Tribal communities in the cross-hairs


By Ali Ahmed
Financial World, 9 July 2012

The outline of the ‘encounter’ at the end last month in the middle of Dantewada forests is by now amply clear. A firefight took place resulting in twenty civilian dead and six CRPF members injured. The furore in wake has witnessed peace activists and the provincial Congress leaders questioning the CRPF version and demanding an inquiry. Since blaming the tools is the sign of a poor workman, the Home Minister in rebound defended his force and left the decision on an inquiry to the state government.

The incident can end up serving as yet more ammunition for motivated use by all parties. However, the civilian lives lost and their numbers – sixteen - suggest that the incident must be invested with greater significance, lest it be yet another landmark merging into an unfolding story.

The establishment side would have it as evidence that the CRPF has finally got its act together after the Chintalnar massacre of 2010 and is able to penetrate jungles, even at night. The Home Minister in standing by the force has sustained its morale, enabling its bolder deployment and employment in future. The state police and CRPF for their part will hopefully go into the details in an in-house inquiry for learning the right lessons, even if for external purposes they stick by their version of the event of a return of fire in self-defence.

The contrary view has it that the firing was into a gathering of civilians being addressed by Maoists resulting in an unconscionable number dying, including women and at least one teenage girl. Even if provoked by Maoists, the principles of discrimination and proportionality seem to have been abandoned by the force. At least some of the six CRPF soldiers injured could be due to friendly fire, intrinsic to the nature of firefights in the dark and in jungles.

Even if the truth is taken as somewhere in-between, there are lessons that need pointing out. Firstly, it is unfair to have the CRPF operate in jungles. The nature of the job and their rotation policy does not suggest that troops when so employed can prove competent. This is an infantryman’s job. Even if the CRPF soldier is up to it, the levels of leadership from the grass root to the supervisory tactical levels are just not up to it. In effect, this is not a job the CRPF can at all rise up to, even if trained for.

Secondly, they operate in support of the state police. The levels of state police capability are well known. These have in this case been supplemented by relying on the erstwhile Salwa Judum or SPOs, now an auxiliary police militia. While their tribal instincts enable a capability for operating in jungles, they cannot be permitted the autonomy they seem to be enjoying. The Supreme Court has frowned on the practice in its judgment last year on using them as SPOs. Therefore, when firefights break out, discipline and fire discipline is liable to break down. Civilian casualties are a natural corollary. The result is a strategic hit-wicket.

Thirdly, the command and control arrangement is not neat. The officer cadre of the police being absent from the frontline, the leadership is missing from the spear-end. The IPS shoulder title cannot substitute either for moral authority or tactical acumen. The idea of expanding the IPS by a mid-career lateral induction exam has lately been jettisoned, suggesting that the ground level leadership deficit will remain indefinitely. Flying visits from the CRPF brass out of the CGO Complex in Delhi can at best serve as eyes and ears for the Home Minister.

The system then happily hides behind the federal structure of the Constitution to claim inability to influence the right wing state government to rethink strategy. Where the buck stops is indistinct. Treating it as a law and order problem implies it is with the state government. Since they don’t have the requisite tools, there is a lack of accountability.

What needs doing? There are liberated zones that need dismantling, a job for the army. Their fixation with Kashmir is not only limiting the potential political dividend there from a retraction of the AFSPA, but is enabling them to duck this national duty staring them in the face. The argument that to use the army is to use a hammer against a fly assumes that the army can only be used as a hammer. Instead, the infantry is capable of much more sensitivity in operations since its officers, right at the frontline, can exercise control and discretion. The lesson learnt from past counter insurgencies and strict adherence to the new subconventional doctrine can dispel fears of a military overkill. Their role can be restricted to vacating ‘liberated zones’, dispersing the Maoists and handing over to the CRPF. 

The tribal communities must be spared the attentions of a force, which, even if stout hearted and well-intentioned, stands misemployed. Call out the army, but ensure its ‘velvet glove’ is on. If that is unthinkable, it is better to go down the peace process route purposefully.

Army Deployment in Central India http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=261&u_id=77   Article No.:	1260	Date:	05/02/2009
Army Deployment in Central India
Ali Ahmed
E-Mail- aliahd66@hotmail.com
It is very unfortunate that headlines such as ‘Naxals kill 15 cops in jungle ambush’ is now routine and consigned to the twelfth page of national newspapers. In 2008, over ten such incidents occurred in which police fatalities counted in double figures. The redoubtable Greyhounds of the AP police lost 36 in one incident. 55 more policemen died when one camp was overrun. News reports of the latest rebel attack in Gadchiroli mention gruesome details of Naxal atrocity. It appears that more needs to be done and urgently at that. The conference of chief ministers of the seven naxal affected states at Delhi provides some indication of that. However, with some areas in central India being routinely described as ‘liberated zones’, there appears to be a case for considering military deployment.  Thus far, there has been a consensus in policy circles and between South and North Blocks that military deployment is not warranted. The Army has repeatedly voiced its discomfort at being deployed far from the border and increasing its presence in internal security. It prefers instead to privilege its primary task of defending the borders. Presumably, placing additional troops on internal security duty would further dilute the conventional deterrence it projects to Pakistan. Since counter insurgency is usually a long affair, the Army would understandably not like to be sucked into a new theatre. This would complicate its troops’ relief profile and add to the stresses of operational deployment, already weighed down as the Army is by extensive deployment in Kashmir and in the North East. This would also affect troop availability in an early timeframe for implementing the Cold Start doctrine. Given these concerns, the Army has rightly been circumspect in offering its services other than in the field of training, officer deputation in some cases, and logistics.   The Ministry of Home Affairs, for its part, has arrived at a strategy that envisages a developmental model with the rights of the underprivileged tribal populations being protected and emphasis on socio-economic development by the state. To tackle Maoist violence, it has resorted to capacity building of police forces. The underside of this action plan is that jungle warfare requires infantry skills and ethos that cannot be matched by police forces. It also takes time to build cohesion and shared ethos in newly raised forces. To expect the police forces to be responsive to the desired level is to demand too much from them.  It is obvious that this long term strategy requires to be supplemented since Maoist exertions are unlikely to stand still in the interim. Army deployment can be considered a short term measure to negotiate this period. With a return of semblance of normalcy to Kashmir, a proportion of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) deployed there is available for redeployment. In case this is accepted, a campaign plan needs to be made that envisages an end state in the disengagement of the Army over a finite duration of time, incorporates ‘best practices’ and ‘lessons learnt’, and is sensitive to human rights from the very outset. A ‘clear and hold’ strategy must be planned indicating the manner and timelines in which the areas vacated of Naxal control would be handed back to state police assisted by the central police. The Army’s reservations could be met by the argument that the state has to fulfill its obligations under Article 355, for which its currently available instrument is the Army. Army has the requisite strength in the RR, presently underemployed in J&K. Two birds can be tackled with one stone. Firstly, the redeployment from J&K would project the state as responsive to people’s aspirations of a reduced military footprint. It would strengthen the government against the radicalized elements and provide Pakistan with incentive to further reduce its proxy war. Secondly, a roll back of LWE would be enabled by the Army, which is capable of operating in jungles.  Of course, some problems would need to be addressed. The Army is wary of deploying in areas without their proclamation as ‘disturbed areas’ in which the Armed Forces Special Powers Act is operational. This would not be tenable or conceded by the government as the AFSPA is not popular. It could give the wrong impression that insurgency in central India is of an order higher than warranted. A seemingly insuperable problem is that of command and control. Law and order is a state subject, and states are loath to conceding control to the central government. This is also a serious issue for the Army, an hierarchical force, which has an early experience in Kashmir where central direction was lacking. In an insurgency spreading over seven states, the problem is compounded. The Army and RR report to MOD, while the control of internal security in such areas is with the MHA. The controlling HQs of the divisional sized RR forces deployed could be HQ Central Command at Lucknow that is currently seized of the matter. The RR forces could utilize the existing Army network of Area and Sub Area HQs for intelligence and liaison. However, the RR Counter Insurgency Force HQs should report to the affected states directly. A Unified HQ can be operational in each capital chaired by the chief minister with operational matters handled by the DGP.  The issue needs to be addressed with an open mind. Pulling out a proportion of the RR from J&K for retraining would build on the momentum of elections just held, even as yet another year is not conceded to the Maoists in central India to consolidate. In case timely action is not taken, the insurgency would graduate to a strategic offensive. The Army would then be called out to assist in any case.  (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)