https://m.thewire.in/article/security/defence-reform-chief-of-defence-staff-nuclear-command-control

Defence Reform: Giving teeth to the new Chief of Defence Staff

India is temporarily back to the erstwhile system of a rotating Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) in which the senior most serving Service Chief tenanted the appointment. It’s now over a month since General Bipin Rawat’s untimely demise in saddle, but the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has not been appointed as yet.

The jointness initiative has been at a pause. The Services have been asked to turn in studies on how each wished to see jointness shape up. Appointed interim CCOSC, General Naravane, though familiar with the fledgling steps taken on jointness so far, cannot take it forward full throttle.

This indicates certain sanguineness that the CDS will not be overly missed, even though the CDS appointment is triple-hatted, with the third hat being that of Secretary Department of Military Affairs.

This complacence owes to the CDS appointment missing a vital ingredient, that of command authority. His command authority is restricted to ‘Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space.’ Therefore, his absence does not appear critical.

However, this inadvertently gives rise to a question that curiously has not figured with any salience in the strategic commentary so far. Since the CDS’ command authority does not include the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in its remit, who exercises command authority over the SFC?

The CDS, in his capacity as Permanent Chairman (PC) COSC, is only ‘the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ The NCA’s Military Adviser being absent appears to have been easily reconciled with. The implication is that the SFC does not report to the PC COSC.

A cursory look at the security situation over the past two years, when a military crisis has been ongoing in Ladakh, suggests that keeping deterrence honed would be a priority. To be sure, there is no nuclear dimension to the crisis, but general deterrence is never meant to be upfront. It is to be quietly ticking away in the background.

Persisting with a structural flaw in not having the SFC under a command authority and having a part-time Military Adviser to the NCA – which is what a reversion to the rotating Chairman COSC implies – means a neglect of deterrence.

The forthcoming appointment of the new CDS can only resolve the latter. The suggestion here is that the former deficit also be simultaneously addressed. 

Ambiguity galore

In the current nuclear command and control (C2) arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command (SFC), who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines: with operational authority lying with the National Security Adviser (NSA) and being only administratively under the PC COSC.

An academic has described the nuclear C2 arrangement as: ‘the command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) through the office of the NSA to the CCoSC (Chairman COSC) and the SFC commander.’ However, there is no mention of nuclear C2 in the Allocation of Business rules.

The NSA, an unelected civilian presently with cabinet rank and with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the Principal Adviser on National Security matters to the Prime Minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role for the NSA. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the NSA’s operational authority over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: ‘The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’

This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the Executive Council, operational authority over the SFC, the C-in-C SFC being a member of the Executive Council. Does this also mean that the NSA also has operational authority over the other members that include Service Chiefs and the PC COSC? Chairmanship of a committee does not imply subordination of the members by the Chair.

The Political Council, being ‘the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons,’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The Executive Council – as a collective - ‘executes the directives given to it by the Political Council’. In other words, a subordinate committee (the Executive Council) is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee (the Political Council).

In this interpretation, the C-in-C SFC, a member of Executive Council, is as part of the collective, the Executive Council, answerable to a collective, the Political Council.

Recall the Draft Nuclear Doctrine had named the prime minister, as head of the Political Council, the sole authority for nuclear use authorization. The relevant para reads: “The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).”

The official doctrine departed from this by vesting the authority with the Political Council, stating: “The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”

In effect, a three-star C-in-C SFC is without a single-point superior with command authority overseeing him and his Command. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has apparently not been met.

It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear C2. Even so, the lack of transparency that gives rise to such ambiguity does not help with deterrence.

Why fix nuclear C2?

To vest the NSA with operational authority over of the SFC is an anomaly in India’s democratic system of governance based on collective ministerial responsibility. The NSA’s advisory role is understandable. But an executive mandate with operational authority over a critical military formation – the SFC - is at odds with the ministerial system.

Even in the presidential system of the United States (US), the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls the nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the Secretary of Defence.

The belief that ‘nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting,’ may have led to the civilian political authority channeling its nuclear directives through a civilian NSA. The apprehension may be over militarization of nuclear decisions. Since the NSA would be on hand for a holistic input, such a situation would not arise. The NSA has a Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat, a military veteran, who can potentially provide a second opinion to the military’s advice.

Changes necessary

The PC COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the Political Council as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, the PC COSC would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the Political Council, of which the defence minister – his boss - is part. Operational authorization of nuclear weapons can be transmitted to the SFC through a single - uniformed - chain of command.

By virtue of this empowerment of the PC COSC, he could also co-Chair the Executive Council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity, not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state. 

With the SFC ‘under command’ of the PC COSC, deterrence stands to gain. Departing from the nuclear C2 that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. The security juncture is appropriate for the military to take over the operational reins of the SFC, the logical final step in the structural inclusion of the military.

In the interim - at a minimum - the role of the PC COSC in relation to the SFC must be explicated by in the mandate of the new CDS. Leaving the SFC out of his remit is either an oversight, that can be remedied, or is result of a misplaced sense of confidentiality, which too needs amending.

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 Lt Gen Jameel Mahmood, AVSM, ADC (09 May, 1938----07 May ,1993) 

My unforgettable memory of Lt Gen Jameel Mahmood. 

I got my wings on 18 May 1976 and was posted to 659 AOP Sqn in Baghdogra. 3 months later I got married. He was a col then and commanding the Air OP Sqn. I submitted a formal application to him seeking permission to get married. He called me into his office and congratulated me. When I landed at the airport with my wife Neena, I was surprised to see all the officers and their wives along with Gen Jameel waiting to give us our most unforgettable experience of our lifetime. They all clapped and congratulated us both. Then we were escorted to a waiting Jonga with a trailer behind which had a sofa in it. We were made to sit in it. The entire group then lined up on their personal vehicles and the Jonga followed behind with a huge sign “ Just Married” on the trailer. As it started to move forward we heard a loud noise of tins from below !!!!! There were dozens of them tied to the trailer causing the sound. All the passengers who came on the flight saw it all and clapped. The motorcade then drove through all corners of Baghdogra officers camp, before it halted in from of the mess. A grand lunch was laid out. After lunch Gan Jameel asked Neena & me to follow him. He took us to a house, opened it and gave the keys and said, “ This officer is on leave for the next two months, you are welcome to use it as your own home. God bless you both”. I had tears in my eyes. I could not stop them. I knew Mrs. Jameel even before I came to Baghdogra. I knew the Zaki family since 1962. Haroon Zaki and I joined RIMC in Jan 1962. He was from Hyderabad. My father was a doctor in the Railways working in Hyderabad. He used to go every Saturday without fail, rain, shine or hail to look up Mrs. Jameel’s mother. Sit with her and check her health conditions and give medications as required. He treated her like his own mother. To this day I look up Lt Gen Zaki whenever I go to Hyderabad. On 07 Feb, 1977 the Chetak I was flying in had a spacing cable failure. Col PC Reddy was in the center seat. It is because of him I’m still alive today. Sukhi & Col PJ came and picked me from Kishanganj. The crash took place around 11:30 AM. I was picked up in the evening.Gen Jameel was still in the office waiting for me. He personally dropped me in his Jonga at my house and came up and spoke to Neena and had a cup of tea made by her. We flew together a couple of times to the helipads in Sikkim. I still recall going to Kerang, the northernmost helipad where suddenly all the mountains vanish and you don’t see an anthill for miles looking North: The Tibetan Plateau. Mrs Jameel was a great cook. We were invited for dinner as newlyweds and treated to typical Hyderabadi cuisine. On one occasion the Army Commander Eastern Command was passing through Baghdogra. He was received at the airport and a lunch was arranged in the Officer’s Mess. He came to know that the Army Commander was having a bad tummy and had requested khichdi for lunch. We all thought that we too will get khichdi for lunch. No we had the usual drinks and lavish menu laid out. He had the rare quality to make junior officers feel absolutely at his ease in his company, irrespective of their rank. And similarly he was at ease with seniors no matter what their rank was. I saw it when he was interacting with the Army Commander. He was a Colonel then, commanding 659 AOP Sqn. We can never forget the couple. Not in this lifetime. May their souls RIP. His son Brig Adil Mahmood looks like him.

Messages from Army aviators who knew Gen Jameel 

"Got these interesting pics of Lt Gen Jameel Mahmood (courtesy: his son Brig Adil Mahmood) who was in Air OP. The Gen was GOC-in-C Eastern Command. He got his wings in 1964 and later commanded 6 Air OP Flt and 659 Air Op Sqn. He passed in an IAF heptr crash in Western Bhutan in 1993. The Gen, who was also my uncle, my aunt, another uncle Col Naeemuddin Ahmed (NDA 31st course), and 7 others armed forces personnel including two IAF pilots didn't make it. The Gen was a 5th generation soldier. His father was a POW with the Japanese in WWII while in Mysore Infantry (18th Madras)". He had stopped specifically for a cup of tea along with Mrs. Jameel Mahmood in our Mess (659 R & O Sqn) in Sevoke Road, enroute from Sukhna to Bhutan. It was a Sunday. He had rung me up & spoken personally that day to say that he starting off in 15 minutes from Sukhna & wanted to meet The wife of his old BM of the Inf Bde he Commanded & was presently staying alone in Sevoke Road presently & that cold I get her to the Avn Mess for a quick cup of tea & meet up. That set the 'Cat amongst the pigeons' - Imagine the chaos of expecting an Army Cdr at real short notice in a 'Avn Mess' early morning after a Saturday Night ! No one could vouch for the general get up of the Mess, forget the standard to be fit to receive an Army Cdr ( & that too my Old Sqn Cdr in the same Sqn !). Anyway, to cut the story short, " All hands on deck" & lo behold when "The Army Cdrs Cavalcade arrived" within an hour or so, we had managed to collect 'The Lady (Old BM's wife) & receive a beaming Army Cdr with things decently in order, for his 'cup of tea'. He & Mrs Jameel met the Lady, laughed around with us and left in high spirits within 20 minutes or so, in a happy mood. He had told me he will make another trip after a month or so to Bhutan & then would like to fly by The Sqn Heptr to Bhutan. Of course destiny sadly planned otherwise... He was our senior most yo at the time of raising of 18 Field Regt in 1960 at Hyderabad under Lt Col GS Reen. He along with Dilrus made an excellent couple. Their hospitality was par excellent. Sweet memories. RIP

CeeEmm, could it have been Mrs Narinder Singh? Why I feel so is that Col Narinder of Raj Rif and I were together as DS in SC Wing, College of Combat (now War College) and he was the BM with Gen Jameel when he commanded his Bde. There could have been more than one BM, I agree but Narinder had a very interesting story to tell which gives out a great facet of Gen Jameel's persona. At a party then Brig Jameel asked Mrs Narinder, who was just a graduate, as to why she was not taking up the opportunity to do BEd as a regular student since a local college was running a one year course for BEd after graduation. The lady expressed her constraint that her son was just two years old and she couldn't leave him alone to attend college. To her utter surprise the Commander said that this was not a problem, on her way to college she should leave the child with him in his office and he would look after him. The lady demurred but the Commander would have none of it and unbelievable as it sounds, the lady was able to do her BEd and the Commander was the nanny/creche, whatever you may like to call it!! Since the whole thing was narrated by the officer, Col Narinder himself, there is no element of doubt. As per Narinder, the child was kept busy in some interesting activity with the Brig going to check maybe once every 25-30 minutes, have a bit of a play around and then leave the child on his own resources to attend to his own work. Rather a difficult thing to swallow since the Commander would have things to do outside his office quite frequently but knowing Gen Jameel, he would have innovated a solution. When he took over 659, I was in the process of moving 17 Flt ground party by train as OIC Train and then was fortunate to have him first as my DS in the first tutorial at DSSC and then as my SI Div on promotion to Col(this was in 1980 when DS were Lt Cols and SI full Cols). Fortunately, had a good equation with him and kept running into him during service, more so when he came as ADG Army Aviation in 1991, got promoted to Lt Gen and stayed as DG for a short while before going as 4 Corps Cdr and then moving as Eastern Army Commander. His younger brother, Maj Gen Sultan Mahmood was my MG Arty during my stay at Raiwala as CArty and had number of exchanges about the late elder brother. The General was a great man and God pulled him away since He needs good men around Him. Sorry for this long tale, regards, Bimbo.

An excellent human. Flew him extensively ex TRINCOMALEE as GOC 36. While we were flying 6avuniya to trinco , he carried a cas in his lap in chetak rear seats. Then flew him in SIKKIM BHUTAN as Eastern Army Cdr. Before the heptr crash , we did 3 days op recce in Bhutan. Flew his and the COMD HQ mortal remains ex Haa Dzong to Hashimara For 659 Raising Day my wife took help of Cheetah Flight Manual to bake a cake depicting a replica of a heptr . Over 3 feet long with skids, tail boom , fuel tank rotors all to scale. I have very fond memories of late Gen & Mrs Jameel Mehmud. He had such sterling qualities forwhich we all held him in awe. I am reminded of an incident in Baghdogra AF mess. He saw late Brig Balwinder Singh smoking with his turban on . Next day he called him to his office and told him I don’t mind you smoking but respect your religion . I will appreciate if you don’t do it ( as related to us by late Balli Singh ) . When I was commanding 166 Med Regt at Lekhapani he came on a visit to Dinjan. I rung him up and invited him to my mess which he readily obliged. He confided in me RS I JUST COULD NOT SAY NO TO YOU 659 and all officers who were part of my team have a special place in my heart. He really enjoyed the impromptu Social Evening arranged by my officers and ladies. He was COS Eastern Comd then . I asked him as to how is the future. He in his absolute positive approach to life said RS future is always good. Brig Adil is the elder of the two siblings . The younger one was Mrs Jameels pet. The couple were I the most wonderful people I have met .May their souls RIP. Gen Jameel was a wonderful person. I first met him in the NDA where he was my SI in pre- Staff course. Shortly thereafter he came to Deolali for the reunion and we met at the para drop demo. He told me that he would be coming to my place the next day for breakfast. Very informal. Next, when he came as ADG Army Avn, I was sent to receive him and family at the airport. A week later, around 9.30 pm the doorbell rang and I find them standing there. What a surprise! He said he had come to visit a close friend in the next block and came to know that I was living close by. So he dismissed his car because he decided to pay us a surprise visit and ask me to drop them back. Such informality was his unique quality. Unfortunately, I was the Colonel Avn in HQs Eastern Comd when he met his end in that horrible crash. He had great affection for all who wore the wing. I will always remember him with great respect� Yes sir, that was a horrible day.

We were 3 heptrs waiting at Paro the next valley to Haa Dzong. We were to take off post his departure. Morning 810 am. Unfortunately his heptr toppled over post hitting cable from valley to haul logs. FELL UPSIDE DOWN AND CAUGHT FIRE. There after I flew the King Bhutan with Indian Ambassador much against rules in a single engine heptr. Got direct clearance from MO Dte

 5 pieces on jointness : 

1 http://https://ali-writings.blogspot.com/2022/01/blog-post.html?spref=tw… 

2 https://ali-writings.blogspot.com/2021/09/blog-post_14.html?spref=tw… 

3 https://ali-writings.blogspot.com/2022/02/blog-post.html?spref=tw… 

4 https://ali-writings.blogspot.com/2021/09/httpepaper.html?spref=tw… 

5 https://ali-writings.blogspot.com/2021/09/blog-post_18.html?spref=tw…

 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/india-needs-a-national-security-doctrine-for-furthering-jointness/

India needs a national security doctrine for furthering jointness

The absence of a national security doctrine is much lamented. The necessity of a strategic doctrine being rather obvious, here an additional argument is made that India’s efforts towards jointness can potentially be stepped up in case informed by a national security doctrine.

India’s civil-military relations are such that the military is left out of the policy loop but, almost as though in compensation, is allowed doctrinal and operational space. However, the three services - like the proverbial blind men of Hindoostan examining an elephant – end up appraising war through the prism of the respective domains - land, sea and air - each is predominant in. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), being first among equals, is not empowered enough to adjudicate.

Some of the areas that have emerged in India’s recent fledgling steps towards jointness can be illumined by an authoritative and a suitable referent. A national security doctrine can place ideational tensions – controversies if you will - that have emerged in the jointness debates in perspective; thereby, assisting the armed forces to take the next doctrinal and structural steps towards jointness with alacrity. 

The story so far

General Bipin Rawat was tasked to further jointness, simply put as conducting military operations with an ‘All-for-one and one-for-all’ approach. There are two lines for bringing about change towards jointness: doctrinal and structural. The former approach builds on the periodic doctrinal products of the military, including that of the HQ IDS that have dealt with joint doctrine. Structural change could then follow. Hampered by non-availability of a higher-order doctrine, General Rawat privileged structural change as precursor to a meeting of minds over jointness.

Pushback on Rawat’s visualization of front-specific integrated theatre commands was quick. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has long held that the numbers of squadrons and aircraft were limited in relation to the scope of wartime operations. Their employment philosophy has been centralized control-decentralized execution, taking advantage of characteristics of air power afforded by air space: speed, flexibility and versatility. Were joint theatre commands to come up, it would add to procedural tedium, with turf battles decreasing responsiveness and heightening uncertainty that attends military operations.

As part of the debate, Rawat - perhaps inadvertently - sparked off acrimony with candid expression of his view that in a border conflict, the Air Force had a supportive role, likening the Air Force with support arms as artillery. On their part, an air power strategist argues that, “the IAF must be able to degrade and delay PLA … carry out interdiction of communication lines ranging from 150 km … fight to create and maintain a favourable air situation over a limited area … revisit all the classical roles of offensive airpower within a limited war framework.”

Alongside such support for the army’s  operations on land, the Air Force bids for continuing relevance as a strategic player, that - acting jointly - can deliver war winning advantages and outcomes. Not oblivious to developments in air power, it maintains that its roles of taking the war to the enemy through ‘parallel warfare’, comprising, inter-alia, an offensive strategic air campaign and counter air operations, must inform war strategy.  

Similar in kind was the controversy in relation to the Navy. CDS Rawat favoured a sea-denial capability predicated on submarines, while the Navy plugged for a carrier battle group based sea-control capability. Its maritime strategy places sea control as the ‘central concept around which the Indian Navy will be employed’ for ‘strategic effect’. Naval strategists argue that in a conflict provoked in the Himalayas by China, India could take recourse to pressurizing China in the maritime domain. India must take advantage of India’s strategic location in relation to the sea lines of communication and bottlenecks in the Indo-Pacific.

Matters for inclusion

A national security doctrine can not only dispel such ‘controversies’, but also preempt other doctrinal disagreements. From the debates is visible thrust towards conflict limitation. As the controversy involving the Air Force indicates, with air power pitching in, vertical escalation has to be reckoned with. Likewise, a maritime answer to a possible predicament posed by China in the Himalayas - of geographical expansion into the maritime domain - spells horizontal escalation.

Escalation implies more resources sucked in and higher political stakes. It has intrinsic dynamics that inevitably impact the bounds of a war originally intended as a limited one. However, acquiring capabilities that carry the war to the enemy enables being undaunted by the manipulation of the threat of escalation by the other side. This helps with deterrence, since an enemy would be doubly wary of taking on an adversary with human, physical and conceptual elements primed for escalation. Limitation implies having the capability for it for deterrence sake, but refraining deliberately as a policy choice.

Thus, there is a tension between war-fighting and deterrence, the capabilities and readiness for demonstrating either being much the same. The build-up of capabilities leads to an interstate contestation under a ‘security dilemma’, in which military related actions of one state are viewed as a threat and matched by the neighbour. This plays out in peace time as arms racing.

Capabilities are obtained over time and at a steep cost, in addition to a hidden opportunity cost. Weighing between the short haul preparedness and preparation over the long durée is required. Further, cultural change necessary to internalize makeovers takes longer.

Finally, the untimely departure of the protagonist of the process, General Rawat, and delay in the appointment of his successor indicates the salience of the triple-hatted CDS. Left untouched by Rawat was the command and control arrangement. India can neither revert to the British era commander-in-chief model nor can the CDS as Permanent Chair of the Chiefs of Staff Committee run a war by committee.

Though the Services have been tasked to submit studies, the bottom-up approach can do with some direction from top. These are issue areas that the Services would require political direction on. Instead of a blue-ribbon commission on defence reform, India has had a succession of committees since the Kargil War as substitute and has implemented many of the conclusions reached. A national security doctrine is an essential next step.   

The government needs stepping up

Doctrinal conundrums do not necessarily have a ‘right’ answer. This necessitates political engagement, with politics as ‘the art of the possible’. A strategic doctrine defines the place of use of force in the broader national scheme. The policy maker can use the document constructively to elaborate on vexed issues holding up jointness. Further, the political master must follow-up by lending imprimatur to a joint doctrine and structures that emerge thereafter.

A government distinct in the way it approaches defence has an additional onus to be responsive on this score to calls from the strategic community. Political dividend is a low hanging fruit. National security reform with the national security doctrine as a central agenda item should figure in the creation of New India.

There is no dearth of draft afloat on such a higher order doctrine. In run up to the last elections, the opposition had articulated a national security strategy. Lately, even Pakistan adopted a human security-centric national security policy. Press reports have it that the National Security Adviser-led Defence Planning Committee, tasked with writing up the strategy, has a draft.

Even if the main document is kept confidential, as with the nuclear doctrine put in the open domain through a press release, it can be given out in an abridged form. The impending appointment of the next CDS provides an opportunity, with the Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav as appropriate backdrop.