STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur
Volume:
34
Issue:
4
Book Review
July 2010
Full Article
Sumit
Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear
Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis
Behaviour and the Bomb, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 251, $126, Rs 795, ISBN
978-0-415-44049-3
Ali
Ahmed*
ndia
and Pakistan have weaponised even more since their ‘tit for tat’ nuclear tests
of
May 1998 at Pokhran and Chagai, respectively. The popular expectation prior to
the
tests was that war would become obsolete. This was one of the drivers for India
reaching
out to Pakistan through the Lahore peace process. In the event, the Pakistani
army
demonstrated at Kargil that it read the effects of nuclearisation differently.
In
military
doctrinal terms, it believed there was scope for conventional operations
between
the nuclear and sub-conventional planes, as it chose to exploit in Kargil, the
first
war of the nuclear era in the sub-continent. That it proved to be a ‘limited
war’
had
much to do with American intervention; nevertheless, there have been other
instances
of a near war-like situation between the two countries—‘Operation
Parakram’ in 2001–2002,
and post-26/11 in late 2008. These make it clear that there is
much
learning to be done on the impact of nuclearisation on the security situation
in
the
sub-continent.
The
volume under review takes up the challenge of seeking out the implications
on
crisis behaviour of nuclearisation. It has a set of eminent scholars looking at
both
sides
of the crisis in the sub-continent during Exercise Brasstacks—Operation
Trident,
the
1990 crisis, the Kargil War and Operation Parakram. While the latter two
events
were in the nuclear era, the former two were also indicative of a nuclear
crisis
of
sorts.
In
1987, Pakistan had a putative nuclear capability even though by 1990 both
states
had the capability, even if an opaque one. The first crisis was brought on by
aggressive
Indian manoeuvres, prompting Pakistan to move its strategic reserves. It
was
at that time that the Indian government ordered the movement of troops from the
North
East region to cope with the Kashmir insurgency. The movement was also
because
Pakistan, which had troops in the vicinity of the border—left over from the
Zarb-e-Momin
exercise—began actively promoting insurgency in the state. This crisis
was
resolved after the intervention of the US government through what is known
as
the Gates mission. The nuclear dimension of this crisis was apparently in the
placing
of
nuclear assets on higher levels of readiness. The Kargil War is well known and
its
myriad facets were reiterated during its tenth anniversary. The nuclear angle
of this
crisis
is recounted by Bruce Riedel in his take on the meeting between Clinton and
Nawaz
Sharif on July 4, 1999, in which Sharif admitted to not knowing the nuclear
moves
his army had taken.1
The
first of the nuclear-era conflicts saw a 10-month long stand-off through
2001–2002.
It saw two instances when the crisis peaked, once in early January when
the
army was ready in a mobilised state and second after the terrorist attack on
families
of
soldiers at KaluChak in Jammu. Pakistan sought to defuse Indian rhetoric and
preparations
in this period by launching a series of missile tests foregrounding nuclear
concerns.
An
analysis of all these four crises has been done earlier also. Notable among
these
are the works of Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari and Pervez Iqbal Cheema on Exercise
Brasstacks;
that of Chari, Cheema and Stephen Cohen on the ‘compound crisis’ of
1990;
of Praveen Swami on the Kargil
War2; and,
lastly, that of V.K. Sood and P.
Sawhney
on The War Unfinished.3
However,
this book is useful in that it brings it all under one cover, in commissioning
authors
with inspiring credentials and also in addressing higher order questions
of
the behaviour of new nuclear powers. It thus makes for a rigorous debate
between
nuclear optimists and pessimists. The events of 26/11 and their aftermath
inform
that such discussion remains unfortunately topical and of policy relevance. Its
discussion
of the cases of North Korea and Iran in light of the lessons drawn from the
South
Asian experience has implications, in particular for US policy with respect to
both
states.
The
book does not take a position on the issue of whether nuclear weapons
acquisition
has helped bring stability or instead made India and Pakistan more venturesome.
The
position of the two editors, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, is
already
well known through their contribution to the section in the prestigious International
Security,
commemorating the tenth anniversary of the tests (Fall 2008 issue)
as
well as in their well-regarded books, Fearful
Symmetry4 (with
Hagerty) and
Dangerous
Deterrent5, respectively.
Ganguly
appears to be on the side of the optimists while Kapur weighs in with the
pessimists.
However, their personal predilections do not complicate their collaboration,
as
is evident from their very balanced introduction to this volume.
What
emerges in their analyses is that nuclear weapons dampen the propensity for
major
war. However, they do increase the tendency towards crisis by making nuclear
powers
more aggressive. Those who stress the final result of the crisis—that war was
avoided—take
an optimistic view. Those concentrating on the processes and drivers
of
the crisis and its escalatory dynamic are more pessimistic. For instance, in
considering
Operation
Parakram, Praveen Swami argues that nuclear weapons deterred India
from
going to war. This was corroborated in the famous faux pas in
which Dr. Abdul
Kalam
claimed that nuclear weapons deterred both states (M.V. Ramana and Zia
Mian,
‘The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia’, SIPRI, 2003, p. 210). Kanti Bajpai,
on
his part, highlights Pakistan’s provocative behaviour under the nuclear cover
and
that
US intervention had more to do with defusing the crisis than nuclear weapons.
Thus,
it will appear that the jury is still out on the benign or malign effects of
nuclear
weapons.
It is no wonder then that drawing on the South Asian experience in their
examination
of the Iran and Korean cases, the authors maintain a balanced position.
It
follows that while nuclear weapons help deter escalation of a crisis into a
conflict,
they
do not prevent crisis nor do they help in resolution of underlying causes.
Therefore,
it would be imprudent to allow nuclear optimism to play a greater role than
warranted.
Instead, there needs be a significant move towards bridging differences
while
there is chance. Given the impact of 26/11 and the likelihood of further such
incidents,
the current times call for predicating the peace process on Pakistani
progress
on the terror front. Two significant changes since the last crisis studied will
have
salience in such a study. One is the raging war on terror in the vicinity and
second
India’s ‘cold start’ doctrine. The book is therefore a recommended and timely
read
to inform such consideration.
*The
reviewer is a Research Fellow at IDSA.
Notes
1.
American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, University of
Pennsylvania,
Center
for Advanced Study of India, 2002, http://www2.ssc.upenn.edu/research/papers/
Riedel_2002.pdf.
2.
Praveen Swami, Kargil War, Leftword Books, New Delhi, 2005.
3.
V.K. Sood and P. Sawhney, The War Unfinished, Sage, New Delhi, 2003.
4.
Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Fearful
Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of
Nuclear Weapons,
University of Washington Press, 2006.
5.
Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous
Determent: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in
South
Asia, National University of Singapore, 2009.
