https://www.newsclick.in/is-military-brass-transgressing-diplomatic-LAC
Is
the military brass transgressing the diplomatic LAC?
On 27 October, at a function at the Budgam airfield re-enacting the landings on the same date in 1947 for saving Kashmir from the invasion of kabailis, the chief of the Air Force’s Western Command expressed the hope that Pakistan occupied part of the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state of Maharaja Hari Singh would be part of India someday.
While delivering the
first Ravi Kant Singh Memorial lecture series’ talk, Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS), General Bipin Rawat, in relation to Chinese inroads in India’s
neighbourhood, said that, "(S)uch attempt and adventure in the
neighbouring countries would go against India's national interest and these are
potential threats to India's territorial integrity and strategic
importance." Almost as if India is not already at it, he went on to note
that, “we
have to … assure neighbours that we are their permanent friends and we want to
engage with them on equal term (sic),” and that, “(W)e need to be able to
convince them that we will be your friends in the long term.”
Late last month, the
army vice chief, speaking at a seminar, opined,
"(I)f Tibet had strong armed forces, they would have never been
invaded." Apparently, he was underlining the necessity for a nation to
have strong armed forces. Not naming a country referred to as ‘a big nation’,
he claimed, "(T)oday
everybody talks about India as the net security provider and it is a security
umbrella against a big nation."
From the three
illustrations above, it is clear that this plain-speak by the brass on the
wider-than-narrowly-military aspects of national security is a trend, or, in
officialese, not an ‘aberration’. Coming in quick succession, the statements
point to a policy decision to have the brass give voice to matters beyond the
narrowly-military pale.
It is not as if the
foreign office has not gently pushed back. When the infamous ‘clash of
civilizations’ thesis acquired a new subscriber
in the CDS, just when the two foreign ministers of India and China were to meet
on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation gathering of foreign
ministers last month, no less than the foreign
minister had to step in to contain the fallout by distancing
India from the general’s words.
However, there has been
little public skirmishing on the continuing inroads the brass seems to be
making into diplomatic turf. Can it be inferred that the brass has been
selectively empowered to participate, if not take the lead, in national
security relevant messaging?
Perhaps the
coordination on this score rests with the National Security Council Secretariat
(NSCS), so that the two branches of government and instruments of national
security – military and diplomacy - do not step on each others’ toes and do not
elbow each other in areas of inevitable overlap.
With theaterisation
coming up and plurilateralism
being the foreign policy mantra, for
the military to get into higher gear visibly and bat at a higher than
operational level is seemingly unexceptionable. Military
exercises and exchange visits are now at a pace
difficult to follow. The fledgling Department of Military Affairs (DMA) appears
to have heightened the salience of the military within government and increased
the scope of activity of the military outside the traditional domain of border
guarding and counter insurgency.
In regard to statements
directed at China, the brass taking on an additional duty of strategic
messaging gives the foreign
office sufficient space to pursue a negotiated end to the
continuing crisis. Besides, India perhaps wants to outgun the Peoples’
Liberation Army in its information war salvoes launched in media
battles that have followed the fraying of relations between
the two states.
As for Pakistan, even
as the military presents an implacable front, the national security bureaucracy
can continue its below-the-radar engagement, such as that brought about the
Line of Control ceasefire
and the recent invite
to the Pakistani national security adviser to discussions on Afghanistan in
Delhi. In any case, Pakistan is fair game since a hybrid
war
is ongoing, of which information war is a key domain.
This is a positive
interpretation of the new practice. However, the military has certainly gone beyond
military diplomacy.
None of the eight
bullet points on the ambit of the CDS and the DMA as given in the Second
Schedule to Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961 have
anything to do with diplomacy. At best, it is the Department of Defence under
the defence secretary that has a role beyond matters that are not strictly
military, if the last bullet point in its charter
(“Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, National Defence College and any
other organisation within the Ministry of Defence whose remit is broader than military matters (italics added)”) is an
indicator.
Therefore, the new-found
practice begs the question of whence did it originate. There are three possible
impulses.
The first is understandable,
but only at a stretch. Given the recurrence of military forays into diplomatic
terrain, it’s possible the military has been allowed greater leeway, with
diplomats acquiescent. This strengthens India’s strategic profile and outreach,
particularly since the Foreign Service has been long criticized for having too small
a cadre to be able to punch at India’s weight.
The second –
uncharitable - one is that these interventions stem from an autonomous,
expanded interpretation of national security post creation of the DMA. The CDS
has acquired a reputation for speaking
his mind on national security. His alleged proximity
with National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval perhaps emboldened him. Taking
cue, his fellow generals are now more voluble, even in matters other
than
diplomacy.
The third - seemingly
implausible but not impossible to visualize in an India that has seen its
institutions been reduced to rump - is that an incipient turf war has been sparked
off by national security minders. The resulting bureaucratic politics places
them in the position of arbitrating. Could friction
between NSA Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Jaishankar have escalated to levels
at which national security bureaucrats using the military to intrude onto
diplomatic turf?
While the latter two
impulses are obviously undesirable, even the first - a reasoned policy to use
the military for sniping at neighbours - is not without its underside.
The underside can be
seen through reasoning why China inexplicably
intruded into Ladakh early last year. A possible reason could be that there was
disconnect
between what China was hearing at the informal
summits at Wuhan and Meenakshipuram and what it was
experiencing on the ground along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The then eastern
army commander had said that the army’s transgressed
across the LAC twice as many times as China, while General
VK Singh put the figure at five times. With the military
operating within its domain (patrolling the LAC) leading to a blowback, when it
operates outsides its domain, blowback is virtually a certainty.
While military
diplomacy does reinforce diplomatic firepower, the military brass shooting its
mouth off is not quite military diplomacy. Even if a policy choice to allow the
brass latitude, with diplomats onboard, the new found practice calls for
review. If impelled by the latter two impulses – military expansionism or bureaucratic
politics – then the need is even more so.