of power by religious extremists. In such a case, the military objectives of the three Services in the war effort acquire significance. The respective positions of the Air Force and the Army, on occasion at variance, have been reflected in many papers written on the subject since early last decade. The general consensus is that the lead service in the various phases of the conflict may shift depending on the conflict circumstances. In the early stage, the Air Force taking advantage of its flexibility would be the lead Service, as it is only an air force which can take the battle to an enemy territory or an area of hostilties. The Army and Navy would chip in with offensive forces immediately available while the remainder is mobilised. The Army’s early offensives being launched under the air cover should be adequate. With additional resources becoming available to support the Indian Air Force (IAF), it would also be possible for it to address its own and Army’s concerns simultaneously. The Navy would mount pressure in the Arabian Sea to address Pakistan’s economy, war potential in terms access to fuel and bring about the incidental political effect of disruption of life in its largest city. The Army promises to be off-theblocks in double quick time in its Cold Start doctrine as reported in a recent newspaper report: ‘The (Cold Start) plan now is to launch selfcontained and highly-mobile ‘battle groups’, with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours.’ The Air Force’s doctrine is known to have been formed by study of the emerging pattern of war over the past two decades. Therefore, gaining air dominance along with destruction of enemy infrastructure, particularly of military significance such as transport, communication and power, would be its primary objective in the opening phases. Demands of net-centric and information war, where India has made considerable progress, would be fulfilled in a tri-service offensive in respective domains. IAF has quietly worked for the past few years to achieve air dominance capability. The third scenario is one that was averred to by the Army Chief as a ‘two- front’ one. The mediainduced controversy around this misses the point that this has been a preoccupation with the Army dating to the Thorat report on organising defences on the China front of the 1950s. It was central to the defining engagement in India’s civil-military relations in which the political head deferred to General Sam Manekshaw’s persuasive case in avoiding a two-front situation by attempting to liberate East Pakistan while the passes towards China were open. In the mid-1990s also, the threat was acknowledged by one of India’s leading defence analysts, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director IDSA, who had advised in the context of the times of straitened financial circumstance that China be managed till the capability to cope is built up. Anticipating the demands of a ‘twofront’ situation, capabilities are, if slowly but steadily, being put in place. But a lot needs to be done in double quick time if this two-front doctrine is to become credible to our competitors and even likely allies. And that means building up strength dissipated after 1989 following allegations of corruption in Bofors gun acquisition. The major difference in this conflict scenario is that the national effort would have to be of a higher order. This would require recourse to the Blue Book, which was avoided even during Op Parakram. So as to prevent simultaneous strain on two fronts, a call by the political head informed by the military-strategic perspective would need to be taken early. Sticking with the choice thereafter would fulfil the requirement of selection and maintenance of aim, the foremost principles of war. The resulting sequencing of effort would help increase the military weight being brought to bear. The lessons from the two World Wars may be worth a recall on this score. The Germans, the British and the US had to make a grand strategic decision early on in the war. The failure of the Germans to stick with their decision, due to leadership and organisational deficiencies of Hitler and his Reich, led in substantial measure to their loss. The nuclear overhang is now a permanent presence in South Asia. While in Scenario One, it does not come to the fore, it serves as a backdrop to Scenario Two. Every effort of Pakistan would be stay India’s conventional hand through foregrounding its nuclear card. As earlier in Op Parakram with posturing in relation to strike corps, the conflict will throw up new lessons in nuclear signaling for their exists no precedence yet of a wider, yet limited, conflict between two nuclear states. The earlier such episodes along the Ussuri and at Kargil are instructive, but not very much so. The third scenario would require a deliberate effort at decreasing the visibility of the nuclear card even as it is not hobbled. The Chief’s reference to ‘two-front’ possibilities has only and actually served a purpose in initiating this discussion. BUILDING CAPABILITIES But then it is the delays in building up of capabilities all across the Services which would have a telling effect on realisation of both the single front or two-front scenarios. The Army continues to suffer from delays especially in artillery modernisation and to an extent in armour modernisation. Acquisition of network centric capabilities in the Army has also not kept pace. Since January 2008, the Ministry of Defence has issued three global tenders for 155MM howitzers for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials were expected to be completed last year but they are still to commence. It was hoped that with commercial negotiations proceeding smoothly, contract/s could have been completed by the first half of 2010. The artillery modernization includes off-the-shelf purchase of 200 155mm/52-calibre mounted gun systems to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 614 such howitzers under transfer of technology (ToT). The 17-tonne motorized howitzers will arm 40 regiments. Another major project includes the purchase of 100 155mm/52-calibre self-propelled tracked guns for five artillery regiments. India is also looking to finalize the Rs 8,000 crores project to buy 400 155mm/52-calibre towed artillery guns, which is to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,180 howitzers. The major contenders are the BAE Systems, ST Kinetics of Singapore and Israeli Soltam. However, the bottlenecks in procurement may not be cleared even by the new procedure promulgated in 2009. Another negative feature of procurement process has been the inordinate delay in acquisition through Fast Track Procedure (FTP). This was introduced for the first time in DPP-2002 to meet the urgent requirements emanating from operational imperatives. Under FTP, the stages of procurement like issue of Request for Proposal (RFP), technical evaluation and trial evaluation were to be skipped to provide a tested and established product. A system under this procedure was to be provided within the maximum time limit of 12 months. But a performance audit of Army has revealed that at least in eight cases, it has taken much more time than mandated. For instance, weapons and equipment for Para Security Forces, the demand for which was initiated in September 2003 under FTP, took almost 29 months to sign the contract for the same in February 2006. Similarly, Electronic Warfare System for the Army approved in the wake of Kargil conflict took 75 months for the signing of contract under FTP. In case of acquisition of Extended Range Rockets it took over 40 months for the FTP to be completed. In the case of Remotely Operated Vehicle, Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Sights for T-72 tanks and UAVs purchased through FTP, the CAG’s audit report has pointed out that there was no need to adopt the FTP, and that normal procedure would have sufficed. The need for acquisition of these items existed since long and these could have been procured without resorting to FTP. UAVs have been under indigenous development since the 1990’s but have had to be imported by the three Services from Israel since 1996. FTP not only compromised on competitiveness but in the instant case, failed the intended purpose of acquiring the capability within the shortest possible time. The new DPP-2006 and 2008, which has been modified again in November 2009, mandates that the application of FTP will be approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and that contract should be signed within five months of intimation and delivery should be completed within three to 12 months. Hopefully, with these timelines, FTP would live up to its terminology and fulfill the purpose of its formulation. Some of the ills pointed out by the Comptroller and Auditor General in our procurement system, especially in case of the Naval equipment, are illustrative of the lack of capacities and capabilities for forging a modern force required to deal with a two front situation. CAG has noted that “the objective of inducting an aircraft carrier – Gorshkov – in time to fill the gap in Indian Navy has not been achieved. The cost of acquisition has more than doubled to USD 2.3 billion in four years. At best, the Indian Navy would be acquiring, belatedly, a second-hand ship with a limited life span by paying significantly more than what it would have paid for new ship.” Further, despite Indian Navy’s depleting force level, the Ministry of Defence took nine years to conclude a contract for the construction of six submarines. The inordinate delay led to enormous increase in the project cost to the extent of Rs. 2,838 crore. And perhaps more. The procurement procedure has had problems and the technical evaluation conducted for a particular type of submarine including the missile to be fitted on-board was not comprehensive and reportedly “biased” in favour of the vendor. Contractual provisions have resulted in undue financial advantage to the vendor to the minimum extent of Euro 58.20 million (Rs. 349 crore) besides other unquantifiable benefits. In addition, “five radars imported at a cost of Rs. 24.88 crore could not be installed for more than three to five years after their acquisition. In the process the radars have not only lost 50 percent of their life but also remained unavailable for operational purpose. The Navy failed to persuade a foreign firm to replace unsuitable items supplies. As a result, the expenditure of Rs. 385 crore on their import was yet to yield any operational benefit to the Navy.” Similarly, for the IAF the long pending acquisition of MMRCA and then bringing up the required strengths of number of Air Force squadrons to the sanctioned level will not be achieved in a hurry. Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that talking about two-front situations requires strong capabilities, inducted timely, clarity of purpose and a strong political leadership. So far diplomacy and wisdom have prevented the eventuality of a twofront scenario. But the geo-political and geo-strategic environment is under flux and the glacial pace of developing such force capabilities would leave gaping holes in our security shield. An extensive political-military interaction that this necessitates in peace needs now to be pursued.
	© India Strategic

IDSA COMMENT

The Indian Army: What the stars foretell for 2012

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/TheIndianArmyWhatthestarsforetellfor2012_aahmed_071211

Ali Ahmed

December 7, 2011

The Indian Army can be relied upon to ensure that the Mayan prophesy for 2012 being the doom’s day for the world will not apply to India. However, living up to such a reputation is hard work. So even as it understandably congratulates itself on a lap well run in 2011, there is no time for any over-indulgence. As is evident in hindsight, even as resounding a victory as obtained four decades ago did not prove an antidote for insecurity for very long. This article attempts a cautionary crystal-ball gazing exercise to possibly pre-empt the contents of the last Army Day parade speech of the Chief.

The foremost consideration in any such exercise has to be the Army’s preparedness for its primary task: the defence of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Over the last year, there appeared to be crystallisation of the ‘two front’ perspective. This is not a new ‘threat’; it was foreseen by K. Subrahmanyam 40 years back in his post 1971 survey of India’s strategic predicament, ‘Our National Security’ (Economic and Scientific Research Foundation, 1972), where he wrote: ‘India must be in a position to face successfully simultaneous conventional threats from China and Pakistan’ (p. xxii).

On the Pakistan front, instability is set to continue with Pakistan having denied itself an opportunity for reprieve by staying away from Bonn II. At the subconventional level, this implies the prevailing levels of peace in Jammu & Kashmir could prove momentary. This apprehension perhaps reinforces the military’s abundant caution in respect of the AFSPA controversy in that state. At the conventional level, the possibility of a strained regional environment implies that the move away from Cold Start rhetoric has been a wise one. That the ‘option’ remains on the table does not need amplification; understated exercises as the ongoing Ex Sudarshan Shakti does that in any case. The exercise conducted by the Pune-based Southern Command is being led by the Bhopal-based 21 Corps, Sudarshan Chakra Corps. Participation of troops of the 31 Armoured Division and aircraft such as SU-30 MKI, Jaguars, Mig-27, MIG-21, AWACS and helicopters suggest little else. Pakistan’s nuclear posturing must however be taken seriously. The implications of Nasr need studying in that light. A possible outcome could be reliance on stand-off firepower led punch rather than a physical one, in the form of Cold Start, in case of grave provocation.

For the China front, the late K. Subrahmanyam’s words need heeding: ‘When Chinese troop strength goes beyond 150000 it will be necessary for India to consider stepping up the forces deployed along the northern border’ (p. xxii). With infrastructure in Tibet reportedly upgraded to sustain three times that number and China having practiced rapid reaction reserves for long distance deployment, India’s approval of an expansion by 86,000 troops appears inevitable. The mountain strike corps set to be raised is billed as the Indian Army’s largest expansion since mechanization in the eighties. One point from the eighties however remains relevant; expansion then in all three dimensions was part of the profligacy that led up to the economic crisis. In the event, the force proved unusable in the security context of the nineties, signified by the stability/instability paradox. The implication for the China front of this experience is that India should quietly go about its upgrades and engage China without indulging in premature, ego-massaging, muscle flexing. The expansion and ongoing infrastructure building itself suggests that India is playing catch up. At the nuclear level, the penultimate piece would fall into place next year with the expected test launch of the Agni V. The final piece, assured second strike capability in the form of a nuclear armed and nuclear powered submarine still lies in the distant future.

At the subconventional level the several SoOs (Suspension of Operations) agreements need to be converted into comprehensive peace agreements to remove vulnerability. The recent exposé (‘Arms and the Rogues’, The Week, 3 December 2011) on the Chittagong arms haul of 2004 should spur the special interlocutors on.

While the military can be expected to rise professionally to the strategic challenge, it would understandably need assistance in grasping the military sociology agenda; given the very human tendency to miss the warts in any mirror image.

Acknowledging that expansion necessarily implies dilution in quality should help the army focus on training. The earlier significance of socialization into military mores through observation and mentoring has suffered an immeasurable setback with the raisings of the Rashtriya Rifles and the two divisions. This cannot now be redeemed. Focusing on the training regimen implies a deepening of professionalisation. This can inject primary group cohesion under threat from personnel turbulence and organizational hyperactivity. Secondly, the earlier paternalistic leadership ethic needs abandoning without remorse. The corresponding concern for ‘welfare’ can be reviewed, with training being taken as the best welfare. Thirdly, the AV Singh committee brought on expansion of the officer cadre is set to be replicated at the Other Ranks and JCO levels. Even as the expansion and the sixth pay commission largesse are useful from the morale and status points of view, the system cannot sustain the privileges and authorizations that go with rank. These would require review, obviously beginning with the officers. This would reduce top heaviness and prevent the Indian Army going ‘Mughal’. While there is no need to preserve the ‘British’ attributes, modernization of social mores and professional relationships will help preserve the Army from wholesale indigenisation. Lastly, on ‘internal health’, the KRA of the chief and courts martial of two lieutenant generals suggest a refocus on leadership. Mundane aspects such as the balance between ‘flexibility’ and ‘integrity’ in the desired personality type need input from best practices in the human resources field.

The last point on leadership brings one to the last issue in this inevitably subjective wish list. At the organizational level, 2012 could well bring in a major change, long desired by the Army. The Naresh Chandra task force will likely tender its report. It may set a timeline for organizational evolution of the national security structure. A point on this may be greater uniformed representation in the ministry of defence. Two implications arise: one is reconfiguring the professional military education system to produce officers who can tenant these appointments; and, secondly, a reevaluation of the command culture to shift from a ‘jhanda and danda’ bias towards a collegiate manner of decision making and a democratic leadership style.

In fact, the latter is perhaps behind the impression left by the Army in its tackling of two issues in the fading year: expansion in the job profile of lady officers and AFSPA. How the military tackles these two issues set to ‘dog’ it into the future will reveal if it has indeed transformed (with a capital ‘T’) into a 21st century force. Academically, the locus of professionalism is the officer corps. The onus rests with it. At the 40th anniversary of the Army’s most famous victory it would be churlish to point out that 2012 holds a significant 50th anniversary.

ISSUE BRIEF

A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict

Ali Ahmed

October 24, 2011

There is considerable interest in a possible conflict with China. However, little discussion exists in the open domain on conflict possibilities. This Brief attempts to fill this gap by dilating upon conflict scenarios along the spectrum of conflict. It brings out the need for limitation to conflict and the necessity for a grand strategic approach towards China as against a military driven one.

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