In Defence of the Chief, the Two-Front war issue
21 January 2010
8ak.in
In Defence of the Chief, the Two-Front war issue
21 Jan 2010: Soon to retire, Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor said that Indian Armed forces should prepare themselves for a hypothetical, two-front war, with Pakistan and China. This was picked up by a hysterical Pakistan media and created much debate in India whether his comments were responsible or not.
Ali Ahmed, a doctoral candidate in international politics at SIS, JNU, New Delhi has written the following:
Mr. Subrahmanyam, in his article in the Indian Express, ‘Generally Speaking’, says, ‘The country needs more such debates’. In that spirit, issue is joined here with his perspective on remarks of the Army Chief at a closed-door seminar organised by the Army Training Command reviewing India’s nuclear doctrine. The Chief’s averring to the requirement of preparedness for a ‘two front war’ at the seminar were scooped by an alert press.
Firstly, in the article he upbraids the Chief writing, ‘The present criticism of the views of General Kapoor highlights the need for…imbuing our senior service officers with adequate diplomatic skills besides their military ones…General Kapoor is due to retire in the next few months.’ While accepting that advice from Bhisma Pitamah equals blessing, in our system its at the position of the Senapati that the buck stops. Dismissive writings do more harm than can be undone.
Secondly, it is apparent from his article that he is not aware that the Chief was speaking to a military audience. He admits, ‘Perhaps his personal caveats were not reported in the media.’ This is why he suggests that the Chief and other service officers speaking on strategic matters preface their remarks with the disclaimer that these are but their ‘personal views’. In this case there was absolutely no need to. Military ethos demands plain speaking and taking responsibility for utterances.
It may be recalled that Mr. Subrahmanyam was effusive in his praise for the address of the retiring Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee at a seminar in mid last year, writing, ‘In a sense this address by Admiral Mehta signified the arrival of senior service officers at the top rung of national grand strategy formulation… In a sense this address breaks new ground.’ At the time, in Mr. Subrahmanyam’s words, ‘A service chief has put on record his views on a whole host of national security issues just a few weeks before demitting office.’ There were no caveats that preceded this wide ranging address. Therefore, Chiefs discoursing on larger issues of security has been taken as a welcome development earlier by him.
Thirdly, the Times of India report on the speech has it that ‘even as the armed forces prepare for their primary task of conventional wars, they must also factor in the eventuality of `a two-front war' breaking out.’ Such a reminder is timely and necessary only if a Chief has over stepped his brief. This has patently not been the case. The Army no where advocates rushing into war, but only having the capability to deliver even in such circumstance in case called upon by the political head.
The Army cannot afford to rely as Mr. Subrahmanyam suggests on the assessment that, ‘Most strategic opinion today discounts the possibility of a war among major powers with nuclear weapons.’ Having headed the Kargil Review Committee, Mr. Subrahmanyam knows best. However, the Army is only giving itself an offensive capability and mindset. This way the government of the day can take an informed choice which the Army can proceed with implementing.
Fourthly, as Mr. Subrahmanyam recounts the two front problem has been a constant consideration in India’s strategy. He finds that ‘the term “two-front war” reminds people of the superpower idiom of the Cold War era…’ Shying away from the term long known to be a worst case scenario makes little sense. It being nothing new, Pakistan’s deliberate over-reaction does not brook an Indian counter, especially one virtually making this a controversy in civil military relations. Therefore, Mr. Subrahmanyam’s take - ‘The criticism is very strident as is to be expected, particularly in Pakistan. It is also understandable…’ - is contestable.
Fifthly, Mr. Subrahmanyam deems the speech to be ill timed, coming as it did while the Defence Secretary was meeting his Chinese counterpart. It can be safely said that the date of the seminar had been fixed at least two months prior without any reference to the movements of the Defence Secretary. Further, the Chinese have no such niceties. They embarked on teaching Vietnam a ‘lesson’, when India’s foreign minister was visiting. They carried out an atomic test when an Indian President was on their soil. Instead, it would have been commendable development in exercise of signalling by India, if the speech had been timed to convey a message even as the Defence Secretary goes about his diplomatic duty.
Lastly, if the leak was by design as taking such umbrage to it would suggest, then the government would have by now demanded an explanation. This was the case when Mr. Gates asked for an explanation from the US military as to how the MacChrystal report was leaked to the Washington Post. That the government is sanguine puts a question mark on Mr. Subrahmanyam’s perspective.
In conclusion, this critique of the article can only echo the author’s words that ‘It would be a pity if because of embarrassment caused there are attempts by politicians and the civil bureaucracy to stifle such frank expression of opinions in professional debates and seminars.’ It is a telling comment that Mr. Subrahmanyam mentions ‘civil bureaucracy’. It would indeed be a tragedy if Chiefs were to shy away from speaking their mind for fear of criticism.
Ali Ahmed, a doctoral candidate in international politics at SIS, JNU, New Delhi has written the following:
Mr. Subrahmanyam, in his article in the Indian Express, ‘Generally Speaking’, says, ‘The country needs more such debates’. In that spirit, issue is joined here with his perspective on remarks of the Army Chief at a closed-door seminar organised by the Army Training Command reviewing India’s nuclear doctrine. The Chief’s averring to the requirement of preparedness for a ‘two front war’ at the seminar were scooped by an alert press.
Firstly, in the article he upbraids the Chief writing, ‘The present criticism of the views of General Kapoor highlights the need for…imbuing our senior service officers with adequate diplomatic skills besides their military ones…General Kapoor is due to retire in the next few months.’ While accepting that advice from Bhisma Pitamah equals blessing, in our system its at the position of the Senapati that the buck stops. Dismissive writings do more harm than can be undone.
Secondly, it is apparent from his article that he is not aware that the Chief was speaking to a military audience. He admits, ‘Perhaps his personal caveats were not reported in the media.’ This is why he suggests that the Chief and other service officers speaking on strategic matters preface their remarks with the disclaimer that these are but their ‘personal views’. In this case there was absolutely no need to. Military ethos demands plain speaking and taking responsibility for utterances.
It may be recalled that Mr. Subrahmanyam was effusive in his praise for the address of the retiring Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee at a seminar in mid last year, writing, ‘In a sense this address by Admiral Mehta signified the arrival of senior service officers at the top rung of national grand strategy formulation… In a sense this address breaks new ground.’ At the time, in Mr. Subrahmanyam’s words, ‘A service chief has put on record his views on a whole host of national security issues just a few weeks before demitting office.’ There were no caveats that preceded this wide ranging address. Therefore, Chiefs discoursing on larger issues of security has been taken as a welcome development earlier by him.
Thirdly, the Times of India report on the speech has it that ‘even as the armed forces prepare for their primary task of conventional wars, they must also factor in the eventuality of `a two-front war' breaking out.’ Such a reminder is timely and necessary only if a Chief has over stepped his brief. This has patently not been the case. The Army no where advocates rushing into war, but only having the capability to deliver even in such circumstance in case called upon by the political head.
The Army cannot afford to rely as Mr. Subrahmanyam suggests on the assessment that, ‘Most strategic opinion today discounts the possibility of a war among major powers with nuclear weapons.’ Having headed the Kargil Review Committee, Mr. Subrahmanyam knows best. However, the Army is only giving itself an offensive capability and mindset. This way the government of the day can take an informed choice which the Army can proceed with implementing.
Fourthly, as Mr. Subrahmanyam recounts the two front problem has been a constant consideration in India’s strategy. He finds that ‘the term “two-front war” reminds people of the superpower idiom of the Cold War era…’ Shying away from the term long known to be a worst case scenario makes little sense. It being nothing new, Pakistan’s deliberate over-reaction does not brook an Indian counter, especially one virtually making this a controversy in civil military relations. Therefore, Mr. Subrahmanyam’s take - ‘The criticism is very strident as is to be expected, particularly in Pakistan. It is also understandable…’ - is contestable.
Fifthly, Mr. Subrahmanyam deems the speech to be ill timed, coming as it did while the Defence Secretary was meeting his Chinese counterpart. It can be safely said that the date of the seminar had been fixed at least two months prior without any reference to the movements of the Defence Secretary. Further, the Chinese have no such niceties. They embarked on teaching Vietnam a ‘lesson’, when India’s foreign minister was visiting. They carried out an atomic test when an Indian President was on their soil. Instead, it would have been commendable development in exercise of signalling by India, if the speech had been timed to convey a message even as the Defence Secretary goes about his diplomatic duty.
Lastly, if the leak was by design as taking such umbrage to it would suggest, then the government would have by now demanded an explanation. This was the case when Mr. Gates asked for an explanation from the US military as to how the MacChrystal report was leaked to the Washington Post. That the government is sanguine puts a question mark on Mr. Subrahmanyam’s perspective.
In conclusion, this critique of the article can only echo the author’s words that ‘It would be a pity if because of embarrassment caused there are attempts by politicians and the civil bureaucracy to stifle such frank expression of opinions in professional debates and seminars.’ It is a telling comment that Mr. Subrahmanyam mentions ‘civil bureaucracy’. It would indeed be a tragedy if Chiefs were to shy away from speaking their mind for fear of criticism.
