Showing posts with label subconventional operations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subconventional operations. Show all posts

Sunday, 12 August 2012

lessons from bandipore, kashmir

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=13101

LESSONS FROM BANDIPORE


An encounter has proven to be an embarrassment for the army in Kashmir with the defence minister taking cognizance of the encounter in which Hilal Ahmed Dar died in the forests at Bandipore. Based on its internal reporting system, the army stuck to its initial position that it was a bonafide encounter. This insistence of the army disregarded the well known pattern in both J&K and the NE that seldom, if ever, do people protest when genuine militants are eliminated. Given this, for the defence minister to overrule his general in Srinagar was inevitable. It is possible that this intervention by the normally placid defence minister was politic, since his visit the Valley was due soon thereafter. 
However, there is a take away from the incident that bears reflection at all three levels: tactical, operational and strategic levels. At the tactical level, there is little dispute over the army springing an ambush in the forest that led to the killing of the youth. Of consequence are subsequent revelations through police investigations that the youth was ‘lured’ into the forest with the expectation of a life with the mujahedeen by civilian ‘sources’ reportedly working with army. The possibility of the army being manipulated, rather than the other way round, cannot be ruled out since it is not the first time that such bottom-up manipulation has taken place.

Exactly a year ago Rajouri served as a site for a similar case in which a mentally challenged man from Poonch was set up to be killed by two SPOs, one from the SOG and one from the army. Even in the Machhil case, two SPOs were found to be involved, though that infamous episode is now be pursued by courts martial by an initially reluctant army, indicating a degree of complicity between the SPOs and their controlling elements in the army. However, the later two episodes mentioned, signs are more of the tail wagging the dog, in that the army has been let down by its associates. 
As a first step, the ‘incentive’ system that tempts such action needs review. But the lesson learnt then is to reappraise the manner it handles such associates. While the intelligence imperative may make their existence indispensable to their effort, by now SOPs and cultural learning should have taught the army that these elements are hardly in the ‘game’ for nationalist reasons. It bears rethinking if the strategic price is worth any tactical ‘gains’. 
At operational level, the learning is for the general in charge to have broad enough shoulders to say that a mistake has been done and the army will hasten to make amends in its procedures. To stick by the initial position in light of contrary indicators, such as an incensed civil population, is good neither from PR point of view nor that of WHAM. It is certainly unnecessary since for the army it is always the ‘nation first’.

The understanding that being introspective in such circumstance is bad for morale is contrary to the fighting ethic. This myth is but a cover for inadequate leadership and needs ruthless exposure since it holds up spring cleaning. For instance, the CRPF leadership’s defence of the indefensible in the recent killings of civilians in Sarkeguda has also been based on this fallacy. That there would be a let up in operations in case the leadership insists on the right means is to miss the stolidity of Indian soldiery, either in the army or the central armed police. Such leadership alibi should not find acceptance either in the military or in its civilian minders. 
Conceded sticking by the subordinate is a command responsibility and a display of leadership; however generalship is not about being overly identified with the institution. It is more important to integrate the institution’s output with its context, in this case the ‘healing touch’ operational now for close to a decade in the Valley. This embedding of the institution within the strategic framework is apparently not without its angularities. It is widely appreciated that precedence for such exertion exists in a succession of generals fully cognizant of their command function in this light; to name only a few for want of space, Generals Zaki, Patankar, Hasnain among others.

More importantly, to place a corps headquarters in a counter insurgency scenario at the operational level is a travesty. It must instead be more deservingly characterized as a strategic level headquarters. This implies that Badami Bagh has to see its role not only as defender of the military’s position, but equally if not more so that of the people in its area of operations. They, after all, constitute the ‘sea’ in which ‘swim’ insurgent fish. This counter intuitively means privileging the people even over soldiers in the scheme of things and the professional mind’s eye. 
This has not been adequately registered in counter insurgency theory since most such theory originates in ‘metropolitan’ academies and deals with pacification of the ‘periphery’. It is for this reason that the sorry spectacle of the American military demanding of General Petraeus greater self-protection in a freer fire regime on change over of its General MacChrystal, who had insisted that it should be otherwise. Clearly, there is no room in India for imbibing such nonsense from global strategic culture.

In India, the nation must imply people. An army of the nation must defend its people, even at its own cost. Leadership is about compensating any costs to the soldier. In fact, there is no contradiction between the requirements of the soldier and the people. Clearly, if people’s acceptance is the ‘end’, then vigil over ‘means’, provisioned by soldiers, is indispensable. Clear recognition of this as the ‘Indian way’ is imperative for the security forces to relegate this long standing misunderstanding of the warrior ethic. This will give lie to the illogical interpretation that the institutional interest is the national interest. Unambiguously restating this is important to dispel any notion that this is amenable to discretion of a military’s leadership. It most certainly is not. 
Lastly, must be recorded a potentially promising movement let on by the strategic level head of the army in Kashmir, the general in Udhampur: “We will go strictly as per the rules. There will be no short cuts, we will be transparent and will ensure that every person who was involved is asked to depose in the inquiry. Therefore, witnesses will not only be from Army, but they will be civilians, they will be from other security forces, whosoever was involved." Even though he refers to the Pathribal and Macchil cases, in which the army has been a reluctant convert, this can serve as precedence for reflexive counter insurgency. 
Since India is not out of the woods yet in J&K, NE or in Central India, young Hilal Dar must not be allowed to leave in vain.

Thursday, 31 May 2012

POLICY BRIEF

Elevate Human Rights as the Core Organising Principle in Counter Insurgency

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November 14, 2011
The Indian Army’s Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations does an admirable job in balancing human rights protection with operational demands. However, there is a degree of dissonance in the approach to human rights brought about by the perspective that protecting human rights is a means to an end. This dissonance can be removed by viewing human rights as ends in themselves or as a ‘categorical imperative and elevating the principle of protecting human rights as the core organizing principle in counter insurgency.

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Reconciling AFSPA with the Legal Spheres

JOURNAL OF DEFENCE STUDIES
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April 2011
Volume: 
 5
Issue: 
 2
Focus
The present paper analyses and examines the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in respect of legal aspects. It first discusses it in terms of domestic law, international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. Given India’s obligations under international human rights instruments going beyond domestic law is necessary in any such discussion. Ensuring complementarity between the Act in its application in armed conflicts and IHL, would contribute towards making the Act more ‘humane’. The second part discusses the Act from security perspectives. In doing so, it reaffirms that respect for human rights and humanitarian law in countering insurgency is of strategic import. In conclusion,it makes some recommendations for the military which will enable it ensure that AFSPA and the IHL complement each other.
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POLICY BRIEF

Revision of the DSCO: Human Rights to the Fore

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March 22, 2011
The Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) is due for review this year. This Brief suggests directions in which the Doctrine can better address the Human Rights factor. It brings out that certain doctrinal formulations lend themselves to a permissive understanding of the use of force. This impinges on the HR factor, rightly taken in the doctrine as central to counter insurgency. The Brief recommends measures to reconcile use of force and the HR factor, which is imperative in light of the idea of India that the nation is working towards.

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Wednesday, 30 May 2012

Tackling Insurgency In Assam
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/tackling-insurgency-in-assam-2862.html

News of bomb blasts appear to be the only manner in which the Northeast enters the consciousness of the nation. The inattention is apparent from the fact that J&K commandeers double the number of pages in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual Report than do all the insurgencies in the Northeast combined. This despite the toll in the latter having surpassed J&K of late and that the Northeast has a vastly more complicated social landscape, greater numbers, larger area and involves more neighbours. This indicates its concerns are not being addressed by North Block with the dispatch they deserve due to the mistaken belief that the problem is manageable and over time, with ‘trickle down’ from India’s economic trajectory, the problem would go away.

The argument here is that the political prong - addressing conflict resolution - has not kept pace with the military prong - engaged in conflict management. Thus, desired, and possible, political dividends have not been achieved. Civil society initiatives are required to bridge the gap.

The Army’s self-assessment is that the insurgent ”support base is severely eroded and activities are on a low key due to own operations.” The Army appears to have met the requirements of the end state - as envisaged in its doctrine - of a security environment in which the levels of ‘law and order’ are such as can be handled by the police assisted by the paramilitary. The paradox that usually develops in such circumstances is that once violence is down, there is little incentive for the government to progress the political prong of strategy.

The MHA believes that a ”two pronged strategy to persist with counter insurgency operations and concurrently to win hearts and minds has paid good dividends.“ The strategy is to ”improve the situation in the NE includes accelerated infrastructural development, stress on employment, good governance and decentralization, building friendly relations with neighbouring countries, willingness to meet and discuss legitimate grievances of the people and assist the state governments to combat militancy.“

The persistence of violence testifies to an imbalance in the progress made by various prongs of national power. The insurgent is apparently using violence to announce his presence and continued credibility, as a means of dialogue with the State. Attempting to reach the proverbial and elusive ‘position of strength,’ by both sides, is holding up resolution. Herein lies the importance of political intervention to unclog the logjam.

A plausible reason for such a hold-up has been given by Lt. Gen. VK Nayar, ”The paradigms of conflict resolution and management relevant to the situation in the NE are Ideal Politik and cooperative approach. The present environment in the country is that of Real Politik and a competitive one…” Political resolution needs to be handled by those with moral capital having political credibility and civil society support, such as was the case with the interlocutor Dr. Indira Goswami with the ULFA. The political prong appears to be limited by its chosen paradigm of realism, which, being power-oriented and state centric, has its limitations when applied in conditions of internal conflict.

A situation exists as described by Gen. Nayar wherein, ”the insurgency is an ‘industry’…(and) common people remain poor and the security forces are the ‘fall guys.” Such normalcy should logically be unacceptable. People too have agency. Their action would also discredit the ‘industry’ that vested interests have acquired in the insurgency. Civil society and students’ movements in Assam have historically been very active. These have legitimacy among the people and therefore, command credibility both with the insurgents and the State. Their role should be expanded with the intent of spearheading political resolution.

In the case of Assam, there is little effort to get Bangladesh on board. Annual Home Secretary and Joint Working Group meetings take place and the instrumentality of the SAARC exists. This time round the Bangladesh angle looks very promising since the Awami League is now in power. The diplomatic prong is at a premium with respect to Assam on account of its centrality in addressing the ‘root cause’ of illegal immigration.

A truism, voiced by Lt. Gen. SK Sinha, has it that, “There can be no military solution to insurgency. It has to be a political solution. Ideally, a dialogue with militants and a political settlement should bring about an end to insurgency.“ A more urgent approach to the political problem posed by the ULFA is warranted as it is now being projected as a national security issue. A political understanding with respect to the illegal immigrants issue needs to be arrived at. This can only be in line with a non-violent approach involving strong physical and legal means to end further immigration as against forcibly sending away those who are already here.

Governmental efforts not withstanding, creative resolution efforts from within civil society should be persisted with. Society does not have to be held hostage to the pathologies that come to plague insurgencies such as vested interests of insurgents, bureaucratic inertia, political opportunism and institutional interests of security forces. Creative civil society action would bridge the existing gap between the military prong and political initiatives.

Army Deployment in Central India
http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=261&u_id=77
 
Article No.:
1260Date:05/02/2009
Army Deployment in Central India
Ali Ahmed
E-Mail- aliahd66@hotmail.com


It is very unfortunate that headlines such as ‘Naxals kill 15 cops in jungle ambush’ is now routine and consigned to the twelfth page of national newspapers. In 2008, over ten such incidents occurred in which police fatalities counted in double figures. The redoubtable Greyhounds of the AP police lost 36 in one incident. 55 more policemen died when one camp was overrun. News reports of the latest rebel attack in Gadchiroli mention gruesome details of Naxal atrocity. It appears that more needs to be done and urgently at that. The conference of chief ministers of the seven naxal affected states at Delhi provides some indication of that. However, with some areas in central India being routinely described as ‘liberated zones’, there appears to be a case for considering military deployment. 

Thus far, there has been a consensus in policy circles and between South and North Blocks that military deployment is not warranted. The Army has repeatedly voiced its discomfort at being deployed far from the border and increasing its presence in internal security. It prefers instead to privilege its primary task of defending the borders. Presumably, placing additional troops on internal security duty would further dilute the conventional deterrence it projects to Pakistan. Since counter insurgency is usually a long affair, the Army would understandably not like to be sucked into a new theatre. This would complicate its troops’ relief profile and add to the stresses of operational deployment, already weighed down as the Army is by extensive deployment in Kashmir and in the North East. This would also affect troop availability in an early timeframe for implementing the Cold Start doctrine. Given these concerns, the Army has rightly been circumspect in offering its services other than in the field of training, officer deputation in some cases, and logistics.  
The Ministry of Home Affairs, for its part, has arrived at a strategy that envisages a developmental model with the rights of the underprivileged tribal populations being protected and emphasis on socio-economic development by the state. To tackle Maoist violence, it has resorted to capacity building of police forces. The underside of this action plan is that jungle warfare requires infantry skills and ethos that cannot be matched by police forces. It also takes time to build cohesion and shared ethos in newly raised forces. To expect the police forces to be responsive to the desired level is to demand too much from them. 
It is obvious that this long term strategy requires to be supplemented since Maoist exertions are unlikely to stand still in the interim. Army deployment can be considered a short term measure to negotiate this period. With a return of semblance of normalcy to Kashmir, a proportion of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) deployed there is available for redeployment. In case this is accepted, a campaign plan needs to be made that envisages an end state in the disengagement of the Army over a finite duration of time, incorporates ‘best practices’ and ‘lessons learnt’, and is sensitive to human rights from the very outset. A ‘clear and hold’ strategy must be planned indicating the manner and timelines in which the areas vacated of Naxal control would be handed back to state police assisted by the central police.
The Army’s reservations could be met by the argument that the state has to fulfill its obligations under Article 355, for which its currently available instrument is the Army. Army has the requisite strength in the RR, presently underemployed in J&K. Two birds can be tackled with one stone. Firstly, the redeployment from J&K would project the state as responsive to people’s aspirations of a reduced military footprint. It would strengthen the government against the radicalized elements and provide Pakistan with incentive to further reduce its proxy war. Secondly, a roll back of LWE would be enabled by the Army, which is capable of operating in jungles. 
Of course, some problems would need to be addressed. The Army is wary of deploying in areas without their proclamation as ‘disturbed areas’ in which the Armed Forces Special Powers Act is operational. This would not be tenable or conceded by the government as the AFSPA is not popular. It could give the wrong impression that insurgency in central India is of an order higher than warranted. A seemingly insuperable problem is that of command and control. Law and order is a state subject, and states are loath to conceding control to the central government. This is also a serious issue for the Army, an hierarchical force, which has an early experience in Kashmir where central direction was lacking. In an insurgency spreading over seven states, the problem is compounded. The Army and RR report to MOD, while the control of internal security in such areas is with the MHA. The controlling HQs of the divisional sized RR forces deployed could be HQ Central Command at Lucknow that is currently seized of the matter. The RR forces could utilize the existing Army network of Area and Sub Area HQs for intelligence and liaison. However, the RR Counter Insurgency Force HQs should report to the affected states directly. A Unified HQ can be operational in each capital chaired by the chief minister with operational matters handled by the DGP. 
The issue needs to be addressed with an open mind. Pulling out a proportion of the RR from J&K for retraining would build on the momentum of elections just held, even as yet another year is not conceded to the Maoists in central India to consolidate. In case timely action is not taken, the insurgency would graduate to a strategic offensive. The Army would then be called out to assist in any case. 
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)