IDSA COMMENT

What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr?

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatDoesPakistanHopetoAchievewithNasr_aahmed_170811

Ali Ahmed

August 17, 2011

A partisan debate has understandably followed the unveiling of Nasr in April 2011. While analysts in Pakistan have taken pains to underline its utility, those in India have expressed an informed scepticism. This debate notwithstanding, the assumption informing this commentary is that Nasr exists as a potent weapon system with capabilities as advertised.
An answer for the question posed in the title can be hazarded along four levels: grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical. There appears to be a contradiction in the implications of Nasr at these different levels. How Pakistan resolves these contradictions will determine how it will eventually employ the weapon system.

At the grand strategic level, the idea seems to be to focus international attention on South Asia as a ‘nuclear flashpoint’. The possibility of use of nuclear weapons increases with the ‘use them lose them’ connotations of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). It is expected that this would energise the international community towards crisis de-escalation and conflict termination. The aim would be to have the pressure work on Indian decision makers, depriving them of autonomy of decision making.

At the strategic level, it has been rightly pointed out by Indian nuclear analysts that Nasr is an attempt at lowering, or rather projecting, a low nuclear threshold. The idea is to restrict the scope for India’s conventional operations. In the limited war logic, India does not intend to flirt with Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. In any event, keeping these low would help Pakistan preserve its territory and military forces to the extent possible.

At the operational level, the impact of Nasr is more psychological. The aim would be to slow down Indian offensive pincers by making them ‘button down’ for a battlefield that could potentially suddenly ‘go nuclear’. The precautions, logistics load and time cycle of standard operations procedures would slow down and complicate operations. This would translate into increased combat friction, resulting in an increased leadership burden. There will be higher levels of vulnerability of bottlenecks such as bridgeheads. Pakistan would be able to counter thrust lines that it cannot address due to the relative imbalance of forces or if it is surprised. Indian forces will not be able to exploit opportunities with a sense of impunity, even those of pursuit. In fact, the more successful they get, the more the nuclear shadow of Nasr will loom large. The element of fear, surprise and its disconcerting effect will be exploited fully by Pakistan. India may need additional forces to cater for various contingencies. This will have a corresponding affect on logistics, the pace of progress of operations, coordination, presenting potential targets, etc.

At the tactical level, the physical and psychological pressures of operating in a potential nuclear battlefield will add to the strain of combat. In hot weather there would be increased physical attrition to troops, requiring earlier relief and time consuming rotation in subunit/unit roles. Wider dispersion that nuclear tactics necessitate will increase command and control problems and the fog of war. Wide frontages increase the vulnerability to counter attack, since the freedom to concentrate would be with the counter attacker.
It would appear that the seeming advantages stated above are behind Pakistan’s development of Nasr. However, it is surely not an unmixed blessing. What are the cons?

At the grand strategic level, attracting international attention to the region as a crisis point works both ways. As the Kargil conflict showed, India can profit from the situation and the onus on backing off could well be on Pakistan. Any propensity for first use may prompt the feared crackdown on its nuclear assets by the US-led international community, which would be to India’s advantage. This may convulse the Pakistan military into an internal battle over its assets, which would be especially untimely when faced with an Indian ‘threat’. Pakistan will finally end up a nuclear pariah with a dysfunctional military, a state it has managed to avoid so far.

At the strategic level, by displaying its new found capability, Pakistan has partially attempted to go down the NATO route during the Cold War. The NATO planned to employ TNW to counter the overwhelming mechanised attacks which were expected to be carried out by the Warsaw Pact forces. Using TNW would destroy the very land being defended. The difference in Pakistan’s case would be in the limited numbers of such weapon systems and, secondly, on India’s self-restraint in pulling its conventional punches. Therefore, the employment of Nasr will not be so much as to effect the military situation as to signal the crossing of the nuclear threshold. Since this would trigger the Indian nuclear doctrine of assured retaliation, in uncertain ways, it is not self-evident what Pakistan could achieve by this. It could, however, attempt to escape paying the price by choosing a ‘green-field’ option of a demonstration strike on its own territory, for instance, in the Cholistan desert.

The operational level fallout of the use of Nasr will be equally on Pakistani forces. Once nuclear weapons have had battlefield incidence, they will prove to be an equaliser. The advantages that Pakistan seeks as a defender would be nullified in a violent, possibly nuclear, Indian response. (The former Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik let on as much in his meeting with the press prior to demitting office.) The psychological, physical and logistics load will be exponentially increased by the panic among civilian populations. This will be relatively greater in Pakistan since the theatre of operations, defined by proactive Indian offensives, will be inside Pakistan.
At the tactical level, there are no empirical studies on the sociological impact of a nuclear battlefield. If combat cohesion breaks down, it will be as likely among Pakistani troops as Indian. The depth in terms of numbers available with India may help it compensate. This luxury is not available to Pakistan. The effect on the force multiplier that Pakistan intends using - irregulars – can only be expected to be negative. Since Pakistani civilians will be more affected, the ties of Pakistani soldiers to kith and kin may prove distracting. There is no evidence of either side having thought through the leadership, bonding and discipline issues on a nuclear battlefield. The emphasis has only been on personal protection at best, and that too is largely lip service for want of training equipment.

As can be seen, there are some operational level dividends that would accrue to Pakistan by using Nasr though it will come at some strategic cost. Two possibilities emerge. The first is that the Pakistani military - true to its wont in being more sensitive to military as against political and strategic concerns - has perhaps focused overly on the operational gains as against strategic costs. Alternatively, given the inescapably obvious costs that it will incur, the military is sensitive to the contradictions. It is only milking Nasr as an information war opportunity.

The judgment here is in favour of the latter. Nasr can at best likely increase India’s natural restraint and operational caution. There is no particular harm in this for there is little case for nuclear haste and any additional operational caution can only energise prior preparation. In its employment, the Nasr is unlikely to halt India in its tracks. Instead, it will likely be employed in nuclear signalling, the most likely manner of which could be in a demonstration strike.

India can arrive at prudent answers, both at the conventional and nuclear levels, to deal with this issue. What might such an answer be? The suggestion here is that the employment of Nasr, even in a ‘green-field’ mode, must release India from NFU constraint. This does not imply default retaliation. Instead, it is for debate whether manipulating the threat of nuclear attack(s) will beget India more political and military dividends than indulging in the

IDSA COMMENT

Afghanistan: An idea anticipating peace

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/AfghanistanAnideaanticipatingpeace_aahmed_060611

Ali Ahmed

June 6, 2011

The recent elimination of Osama bin Laden has created positive prospects for counter insurgency in Afghanistan. The possibility of a draw down of the US-NATO presence in Afghanistan beginning July 2011 has heightened. The US would initially prefer to end its combat tasks so that, as in Iraq, it is able to eventually exit with dignity. The NATO Europeans are exhausted. Islamabad would like to see a negotiated end to the conflict in order that instability does not spread in Pakistan. India has expressed its support for an Afghan-led and- owned peace process. The Afghans themselves - including the Taliban - would like to see peace return.

Currently there is a military deadlock between the Taliban and the ISAF on the one hand, and a political one between the Karzai regime and the Taliban. All indicators are that the ISAF will continue operations and mentoring of the fledgling ANA, till the situation improves. Having launched its summer campaign, the Taliban are prepared to ‘wait out’ the ISAF. The result is a continuing Afghan problem with the prospects of it engulfing Pakistan. Therefore a special effort on the peace front is called for.

This is reportedly underway. The US envoy, Marc Grossman, is reportedly scouting for Taliban interlocutors. The Karzai government upgraded its National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission to a High Peace Council following last year’s ‘peace jirga’. A two-tier Afghanistan-Pakistan joint commission was set up during the visit of Prime Minister Gilani to Kabul. The US has redefined the earlier preconditions for talks - that the Taliban lay down arms, reject al Qaeda, and embrace the Afghan constitution – and has stated that these are outcomes to be sought through talks. This is facilitative and the impending announcement of the beginning of the US draw down will go part of the way towards meeting the Taliban’s condition that foreign troops should first leave. These initiatives scale up the peace feelers sent to the Taliban.

The idea behind the ‘surge’ over the past three years has been to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. In case the Taliban are responsive, at the very least they would insist on the cessation of operations while talks are on. This means that there will also be a decline in the combat missions of the ISAF even as a few troops symbolically depart. Progress in the talks over time would imply a transition from peace enforcement to peace keeping. Progress means - whether the Taliban are amenable to verifiable moderation and the extent to which their demands can be accommodated in the changed constitutional and power setup.

Thinking ahead requires preparing not only for the worst case i.e. the war continuing in Afghanistan and extending into a failing Pakistan; but also for a change towards the better. Understandably there would be reservations about the Taliban’s amenability to moderation. The promise that the Taliban need to make through the talks is a softening of their stance on gender equality, burying of war time feuds and a commitment to the Afghan constitution and multi-ethnic solidarity. This can only be ascertained when links are forged. They may yet prove to be rational strategic and political players.

The way to capitalise on any positive change would be the ‘out-of-the-box’ idea to transform the NATO enforcement mission into a joint UNAMA-SAARC peacekeeping one, predicated on progress in the peace talks. Since the UN is a neutral organisation, it may be able to unlock the standoff as a credible mediator. SAARC as a regional organisation packs considerable peacekeeping muscle, and can facilitate the transition to peacekeeping. A partnership between the UN and the SAARC has the potential to end the logjam. This partnership would have the advantage of leveraging the peacekeeping experience of regional states. A precedent for such a partnership is the UNAMID - the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur.

The UNAMA in Afghanistan, is currently involved in activities that involve aiding governance, drug control, humanitarian and developmental work, human rights and fighting corruption. However, the political aspect of its mandate has not seen much progress. This is not for want of trying. Reports of former UNAMA head, Kai Eide’s dealings with the Taliban surfaced on the arrest of his interlocutor Mullah Baradar, by the ISI. This time round the peace initiative can be undertaken transparently and in a high profile manner. This does not require empowerment since the current mandate caters for pursuing a political strategy. Contingency planning for ‘blue berets’ needs to look no further than the region itself.

Specifics of the idea can be gone into once it gains momentum. Only a bare bones outline can be drawn here. A SAARC foreign ministers meet can approve the modalities worked out by the secretariat. A foreign minister can be nominated in rotation for the purpose by the SAARC who can interface with the UN as coordinator. Later perhaps the SRSG can be an eminent person belonging to the region. The secretariat can get additional working hands and create a new section for the purpose. A joint military core staff can be created and a liaison cell located at the ISAF HQs. A force commander would need to be nominated, if necessary to sell the idea in Pakistan - he could be from Pakistan. The appointment can later rotate between contributing states.

The presence of both Pakistan and India, which has proved useful in UN missions elsewhere, may be reassuring for both states. Involved in seeing a regional endeavour through to success, their respective interests would be protected and rivalry mitigated. Scepticism may be voiced that the supposed ‘proxy war’ between the two states may derail the mission and this apprehension makes the idea a non-starter. The counter to this is that the common objective of seeing peace return, ensuring that instability does not spread and the extraordinary scope for cooperation elsewhere are incentives enough to chance the option. The professionalism of their militaries and of foreign policy bureaucracies is known to be of an order that can cope with the demands.

Envisaging problems helps craft prior solutions, thereby helping sell the idea. For instance, the Taliban have apparently expressed a preference for peacekeepers from Muslim states earlier. At least initially Bangladeshi and Pakistani troops can perhaps be predominantly deployed in Pukhtun inhabited areas. In addition, if necessary, the hybrid mission could have contingents from countries such as Turkey and Malaysia, for instance. With time, the professionalism, peacekeeping prowess of troops and the return of a semblance of peace will make this redundant.

Clearly, if an ‘out of the box’ idea is to gain headway, it should not be too far out either. How will India and Pakistan set aside suspicions to enable SAARC to take off? India can play a lead role since it is in the UNSC and is an important member of the SAARC. Any initiative along these lines will be viewed with scepticism by Pakistan. These issues can be sorted out in the impending talks between the two foreign secretaries and ministers. Mutual apprehensions can be voiced and worked around as the idea gains shape. For instance, Pakistanis could be appointed to the positions of SAARC pointsmen and force commander to allay fears.

The potential of SAARC is well recognised. It is yet to develop the game changing habits of thinking and practice that can give traction to this potential. The common aim of seeking peace for a SAARC member state and its people provides an opportunity and a starting point. The idea can further the intent of the prime ministers of both India and Pakistan expressed in their separate trips to Kabul recently. The time for the idea has come. As to whether the time of its implementation is nigh, developments over this summer shall tell. The stalemate is too costly in lives to keep innovative thinking tied up within the traditional balance of power rut.

Reconciling AFSPA with the Legal Spheres

JOURNAL OF DEFENCE STUDIES

Ali Ahmed

April 2011

Volume: 

 5

Issue: 

 2

Focus

The present paper analyses and examines the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in respect of legal aspects. It first discusses it in terms of domestic law, international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. Given India’s obligations under international human rights instruments going beyond domestic law is necessary in any such discussion. Ensuring complementarity between the Act in its application in armed conflicts and IHL, would contribute towards making the Act more ‘humane’. The second part discusses the Act from security perspectives. In doing so, it reaffirms that respect for human rights and humanitarian law in countering insurgency is of strategic import. In conclusion,it makes some recommendations for the military which will enable it ensure that AFSPA and the IHL complement each other.

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IDSA COMMENT

Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistansFirstUseinPerspective_aahmed_120511

Ali Ahmed

May 12, 2011

Before and after Osama’s killing, the spotlight fell momentarily on Pakistan’s nuclear intentions. Prior to his death, the headlines dwelt on Pakistani tests of Hatf VIII and Hatf IX. Demonstrating plausible first use capability, these were intended to deter a conventional attack by India. After Osama’s death, in a verbal salvo, Pakistan’s foreign secretary warned of ‘catastrophic’ consequences in case any state (read India) chose to emulate the US. His reference was perhaps to escalation, with Pakistani nuclear first use as a grim possibility. What exactly are the chances of this?

That ‘first use’ is inherent in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is less indicative of what the doctrine contains and more the general consensus with regard to its nature. Pakistan has not declared its nuclear doctrine as India has done. The fact that it does not subscribe to NFU does not by default imply a first use doctrine. Therefore, it cannot categorically be said that Pakistan’s operational nuclear doctrine is one of nuclear first use.

Having acknowledged this, it has to be said that all indicators point to Pakistani ‘first use’. Firstly, Pakistan wishes not only to deter a nuclear attack but also a conventional attack by compensating for its conventional disadvantages through nuclear means. Second, it has not subscribed to NFU and as per Wikileaks revelations, General Kayani was not in sync with his president’s inclination towards NFU. Third, there are several statements from important personages on the Pakistani intention to escalate in case of conventional conflict. Fourth, since it is the military that has control over the nuclear button, the nuclear arsenal may be more attuned to developments in conventional warfare than would otherwise be the case. Lastly, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is operated under military control through service specific strategic commands. This indicates a greater readiness to follow through.

Pakistan is also ambiguous about the nature of its first use. One option is along the time dimension. For some, first use could be a Samson option - as a ‘last resort’. This may command greater legality in terms of extreme resort in self-defence. Alternatively, as the development of the ‘Nasr’ suggests, it may be taken early on when the conflict in a ‘low threshold mode’.

The second ambiguity is over the type of nuclear strike. The first type is a ‘higher order’ strike, attempting to disarm and degrade India’s strike back capability. This is more likely a last resort. The targets could be a mix of counter military, counter force and counter city. The second type is more likely a ‘middle order’ use option in which multiple nuclear strikes are used to blunt India’s conventional offensive capabilities, such as when India’s strike corps are delivering a grievous blow. These could be on counter military targets, and include targets within India - such as supporting air fields. The third is ‘lower order’ first use, as part of nuclear signalling such as demonstration strikes or low opprobrium quotient strike(s). These could include a strike or two -in the oft-discussed scenario of a strike on an advancing Indian armoured column - in Pakistani territory in a defensive mode. In graduated first use scenarios, this is how nuclear weapons may be introduced into the conflict.

Pakistan has demonstrated its tactical nuclear capability through the miniaturisation, low yield, short range and shoot and scoot capability of ‘Nasr’. This helps project a low threshold in the early use mode. This means it can attempt either demonstration strikes or employ these in greater numbers to derail India’s strike formations. This is not so much by physically stopping the pincers, as much as by slowing them down by the strategic, operational and logistics effects of transiting to the nuclear realm.

These weapons have not been delegated to operational formations. Instead, they are controlled by service specific strategic commands, indicating centralisation. This means that any of the options discussed above is available to Pakistan for execution, and it is not necessarily restricted to a default war fighting first use option.

Pakistan can be expected to reinforce its deterrent through an information campaign, surrounding a low threshold projection. This compensates for any weakness or lack of credibility relating to its deterrent, since the deterrent also covers the conventional level. Its projection of irrationality is in keeping with the ‘rationality of irrationality’ thesis - a part of nuclear deterrence theory. The idea is to keep India guessing and hopefully deterred.

To attribute a first use doctrine to Pakistan is to admit that India’s nuclear weapons do not deter adequately. This may not be true since Pakistan too is subject to the psychological effects of deterrence. Deterrence is heightened since first use implies a break in the nuclear taboo. There would also be no guarantee of success and the only certainty would be of costs - known and known unknowns as well as unimagined and unimaginable.

‘First use’ would be dependent on appreciation of gains and costs. Gains from projection of a first use are self-evident. Firstly, the existence of a ‘threshold’ forecloses any expansive options that India’s conventional might may enable. Secondly, it refines the stability/instability paradox in injecting instability at the nuclear level. It indicates a rejection of India’s deterrence as it is currently defined, as a one-step escalatory ladder. This will force India to reconsider its nuclear response strategy, if not its declaratory doctrine. It stabilises the conventional level in reinforcing Indian prudence, thereby opening up the sub-conventional level for proxy war. The paradox can therefore be extended to read instability/stability/instability.

The gain from executing first use is in attempting to escape paying a price that India may set out to exact by catalysing the international community’s intervention. It would also bring home to India grave dangers that it may have discounted in going in for a military showdown. But the costs are much starker.

India’s promise of assured retaliation cannot be ignored, in the light of India’s growing second strike capability. Even if India’s declared intent of visiting ‘massive’ retribution is seemingly lacking in credibility, assured retaliation may yet inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. Secondly, there are risks in a first use intent inviting a pre-emptive strike. India is going down the BMD route. It has a multiple satellite launch capability, which over time can translate into an MIRV capability.

The upshot of this discussion is: firstly that first use is useful only for projection. Secondly, strategic sense favours an operational nuclear doctrine that tends towards NFU. Equally, strategic sense, from Pakistan’s point of view, is in keeping this secret. It can therefore be inferred, that the greater the projection the less likely the intention.

Projection of first use is safe for Pakistan since it rightly counts on India’s strategic maturity. India has no intention of being deflected from its economic trajectory. Pakistan’s nuclear nonchalance therefore owes much to its largely accurate appreciation of its nuclear posturing going untested.

This is one assumption India will not challenge by departing from military prudence. Its recent distancing from Cold Start is not so much on account of the efficacy of Pakistani deterrence, but its own grand strategic economic imperative. Sensibly, even as India wishes to match step with Pakistan, it has no intention of accompanying Pakistan on its way downhill.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict by K.S. Sheoran

Volume: 

 35

Issue: 

 3

Book Review

May 2011

The book is the result of the author's sabbatical with the National Human Rights Commission and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies to research 'all aspects of human rights in the context of the employment of the armed forces for internal security duties'. Only the first chapter of two and half pages carries any content on human rights. The remainder is a distillation of the army's Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) (Shimla, HQ ARTRAC, 2006) available on the internet at http://ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/doctrine%20sub%20conv%20w.pdf. There are four attached appendices that are human rights related, but are again from the DSCO. In fact Appendix A reproduces Chapter 7 of the DSCO, 'Human Rights', verbatim. A chapter entitled 'Media Dynamics and Human Rights' again disappoints by focusing on the military-media relationship rather than human rights.

The issue of human rights should have been left out of the title because the book otherwise quite ably covers the subject of 'Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflicts'. But even here the book does not venture beyond the DSCO. This gives rise to the question, 'What purpose has been served?' And a wider question as to what the sabbatical was about. It is a pity that the opportunity for informed comment on the issue and a much debated subject like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), has been passed up. The author's first-hand engagement with the subject as a military professional, his access to its nuances at the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and research possibilities at Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) have been sub-optimally utilised in this monograph. The author could compensate by taking up the issue once again in a subsequent edition by incorporating his experience at his present posting on the general staff in charge of human rights at the Corps HQ in Srinagar.
The author, in his take, makes a contestable equation between human rights and fundamental rights. While there is an understandable correspondence between the two, fundamental rights are a contract between the state and its citizens. Human rights instead are intrinsic to people on account of their being human, which means that there are also some 'hard core rights' that are not liable to abridgement by national laws or constitutions. Fundamental rights as we know can be held in abeyance in periods of national emergency or amended by appropriate legislation. The concept of human rights instead made the individual the referent and sought to preserve, protect and advance human rights of the individual and the collective, taking the issue beyond the scope of nation and state. The experience of the twentieth century dictated this. While in India's case, fundamental rights guarantee basic freedoms and human rights, it is important to maintain this distinction.
Getting this distinction right is crucial since its absence gives rise to the flawed logic that 'Where there is terrorism, there cannot be human rights' (p. 4). 'Hard core' human rights, specifically against arbitrary killing and torture, exist at all times for all, including foreign terrorists on Indian soil. The Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention covers these, and they are valid even in internal security situations and have been incorporated into national legislation. This is true for low intensity conflicts, deemed different from insurgencies in terms of the levels of external interference. The case is made that the external factor legitimises not only army deployment but a tougher line. This risks overlooking the human terrain comprising Indian citizens and the fact that a majority of the fighters are Indian citizens even under maximum levels of proxy war.
A permissive environment for egregious measures, referred to in the foreword by the director of CLAWS, is created by focusing on the external factor for distinguishing a low intensity conflict from an insurgency. The author takes a 'clash' between the two as being inevitable. He writes, 'This is the basic point of clash between the goals of achieving internal security and the observance of human rights' (p. 4). He urges the state to 'remain fully aware of its obligations to prevent occurrence of such instances and take prompt measures to check them' (p. 4). The contention here is that this conceptual understanding of the army contributes to its predicament in such situations.
What the author describes as 'insolence', or disaffection and alienation from the state, then develops. This is the response of the citizenry not only to violations of the hard core rights of local fighters but also to the infringements of its soft core rights. It makes strategic sense in countering insurgency or proxy war to privilege human rights, lest the situation get worse before it gets any better. This trajectory of violence has been true in most of India's counter-insurgency engagements, whether externally inspired or not, ranging from Mizoram, referred to as a successful case, to Kashmir. Whereas in the former the policy of grouping infringed on soft core rights, in Kashmir the existence and work of the non-governmental organisation 'Association of Parents of Disappeared People' indicates the levels of departure from doctrinal tenets by security forces. For the army to forever prefix 'allegations of' when referring to violations is to be more conscious of self-image than the possibility that the image may not match the reality. The author in not having answered the question, 'But, are these violations a reality and are the armed forces really at fault?' does not help to resolve this debate in any way.

Given that the book is a research effort, it could have benefited from a bibliography. Its scant footnotes otherwise suggest that the sabbatical programme of the army could do with some improvement, particularly in terms of the officers being permitted to speak their minds. This would not only benefit them and the institution, but also the attentive public keenly interested in the army's viewpoint and ever ready to be persuaded by its case.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Towards a Proactive Military Strategy: 'Cold Start and Stop'

Ali Ahmed

Volume: 

 35

Issue: 

 3

Articles

May 2011

The article reviews the Cold Start doctrine in light of the limited war doctrine. It argues that the launch of strike corps entails a risk prone war expansion. War termination should therefore be short of the launch of strike corps offensives. It suggests a 'Cold Start and Stop' strategy with limited offensives by integrated battle groups being used to coerce Pakistan. Pakistani amenability to Indian war aims would be dependent on India offering incentives diplomatically alongside. India's limited war doctrine, currently not articulated, must be informed by such a war waging strategy. Making force usable in the nuclear age requires certain doctrinal and organisational changes suggested in the article.

Full Article

IDSA COMMENT

Making Sense of ‘Nasr’

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MakingSenseofNasr_aahmed_240411

Ali Ahmed

April 24, 2011

News reports have it that Pakistan has successfully conducted a test of a surface-to-surface short range Hatf IX (Nasr), described as a multi-tube ballistic missile with a ‘shoot and scoot’ capability. The statement of the Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division, Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, that the flight consolidated Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum indicates that Nasr is nuclear capable.

To Pakistani analyst, Dr. Shireen Mazari, ‘It (Nasr) will act as a deterrent against use of mechanised conventional land forces. This was essential in the wake of India's adventurist war-fighting doctrine formulations, which envisaged the use of rapid deployment of armed brigades and divisions in surprise and rapid attacks.’ She believes, ‘Indian dreams of a limited war against Pakistan through its Cold Start strategy have been laid to rest. This will allow for a reassertion of a stable nuclear deterrence in the region.’ This article analyses if Dr. Mazari is right.

Pakistan is the weaker side in the India-Pakistan dyad. Recognising this structural factor, its military, which also runs the state, has been constantly innovative in addressing what it perceives as an asymmetry. It has resorted to external balancing in renting out its strategic location for geopolitical use by external powers. It has forged a close relationship with China to balance India and help China in its strategic purposes in relation to India. For over quarter of a century, it has tried to gain ‘depth’, forward of its defences, by rendering rear area security problematic for Indian forces through its proxy war. It has attempted internal balancing by reportedly training five lakh irregulars for making India’s stabilisation operations untenable, even at the risk and cost of the backlash it is currently enduring. This explains the utilisation of the development of Nasr for purposes beyond merely doctrinal.

Further, Pakistan employs information operations interestingly and to some effect. For instance, it claims to have equalised India’s number of nuclear tests at Chagai and insists that these give a variegated capability. It periodically claims success of missile tests from the point of view of deterrence signalling. The Nasr test, for instance, coincided with the launch of corps level Indian military manoeuvres, Exercise Vijayi Bhav, in the Rajasthan deserts. Pakistan’s nuclear related rhetoric is also designed to increase the salience of the nuclear overhang and addresses multiple audiences, in particular the US. Its prosecution of operations against the Taliban in FATA and Khyber Pakhtoonwa province has been marked by much sound and fury, particularly with respect to the displacement of people. Its deployment of nationalist strategic analysts to inform, rationalise, legitimise and influence has been proactive. All these resulted in a former US president once famously mistaking South Asia to be the most ‘dangerous’ place in the world!

This creditable record of information warfare requires to appropriately condition analyses of developments like that of the Nasr. Nasr’s flight test had both Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai and Dr. Shireen Mazari giving their opinions. This clearly indicates that even if Nasr is a forbidding reality by itself, the same needs underlining and highlighting for effect. Multiple aims are thus achieved. The purported aim is deterrence, which explains the timing to coincide with the Indian exercise. It could also be to get the US focus back on the eastern front in terms of making the admittedly delicate balance seem untenably unstable, in light of US keenness to get the Pakistani Army take on the Taliban in North Waziristan.

That said, taking Nasr seriously at face-value helps arrive at its actual significance. The development of Nasr indicates that Pakistan views India’s Cold Start doctrine with concern. The Nasr is meant to deter India’s launch of Cold Start. Since Nasr is reportedly nuclear capable, short range and light weight, it could imply the use of tactical nuclear weapons were such a conflict to occur. Fearing a lower nuclear threshold, implied by availability of tactical nuclear weapons, India may be deterred from embarking on Cold Start. This would enable Pakistan to recreate the space it once had for continuing its prosecution of proxy war - a space that has been constricted by India’s formulation of a Cold Start doctrine, even though all the components of the doctrine such as weapons acquisitions, relocation of formations and change to a manoeuvre war culture are not yet entirely in place.

It has been assessed that Pakistani reliance on its nuclear cover would increase with India’s increasing felicity with Limited War doctrine. Pakistan is reportedly ahead of India in numbers of nuclear warheads and in a more variegated missile delivery capability. This, to one analyst, spells a strategy of ‘asymmetric escalation’. In the Pakistani logic, nuclear deterrence is also to operate at the conventional level. Nasr, to Dr. Mazari, makes for deterrence stability since it helps strengthen this dimension of nuclear stability. Dr. Mazari is right on deterrence stability, but gets her reason wrong - the reference to Cold Start being anachronistic.

India’s Army Chief has indicated that no such doctrine exists. It appears that the Indian military is looking to respond to subconventional provocations at the same level. This may be in the form of surgical strikes, Special Forces operations, border skirmishes, activation of the Line of Control, select punitive operations, etc. The Indian intent will be to convey a message of resolve as well as to punish and cause selective attrition. And the aim would be to address Pakistani cost-benefit calculations in such a manner as to coerce Pakistan into limiting its provocation below India’s ‘level of tolerance’. Such a course of action by India has internal political utility in letting off steam in terms of ‘something’ being done. It is also decidedly less expensive, preserving India’s grand strategy of economic rise from being unnecessarily buffeted.

The Indian move away from a default resort to Limited War places the onus of escalation on Pakistan. India’s conventional capability is to ensure that Pakistani reaction to such subconventional retribution is non-escalatory. Should Pakistan try to respond with conventional action, that would provoke a ‘Cold Start’ by India. Pakistan would thus be placed a second time round in a position of decision to escalate, this time by using Nasr. The prospects of Pakistan’s self-deterrence under such circumstances are higher. In the event, Pakistan will be forced to react defensively to India’s ‘contingency’ operations.

In case push comes to shove and Pakistan does resort to the use of Nasr, then this would more likely be on its own territory, rather than provocatively on Indian launch pads close to the border. India’s promised retaliation may not then necessarily be along the lines of its nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation (strategy having the privilege of departing from doctrine). The net result would be further nuclear impact(s) on Pakistani territory.

In other words, stability reigns not due to India being deterred, but Pakistan being self-deterred. Accountability for initiating both the conflict and a possible nuclear conflict would rest with the Pakistani military. The aftermath would surely find it decisively pushed off its commanding perch in Pakistan by an angered people.

In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing. It appears to be playing by Schelling’s concept of Limited War as a ‘bargaining’ process:

‘It is in wars that we have come to call ‘limited wars’ that the bargaining appears most vividly and is conducted most consciously. The critical targets in such a war are the mind of the enemy…the threat of violence in reserve is more important than the commitment of force in the field… And, like any bargaining situation, a restrained war involves some degree of collaboration between adversaries.’ (Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966).

The challenge in South Asia is to ensure that the contest remains at the doctrinal level. Keeping it so entails getting into a doctrinal dialogue with Pakistan so that the ‘collaboration’, mentioned by Schelling, can be from a mutually intelligible script.