MIZORAM: THE
FORGOTTEN INSURGENCY
Abstract
Mizoram
is rightly taken as one of India’s
counter insurgency success stories. The early experience in Mizoram has considerable
learning value. This article dwells on the first two phases of counter
insurgency in the Mizo Hills district of Assam in the late sixties. The two
phases were the initial breaking of the siege laid by the Mizo National Front
in March 1966 and the later phase of grouping of villages. It is worth
revisiting these episodes for insights on India’s way in countering
insurgency.
Introduction
The
Mizoram experience deserves special attention since India
faced its gravest challenge in that remote corner of India. That the final successful
‘win-win’ outcome for both the insurgent and counter insurgent is to India’s credit,
should not obscure unpalatable lessons from the history of that conflict. The
aim here is to illumine the meager historical record. This paper looks at the
first two phases of counter insurgency in Mizo Hills. The first phase was the
rolling back of the Mizo National Front (MNF) gains made under its Operation
Jericho in March 1966, in which offensive air power was witnessed for the first
and only time in the history of independent India. The second phase involved
grouping of villages as a strategy to seal off the sustenance base among the
people of the MNF. Subsequent phases involving the peace process and counter
insurgency are not covered here. The paper is laid out in two parts, with the
operations being covered in the first part and an analysis of these in the
second part.
PART I – THE EARLY
PHASES
The setting
The
Mizo insurgency is dated to the rat famine, Mautam
that occurred at the turn of the sixties.
Noted military historian, Maj Gen DK Palit, writes, ‘Shillong’s initial
indifference and subsequent delays in activating relief measures caused serious
discontent among the people even alienating some of the more liberal leaders,
unmitigated by any effort from the state government to organize local preparations
and management, And when Assam government’s publicity machinery attempted to
play down the extent of the disaster, the disillusionment was complete.’
Taking advantage of the neglect by the Assam government, under which the
Districit Council of the Lushai Hills dictrict functioned, the Mizo National
Famine Front, led by Laldenga, transformed into the Mizo National Front.
Laldenga’s bid to capture the District Council dominated by the conservative
Mizo Union, led to his reaching out to East Pakistan
for support in 1963.
The ‘preparatory phase’ of the insurgency went on through the mid sixties till
Operation Jericho, the military takeover of the district, was launched on 28
February 1966. That year’s Annual Report
of the Ministry of Defence, best describes Delhi’s appreciation of the situation:
Extremist elements in the Mizo Hills
District posed a serious threat to the maintenance of law and order by the
civil administration in the beginning of March 1966. Well planned, widespread
and coordinated attacks were made by armed gangs on various administrative
centers and outposts in the district. In the outlying areas, after some time
these gangs succeeded in obtaining control of the outposts, killed and
kidnapped some government personnel including police and Assam Rifles personnel
and looted and destroyed Government property.
The
shock of the challenge in the remote corner of India perhaps led to the ferocity
of the Indian reaction, including the use of airpower.
After the siege laid by Mizo insurgents was broken by Army operations, the
guerrillas melted into the rugged terrain. The Annual Report describes the operations in these words:
The Army went to the aid of civil
authorities, quickly cleared road blocks, restored communications and relieved
the situation in administrative centers that were threatened. The besieged
posts were supplied food and ammunition by air. By the middle of March 1966 the
law and order situation had improved considerably and all the main
administrative centers and outposts were free from extremist control or threat.
The hostile elements then took to the interior and for their maintenance
resorted to raiding of villages and extortion of money and rations besides
indulging in atrocities. Mobile columns were, therefore, dispatched for
intensive patrolling and for searching and destroying hostile hide-outs. The
hostiles have since been on the run.
The
combination of high literacy, warrior qualities and political motivation made the
opposition formidable guerilla fighters.
The scheme for grouping of villages that followed military action was to slice
off sustenance and support for these insurgents. It was thought up and
implemented in 1967 to 1970. This proved to be ‘undoubtedly a harsh tactic’,
amounting to perhaps an abiding blemish on India’s otherwise remarkable record. The
‘lesson learnt’ has been that it has not been followed subsequently in the
other counter insurgency campaigns that India has engaged in since. The
view in New Delhi
of the situation then is summarized in the Annual
Report:
As the hostiles have been raiding and
committing atrocities on outlying villages, the Army assisted by the civil
administration in transferring the population, in certain areas, along with
their belongings to bigger villages in the vicinity of the main road so as to
ensure better protection for the inhabitants and also to isolate hostile
elements. The Army provided considerable assistance, provision of water supply
etc., in order to promote the grouping of villages and the orderly resettlement
of the transferred population.
Breaking the siege
A
history of the Assam Rifles, responsible for security in Mizoram at the time,
records that, ‘The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the
Government at last decided to send reinforcements to the Mizo Hills. In
February 1966, orders were issued for the induction of 18th Assam
Rifles, a development that alarmed the MNF leadership. For them it suddenly
became a question of now or never; and they decided to start the revolt before
18th Battalion could reach Aizwal.’
Operation Jericho
has received much praise from a military writer, who describes it as a
‘masterstroke’ with ‘near complete military preparation’ amounting to an
‘expression of confidence and clinical planning not witnessed hithertofore in
the Indian subcontinent.’ It has been taken as a ‘marvel in military planning,
in terms of ability to achieve surprise.’
Vivek
Chadha explains the military precision as being a result of ‘the fact that a
large number of volunteers who joined in the armed struggle were either
ex-servicemen or dismissed personnel of the Assam Regiment battalions for lack
of discipline.’ In
Chadha’s view, this ‘ideal mix gave the battalions an enviable strength in
terms of professional abilities and basic military training, which take years
to inculcate in an organization. It also brought inherent military virtues of
detailed operational planning, sound logistics backup and disciplined cohesive
amalgamation. All these qualities were more than perceptibly visible,
immediately after launch of Operation Jericho.’
The
official history of the Assam Rifles records, ‘At the time 1 Assam Rifles and 4
companies of 5 Border Security Force were in Mizoram. The main stumbling block
in the MNF design was in gaining simultaneous control of Aizwal, Lunghleh and
Champai and cut the Silchar road by capture of Chhinluang was 1 Assam Rifles…’
That surprise was complete is evident from the fact that the Commanding Officer
of 1 Assam Rifles was away to Shillong for a conference. If
Laldenga’s move is seen as a preemptive attack, the strategic intelligence
cannot be taken as faulty. However, tactical intelligence was a failure. This
is a veritable hallmark of India’s
counter insurgency cycle.
A
participant in the relief operations to evict the MNF was Mathew Thomas. His
recall of events was, ‘When 61 Mountain Brigade was pushed in with 8 SIKH in
the lead and 2 PARA behind them, 8 SIKH could not get into Aizwal because of
the fact that Assam Rifles were still holding out, but the Mizos were all
around…We had to bring in the Air Force. It strafed them and it was only after
that we were able to push in and get into Aizwal…the situation was very
volatile.’
Heliborne reinforcements were attempted but the ‘sniping was too close to the camp
and too heavy for the choppers to come down’
Therefore, ‘at last at 1130 hrs, came the air strikes, IAF fighters strafing
hostile positions all around the Battalion area. The strafing was repeated in
the afternoon and it soon became apparent that the hostiles were beginning to
scatter….’ At the
end of air action, Aizwal town caught fire. Later, ‘from 9 to 13 March the IAF
strafed the hostiles positions, forcing them to scatter, and brought some
relief to the hard pressed garrison (Demagiri).’ It
is interesting to note that the MoD Annual
Report makes no mention of offensive air action at all.
While
seemingly a military over reaction, a Welsh missionary records that, ‘Five
minutes before we were due to start an aeroplane came overhead machine gunning…They
were not firing at random, but trying to aim at the rebels position as it
were…’
This must be seen alongside the preexisting position on the issue of use of air
power. The Army had once suggested air force for air support but the idea had
been rejected by Nehru.
So serious was the crisis, that there was also a para-drop at Lunghlei to
retrieve the situation earliest.
Reflecting on the uncharacteristic reaction, Chadha reasons:
It was probably an angry reaction
caused due to the virtual loss of the town, which prompted the government to
take as drastic a stepe as it finally did. It did little for the people who had
already been alienated by the state government and only caused more damage –
both mental and physical – to the town….However, it must clearly be understood
that it conveyed two contrasting messages to the people, even if the intent was
not to do so. The first was that the nation would use requisite force available
at its disposal to uphold the unity and integrity of the country. The second
was from the point of view of the people of the region. It probably conveyed to
them that the security forces were willing to employ harsh and punitive
measures to teach them a lesson for their betrayal. It is this second aspect
which alienated the moderates…and which increased the hold and grasp of
insurgency…
Once
the guerrillas dispersed, the insurgency settled in with peoples support. The Annual Report for the year describes the
outcome in the following words:
Cordial relations have been maintained
by the Army with the civil population in the Mizo Hills, as a result of liaison
kept with village councils and the local administration. The Army has also
taken steps to prevent the movements of hostiles and supplies across the
borders with Pakistan.
On the whole the situation in Mizo Hills is well in hand and with
intensification of rounding up measures now made possible by grouping, it is
expected that the lawless activities of the rebels will be substantially
reduced in the near future.
In
an interview to Vivek Chadha, Mathew Thomas recalled: ‘In the initial stages
the Army was not liked at all, because of the fact that we had to take very
harsh measures to cull the rebellion. We were just three battalions and the
fourth battalion came later and it was a huge are that one had. We had to open
all axes from south to north and had to clear all the major villages along the
central route. In doing that people were alienated to a certain extent, due to
the fact that we were not very sure how to go about things. None of the
battalions that were from 61 Mountain Brigade had any experience of counter
insurgency…But we learnt on the way, we learnt very quickly I would say.’
At
this stage, Laldenga, subject to India’s military resolve on
display, had afterthoughts and sent out feelers for a compromise. These were
rebuffed,
prolonging the insurgency as events were to prove by two decades. This issue
needs underlining since initiation of the peace process is slovenly in the
Indian circumstance. The need to reach a military position of strength first
forecloses the political option. The Home Minister, YB Chavan, is reported to
have said, ‘Let them give up arms. After that we can talk’; reasoning
(breathtakingly) that ‘I have to punish my children severely if they behave
badly.’
Grouping of villages
The
scheme for the grouping of existing villages was begun on 3 January 1967. These
were named ‘Protected and Progressive
Villages’ (PPV) under
Rule 57 of the Defence of India Rules. Due to paucity of troops to implement
the scheme, it was done in four phases. The first phase covered 106 villages
and a population of 52, 210 grouped into 18 PPVs. The second phase till August
1969 covered 184 villages with a population of 97339 into 40 New Grouping
Centers. The third was of 120 villages with 47156 people into 26 Voluntary
Grouping Centers and was between 1968 and August 1970. The last, named
‘Extended Loop Areas’ covered 63 villages with a population of 34219. The
later two phases were interrupted by stay orders from the Gauhati High Court.
The
strategy had origin in South East Asia, in Malaya and then in Vietnam. On the
strategic hamlets program in Vietnam,
the judgment was unanimous even by 1964 that it was a failure. The opinion was that, ‘Strategic Hamlets
represented an attempt by a weak government to control physically people it did
not understand because of antagonistic class and religious differences…the
construction of Strategic Hamlets was thus a threefold disruption of peasant
life: first, in order to build the hamlets, work in fields, a necessity for
survival, had to stop; second, the distance between forts and fields, in
conjuction with dusk to dawn curfews, made farming difficult for all and
impossible for some...Peasants resisted the program.’ Militarily, ‘one projected benefit of
Strategic Hamlets included creating ‘free fire zones’, Once a fortified
Strategic Hamlet had been constructed, the surrounding area became a virtually
unrestricted target zone…’
This was understandable given the manner the US Army approached counter
insurgency in its reliance on firepower.
Despite
limitations of the strategy, it was replicated in Mizoram. A military writer,
VK Singh, in his profile of military leaders, Leadership in the Indian Army, attributes the idea to Sagat Singh
in his chapter on the military hero. Sagat Singh had already acquired a
reputation as a tactician, having commanded the Para brigade in the liberation
of Goa and in facing up to the Chinese in the
stand off at Nathu La in 1967. VK Singh attributes the idea of grouping of
villages to Sagat Singh, though this seems improbable, since Sagat Singh only
took over command of the 101 Communication Zone in 1967. The implementation of
the idea was already ongoing since January that year, which means it was
conceptualized in 1966 after the insurgency spread. Nevertheless, VK Singh
records:
To reduce the feeling of neglect by
providing food, medical care and other facilities, and also to improve
security, Sagat decided to group the villages astride the only road in the
region that ran between Aizawl and Lunghleh. There were strong objections from
the civil administration on legal and administrative grounds. Fortunately,
Sagat’s excellent rapport with Assam’s
Chief Minister, B.P. Chaliha, and the Governor, B.K. Nehru, enabled him to have
his way and he could carry out the grouping as planned.
On
the grouping scheme, ‘Monty’ Palit writes, that ‘in order to isolate the
insurgents and deny them moral and material support from villages, in 1967 the
security forces grouped the villagers and rural people into Group Centers under
Operation Accomplishment. The grouping scheme covered a 930 km belt astride the
road from Veirangte…through Aizwal, Serchhip and South of Lunghleh. A total of
18 group Centers and there smaller protected villages were created. Operation
Accomplishment took the hostiles completely by surprise and proved very
successful…’ The
logic and the method is covered by him as under:
As Mizo insurgents were entirely
dependent on the village…and for security forces it was not possible to keep in
an eye on all villages and villagers, therefore, a new concept was evolved,
code named ‘Operation Blanket’. Under this operaiont each company of the Army
and of Assam Rifles established two posts of about 20 men each, self contained
for 10-14 days next to villages…These posts…were supposed to get to know all
the people staying in the village so that they could weed out active MNF
sympathizers and thus separate the Mizo insurgents from the people…Operation Blanket
proved only a partial success.
Since
civil administration had collapsed, the military had a larger role to play in
the relocation of villages. Sood describes the operation, writing, ‘Army
engineers and pioneers were deployed to help the regrouped villages in becoming
self-sufficient at the earliest….This helped in curbing free movement of the
insurgent and cutting down on the use of trained troops on guarding duties.’
The operations over time involved, ‘Army officers from nearby units were posted
to these regrouped villages as GCC (Grouping Center Commanders) to oversee the
rehabilitation and distribution of material and rations…Since the civil
administration had virtually collapse din this area, it was the responsibility
of the GCC to ensure successful implementation of this scheme suitably backed by the Assam Rifles and the
Army….’ His judgment is that, ‘This was a bold experiment by Eastern Command
and was tried out successfully for the first time.’
The fact escapes attention is that in case of collapse of civil administration,
it is not for the people to pay a price, nor can the Army expect to substitute.
Sam Manekshaw’s perspective is summed up by his former ADC, ‘Shubhi’ Sood.
He writes:
The insurgents had a wide base, and
were regularly collecting taxes from the population, that was spread far and
wide in small hamlets.… Whenever SF elements were ambushed in the vicinity of
these villages, headmen and their councils in villages were blamed and
punished. The villagers thereafter had a ‘Hobson’s Choice’.… In order therefore
to secure the villages against harassment by the insurgents while at the same
time denying them their sanctuaries information and so on, and securing the
axis of maintenance of the SF, a plan to regroup many small hamlets lying close
to the axis into larger groups was conceived by Sam.
The
consequences appear predictable in retrospect. DK Palit, himself a military
man, observes that, ‘it is unfortunate that the regrouping scheme was also
striking at the heart of the tribal economy, cutting the farmers off from their
traditional jhooms (shifting
cultivation). The curfew imposed on these areas restricted movement to and from
the grouped villages to their farming areas….Hunting had already been denied
because of the confiscation of fire-arms. Since theirs was not a market
economy, the disruption in the lives and norms of the villages was
considerable. All this had the effect of creating a sullen resentment against
the security forces among all but the more educated of the Mizo people. The
bitterness that resulted would take years to be assuaged.’
An interesting effect was that ‘stealing or theft very uncommon in the Mizo
Society became quite natural.’
Contrary to this appreciation, the laconic Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1967-68 approvingly
stating instead,
After the successful completion of the
transference of the population of the villages on either side of the road from
Vairangte to Lunghleh to the newly established protected villages and other
facilities such as supplies, housing and water supply etc., the army
transferred the administration of the new villages to the civil authorities.
BG
Verghese visited Mizoram as an official in the PM’s secretariat. He carried the
impression back with him that, ‘the insurgency continued from sanctuaries in
East Pakistan, but the grouping of villages - bringing small hamlets together
in more viable roadside units – though originally resented had worked well, and
sections of the Mizo National Front appeared willing to come to a settlement.’
The return of relative peace owed to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, and consequent loss
of sanctuary there. The Union
Territory was established
in 1972. By 1973-74 as greater peace came, people started de-grouping from
Group Centers established by SFs for counter insurgency.
The
counter insurgency campaign continued since the insurgency did alongside,
counting in its toll the Inspector General of Police in 1975. A desultory peace
process, interrupted by India’s
Emergency and later the change of power in Delhi,
was started in which Laldenga interfaced through intelligence channels with Delhi.
BG Verghese writes that 82 percent of the population was ‘herded’ into these
villages. While ‘the policy of resource denial to the rebels worked, but the
effect on the civil population was harsh. There was above all deep resentment…’
Therefore, in the analysis of the strategy, it needs to be gauged against not
only a military, but also political and civilisational parameters.
PART II – ANALYSING THE
OPERATIONS
Higher decision making
While
the issue has local and institutional roots, the national level needs factoring
in: in particular, the aspect of perspectives. It bears recall that in early
January 1966, there was a change of guard in Delhi with death of Prime Minister, Shastri’s
death. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was chosen over the claims of Morarji Desai by the
Congress ‘Syndicate’ led by Kamaraj, under the impression that ‘the state
leaders would accept only an innocuous person for Prime Minister at the Center.’
Her ascendance was at a particularly delicate period for India. As it
is, the sixties were characterized as the ‘dangerous decades’.
The question remained over India’s
national cohesion, ‘After Nehru, Who?’
To the historian in Ramchandra Guha, the late 1960s were reminiscent of the
late 1940s, ‘likewise a time of crisis and conflict, of resentment along lines
of class, religion, ethnicity and region, of a center that barely seemed to
hold.’
Guha quotes a western observer: ‘the bizarre range of India’s seething problems of
religious fanaticism, language barriers, religious feuds.’ Adding to the unrest
were shortages of food and inflation, with India living a ‘ship to mouth’
existence in the pre-Green Revolution era.
There were fears voiced that ‘the breakdown in law and order will be so
complete that the Army will take power…’, with Neville Maxwell maintaining,
‘the crisis is upon India…the already fraying fabric of the nation itself’
maintenance of an ordered structure of society is going to slip out of reach of
an ordered structure of civil government and the army will be the only alternative source of
authority.’ The
outbreak of Naxalism at Naxalbari was just round the corner.
Indira Gandhi was unexpectedly thrust into office in 1966. Like Nehru, she was
in control in Delhi
by winning the election in 1967. But like him, she could not be certain how far
her government’s writ ran beyond it.
Mrs. Gandhi’s first test in high office was the Mizo insurgency. Guha writes,
‘Her first months in office were if anything as troubled as her father’s.
Nothing much happened in February, but in March a major revolt broke out in the
Mizo Hills.’
Attitudes
are critical to policy response. Nagaland insurgency, that had preceded the
Mizo one by a decade, had shaped perceptions in India towards its North East. With
Mizoram being located close by, counter insurgency efforts in Mizoram were
often linked with those in Nagaland. A
representative attitude with respect to the Nagas then prevalent in the
decision making elite can be seen from the account of the Assam Governor,
BK Nehru, in his memoirs. In his view,
‘the underground were law breakers and would have to be dealt with as
such. If the underground indulged in violence, I would make sure they were
beaten up that they would not do it again.’
To one Naga sympathetic interlocutor, he narrates giving the following logic:
If each Naga killed ten Indians he
would only kill five million people before killing himself. There would still
remain 495 million Indians. But there would be no more Nagas left on this
planet…The Nagas should realize the consequences to them of the continuance of
violence. If, of course, they had a lemming complex and wanted to commit mass
suicide, I really could not help them.
But
BK Nehru absolves himself of anything to do with Mizoram writing: ‘The Lushai
Hills (Mizoram) was being handled by the Government of India direct. Though
nominally the government of Assam
continued to have jurisdiction over the district and there was a Deputy Commissioner
always in residence, the real power was wieled by the army under the direct
control of Delhi.
The Governor was therefore not in any way responsible for the administration of
Mizoram, though I did once visit the area to see what was happening.’
Yet
the Governor’s role was crucial in the times. Section 3 of the Fifth Schedule
to the Constitution has it that ‘the Governor of each state having scheduled
areas therein shall annually or whenever so required by the President, make a
report to the President regarding the administration of the scheduled areas in
the state....’ Section 5(2) states that ‘The Governor may make regulations for
the peace and good governance of any area of the state which is for the time
being a Scheduled Area.’
It is interesting that spare capacity did exist in the office of the Governor
for a proactive interest, in case it had been institutionally prescribed. BK
Nehru had a role to play in the stabilizing of the state government in Nagaland
after creation of the state there in 1963. In this case, that he was
under-employed, is evident from his narration of life in the Raj Bhawan,
Shillong:
‘There being nothing really serious
for me to do in Assam…,
I spent much of my time in Nagaland than seems to have been done by any of my
predecessors and with I am immodest enough to think benefit to the country. For
the rest I enjoyed myself wih playing badminton in the Darbar Hall…playing
billiards and croquet and bridge with whoever was available.’
BG
Verghese records that the issue of reaction to the insurgency was discussed
with the Chaliha government by Indira Gandhi at the Gauhati airport. He was
present in his capacity as the media adviser to the PM. Also, present at the
meeting were Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, Dev Kanta Barooah and Chaliha. They
had met Sam Manekshaw already at Calcutta
from where the delegation flew to Gauhati. At the Gauhati meeting, the
Intelligence Bureau Director said that the intelligence was forthcoming as a
result of which two battalions of the Assam Rifles had been earmarked for move
to Mizo Hills. Laldenga, perhaps getting wind of this, acted preemptively.
Accountability for what happened then needs to be traced to Delhi. The stand-off attitude of the Chaliha
government cannot be overlooked.
The
military dimension
The
military reaction to the insurrection in Mizo Hills is understandable. India had only recently lost a war with China. It was
contending with an insurgency in Nagaland that was being supported by China. The
presence of East Pakistan and ever helpful Pakistani intelligence across a
permeable border was not lost on the Command Headquarters at Calcutta, led by Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw. The
area was at the end of long and tenuous line of communication. A communist
insurgency was raging in the close vicinity in South East
Asia. The influence of the counter insurgency practices there were
being felt; the use of air power in the Vietnam War being a significant one.
This was of a piece with the Army’s counter insurgency legacy from the British
times both in North West Frontier province and also in the pacification
expeditions targeting tribes in the Naga Hills.
It was believed that the success of counter insurgency in Malaya
by the British owed in part to the application of the technique of grouping of
villages of Chinese squatters. These factors converged to make grouping of
villages a seemingly attractive strategy.
Insurgency
is taken as a professional problem having a repertoire of practices to address,
amongst which is grouping. This has credible pedigree in having been practiced
not only by the British as per the Briggs plan in Malaya, but also adopted by
the US as part of their
counter insurgency support for South
Vietnam in the early sixties under the
‘Strategic Hamlet’ program. They received advice from their British adviser,
Sir Robert Thompson, who had been associated earlier with the British effort in
Malaya.
Nevertheless, the practice was not alien to Vietnam, having been implemented by
the French colonizers in Indo-China under their ‘agroville’ concept. What
escaped the military chain of command was that these were foreign armies
operating away from home.
The
military viewed it was a useful strategy. A military man, Onkar Kalkat, opines
that, ‘The establishment of grouped villages in the Mizo Hills was a great
success, since normal life without harassment could be led there. The army,
which first set these PPVs up, did a magnificent job and gained the respect and
admiration of the locals…Unfortunately ever since the civil administration took
these over, they have deteriorated considerably…’
Presumably, he refers to the later period as coinciding with the return of the
people to their original villages. His view of the Naga experiment is
expectedly different. He expresses satisfaction at the precedent in Nagaland,
noting that, ‘In an attempt to bring a speedy end to the hostilities villages
were grouped and the people concentrated in effectively guarded stockades
located near Army posts. This enabled the Army to operate freely in the jungles
and deprive the hostile of his means of sustenance, the villagers.’
This despite himself admitting, ‘The system was not without its difficulties.
The villagers found it unsatisfactory, as their movements were restricted to
certain timings; and as they could not get to the fields without protection.
The produce had to be carried back to secure places, and due to the limited
hours its quantity declined…’
Kalkat
lays the onus on the people to bear with the inconvenience. To him, ‘Measures
to prevent the insurgents from access to the local population are liable to be
unpopular with the latter as it is interferes with their traditional liberties,
and makes inroads into their earnings….these measures must therefore explained
and justified to the people, who must be made aware that the battle against the
hostiles is a joint one, in which they must participate as a part of their duty
to the nation and in their own interest.’
Since such measures would attract criticism, he recommends that such criticism
be discredited, stating: ‘The suggestions regarding degrouping, relaxation of
curfew and reducing army influence over the population can only be termed as
mischievous, as implementation of these proposals would result in fresh
outbreaks of violence and prolongation of the conflict. Such statements
(degrouping of villages) made for cheap popularity have far reaching
repercussions.’
It
bears recording that the precedent already existing in Eastern Command was
ignored. A similar experiment as the Briggs Plan, named after Sir Gerald
Templer’s director of operations in Malaya,
had been tried in Nagaland. Rajesh Rajagopalan writes that ‘One fundamental
lesson that the Indian Army derived from these (Malayan campaign) was the
importance of isolating guerrillas from the population and maintaining control
over the population…the model for ‘isolating the guerrillas from the people’
came primarily from the British experience in Malaya. Army writings approvingly
cited the British model in resettling villagers in large, grouped villages
established under army control…The grouping scheme began in early 1957 in Sema
Naga area.’ The
experiment, though successful in Malaya,
failed in Nagaland.
Chadha opines that, ‘the Indian government’s policy post-independence, of
relocating the Nagas, was viewed by them as an attempt to impinge on their
right to live with their age old way of life. It succeeded in alienating them
from not only the government, but also the army. And rather than stopping the
flow of support for the militants, it only strengthened the case of the
insurgent groups, and enhanced animosity towards the army, which adversely
affected the ability to collect intelligence and amalgamate the Naga into the
national mainstream.’
Complaints and logistical difficulties put a stop to the program there by end
1958.
Judging
critically through liberal lenses from today’s vantage would be unfair to the
two leading military protagonists who gained additional fame for their work in
the subsequent 1971 War. Sagat
Singh observed that there were lack of intelligence, lack of attunement of the
infantry battalions to insurgency situations, and ill-treatment of the locals
by a few post commanders. He set about to remedy this by devising his own
intelligence system; adjusting training of infantry battalions to suit the
peculiar circumstances for which an adhoc
training camp was started that was later to became the famous Counter
Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairangte;
and by issuing strict orders against harassment and ill treatment of the
population, while meting out exemplary punishment to erring post commanders.
The logic of the scheme appears to have been to, ‘enable the security forces to
operate more freely against the hostiles in the depopulated areas, thus
lessening the risk of inadvertently harassing innocent people. Furthermore, the
concentration of villagers into larger centers would enable civil
administration to implement its various economic and social programs more
effectively…’ Access
to intelligence would be possible, even while the aim of separating the
guerrilla fish from the water was met.
Clearly,
these were military professionals doing the best they could under the
geopolitical, political and military constraints. Manekshaw’s aide, ‘Shubhi’
Sood’s judgment is that,
Manekshaw’s approach to the
insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram was very mature and realistic. He was
clear that these were ‘political’ problems and the military could only create
conditions in which political solutions could be found by holding talks and so
on. It was the task of the army to achieve ascendancy over the armed insurgent.
In establishing ascendancy, the Army had to be alert and not entrapped into
taking casualties through complacency. It had to ensure that measures to win the
hearts and minds of the people were put into place simultaneously.
Yet,
the military results of the grouping scheme were not of a spectacular order as
to retrospectively justify it. That the casualty ratio in operations between 1
March 1966 and 31 December 1967 was 491 Mizos killed versus only 12 security
forces.
An alternative figure on casualties is given by Vijender Singh Jafa.
Even taking the higher figures as accurate, it would still be difficult to
justify the strategy of resettling 80 percent of the population. Instead the
casualty ratio suggests that the situation was well under control after the MNF
were dislodged in merely ten days in March 1966. That they had an estimated
strength of 10000 thereafter suggests that the MNF got a boost from the
strategy of grouping. Further, grouping could not be sustained beyond a few
years. Instead, the insurgency continued into the next two decades.
The
strategy was also out of sync with the normative template. The Nehru-influenced
template, available in the form of the COAS Special Order of the Day (extract
below) on the outbreak of the Naga insurgency, had it that,
You must remember that all the people
of the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians. They may have
different religions, pursue a different way of life, but they are Indians and
the very fact, that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s
greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken up arms against
their own people and are disrupting peace of this area. You are to protect the
mass of the people in the area from these disruptive elements. You are not to
fight the people in the area but to protect them.
In
judging the grouping scheme, the postulation of Prussian thinker von Clausewitz
that politics precedes military considerations provides a fair yardstick. A
Mizo Brigadier in the Indian Army, T Sailo, later chief minister, wrote to the
Prime Minister in dismay on his return home on retirement, ‘But the feelings of
the entire village population of Mizoram are now totally alienated by what
amounts to the denial of all decencies of human rights; and any picture which
you may have had painted to you to the contrary is false….’
Such criticism attracted by the policy has rightly led to its elimination from
India’s counter insurgency repertoire. The insurgency came to an end not only
because of military pressure, but also due to the desire of the Mizo leader,
Laldenga, to bring it to a closure.
Conclusion
India has much in its doctrine
and practice of counter insurgency that is useful for the rest of the world.
However, possible shortfalls in Indian practice have lessons to be learnt. The
Mizo experience is taken as a successful one
in light of the happy outcome of preservation of territorial integrity,
strengthening of democracy and the negotiated nature of conflict termination.
This paper has tried to revisit this forgotten insurgency and its counter. The
aim has been to understand the operations in the context of the times without
obfuscating the possible shortfalls in strategy. The grouping scheme can be
seen in retrospect to have been avoidable. The positive aspect is that chief
lesson from Mizoram, of avoiding imposition on the population’s way of life, has
been well learnt.
The second lesson of non-use of air power in internal security operations has
also been internalised. The more important lesson has been that of preventing
situations arising of such extreme challenges. On this score there was much
learning left as the record of June 1984 in Punjab and of January 1990 in Kashmir indicates. The chief lessons are that ‘prevention
is better than cure’ and secondly that political solutions need to be progressed
early and with commitment.
Words - 6200
DK Palit, Sentinels of the North East, New Delhi: Palit and
Palit, 1984, p. 255.
Ministry of
Defence, Annual Report 1966-67, New Delhi: Ministry of
Defence, 1967, p. 21.
DK Palit, Sentinels of the North East, New Delhi: Palit and
Palit, 1984, p . 258-59.
Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, New
Delhi: Sage, 2005, p. 388.
Ibid, p. 337. The
issue of ex-servicemen joining militant ranks is disputed by SK Pillai (Assam Vikram: Unique Valour – History of the
Assam Regiment 1947-2002, New Delhi: MacMillan 2004, p. 28-30). He writes:
‘Some books on Mizo insurgency have attributed the disbandment of 2 Assam as one of
the causes for growth of insurgency in the area. This is overstating the case
as out of the 145 men sent home, the number of Mizos were 45.’
Guardians of the North East: The Assam
Rifles, 1835-2002, New Delhi:
DGAR, 2003,
p. 80-81.
Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, p.
340.
Ram Chandra Guha, India After Gandhi,
p. 406.
Chadha, Low
Intensity Conflicts in India,
p. 340.
Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire, p. 155. Also see
the narration on peace initiatives of the Church led by Zairema in Nirmal Nibedon, Mizoram:
The Dagger Brigade, New Delhi:
Lancers, 1980, p. 117-18. The precedence given to the military prong over the
political prong persists, see ‘The govt sabotaged talks with Maoists’, Mail Today, 4 Aug 2010, on the killing
of Maoist leader engaged in ceasefire talks with Swami Agnivesh recently.
Michael
Maclear, Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War, London: Thames Methuen,
1981, p. 88.
JW
Gibson, The Prefect War, New York: The Atlantic
Press, 1986 p. 83.
VK Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army, New Delhi: Sage, 2005, p.
314-315. Also see, SC Narang, Military Generals of India, Delhi: Prashant Publishing
House, p. 236-7.
Nirmal Nibedon dates
the beginning of the trickle back to 1971, The
Dagger Brigade, p. 158.
BK Nehru, Nice guys finish second, p. 488.
OS Kalkat, The Farflung Frontiers, New Delhi: Allied
Publishers, p. 96.
Another attempt in
1964 in the Kohima-Mokokchung area failed though some villages were regrouped
as a punitive measure (Rajagopalan, Fighting
Like a Guerilla, p. 151).
The
analogy is attributed to Mao’s statement that, ‘revolutionary fighters are
fish, the people are the sea in which they swim’. See, John Shy and T Collier,
‘Revolutionary War’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers
of Modern Strategy, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 842.
Nirmal Nebedon, Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade, New Delhi: Lancers, 1980,
p. 124, note 5.
Karl von Clausewitz,
On War, Paret, P. and Howard, M. (eds.), Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976.
