STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
The author, in his take, makes a contestable equation between human rights and fundamental rights. While there is an understandable correspondence between the two, fundamental rights are a contract between the state and its citizens. Human rights instead are intrinsic to people on account of their being human, which means that there are also some 'hard core rights' that are not liable to abridgement by national laws or constitutions. Fundamental rights as we know can be held in abeyance in periods of national emergency or amended by appropriate legislation. The concept of human rights instead made the individual the referent and sought to preserve, protect and advance human rights of the individual and the collective, taking the issue beyond the scope of nation and state. The experience of the twentieth century dictated this. While in India's case, fundamental rights guarantee basic freedoms and human rights, it is important to maintain this distinction.
Getting this distinction right is crucial since its absence gives rise to the flawed logic that 'Where there is terrorism, there cannot be human rights' (p. 4). 'Hard core' human rights, specifically against arbitrary killing and torture, exist at all times for all, including foreign terrorists on Indian soil. The Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention covers these, and they are valid even in internal security situations and have been incorporated into national legislation. This is true for low intensity conflicts, deemed different from insurgencies in terms of the levels of external interference. The case is made that the external factor legitimises not only army deployment but a tougher line. This risks overlooking the human terrain comprising Indian citizens and the fact that a majority of the fighters are Indian citizens even under maximum levels of proxy war.
A permissive environment for egregious measures, referred to in the foreword by the director of CLAWS, is created by focusing on the external factor for distinguishing a low intensity conflict from an insurgency. The author takes a 'clash' between the two as being inevitable. He writes, 'This is the basic point of clash between the goals of achieving internal security and the observance of human rights' (p. 4). He urges the state to 'remain fully aware of its obligations to prevent occurrence of such instances and take prompt measures to check them' (p. 4). The contention here is that this conceptual understanding of the army contributes to its predicament in such situations.
What the author describes as 'insolence', or disaffection and alienation from the state, then develops. This is the response of the citizenry not only to violations of the hard core rights of local fighters but also to the infringements of its soft core rights. It makes strategic sense in countering insurgency or proxy war to privilege human rights, lest the situation get worse before it gets any better. This trajectory of violence has been true in most of India's counter-insurgency engagements, whether externally inspired or not, ranging from Mizoram, referred to as a successful case, to Kashmir. Whereas in the former the policy of grouping infringed on soft core rights, in Kashmir the existence and work of the non-governmental organisation 'Association of Parents of Disappeared People' indicates the levels of departure from doctrinal tenets by security forces. For the army to forever prefix 'allegations of' when referring to violations is to be more conscious of self-image than the possibility that the image may not match the reality. The author in not having answered the question, 'But, are these violations a reality and are the armed forces really at fault?' does not help to resolve this debate in any way.
Given that the book is a research effort, it could have benefited from a bibliography. Its scant footnotes otherwise suggest that the sabbatical programme of the army could do with some improvement, particularly in terms of the officers being permitted to speak their minds. This would not only benefit them and the institution, but also the attentive public keenly interested in the army's viewpoint and ever ready to be persuaded by its case.
Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict by K.S. Sheoran
35
Issue:
3
Book Review
May 2011
The book is the result of the author's sabbatical with the National Human Rights Commission and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies to research 'all aspects of human rights in the context of the employment of the armed forces for internal security duties'. Only the first chapter of two and half pages carries any content on human rights. The remainder is a distillation of the army's Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) (Shimla, HQ ARTRAC, 2006) available on the internet at http://ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/doctrine%20sub%20conv%20w.pdf. There are four attached appendices that are human rights related, but are again from the DSCO. In fact Appendix A reproduces Chapter 7 of the DSCO, 'Human Rights', verbatim. A chapter entitled 'Media Dynamics and Human Rights' again disappoints by focusing on the military-media relationship rather than human rights.
The issue of human rights should have been left out of the title because the book otherwise quite ably covers the subject of 'Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflicts'. But even here the book does not venture beyond the DSCO. This gives rise to the question, 'What purpose has been served?' And a wider question as to what the sabbatical was about. It is a pity that the opportunity for informed comment on the issue and a much debated subject like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), has been passed up. The author's first-hand engagement with the subject as a military professional, his access to its nuances at the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and research possibilities at Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) have been sub-optimally utilised in this monograph. The author could compensate by taking up the issue once again in a subsequent edition by incorporating his experience at his present posting on the general staff in charge of human rights at the Corps HQ in Srinagar.The author, in his take, makes a contestable equation between human rights and fundamental rights. While there is an understandable correspondence between the two, fundamental rights are a contract between the state and its citizens. Human rights instead are intrinsic to people on account of their being human, which means that there are also some 'hard core rights' that are not liable to abridgement by national laws or constitutions. Fundamental rights as we know can be held in abeyance in periods of national emergency or amended by appropriate legislation. The concept of human rights instead made the individual the referent and sought to preserve, protect and advance human rights of the individual and the collective, taking the issue beyond the scope of nation and state. The experience of the twentieth century dictated this. While in India's case, fundamental rights guarantee basic freedoms and human rights, it is important to maintain this distinction.
Getting this distinction right is crucial since its absence gives rise to the flawed logic that 'Where there is terrorism, there cannot be human rights' (p. 4). 'Hard core' human rights, specifically against arbitrary killing and torture, exist at all times for all, including foreign terrorists on Indian soil. The Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention covers these, and they are valid even in internal security situations and have been incorporated into national legislation. This is true for low intensity conflicts, deemed different from insurgencies in terms of the levels of external interference. The case is made that the external factor legitimises not only army deployment but a tougher line. This risks overlooking the human terrain comprising Indian citizens and the fact that a majority of the fighters are Indian citizens even under maximum levels of proxy war.
A permissive environment for egregious measures, referred to in the foreword by the director of CLAWS, is created by focusing on the external factor for distinguishing a low intensity conflict from an insurgency. The author takes a 'clash' between the two as being inevitable. He writes, 'This is the basic point of clash between the goals of achieving internal security and the observance of human rights' (p. 4). He urges the state to 'remain fully aware of its obligations to prevent occurrence of such instances and take prompt measures to check them' (p. 4). The contention here is that this conceptual understanding of the army contributes to its predicament in such situations.
What the author describes as 'insolence', or disaffection and alienation from the state, then develops. This is the response of the citizenry not only to violations of the hard core rights of local fighters but also to the infringements of its soft core rights. It makes strategic sense in countering insurgency or proxy war to privilege human rights, lest the situation get worse before it gets any better. This trajectory of violence has been true in most of India's counter-insurgency engagements, whether externally inspired or not, ranging from Mizoram, referred to as a successful case, to Kashmir. Whereas in the former the policy of grouping infringed on soft core rights, in Kashmir the existence and work of the non-governmental organisation 'Association of Parents of Disappeared People' indicates the levels of departure from doctrinal tenets by security forces. For the army to forever prefix 'allegations of' when referring to violations is to be more conscious of self-image than the possibility that the image may not match the reality. The author in not having answered the question, 'But, are these violations a reality and are the armed forces really at fault?' does not help to resolve this debate in any way.
Given that the book is a research effort, it could have benefited from a bibliography. Its scant footnotes otherwise suggest that the sabbatical programme of the army could do with some improvement, particularly in terms of the officers being permitted to speak their minds. This would not only benefit them and the institution, but also the attentive public keenly interested in the army's viewpoint and ever ready to be persuaded by its case.
