STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur

Ali Ahmed

Volume: 

 34

Issue: 

 4

Book Review

July 2010

Full Article

Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis

Behaviour and the Bomb, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 251, $126, Rs 795, ISBN

978-0-415-44049-3

Ali Ahmed*

ndia and Pakistan have weaponised even more since their ‘tit for tat’ nuclear tests

of May 1998 at Pokhran and Chagai, respectively. The popular expectation prior to

the tests was that war would become obsolete. This was one of the drivers for India

reaching out to Pakistan through the Lahore peace process. In the event, the Pakistani

army demonstrated at Kargil that it read the effects of nuclearisation differently. In

military doctrinal terms, it believed there was scope for conventional operations

between the nuclear and sub-conventional planes, as it chose to exploit in Kargil, the

first war of the nuclear era in the sub-continent. That it proved to be a ‘limited war’

had much to do with American intervention; nevertheless, there have been other

instances of a near war-like situation between the two countries—‘Operation

Parakram’ in 2001–2002, and post-26/11 in late 2008. These make it clear that there is

much learning to be done on the impact of nuclearisation on the security situation in

the sub-continent.

The volume under review takes up the challenge of seeking out the implications

on crisis behaviour of nuclearisation. It has a set of eminent scholars looking at both

sides of the crisis in the sub-continent during Exercise Brasstacks—Operation Trident,

the 1990 crisis, the Kargil War and Operation Parakram. While the latter two

events were in the nuclear era, the former two were also indicative of a nuclear crisis

of sorts.

In 1987, Pakistan had a putative nuclear capability even though by 1990 both

states had the capability, even if an opaque one. The first crisis was brought on by

aggressive Indian manoeuvres, prompting Pakistan to move its strategic reserves. It

was at that time that the Indian government ordered the movement of troops from the

North East region to cope with the Kashmir insurgency. The movement was also

because Pakistan, which had troops in the vicinity of the border—left over from the

Zarb-e-Momin exercise—began actively promoting insurgency in the state. This crisis

was resolved after the intervention of the US government through what is known

as the Gates mission. The nuclear dimension of this crisis was apparently in the placing

of nuclear assets on higher levels of readiness. The Kargil War is well known and

its myriad facets were reiterated during its tenth anniversary. The nuclear angle of this

crisis is recounted by Bruce Riedel in his take on the meeting between Clinton and

Nawaz Sharif on July 4, 1999, in which Sharif admitted to not knowing the nuclear

moves his army had taken.1

The first of the nuclear-era conflicts saw a 10-month long stand-off through

2001–2002. It saw two instances when the crisis peaked, once in early January when

the army was ready in a mobilised state and second after the terrorist attack on families

of soldiers at KaluChak in Jammu. Pakistan sought to defuse Indian rhetoric and

preparations in this period by launching a series of missile tests foregrounding nuclear

concerns.

An analysis of all these four crises has been done earlier also. Notable among

these are the works of Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari and Pervez Iqbal Cheema on Exercise

Brasstacks; that of Chari, Cheema and Stephen Cohen on the ‘compound crisis’ of

1990; of Praveen Swami on the Kargil War2; and, lastly, that of V.K. Sood and P.

Sawhney on The War Unfinished.3

However, this book is useful in that it brings it all under one cover, in commissioning

authors with inspiring credentials and also in addressing higher order questions

of the behaviour of new nuclear powers. It thus makes for a rigorous debate

between nuclear optimists and pessimists. The events of 26/11 and their aftermath

inform that such discussion remains unfortunately topical and of policy relevance. Its

discussion of the cases of North Korea and Iran in light of the lessons drawn from the

South Asian experience has implications, in particular for US policy with respect to

both states.

The book does not take a position on the issue of whether nuclear weapons

acquisition has helped bring stability or instead made India and Pakistan more venturesome.

The position of the two editors, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, is

already well known through their contribution to the section in the prestigious International

Security, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the tests (Fall 2008 issue)

as well as in their well-regarded books, Fearful Symmetry4 (with Hagerty) and

Dangerous Deterrent5, respectively.

Ganguly appears to be on the side of the optimists while Kapur weighs in with the

pessimists. However, their personal predilections do not complicate their collaboration,

as is evident from their very balanced introduction to this volume.

What emerges in their analyses is that nuclear weapons dampen the propensity for

major war. However, they do increase the tendency towards crisis by making nuclear

powers more aggressive. Those who stress the final result of the crisis—that war was

avoided—take an optimistic view. Those concentrating on the processes and drivers

of the crisis and its escalatory dynamic are more pessimistic. For instance, in considering

Operation Parakram, Praveen Swami argues that nuclear weapons deterred India

from going to war. This was corroborated in the famous faux pas in which Dr. Abdul

Kalam claimed that nuclear weapons deterred both states (M.V. Ramana and Zia

Mian, ‘The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia’, SIPRI, 2003, p. 210). Kanti Bajpai,

on his part, highlights Pakistan’s provocative behaviour under the nuclear cover and

that US intervention had more to do with defusing the crisis than nuclear weapons.

Thus, it will appear that the jury is still out on the benign or malign effects of nuclear

weapons. It is no wonder then that drawing on the South Asian experience in their

examination of the Iran and Korean cases, the authors maintain a balanced position.

It follows that while nuclear weapons help deter escalation of a crisis into a conflict,

they do not prevent crisis nor do they help in resolution of underlying causes.

Therefore, it would be imprudent to allow nuclear optimism to play a greater role than

warranted. Instead, there needs be a significant move towards bridging differences

while there is chance. Given the impact of 26/11 and the likelihood of further such

incidents, the current times call for predicating the peace process on Pakistani

progress on the terror front. Two significant changes since the last crisis studied will

have salience in such a study. One is the raging war on terror in the vicinity and

second India’s ‘cold start’ doctrine. The book is therefore a recommended and timely

read to inform such consideration.

*The reviewer is a Research Fellow at IDSA.

Notes

1. American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, University of Pennsylvania,

Center for Advanced Study of India, 2002, http://www2.ssc.upenn.edu/research/papers/

Riedel_2002.pdf.

2. Praveen Swami, Kargil War, Leftword Books, New Delhi, 2005.

3. V.K. Sood and P. Sawhney, The War Unfinished, Sage, New Delhi, 2003.

4. Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of

Nuclear Weapons, University of Washington Press, 2006.

5. Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Determent: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in

South Asia, National University of Singapore, 2009.