A grand bargain for India and
Pakistan
The Financial World, 20 June 2011
That no headway was intended by either state owes to
both following a wait and watch policy. They await Barack Obama’s speech that is
to bring out his design for AfPak, in particular if the nature of the impending
drawdown in troops is to be symbolic or significant. If the former, it would
gladden India; if the latter, it would gladden Pakistan. Pakistan is waiting to
encash on its relationship with the Taliban, nurtured assiduously over the past
decade despite intense American pressure. It would prefer a negotiated end to
the conflict to its north. Once its allies are ensconced in some kind of power
arrangement there, it could turn its attention once again towards the west,
assured of strategic depth to its rear and the vitality of its strategic assets.
India for its part is aware that to an extent the return to normalcy in Kashmir
since 9/11 owed to Pakistan’s preoccupation with its western front. It has taken
advantage of the benign fallout to firm in and rests content that a falling back
to the troubled years is unlikely. It would prefer to see western presence in
Afghanistan till as long as a verifiable promise of moderation is not extracted
from the Taliban. It has played hardball with Pakistan to keep up the pressure
to this eminently reasonable end. Given that the Taliban has managed to whittle
the West’s appetite for nation-building, for the west to be looking for an exit
is understandable. Towards this end, Obama would progress the political prong of
strategy, even while keeping the military prong on course for a while longer. US
military presence would therefore continue, but its combat role may
progressively be less visible. This means that Pakistan’s significance to the
end game in terms of delivering a moderated Taliban increases even while India
is not entirely disappointed. An argument would be that since they cannot
together shape the region’s future, they are realistically hoping to make the
best of what emerges from the impending changes in US course in the region. This
is typical of a conflict management approach. The belief in India is that with
Pakistan busily proceeding downhill, there is no need for India to be overly
concerned. Pakistan would be less able to impose on India’s interests. The
hard-line expectation is that Pakistan’s oft-aired obituary will ring true
finally. India will then be at the vanguard of containment, in conjunction with
its strategic partner, the US. Then it would be able to shape the regional
future. It is precisely for this reason that India needs to pre-empt such a
future. Expecting that India would not be singed by the outcome is unrealistic.
AS A self-confessed regional power India needs to take charge. Here the
suggestion is for Pakistan and India to arrive at a modus-vivendi. India wants
Pakistan to re-examine its Kashmir obsession. Pakistan, beset as it is by the
terror blowback, wishes to remain on even keel. India could permit increased
political space for Pakistan in Afghanistan, while Pakistan could in turn walk
away from Kashmir. The coming talks between the two foreign secretaries can be
used to discuss a grand bargain. Specifically, it would mean assuring Pakistan
of India’s support in its delivering the Taliban to the table. In return,
Pakistan would require assuring India that any return of the Taliban to a share
of power in Kabul would not be at the cost of India or its Afghan allies. More
importantly, Pakistan needs to follow through on its oft-repeated intent of not
allowing its soil for use by anti-India terrorists. This it can do if allowed to
claim that India’s implementing of the impending report of the three
interlocutors in letter and spirit is at its behest. The jihadis then - no
longer required - can be rolled back non-militarily. Currently, it can be said
that the Indian government is not keen on the hard-line. Yet, talks are for
forms’ sake for both parties. India assumes Pakistan will fall out of the
equation and Pakistan thinks it will bounce back. Even if India is right, the
consequence in both cases makes such a future worth pre-empting. The two foreign
ministries can flesh out the idea. The off-the-record agenda should be the
trade-off suggested. It must lead up eventually to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
taking up the Mohali invite of Yousaf Raza Gillani to visit Islamabad, where
Hamid Karzai could well join them to arrive at a regional solution to a regional
problem. India can then be said to have lived up to its credentials as a
regional power. Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at New Delhi’s Institute of
Defence Studies and Analyses. He may be reached at aliahd66@hotmail.com
|
