A timely rehearsing of General Sundarji’s principal contribution to strategic thought
I was one of three Indian Military Academy gentlemen cadets selected to attend the Army Day events as the army chief’s guests in January 1987. At the traditional reception at Army House, General Sundarji personally introduced us to the president and the prime minister. We had a group photo taken, a portion of which has made its way into the selection that graces the new biography of General Sundarji, Probal Dasgupta’s General Brasstacks, with two of us, including me, edited out!
Understandably, the general spending a longer-than-necessary portion of the evening with us left a lasting impression. It is no wonder then that a couple of decades later I wrote an article in tribute of the late general. The atypical conclusion of that article - that finds mention in the book – was that the General would be known to history not so much for aspects of his life well covered in the book - his commendable work on mechanization of the army and his spooking of the Chinese at Sumdorong Chu, or the less praiseworthy stewardship of two subconventional operations (Op) (Op Blue Star and Op Pawan) - but for his thoughts on nuclear use.
The fraught situation
The general’s thinking bears reiteration in the current regional security environment, that has a ‘forever war’, Op Sindoor 2, on ‘pause’. A prominent strategic commentator, General Panag, reckons that if not sooner when prompted by a black-swan terror event, the next round of Op Sindoor is due within five years, by when both sides would be well up-gunned.
Rightly, Panag notes that, “There is no scope for decisive wars among nuclear-weapon-armed states. Conflict must remain below the nuclear threshold….” He had earlier held that, “India, and Pakistan are modern armies that have to wage conflict below the nuclear threshold. Keeping in view the nuclear threshold, there are obvious constraints in the way conflict will manifest.”
Though he expects “a high-end conventional air, missile, and drone campaign with each side trying to do all it did in 2025 with higher tempo, depth, and lethality,” and can also “foresee limited ground operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K),” he nevertheless holds that, “(T)he echoes of a limited war, without major ground operations, can be heard loud and clear.”
However, Panag bases his case on the popularly held juncture of where the two sides left off in round one: “(T)he measure of victory is to create psychological paralysis…up the escalatory ladder, as a result of which the adversary, despite its military potential, cannot respond.” This, he believes, “was achieved in the early hours of 10 May, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) could strike at will…and the adversary’s air force and air defence could not respond or retaliate.”
Two problems with the popular version
One problem with a clipped reading of the conflict is in the significance of a news report not registering adequately. The report had it that the Pakistanis had convened their national command authority (NCA) that controls nuclear use. Overtaken by events the preceding night – the last night of Op Sindoor - the Pakistanis distanced themselves from the report.
That the matter is graver was clearer from one of the Pakistani airfields hit being the Nur Khan airfield. Apparently, it is proximate to the Chaklala cantonment where Pakistan’s nuclear hub, the Strategic Plans Division, is located. There was also considerable disinformation surrounding whether nearby Kairana hills had also been hit, allegedly a nuclear storage site. Such egregious targeting could have trigger nuclear-related misperceptions: that nuclear facilities are under a degrading attack. Consequently, it can reasonably be surmised that a nuclear dimension to the crisis might have materialised.
The second problem is the assumption that the Pakistanis succumbed to military force application. On his part, the raksha mantri takes to hyperbole on this: “Op Sindoor as a short-duration, deep-penetration, high-intensity, and high-impact operation which showcased India’s ability to compel its adversary to surrender.” The prime minister goes a step further, holding that India ‘forced Pakistan to its knees,’ whereupon Pakistan ‘pleaded’ to be let off. Even if theatrics and rhetoric are discounted, analysis that speaks truth to power cannot be wholly blind to such delusions.
From Pakistan catapulting to brokering of a ceasefire in the Iran-US conflict, it is clear Pakistan was playing for higher stakes. Munir forewent the opportunity for getting even, playing to get into Trump’s good books as his ‘favourite field marshal.’ Further, that there have been no images of like damage on the Indian side does not mean there was none. Pakistan, reassured by its performance on the first night, thought it could replicate the same with interest in future iterations.
The nuclear factor
Indian reticence to concede that the Americans had anything to do with the pause would likely make them less enthusiastic next time. Absent a line of communication between two parties increases the premium on third party intervention; which will be less than forthcoming. Therefore, Pakistan will likely holdout longer. Its principal takeaway from the Iran War II can only be that a weaker side must sustain in a fight. The field marshal is already attempting build resilience by reiterating his belief that a ‘battle of ideologies’ is on.
Pakistan has taken care to centralise military authority and authority over its nuclear structure under one chair, that of the newly-created Chief of Defence Forces; occupied by the army chief promoted to five-star rank. It has also divorced its conventional and nuclear missile forces, for prosecuting either type of war. An assessment has it that it has given itself a velocity upgrade, enabling a head start in the next round. Not only are Chinese J35s in the pipeline of procurement, but there is a half-a-billion dollars F-16 upgrade also on.
Even so, its budgetary increase of some 20 per cent is outpaced by India’s increase of 24 per cent of a budget eight-to-nine times larger than that of Pakistan. India is also on the cusp of theaterisation, allowing it to take on the western front with greater coherence. In the interim, there is movement towards operationalising a a joint operations and coordination center for greater synergy at the apex military level. Not only is convergence of outcomes in multi-domain operations sought by the out-going chief of defence staff (CDS), but the raksha mantri discerns a “new military ethos.”
Pakistan – even if back-stopped by China - may wish to preserve itself from greater punishment. With India fully capable of matching escalatory step, Pakistan reach for nuclear signalling. An American analyst warns: “They (India and Pakistan) also appear increasingly convinced that, should the conflict erupt again, more intense conventional fighting would not risk nuclear escalation.”
That such recourse that should worry has not figured in the deafening din from the one-year-on discussions owes to multiple reasons. First, is that there has been a clampdown on nuclear doctrinal discourse; in contrast to the appreciative buzz around missile tests. Two is that the political level may not wish to obscure the dangerous backdrop to India’s forever war, hastily and impulsively embarked on. Third, it wishes to avoid the corollary: that dialogue channels are necessary to keep open, if not for conflict resolution but merely for crisis management.
How will it manifest?
One measure has already found mention: activity of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making body, duly advertised to make an impression. The second is movements of its nuclear-related weapons, such as a Nasr or two visible to Indian peeking systems. The third is activating well-intentioned third party diplomacy, by mutual interlocutors as Gulf states or concerned neighbours. Fourth could be activation of its nuclear test sites for a demonstration test. Fifth could be a greenfield test of its nuclear weapon in, for instance, the Kharan desert. Sixth could be information operations to generate a ‘no smoke without fire’ panic. Seventh, as has been seen earlier, the firing of nuclear-capable missiles. Eighthly, intelligence operations; and, finally, a ‘shot across the bow’, at no military target in particular, such as in the Cholistan desert.
Likewise, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict can be decidedly at the lowest possible level of provocation. This could be in the desert along the border or on an enclave captured prior, or, indeed, on the seas.
Under the circumstance, the rationality exhibited by both sides in Op Sindoor, would hopefully continue. By the yardstick of strategic rationality, it would not be irrational on Pakistan’s part to bandy nuclear weapons. Since the escalatory tendency inherent in war - observed some two hundred years ago by Clausewitz - could take hold, it would be irrational for Pakistan not to reach for its nuclear card.
It could be forced by Indian reinforcing of failure by progressively larger scale conventional operations. For instance, while Panag’s reference to operations in J&K was in respect to operations to tidy up the LC; however, some chicken-hawks in the regime and its right wing support formations or a misinformed public may wish for taking Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
Heeding Sundarji
It is at such a juncture that Sundarji becomes posthumously most relevant. He left behind the Sundarji nuclear doctrine, that has not received traction in Indian doctrinal discussion. He posited that any introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict must prompt not only an immediate termination of the exchange(s) at the lowest possible level of opprobrium of nuclear use, but also an early cessation of hostilities itself, if necessary by easing up on the matter that led to outbreak of the conflict in first place.
As is evident, this is diametrically opposite the tenet of India’s nuclear doctrine that calls for an annihilating nuclear attack of the nuclear taboo breaking party; ‘unacceptable damage’ being code for counter-value targeting, itself jargon for city-busting. It also goes against the new Pakistan-centric policy of ‘no talks with terror.’
The conclusions that emerge are as follows: the pursuit of escalation dominance is to chase a receding horizon; it is best to pull punches at every level to keep from ascending the escalatory ladder, even if matching the other side punch for punch (tit-for-tat has deterrence value as Axelrod found in his experiment at game theory); minimally a crisis management mechanism must be in place prior; and maximally, incompatibilities must be engaged with in a dialogue.
Though the incoming CDS General Subramani is advantaged by his current proximity to the nuclear strategy staff, he would unlikely have had his knowledge base for his forthcoming duties as military adviser to the nuclear command authority expanded with this bit of wisdom. He would do well to read up Sundarji on what nuclear armed states owe their citizens, a duty to preserve them from harm.
