Incipient Shift in Civil-Military Relations ?
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A problem from hell
in India’s civil-military relations
A recently-released monograph, collectively authored by a set of liberal intellectuals, India’s Path to Power: Strategy in a World Adrift, carries a section on ‘Politicisation of the military’. The paper has it that there is an incipient shift in the apolitical characteristic of the Indian military. The military brass needs to fight a rearguard action, lest the military too fall along with other institutional ninepins.
The paper apprehends that, “the traditional
apolitical stance of the military is under pressure at two levels: the first,
of the senior military leadership, and the second, comprising the junior
leadership of officers and persons below officer rank.” Whereas the rank and
file is susceptible to the change in wider society towards majoritarianism, the
senior leadership is under pressure from the rightward thrust of polity.
With regard to the former, it observes a conflation
in the mind’s eye of senior military leadership, between the government and the
State. This disrupts the traditional distinction between loyalty to the
Constitution and the ruling party. As for the latter, according to it, there is
an “assault on the secular outlook of the armed forces by wider social and
ideological currents.”
It prognosticates that the political masters are
likely to continue to ride military horses to electoral victory, in light of
precedence of partisan dividend. The government has also taken to ‘deep
selection’ of senior military appointments. Even though it
is a legitimate process, pliability or like-mindedness could overshadow
competence.
Though spot-on in diagnosing a looming problem, the
paper – perhaps for reasons of space – is light on the remedy: “This issue is a
matter for the military leadership to introspect and rectify.” It believes that
the onus for keeping at an apolitical distance from pernicious politics
devolves on a military leadership seized of the motto, “Service Before Self”.
It is unlikely that the paper’s recommendation that
the military brass stand up and be counted on this score will find traction.
There is a pattern of intimidation followed by the government, such as of the
liberal media and personages
taking a skeptical stance.
This will likely to deter any such thoughts on part
of the military brass. It does not have to go as far back as the instance of
sacking of an admiral by a previous right wing government, but the nasty information
campaign of petty corruption against the general who led
the pack when this government made its first deep
selection, picking the third in line for army chief.
Curiously, on the continuing necessity of an
apolitical military, the paper says, “This responsibility on the military
leadership is huge because India is a nuclear power.” It does not elaborate on how
India’s nuclear weapon state (NWS) status attenuates the apolitical military
characteristic that predates the NWS status.
Even so, it is worth reiterating the questions that
animate the section and to try answering them: Is an apolitical military needed,
and, if so, how can this be ensured?
India, though continuing as a procedural
democracy, has been recently termed an ‘electoral
autocracy’. A putatively authoritarian
polity can do without an apolitical military. An apolitical military is
required when there is alternation in government of different political parties.
The political project of this
government requires it ensconced in power till the majoritarian turn to polity
it not complete.
In such an endeavour, the ruling formation, termed
the ‘Parivar’,
requires the military as a subordinate ally. Compliance is facilitated by the
military being enthused by the
ethno-democracy
in-the-works or swayed by a populist political leadership. Both thrust-lines
for a docile military are at play.
The former is a work-in-progress, with no dearth of
trying. Soon, the military curriculum is to be injected with
a dash of inspiration from ancient India.
The concept of an apolitical military
is a throwback to the fifties, when the military sociology theory in the West
dwelt on how to subordinate the military in a democracy. Today, how Indian
tradition has it on issues as the relationship of the chakravartin with
the senapati and place of the military in state craft - perhaps elucidated
in tracts as the Arthashastra -
matters more.
As for the latter, the prime minister has long
sought occasions to vibe directly with troops, with his Diwali
visits to frontlines being a prominent vehicle for such insertion into their
consciousness. In his latest interaction with troops on the Line of Control,
while thanking them for the execution by the army of surgical strikes, he
brought out his abiding concern with
their safety when the strikes were being conducted. The brass has evidently
taken cue. A general recently approved an obsequious tweet on
his formation’s twitter handle greeting the prime minister on his birthday,
only to later withdraw it.
Taken together, the two thrust-lines imply that
nurturing an apolitical military is not necessary in New India. The
problem that arises, as pointed out in the paper, is, “a danger of a pliable
military leadership being used for narrow party-political purposes at the cost
of national interests.”
Illustrations of such a principal-agent (government-military)
relationship are in the cover-up, with
the military complicit, over Balakot and
the Ladakh
intrusion. The military’s sub-par performance is overlooked by political
masters in return for the military keeping the reality – embarrassing for
political masters - under wraps. The price of such mutual back-scratching is in
national security.
Another illustration is
Kashmir, where, in not calling out the obvious aggravation of the problem in
Kashmir that accrues from the political high-handedness - specifically evacuation
of Article 370 of all meaning - and security force heavy
handedness, the military furthers an inaccurate picture of
success. While there is no call that this be done in the open domain, there are
no reports of the military thumping the table in dissent even at the discussion
stage.
The military’s lending of its credibility to
preferred narratives of the government helps absolve the government of democratic
accountability, thus compromising a vital national interest: democracy. The
military ends up playing a political role to the partisan advantage of the
ruling party, unwarily ending up party to the slow-motion dismantling of liberal,
Constitutional democracy.
This is easy for the military to miss when, as the
paper points out, “(C)ontemporary political and popular discourse routinely
conflates the government with the state.” The military is victim of such
conflation too. This reveals a blind side to its professional military
education.
If and since the lacuna advantages the ruling
party, the political masters are unlikely to be concerned. The military is also
unlikely to righting the tilt, since it might put it at odds with the political
masters. Besides, who will bell the cat? The opposition cannot be too vocal on
this score, lest it drag the military into the political bull-pit. Strategic
commentators can at best caution the national security establishment to advise
political masters on a course correct.
The danger is in the problem culminating in the
next national security crisis if in the interim till next elections. That these
have a nuclear overhang explains the otherwise curious underlining in the paper
of the nuclear factor as compelling civil-military relations remain on even
keel.
