To call out the army or not

Financial World - 2 Aug 12

ALI AHMED SAYS EARLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS AN EASY WAY OUT OF PREVENTIVE ACTION FOR STATES


A CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUE that has
emerged from the blame game in wake of the
Bodo-Muslim riots in Assam is the response
of the army in ‘aid to civil authority’. Guwahati
has let on that there was a lapse of two
days between its requisition and its deployment. This
was despite both the state and centre being run by Congress
governments. The latest in this episode is the home
ministry’s missive to its neighbour on Raisina Hill, the
defence ministry that such calls on the army by a district
administration must be responded to without waiting for
clearances from the hierarchy.

But this amounts to turning the clock back. A point in
the post-Kargil reforms agenda was on distancing the
military from internal security to the extent possible.
This was along two lines: one was in raising additional
crpf units for taking over internal security duties and the
second was in reducing the calls on the army for assisting
with law and order duties.

The procedure for the latter was changed from the dc
having a lien on the military in the vicinity for such duty
to having the demand routed through and vetted in the
home and defence ministries. In an age of instant communication
this can be a real time process, but can be delayed
on two counts. One is in the decision-making procedures
on ‘babudom’, and second the bureaucratic politics
endemic to civil-military relations in general and which
have deepened lately.

Even though this time round the procedure accounted
for more fatalities than need have occurred, harking
back to the older system may not be the most useful
‘lesson learnt’.

Under the strain of deployments in ‘aid to civil authority’
through the eighties and nineties the military had
urged for change. Over the period, a substantial portion
of it had been caught up in countering insurgency successively
in Punjab, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Assam. The
rotations of units in peace stations had been cut short to
two years. During this time they were on call for restoring
law and order, particularly in a situation of worsening
communal harmony in the run up to and beyond the
Babri Masjid episode. In tiring out the military, such duties
were seen as denuding its cutting edge.

Besides, an early resort to military assistance was an
easy way out for the administration. Not only was this
holding up preventive action, it was also hampering the
professionalisation of police. The ease of conflict management
made conflict prevention and resolution recede
from the consciousness of governments. Thus the constitutional
responsibility vesting with state governments for
Public Order and Police, included in the State List (List II,
Seventh Schedule), tended to be neglected.

A course correction was done in having the military
less readily available, first through procedural measures
and secondly by substituting it through an expansion in
the central armed police forces (capf), as recommended
by the NN Vohra Task Force on internal security as part of
pos-Kargil reforms. This has been duly done over the past
decade. However, the demands on the expanded crpf
ranging from Kashmir to Central India have tied it down.
Consequently the government cannot seem to do without
the military close at hand.

There are advantages in the military’s ready availability.
Firstly, the human toll can be contained. Secondly, long-
term effects of extensive blood-
letting are precluded. For instance,
the post-Babri Masjid Mumbai
riots cast a shadow over the balance
of that century as did the Gujarat
carnage over the last decade.
Likewise, the recent Bodo-Muslim
clashes are likely to remain in collective
memory of the two communities
making political and social
reconciliation difficult. Lastly, the
intervention of the military, seen as
an honest broker by all sides, helps
defuse the crisis and tensions.

THEREFORE, WHILE the
system currently in place
needs preserving to deter
over reliance on the army, over-
riding protocols can be worked into
it that can enable quick time reactions
in situations warranting it.
The army, itself attuned to developing
situations through its static formations,
can be enabled to act on
lateral calls on it. This was the case
in Srinagar in the January 1990 crisis
when the Srinagar Corps commander,
Lt Gen Zaki, deployed
military assets without recourse
to higher headquarters, even while
keeping it informed of the developing
situation. Incidentally, while
the word martial law does not appear
in the Constitution, the defence
service regulations devote
three pages to the concept and its conduct!

In the case of the clashes in the Bodo Territorial Council,
the army is already in location as part of the counter
insurgency grid in Assam and enabled by afspa. It could
and should have deployed without unduly looking over its
shoulders. Therefore, while the state government is amiss
in allowing the situation to have come to such a pass, the
army’s slovenly reaction suggests that its live-wire characteristic
is somewhat rusty. While prescriptively the
case for police reforms comes to fore yet again, the interim
cannot be tidied over without the army.

Ali Ahmed is Assistant Professor,
Nelson Mandela Center for Peace & Conflict Resolution,
Jamia Millia Islamia

Tackling Insurgency In Assam
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/tackling-insurgency-in-assam-2862.html

News of bomb blasts appear to be the only manner in which the Northeast enters the consciousness of the nation. The inattention is apparent from the fact that J&K commandeers double the number of pages in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual Report than do all the insurgencies in the Northeast combined. This despite the toll in the latter having surpassed J&K of late and that the Northeast has a vastly more complicated social landscape, greater numbers, larger area and involves more neighbours. This indicates its concerns are not being addressed by North Block with the dispatch they deserve due to the mistaken belief that the problem is manageable and over time, with ‘trickle down’ from India’s economic trajectory, the problem would go away.

The argument here is that the political prong - addressing conflict resolution - has not kept pace with the military prong - engaged in conflict management. Thus, desired, and possible, political dividends have not been achieved. Civil society initiatives are required to bridge the gap.

The Army’s self-assessment is that the insurgent ”support base is severely eroded and activities are on a low key due to own operations.” The Army appears to have met the requirements of the end state - as envisaged in its doctrine - of a security environment in which the levels of ‘law and order’ are such as can be handled by the police assisted by the paramilitary. The paradox that usually develops in such circumstances is that once violence is down, there is little incentive for the government to progress the political prong of strategy.

The MHA believes that a ”two pronged strategy to persist with counter insurgency operations and concurrently to win hearts and minds has paid good dividends.“ The strategy is to ”improve the situation in the NE includes accelerated infrastructural development, stress on employment, good governance and decentralization, building friendly relations with neighbouring countries, willingness to meet and discuss legitimate grievances of the people and assist the state governments to combat militancy.“

The persistence of violence testifies to an imbalance in the progress made by various prongs of national power. The insurgent is apparently using violence to announce his presence and continued credibility, as a means of dialogue with the State. Attempting to reach the proverbial and elusive ‘position of strength,’ by both sides, is holding up resolution. Herein lies the importance of political intervention to unclog the logjam.

A plausible reason for such a hold-up has been given by Lt. Gen. VK Nayar, ”The paradigms of conflict resolution and management relevant to the situation in the NE are Ideal Politik and cooperative approach. The present environment in the country is that of Real Politik and a competitive one…” Political resolution needs to be handled by those with moral capital having political credibility and civil society support, such as was the case with the interlocutor Dr. Indira Goswami with the ULFA. The political prong appears to be limited by its chosen paradigm of realism, which, being power-oriented and state centric, has its limitations when applied in conditions of internal conflict.

A situation exists as described by Gen. Nayar wherein, ”the insurgency is an ‘industry’…(and) common people remain poor and the security forces are the ‘fall guys.” Such normalcy should logically be unacceptable. People too have agency. Their action would also discredit the ‘industry’ that vested interests have acquired in the insurgency. Civil society and students’ movements in Assam have historically been very active. These have legitimacy among the people and therefore, command credibility both with the insurgents and the State. Their role should be expanded with the intent of spearheading political resolution.

In the case of Assam, there is little effort to get Bangladesh on board. Annual Home Secretary and Joint Working Group meetings take place and the instrumentality of the SAARC exists. This time round the Bangladesh angle looks very promising since the Awami League is now in power. The diplomatic prong is at a premium with respect to Assam on account of its centrality in addressing the ‘root cause’ of illegal immigration.

A truism, voiced by Lt. Gen. SK Sinha, has it that, “There can be no military solution to insurgency. It has to be a political solution. Ideally, a dialogue with militants and a political settlement should bring about an end to insurgency.“ A more urgent approach to the political problem posed by the ULFA is warranted as it is now being projected as a national security issue. A political understanding with respect to the illegal immigrants issue needs to be arrived at. This can only be in line with a non-violent approach involving strong physical and legal means to end further immigration as against forcibly sending away those who are already here.

Governmental efforts not withstanding, creative resolution efforts from within civil society should be persisted with. Society does not have to be held hostage to the pathologies that come to plague insurgencies such as vested interests of insurgents, bureaucratic inertia, political opportunism and institutional interests of security forces. Creative civil society action would bridge the existing gap between the military prong and political initiatives.