MIZORAM: THE FORGOTTEN INSURGENCY

Abstract

 

Mizoram is rightly taken as one of India’s counter insurgency success stories. The early experience in Mizoram has considerable learning value. This article dwells on the first two phases of counter insurgency in the Mizo Hills district of Assam in the late sixties. The two phases were the initial breaking of the siege laid by the Mizo National Front in March 1966 and the later phase of grouping of villages. It is worth revisiting these episodes for insights on India’s way in countering insurgency.

 

Introduction

 

The Mizoram experience deserves special attention since India faced its gravest challenge in that remote corner of India. That the final successful ‘win-win’ outcome for both the insurgent and counter insurgent is to India’s credit, should not obscure unpalatable lessons from the history of that conflict. The aim here is to illumine the meager historical record. This paper looks at the first two phases of counter insurgency in Mizo Hills. The first phase was the rolling back of the Mizo National Front (MNF) gains made under its Operation Jericho in March 1966, in which offensive air power was witnessed for the first and only time in the history of independent India. The second phase involved grouping of villages as a strategy to seal off the sustenance base among the people of the MNF. Subsequent phases involving the peace process and counter insurgency are not covered here. The paper is laid out in two parts, with the operations being covered in the first part and an analysis of these in the second part.

 

PART I – THE EARLY PHASES

 

The setting

 

The Mizo insurgency is dated to the rat famine, Mautam that occurred at the turn of the sixties.[1] Noted military historian, Maj Gen DK Palit, writes, ‘Shillong’s initial indifference and subsequent delays in activating relief measures caused serious discontent among the people even alienating some of the more liberal leaders, unmitigated by any effort from the state government to organize local preparations and management, And when Assam government’s publicity machinery attempted to play down the extent of the disaster, the disillusionment was complete.’[2] Taking advantage of the neglect by the Assam government, under which the Districit Council of the Lushai Hills dictrict functioned, the Mizo National Famine Front, led by Laldenga, transformed into the Mizo National Front. Laldenga’s bid to capture the District Council dominated by the conservative Mizo Union, led to his reaching out to East Pakistan for support in 1963.[3] The ‘preparatory phase’ of the insurgency went on through the mid sixties till Operation Jericho, the military takeover of the district, was launched on 28 February 1966. That year’s Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence, best describes Delhi’s appreciation of the situation:

 

Extremist elements in the Mizo Hills District posed a serious threat to the maintenance of law and order by the civil administration in the beginning of March 1966. Well planned, widespread and coordinated attacks were made by armed gangs on various administrative centers and outposts in the district. In the outlying areas, after some time these gangs succeeded in obtaining control of the outposts, killed and kidnapped some government personnel including police and Assam Rifles personnel and looted and destroyed Government property.[4]

 

The shock of the challenge in the remote corner of India perhaps led to the ferocity of the Indian reaction, including the use of airpower.[5] After the siege laid by Mizo insurgents was broken by Army operations, the guerrillas melted into the rugged terrain. The Annual Report describes the operations in these words:

 

The Army went to the aid of civil authorities, quickly cleared road blocks, restored communications and relieved the situation in administrative centers that were threatened. The besieged posts were supplied food and ammunition by air. By the middle of March 1966 the law and order situation had improved considerably and all the main administrative centers and outposts were free from extremist control or threat. The hostile elements then took to the interior and for their maintenance resorted to raiding of villages and extortion of money and rations besides indulging in atrocities. Mobile columns were, therefore, dispatched for intensive patrolling and for searching and destroying hostile hide-outs. The hostiles have since been on the run.[6]

 

The combination of high literacy, warrior qualities and political motivation made the opposition formidable guerilla fighters.[7] The scheme for grouping of villages that followed military action was to slice off sustenance and support for these insurgents. It was thought up and implemented in 1967 to 1970. This proved to be ‘undoubtedly a harsh tactic’,[8] amounting to perhaps an abiding blemish on India’s otherwise remarkable record.[9] The ‘lesson learnt’ has been that it has not been followed subsequently in the other counter insurgency campaigns that India has engaged in since.[10] The view in New Delhi of the situation then is summarized in the Annual Report:

 

As the hostiles have been raiding and committing atrocities on outlying villages, the Army assisted by the civil administration in transferring the population, in certain areas, along with their belongings to bigger villages in the vicinity of the main road so as to ensure better protection for the inhabitants and also to isolate hostile elements. The Army provided considerable assistance, provision of water supply etc., in order to promote the grouping of villages and the orderly resettlement of the transferred population.[11]

 

Breaking the siege

 

A history of the Assam Rifles, responsible for security in Mizoram at the time, records that, ‘The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the Government at last decided to send reinforcements to the Mizo Hills. In February 1966, orders were issued for the induction of 18^th Assam Rifles, a development that alarmed the MNF leadership. For them it suddenly became a question of now or never; and they decided to start the revolt before 18^th Battalion could reach Aizwal.’[12] Operation Jericho has received much praise from a military writer, who describes it as a ‘masterstroke’ with ‘near complete military preparation’ amounting to an ‘expression of confidence and clinical planning not witnessed hithertofore in the Indian subcontinent.’ It has been taken as a ‘marvel in military planning, in terms of ability to achieve surprise.’[13]

 

Vivek Chadha explains the military precision as being a result of ‘the fact that a large number of volunteers who joined in the armed struggle were either ex-servicemen or dismissed personnel of the Assam Regiment battalions for lack of discipline.’[14] In Chadha’s view, this ‘ideal mix gave the battalions an enviable strength in terms of professional abilities and basic military training, which take years to inculcate in an organization. It also brought inherent military virtues of detailed operational planning, sound logistics backup and disciplined cohesive amalgamation. All these qualities were more than perceptibly visible, immediately after launch of Operation Jericho.’[15]

 

The official history of the Assam Rifles records, ‘At the time 1 Assam Rifles and 4 companies of 5 Border Security Force were in Mizoram. The main stumbling block in the MNF design was in gaining simultaneous control of Aizwal, Lunghleh and Champai and cut the Silchar road by capture of Chhinluang was 1 Assam Rifles…’[16] That surprise was complete is evident from the fact that the Commanding Officer of 1 Assam Rifles was away to Shillong for a conference.[17] If Laldenga’s move is seen as a preemptive attack, the strategic intelligence cannot be taken as faulty. However, tactical intelligence was a failure. This is a veritable hallmark of India’s counter insurgency cycle.

 

A participant in the relief operations to evict the MNF was Mathew Thomas. His recall of events was, ‘When 61 Mountain Brigade was pushed in with 8 SIKH in the lead and 2 PARA behind them, 8 SIKH could not get into Aizwal because of the fact that Assam Rifles were still holding out, but the Mizos were all around…We had to bring in the Air Force. It strafed them and it was only after that we were able to push in and get into Aizwal…the situation was very volatile.’[18] Heliborne reinforcements were attempted but the ‘sniping was too close to the camp and too heavy for the choppers to come down’[19] Therefore, ‘at last at 1130 hrs, came the air strikes, IAF fighters strafing hostile positions all around the Battalion area. The strafing was repeated in the afternoon and it soon became apparent that the hostiles were beginning to scatter….’[20] At the end of air action, Aizwal town caught fire. Later, ‘from 9 to 13 March the IAF strafed the hostiles positions, forcing them to scatter, and brought some relief to the hard pressed garrison (Demagiri).’[21] It is interesting to note that the MoD Annual Report makes no mention of offensive air action at all.[22]

 

While seemingly a military over reaction, a Welsh missionary records that, ‘Five minutes before we were due to start an aeroplane came overhead machine gunning…They were not firing at random, but trying to aim at the rebels position as it were…’[23] This must be seen alongside the preexisting position on the issue of use of air power. The Army had once suggested air force for air support but the idea had been rejected by Nehru.[24] So serious was the crisis, that there was also a para-drop at Lunghlei to retrieve the situation earliest.[25] Reflecting on the uncharacteristic reaction, Chadha reasons:

 

It was probably an angry reaction caused due to the virtual loss of the town, which prompted the government to take as drastic a stepe as it finally did. It did little for the people who had already been alienated by the state government and only caused more damage – both mental and physical – to the town….However, it must clearly be understood that it conveyed two contrasting messages to the people, even if the intent was not to do so. The first was that the nation would use requisite force available at its disposal to uphold the unity and integrity of the country. The second was from the point of view of the people of the region. It probably conveyed to them that the security forces were willing to employ harsh and punitive measures to teach them a lesson for their betrayal. It is this second aspect which alienated the moderates…and which increased the hold and grasp of insurgency…[26]

 

Once the guerrillas dispersed, the insurgency settled in with peoples support. The Annual Report for the year describes the outcome in the following words:

 

Cordial relations have been maintained by the Army with the civil population in the Mizo Hills, as a result of liaison kept with village councils and the local administration. The Army has also taken steps to prevent the movements of hostiles and supplies across the borders with Pakistan. On the whole the situation in Mizo Hills is well in hand and with intensification of rounding up measures now made possible by grouping, it is expected that the lawless activities of the rebels will be substantially reduced in the near future.[27]

 

In an interview to Vivek Chadha, Mathew Thomas recalled: ‘In the initial stages the Army was not liked at all, because of the fact that we had to take very harsh measures to cull the rebellion. We were just three battalions and the fourth battalion came later and it was a huge are that one had. We had to open all axes from south to north and had to clear all the major villages along the central route. In doing that people were alienated to a certain extent, due to the fact that we were not very sure how to go about things. None of the battalions that were from 61 Mountain Brigade had any experience of counter insurgency…But we learnt on the way, we learnt very quickly I would say.’[28]

 

At this stage, Laldenga, subject to India’s military resolve on display, had afterthoughts and sent out feelers for a compromise. These were rebuffed,[29] prolonging the insurgency as events were to prove by two decades. This issue needs underlining since initiation of the peace process is slovenly in the Indian circumstance. The need to reach a military position of strength first forecloses the political option. The Home Minister, YB Chavan, is reported to have said, ‘Let them give up arms. After that we can talk’; reasoning (breathtakingly) that ‘I have to punish my children severely if they behave badly.’[30]

 

Grouping of villages

 

The scheme for the grouping of existing villages was begun on 3 January 1967. These were named ‘Protected and Progressive Villages’ (PPV) under Rule 57 of the Defence of India Rules. Due to paucity of troops to implement the scheme, it was done in four phases. The first phase covered 106 villages and a population of 52, 210 grouped into 18 PPVs. The second phase till August 1969 covered 184 villages with a population of 97339 into 40 New Grouping Centers. The third was of 120 villages with 47156 people into 26 Voluntary Grouping Centers and was between 1968 and August 1970. The last, named ‘Extended Loop Areas’ covered 63 villages with a population of 34219.[31] The later two phases were interrupted by stay orders from the Gauhati High Court.[32]

 

The strategy had origin in South East Asia, in Malaya and then in Vietnam. On the strategic hamlets program in Vietnam, the judgment was unanimous even by 1964 that it was a failure.[33]  The opinion was that, ‘Strategic Hamlets represented an attempt by a weak government to control physically people it did not understand because of antagonistic class and religious differences…the construction of Strategic Hamlets was thus a threefold disruption of peasant life: first, in order to build the hamlets, work in fields, a necessity for survival, had to stop; second, the distance between forts and fields, in conjuction with dusk to dawn curfews, made farming difficult for all and impossible for some...Peasants resisted the program.’[34]  Militarily, ‘one projected benefit of Strategic Hamlets included creating ‘free fire zones’, Once a fortified Strategic Hamlet had been constructed, the surrounding area became a virtually unrestricted target zone…’[35] This was understandable given the manner the US Army approached counter insurgency in its reliance on firepower.

 

Despite limitations of the strategy, it was replicated in Mizoram. A military writer, VK Singh, in his profile of military leaders, Leadership in the Indian Army, attributes the idea to Sagat Singh in his chapter on the military hero. Sagat Singh had already acquired a reputation as a tactician, having commanded the Para brigade in the liberation of Goa and in facing up to the Chinese in the stand off at Nathu La in 1967. VK Singh attributes the idea of grouping of villages to Sagat Singh, though this seems improbable, since Sagat Singh only took over command of the 101 Communication Zone in 1967. The implementation of the idea was already ongoing since January that year, which means it was conceptualized in 1966 after the insurgency spread. Nevertheless, VK Singh records:

 

To reduce the feeling of neglect by providing food, medical care and other facilities, and also to improve security, Sagat decided to group the villages astride the only road in the region that ran between Aizawl and Lunghleh. There were strong objections from the civil administration on legal and administrative grounds. Fortunately, Sagat’s excellent rapport with Assam’s Chief Minister, B.P. Chaliha, and the Governor, B.K. Nehru, enabled him to have his way and he could carry out the grouping as planned.[36]

 

On the grouping scheme, ‘Monty’ Palit writes, that ‘in order to isolate the insurgents and deny them moral and material support from villages, in 1967 the security forces grouped the villagers and rural people into Group Centers under Operation Accomplishment. The grouping scheme covered a 930 km belt astride the road from Veirangte…through Aizwal, Serchhip and South of Lunghleh. A total of 18 group Centers and there smaller protected villages were created. Operation Accomplishment took the hostiles completely by surprise and proved very successful…’[37] The logic and the method is covered by him as under:

 

As Mizo insurgents were entirely dependent on the village…and for security forces it was not possible to keep in an eye on all villages and villagers, therefore, a new concept was evolved, code named ‘Operation Blanket’. Under this operaiont each company of the Army and of Assam Rifles established two posts of about 20 men each, self contained for 10-14 days next to villages…These posts…were supposed to get to know all the people staying in the village so that they could weed out active MNF sympathizers and thus separate the Mizo insurgents from the people…Operation Blanket proved only a partial success.[38]

 

Since civil administration had collapsed, the military had a larger role to play in the relocation of villages. Sood describes the operation, writing, ‘Army engineers and pioneers were deployed to help the regrouped villages in becoming self-sufficient at the earliest….This helped in curbing free movement of the insurgent and cutting down on the use of trained troops on guarding duties.’ The operations over time involved, ‘Army officers from nearby units were posted to these regrouped villages as GCC (Grouping Center Commanders) to oversee the rehabilitation and distribution of material and rations…Since the civil administration had virtually collapse din this area, it was the responsibility of the GCC to ensure successful implementation of this scheme  suitably backed by the Assam Rifles and the Army….’ His judgment is that, ‘This was a bold experiment by Eastern Command and was tried out successfully for the first time.’[39] The fact escapes attention is that in case of collapse of civil administration, it is not for the people to pay a price, nor can the Army expect to substitute. Sam Manekshaw’s perspective is summed up by his former ADC, ‘Shubhi’ Sood.[40] He writes:

 

The insurgents had a wide base, and were regularly collecting taxes from the population, that was spread far and wide in small hamlets.… Whenever SF elements were ambushed in the vicinity of these villages, headmen and their councils in villages were blamed and punished. The villagers thereafter had a ‘Hobson’s Choice’.… In order therefore to secure the villages against harassment by the insurgents while at the same time denying them their sanctuaries information and so on, and securing the axis of maintenance of the SF, a plan to regroup many small hamlets lying close to the axis into larger groups was conceived by Sam.[41]

 

The consequences appear predictable in retrospect. DK Palit, himself a military man, observes that, ‘it is unfortunate that the regrouping scheme was also striking at the heart of the tribal economy, cutting the farmers off from their traditional jhooms (shifting cultivation). The curfew imposed on these areas restricted movement to and from the grouped villages to their farming areas….Hunting had already been denied because of the confiscation of fire-arms. Since theirs was not a market economy, the disruption in the lives and norms of the villages was considerable. All this had the effect of creating a sullen resentment against the security forces among all but the more educated of the Mizo people. The bitterness that resulted would take years to be assuaged.’[42] An interesting effect was that ‘stealing or theft very uncommon in the Mizo Society became quite natural.’[43] Contrary to this appreciation, the laconic Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1967-68 approvingly stating instead,

 

After the successful completion of the transference of the population of the villages on either side of the road from Vairangte to Lunghleh to the newly established protected villages and other facilities such as supplies, housing and water supply etc., the army transferred the administration of the new villages to the civil authorities.

 

BG Verghese visited Mizoram as an official in the PM’s secretariat. He carried the impression back with him that, ‘the insurgency continued from sanctuaries in East Pakistan, but the grouping of villages - bringing small hamlets together in more viable roadside units – though originally resented had worked well, and sections of the Mizo National Front appeared willing to come to a settlement.’[44] The return of relative peace owed to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, and consequent loss of sanctuary there. The Union Territory was established in 1972. By 1973-74 as greater peace came, people started de-grouping from Group Centers established by SFs for counter insurgency.[45]

 

The counter insurgency campaign continued since the insurgency did alongside, counting in its toll the Inspector General of Police in 1975. A desultory peace process, interrupted by India’s Emergency and later the change of power in Delhi, was started in which Laldenga interfaced through intelligence channels with Delhi.[46] BG Verghese writes that 82 percent of the population was ‘herded’ into these villages. While ‘the policy of resource denial to the rebels worked, but the effect on the civil population was harsh. There was above all deep resentment…’[47] Therefore, in the analysis of the strategy, it needs to be gauged against not only a military, but also political and civilisational parameters.

 

PART II – ANALYSING THE OPERATIONS

 

Higher decision making

 

While the issue has local and institutional roots, the national level needs factoring in: in particular, the aspect of perspectives. It bears recall that in early January 1966, there was a change of guard in Delhi with death of Prime Minister, Shastri’s death. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was chosen over the claims of Morarji Desai by the Congress ‘Syndicate’ led by Kamaraj, under the impression that ‘the state leaders would accept only an innocuous person for Prime Minister at the Center.’[48] Her ascendance was at a particularly delicate period for India. As it is, the sixties were characterized as the ‘dangerous decades’.[49] The question remained over India’s national cohesion, ‘After Nehru, Who?’[50] To the historian in Ramchandra Guha, the late 1960s were reminiscent of the late 1940s, ‘likewise a time of crisis and conflict, of resentment along lines of class, religion, ethnicity and region, of a center that barely seemed to hold.’[51] Guha quotes a western observer: ‘the bizarre range of India’s seething problems of religious fanaticism, language barriers, religious feuds.’ Adding to the unrest were shortages of food and inflation, with India living a ‘ship to mouth’ existence in the pre-Green Revolution era.[52] There were fears voiced that ‘the breakdown in law and order will be so complete that the Army will take power…’, with Neville Maxwell maintaining, ‘the crisis is upon India…the already fraying fabric of the nation itself’ maintenance of an ordered structure of society is going to slip out of reach of an ordered structure of civil government and the army will be the only alternative source of authority.’[53] The outbreak of Naxalism at Naxalbari was just round the corner.[54] Indira Gandhi was unexpectedly thrust into office in 1966. Like Nehru, she was in control in Delhi by winning the election in 1967. But like him, she could not be certain how far her government’s writ ran beyond it.[55] Mrs. Gandhi’s first test in high office was the Mizo insurgency. Guha writes, ‘Her first months in office were if anything as troubled as her father’s. Nothing much happened in February, but in March a major revolt broke out in the Mizo Hills.’[56]

 

Attitudes are critical to policy response. Nagaland insurgency, that had preceded the Mizo one by a decade, had shaped perceptions in India towards its North East. With Mizoram being located close by, counter insurgency efforts in Mizoram were often linked with those in Nagaland.[57] A representative attitude with respect to the Nagas then prevalent in the decision making elite can be seen from the account of the Assam Governor, BK Nehru, in his memoirs. In his view,  ‘the underground were law breakers and would have to be dealt with as such. If the underground indulged in violence, I would make sure they were beaten up that they would not do it again.’[58] To one Naga sympathetic interlocutor, he narrates giving the following logic:

 

If each Naga killed ten Indians he would only kill five million people before killing himself. There would still remain 495 million Indians. But there would be no more Nagas left on this planet…The Nagas should realize the consequences to them of the continuance of violence. If, of course, they had a lemming complex and wanted to commit mass suicide, I really could not help them.[59]

 

But BK Nehru absolves himself of anything to do with Mizoram writing: ‘The Lushai Hills (Mizoram) was being handled by the Government of India direct. Though nominally the government of Assam continued to have jurisdiction over the district and there was a Deputy Commissioner always in residence, the real power was wieled by the army under the direct control of Delhi. The Governor was therefore not in any way responsible for the administration of Mizoram, though I did once visit the area to see what was happening.’[60]

 

Yet the Governor’s role was crucial in the times. Section 3 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution has it that ‘the Governor of each state having scheduled areas therein shall annually or whenever so required by the President, make a report to the President regarding the administration of the scheduled areas in the state....’ Section 5(2) states that ‘The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good governance of any area of the state which is for the time being a Scheduled Area.’[61] It is interesting that spare capacity did exist in the office of the Governor for a proactive interest, in case it had been institutionally prescribed. BK Nehru had a role to play in the stabilizing of the state government in Nagaland after creation of the state there in 1963. In this case, that he was under-employed, is evident from his narration of life in the Raj Bhawan, Shillong:

 

‘There being nothing really serious for me to do in Assam…, I spent much of my time in Nagaland than seems to have been done by any of my predecessors and with I am immodest enough to think benefit to the country. For the rest I enjoyed myself wih playing badminton in the Darbar Hall…playing billiards and croquet and bridge with whoever was available.’[62]

 

BG Verghese records that the issue of reaction to the insurgency was discussed with the Chaliha government by Indira Gandhi at the Gauhati airport. He was present in his capacity as the media adviser to the PM. Also, present at the meeting were Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, Dev Kanta Barooah and Chaliha. They had met Sam Manekshaw already at Calcutta from where the delegation flew to Gauhati. At the Gauhati meeting, the Intelligence Bureau Director said that the intelligence was forthcoming as a result of which two battalions of the Assam Rifles had been earmarked for move to Mizo Hills. Laldenga, perhaps getting wind of this, acted preemptively.[63] Accountability for what happened then needs to be traced to Delhi. The stand-off attitude of the Chaliha government cannot be overlooked.

 

The military dimension

 

The military reaction to the insurrection in Mizo Hills is understandable. India had only recently lost a war with China. It was contending with an insurgency in Nagaland that was being supported by China. The presence of East Pakistan and ever helpful Pakistani intelligence across a permeable border was not lost on the Command Headquarters at Calcutta, led by Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw. The area was at the end of long and tenuous line of communication. A communist insurgency was raging in the close vicinity in South East Asia. The influence of the counter insurgency practices there were being felt; the use of air power in the Vietnam War being a significant one. This was of a piece with the Army’s counter insurgency legacy from the British times both in North West Frontier province and also in the pacification expeditions targeting tribes in the Naga Hills. It was believed that the success of counter insurgency in Malaya by the British owed in part to the application of the technique of grouping of villages of Chinese squatters. These factors converged to make grouping of villages a seemingly attractive strategy.

 

Insurgency is taken as a professional problem having a repertoire of practices to address, amongst which is grouping. This has credible pedigree in having been practiced not only by the British as per the Briggs plan in Malaya, but also adopted by the US as part of their counter insurgency support for South Vietnam in the early sixties under the ‘Strategic Hamlet’ program. They received advice from their British adviser, Sir Robert Thompson, who had been associated earlier with the British effort in Malaya.[64] Nevertheless, the practice was not alien to Vietnam, having been implemented by the French colonizers in Indo-China under their ‘agroville’ concept. What escaped the military chain of command was that these were foreign armies operating away from home.

 

The military viewed it was a useful strategy. A military man, Onkar Kalkat, opines that, ‘The establishment of grouped villages in the Mizo Hills was a great success, since normal life without harassment could be led there. The army, which first set these PPVs up, did a magnificent job and gained the respect and admiration of the locals…Unfortunately ever since the civil administration took these over, they have deteriorated considerably…’[65] Presumably, he refers to the later period as coinciding with the return of the people to their original villages. His view of the Naga experiment is expectedly different. He expresses satisfaction at the precedent in Nagaland, noting that, ‘In an attempt to bring a speedy end to the hostilities villages were grouped and the people concentrated in effectively guarded stockades located near Army posts. This enabled the Army to operate freely in the jungles and deprive the hostile of his means of sustenance, the villagers.’[66] This despite himself admitting, ‘The system was not without its difficulties. The villagers found it unsatisfactory, as their movements were restricted to certain timings; and as they could not get to the fields without protection. The produce had to be carried back to secure places, and due to the limited hours its quantity declined…’[67]

 

Kalkat lays the onus on the people to bear with the inconvenience. To him, ‘Measures to prevent the insurgents from access to the local population are liable to be unpopular with the latter as it is interferes with their traditional liberties, and makes inroads into their earnings….these measures must therefore explained and justified to the people, who must be made aware that the battle against the hostiles is a joint one, in which they must participate as a part of their duty to the nation and in their own interest.’[68] Since such measures would attract criticism, he recommends that such criticism be discredited, stating: ‘The suggestions regarding degrouping, relaxation of curfew and reducing army influence over the population can only be termed as mischievous, as implementation of these proposals would result in fresh outbreaks of violence and prolongation of the conflict. Such statements (degrouping of villages) made for cheap popularity have far reaching repercussions.’[69]

 

It bears recording that the precedent already existing in Eastern Command was ignored. A similar experiment as the Briggs Plan, named after Sir Gerald Templer’s director of operations in Malaya, had been tried in Nagaland. Rajesh Rajagopalan writes that ‘One fundamental lesson that the Indian Army derived from these (Malayan campaign) was the importance of isolating guerrillas from the population and maintaining control over the population…the model for ‘isolating the guerrillas from the people’ came primarily from the British experience in Malaya. Army writings approvingly cited the British model in resettling villagers in large, grouped villages established under army control…The grouping scheme began in early 1957 in Sema Naga area.’[70] The experiment, though successful in Malaya, failed in Nagaland.[71] Chadha opines that, ‘the Indian government’s policy post-independence, of relocating the Nagas, was viewed by them as an attempt to impinge on their right to live with their age old way of life. It succeeded in alienating them from not only the government, but also the army. And rather than stopping the flow of support for the militants, it only strengthened the case of the insurgent groups, and enhanced animosity towards the army, which adversely affected the ability to collect intelligence and amalgamate the Naga into the national mainstream.’[72] Complaints and logistical difficulties put a stop to the program there by end 1958.[73] 

 

Judging critically through liberal lenses from today’s vantage would be unfair to the two leading military protagonists who gained additional fame for their work in the subsequent 1971 War.[74] Sagat Singh observed that there were lack of intelligence, lack of attunement of the infantry battalions to insurgency situations, and ill-treatment of the locals by a few post commanders. He set about to remedy this by devising his own intelligence system; adjusting training of infantry battalions to suit the peculiar circumstances for which an adhoc training camp was started that was later to became the famous Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairangte;[75] and by issuing strict orders against harassment and ill treatment of the population, while meting out exemplary punishment to erring post commanders.[76] The logic of the scheme appears to have been to, ‘enable the security forces to operate more freely against the hostiles in the depopulated areas, thus lessening the risk of inadvertently harassing innocent people. Furthermore, the concentration of villagers into larger centers would enable civil administration to implement its various economic and social programs more effectively…’[77] Access to intelligence would be possible, even while the aim of separating the guerrilla fish from the water was met.[78]

 

Clearly, these were military professionals doing the best they could under the geopolitical, political and military constraints. Manekshaw’s aide, ‘Shubhi’ Sood’s judgment is that,

 

Manekshaw’s approach to the insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram was very mature and realistic. He was clear that these were ‘political’ problems and the military could only create conditions in which political solutions could be found by holding talks and so on. It was the task of the army to achieve ascendancy over the armed insurgent. In establishing ascendancy, the Army had to be alert and not entrapped into taking casualties through complacency. It had to ensure that measures to win the hearts and minds of the people were put into place simultaneously.[79]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 

Yet, the military results of the grouping scheme were not of a spectacular order as to retrospectively justify it. That the casualty ratio in operations between 1 March 1966 and 31 December 1967 was 491 Mizos killed versus only 12 security forces.[80] An alternative figure on casualties is given by Vijender Singh Jafa.[81] Even taking the higher figures as accurate, it would still be difficult to justify the strategy of resettling 80 percent of the population. Instead the casualty ratio suggests that the situation was well under control after the MNF were dislodged in merely ten days in March 1966. That they had an estimated strength of 10000 thereafter suggests that the MNF got a boost from the strategy of grouping. Further, grouping could not be sustained beyond a few years. Instead, the insurgency continued into the next two decades.

 

The strategy was also out of sync with the normative template. The Nehru-influenced template, available in the form of the COAS Special Order of the Day (extract below) on the outbreak of the Naga insurgency, had it that, 

 

You must remember that all the people of the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians. They may have different religions, pursue a different way of life, but they are Indians and the very fact, that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken up arms against their own people and are disrupting peace of this area. You are to protect the mass of the people in the area from these disruptive elements. You are not to fight the people in the area but to protect them.[82]   

 

In judging the grouping scheme, the postulation of Prussian thinker von Clausewitz that politics precedes military considerations provides a fair yardstick.[83] A Mizo Brigadier in the Indian Army, T Sailo, later chief minister, wrote to the Prime Minister in dismay on his return home on retirement, ‘But the feelings of the entire village population of Mizoram are now totally alienated by what amounts to the denial of all decencies of human rights; and any picture which you may have had painted to you to the contrary is false….’[84] Such criticism attracted by the policy has rightly led to its elimination from India’s counter insurgency repertoire. The insurgency came to an end not only because of military pressure, but also due to the desire of the Mizo leader, Laldenga, to bring it to a closure.

 

Conclusion

India has much in its doctrine and practice of counter insurgency that is useful for the rest of the world. However, possible shortfalls in Indian practice have lessons to be learnt. The Mizo experience is taken as a successful one[85] in light of the happy outcome of preservation of territorial integrity, strengthening of democracy and the negotiated nature of conflict termination. This paper has tried to revisit this forgotten insurgency and its counter. The aim has been to understand the operations in the context of the times without obfuscating the possible shortfalls in strategy. The grouping scheme can be seen in retrospect to have been avoidable. The positive aspect is that chief lesson from Mizoram, of avoiding imposition on the population’s way of life, has been well learnt.[86] The second lesson of non-use of air power in internal security operations has also been internalised. The more important lesson has been that of preventing situations arising of such extreme challenges. On this score there was much learning left as the record of June 1984 in Punjab and of January 1990 in Kashmir indicates. The chief lessons are that ‘prevention is better than cure’ and secondly that political solutions need to be progressed early and with commitment.

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[1] Vivek Chadha’s view is that the outbreak of insurgency had more complex motivations. Aspects of India’s pre- and post-Independence history are equally important. See his ‘India’s counter insurgency campaign in Mizoram’, in Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler (eds.), India and Counter Insurgency: Lessons Learned, New York: Routledge, 2009.

[2] DK Palit, Sentinels of the North East, New Delhi: Palit and Palit, 1984, p. 255.

[3] Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North East India, New Delhi: Lancer Publication, 1998, pp. 141-453.

[4] Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 1966-67, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 1967, p. 21.

[5] It is characteristic of India’s counter insurgency cycle that it first neglects to prevent the problem from occurring, then neglects intelligence input on the insurgency in its preparatory period and finally cracks down with considerable vigour. Thereafter the insurgency settles into a long haul with peace talks coextensive with counter insurgency operations. This has been witnessed in Punjab, Assam and Kashmir.

[6] Annual Report 1966-67, p. 21.

[7] DK Palit, Sentinels of the North East, p. 254

[8] BG Verghese, First Draft: Witness to the Making of Modern India, New Delhi: Tranquebar, 2010, p. 88.

[9] For instance, during the same period, in Vietnam, the US was undertaking Operation Rolling Thunder to bomb Vietnam into submission. Over the past decade, it has been engaged in a brutal counter insurgency, first in Iraq and now in ‘AfPak’. Likewise, Russian operations in Chechenya have nothing to recommend them. The Pakistan Army’s sweep of Swat and South Waziristan resulted in over two million displaced people.

[10] The closest example has been the prevention of Gujars and Bakkarwals from going into their traditional pastures during the summers of 2003-05 as a consequence of Operation Sarp Vinash in Surankote Tehsil of Poonch district in J&K. The area was Hil Kaka in which a terrorist camp had been set up. The military launched an operation to destroy the camp in 2003-04. The people inconvenienced were given compensation in this case and the operation was necessary in their own safety and for national security.

[11] Annual Report 1966-67, p. 21.

[12] DK Palit, Sentinels of the North East, New Delhi: Palit and Palit, 1984, p . 258-59.

[13] Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, New Delhi: Sage, 2005, p. 388.

[14] Ibid, p. 337. The issue of ex-servicemen joining militant ranks is disputed by SK Pillai (Assam Vikram: Unique Valour – History of the Assam Regiment 1947-2002, New Delhi: MacMillan 2004, p. 28-30). He writes: ‘Some books on Mizo insurgency have attributed the disbandment of 2 Assam as one of the causes for growth of insurgency in the area. This is overstating the case as out of the 145 men sent home, the number of Mizos were 45.’

[15] Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, p. 337.

[16] Guardians of the North East: The Assam Rifles, 1835-2002, New Delhi: DGAR, 2003,

p. 80-81.

[17] Palit, Sentinels of the North East, p. 261.

[18] Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, p. 340.

[19] Palit, Sentinels of the North East,  p. 264.

[20] Ibid, p. 264.

[21] Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India,  p. 262.

[22] Depinder Singh notes that the yearly Annual Report is not meant to be very informative, writing that, ‘Until then the Report had always been a study in ambiguity, shrouded in secrecy, telling the intelligent reader almost nothing.’ See his, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: Soldiering with Dignity, Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 2003, p. 96.

[23] Ram Chandra Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 406.

[24] Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerilla, p. 148.

[25] Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India, p. 340.

[26] Ibid, p. 342.

[27] Annual Report 1966-67, p. 21.

[28] Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India,  p. 342.

[29] Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire, p. 155. Also see the narration on peace initiatives of the Church led by Zairema in Nirmal  Nibedon, Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade, New Delhi: Lancers, 1980, p. 117-18. The precedence given to the military prong over the political prong persists, see ‘The govt sabotaged talks with Maoists’, Mail Today, 4 Aug 2010, on the killing of Maoist leader engaged in ceasefire talks with Swami Agnivesh recently. 

[30] Nirmal  Nibedon, Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade, p. 117-118. .

[31] Chadha, Low Intensity Conflict in India, p. 345.

[32] Nibedon, The Dagger Brigade, p. 139.

[33] Michael Maclear, Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War, London: Thames Methuen, 1981, p. 88.

[34] JW Gibson, The Prefect War, New York: The Atlantic Press, 1986 p. 83.

[35] Ibid, p. 85.

[36] VK Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army, New Delhi: Sage, 2005, p. 314-315. Also see, SC  Narang, Military Generals of India, Delhi: Prashant Publishing House, p. 236-7.

[37] Palit, Sentinels of the North East, p. 270.

[38] Ibid, p. 269.

[39] S Sood, Leadership: Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, Noida: SDS Publishers, p. 52.

[40] Manekshaw himself did not pen his memoirs; a major loss for military historians in light of his featuring prominently in India’s post Independence military engagements ranging from 1947 to the 1971 War.

[41] Sood, Leadership: Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, p. 51.

[42] Palit, Sentinels of the North East p. 272.

[43] Lianzela, ‘Internally Displaced Persons in Mizoram’ in C. Joshua Thomas (ed), Dimensions of Displaced People in North-East India. New Delhi: Regency, 2002, p. 247.

[44] BG Verghese, First Draft, p. 131.

[45] Nirmal Nibedon dates the beginning of the trickle back to 1971, The Dagger Brigade, p. 158.

[46] BG Verghese, India’s North East Resurgent, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996, p. 146. 

[47] Ibid, p. 142.

[48] Ramchandra Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 405. The term ‘gungi gudia’ is associated with the selection. In the event, Mrs. Gandhi proved their expectations false. But her exertions to do so perhaps led to over compensation such as in dividing Pakistan or Operation Blue Star. Her tenure was one of realist ascendance in Indian strategy.

[49] Selig S Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades, Princeton University Press, 1960.

[50] Welles Hangen, After Nehru Who, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1963. 

[51] Ramchandra Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 432

[52] The reference is to the import of food grain from the USA under PL 480 then ongoing.

[53] Ramchandra Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 416.

[54] Ibid, p. 422.

[55] Ibid, p. 433.

[56] Ibid, p. 405.

[57] Vivek Chadha, ‘India’s counter insurgency campaign in Mizoram’, in Sumit Ganguly and D. Fidler (eds.), India and Counter Insurgency, p. 28.

[58] Ramchandra Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 511.

[59] Ibid, p. 512.

[60] Ibid, p. 526.

[61] BG Verghese, First Draft, p. 504.

[62] BK Nehru, Nice guys finish second, p. 488.

[63] BG Verghese, First Draft, pp. 88-89.

[64] JW Gibson, The Prefect War, New York: The Atlantic Press, 1986 p. 82.

[65] OS Kalkat, The Farflung Frontiers, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, p. 96.

[66] Ibid, p. 60.

[67] Ibid, p. 60.

[68] Ibid, p. 81.

[69] Ibid, p. 91.

[70] Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerrilla, p. 150.

[71] Chadha, Low Intensity Conflict in India. p. 288. Incidentally, MA Zaki, later Lieutenant General, was a company commander in Nagaland in 1958-61. His company, Bravo Company of 19 Maratha LI, implemented grouping in its area of responsibility on orders alongwith a company of 4 Sikh LI under 2Lt Nair, in 1959. The veteran’s comment on the policy was, ‘It was wrong and it failed.’ The villages in particular were Iphonomi, Kilaghutomi, Iganomi and two neighbouring villages. These were concentrated at Kilami in Sema area. The process involved a head count every morning that would end with ‘Jana Gana Mana’. For fraternization, Zaki recalls that he bought the people a volleyball from his own money so that the people and his troops could play together (Interview at Hyderabad, India, on 10 December 2010).

[72] Ibid, p. 289.

[73]Another attempt in 1964 in the Kohima-Mokokchung area failed though some villages were regrouped as a punitive measure (Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerilla, p. 151).

[74] It is interesting that Depinder Singh indicates that the two, Manekshaw and Sagat Singh, had strained relations. He writes, ‘There was always some degree of friction between him and General Officer Commanding 4 Corps, Lieutenant General Sagat Singh (Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: Soldiering with Dignity, p. 228).’

[75] Sood, Leadership: Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, p. 53. A veteran of Mizo Hills, Mathew Thomas, was the first Commandant.

[76] VK Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army, pp. 314-15.

[77] Palit, Sentinels of the North East, p. 270.

[78] The analogy is attributed to Mao’s statement that, ‘revolutionary fighters are fish, the people are the sea in which they swim’. See, John Shy and T Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 842.

[79] Sood, Leadership: Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, p. 53.

[80] Nirmal Nebedon, Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade, New Delhi: Lancers, 1980, p. 124, note 5.   

[81] VS Jafa (‘Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Use & Abuse of Military Force’, Faultlines, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume3/Fault3-JafaF.htm) writes that ‘Between March and December 1966, the SF lost 95 men and 60 weapons.’ He gives the logic of the grouping as resulting from, ‘The high casualties and the inability of the SFs to effectively check MNA depredations were viewed with some concern. There was only a semblance of Indian authority in the Mizo Hills during 1966, and with the reported arrival of fresh MNA reinforcements from East Pakistan with more arms, it was feared that the situation would not be qualitatively better in the days to come unless a longer-term view was taken of the counterinsurgency operations and its strategic/logistic requirements.’

[82] Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerrilla, p. 147.

[83] Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Paret, P. and Howard, M. (eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

[84] Nibedon, The Dagger Brigade, pp. 190, 223.

[85] Namrata Goswami, ‘The Indian Experience of Conflict Resolution in Mizoram’, Strategic Analysis, 33:4, pp. 579-589

[86] This is especially relevant given that at the time of writing counter insurgency operations are ongoing in Central India’s tribal belt against the Maoists. In these operations, for instance, the strategy of employing Salwa Judum, or pro government militias, has resulted in depopulation of some forested areas. The Supreme Court has taken cognizance of the matter. The Center has asked the Chattisgarh government to discontinue the Salwa Judum and resettle the villagers.