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Punishing future Pakistani terror provocations

A leading scholar-strategist, Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan, opined recently: “With the US (United States) no longer needing Pakistan in the critical manner it did before – and with considerable domestic US anger at Rawalpindi’s role in Afghanistan – there is no reason why India should not plan much more extensive punishment for any Pakistani provocation.” In light of US’ departure from the region, the new geopolitics reopens a consideration of India’s response. The expectation is that Pakistan will revert to its usual provocative self once it settles matters on its northern front in Afghanistan in favour of its protégé, Taliban, requiring India to reassert deterrence and if challenged, resort to compellence.

India’s response options

Even prior to the large scale surgical strikes of 2016, India always reserved the option of retribution and had administered measured punishment on Pakistan along the Line of Control, either through discreet raids or heightened fire assaults. In one case it also baited Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control gave the intruders a controlled drubbing by localized air attacks in the cul-de-sac operation, with Operation Parakram providing the backdrop.

With the Balakot air strikes that targeted the Pakistani mainland, the scale of retaliation decidedly went up a notch. In the aftermath of the speedy Pakistani aerial counter in the Pooch-Rajauri sector, India had reportedly prepared missile strikes, aborted by the Pakistanis sensibly throwing in the towel by returning India’s downed pilot in that aerial skirmish. Lately, by reconfiguring to fulfill the belated promise of its Cold Start doctrine, India has the option of launching an integrated battle group or two for a limited counter to Pakistani provocation. Ever since the raising of the defence cyber agency, cyber space shall perhaps also witness a joust or two. 

Thus, it is evident that India has multiple military options for response against Pakistan sponsored mega terror attacks. These complement the diplomatic and intelligence options available, such as the financial action task force as an instance of the former and clandestine support for Pakistani insurgents, as the Baluch, in regard to the latter. A combination of these orchestrated by the national security adviser (NSA), serve to reinforce deterrence.

Communication is the third subset of deterrence – the other two being capability and resolve. Capability, reprised above, is constantly a work-in-progress, while resolve has been demonstrated in publicly acknowledging the surgical strikes - pitched higher - since 2016. The strategy is thus one at the interstices of deterrence and compellence and therefore can be construed as offensive deterrence, characterized by the NSA as ‘defensive offence’. 

The US as a factor

However, the relative decline in Pakistani support for insurgency in Kashmir over the last decade and in terror attacks – other than the Pulwama episode – cannot be attributed to the strategy of deterrence/compellence alone. The US’s hitherto presence in the region needs factoring in. 

US’ presence hitherto compelled India to pull its punches against US’ frontline partner, Pakistan. India had to factor in the US’ global war on terror (GWOT) concerns. To an extent, this accounted for Operation Parakram being restricted to being coercive diplomacy since the GWOT had just about been launched. When faced with 26/11, India had to factor in the fact that the US was then bogged down in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The US had been pressing India – mostly at the behest of Pakistan – to engage with Pakistan on differences in the period prior to the mega terror attack. In the event, the government of the day chose the economic rationale for staying its military hand, even though the foreign ministry argued that India must not only retaliate but be seen to do so and the military said that it was game, but assaying the escalatory possibility was a political call.

While the US presence impacted India’s response, to an extent it also stayed Pakistan’s proxy war. The US wished to extricate from what was developing into a potential ‘forever war’ for over a decade. Pakistan was critical to a successful outcome on this. Therefore, Pakistan bided its time, first wanting to stabilize its northern front on its terms. Its strategic patience appears to have paid-off with Taliban grabbing power in Kabul. This turn has raised concerns in India of a revival in the proxy war. Besides, global jihadists received a boost from the set back to the US adding to India’s wariness over international terrorism.

Considering escalation

India has both upped its retaliation and capability. The departure of the US seemingly gives India freer hand. However, US disconnecting opens up the possibility of escalation, especially so if the retaliation is heavier, as suggested by the professor. Consequently, if escalation looms larger, a point for India to deliberate would be escalation control and if retaliation fraught with such risk is worth it.

To recall, President Trump’s engaging the North Koreans at Singapore had led to the US’ inattention in 2019 that allowed the two sides to punch up post-Pulwama. The moment the North Koreans departed the summit, the US weighed in to de-escalate the developing situation in South Asia. Since its national security interest is not intricately linked with South Asia anymore, US’ efficacy as a third party insertion to help with de-escalation will be less forceful.

Earlier, when India had engaged China in summit diplomacy, China was also reckoned as a stabilizing force in such circumstance. However, post Ladakh this is no longer the case. China’s incursion into Ladakh, though veritably amounting to ‘a riddle wrapped in an enigma’, can be also be interpreted as its aiding Pakistan by indubitably materializing the two-front threat for India. Even so, China’s stance will be uncertain. While it would not want escalation to jeopardize its belt and road initiative in the region in the form of the China-Pakistan economic corridor and the budding prong towards Afghanistan, it would like to re-hyphenate India to Pakistan by having Pakistan wrestle India in a South Asian sandbox, distracting India from its aspiration to be an Indo-Pacific player.

Severe retaliation?

If India’s nuclear doctrine – that posits massive retaliation - is any guide, severe retaliation is its preferred form of deterrence by punishment. It is also a logical extension of the strategic shift of the New India. This has deterrence utility in warning off Pakistan that the onus of escalation in such a case rests with it. Either Pakistan absorbs the punishment or faces the consequences of any escalatory choice it makes. India’s escalation dominance advantages enable posing of a credible threat on these lines. The professor’s view quoted is a credible articulation of deterrence.

Prevention (deterrence) being better than cure (compellence), India can at best keep its capabilities and resolve transparent. However, when faced with the circumstance, India may have to appreciate the circumstance on its merits. Consideration will have to go beyond strategic factors as escalatory dynamics, potential for de-escalation, uncertainty of military means generating political outcomes and nuclear thresholds. Factoring in the positions of the US and China, political certitude, the legal case, diplomatic heft, domestic compulsions and any economic underside may be more significant than military aspects. Therefore, severe retaliation cannot be a default option. 

 

 

   

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 https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/20920/Lessons-From-the-Commemoration-Season-

Lessons from the commemoration season

Unedited version

It is important to commemorate the sacrifices of soldiers, airmen and sailors in the nation’s wars. However, it is well known in the land of the Buddha that moderation is a value in itself. Overdoing of commemorations, as seems to be the case with periodic commemorations of conflict related anniversaries, prompts the question: ‘Why?’ 

For congenital cynics, there could be two answers to this. One is that there is something to hide; and second, that other aims are sought rather than the purported honouring of sacrifices.

To begin with the first, the anniversary in the offing is of the post Uri terror attack surgical strikes. The air force has been tasked to conduct air shows across the country, to include one on 26 September over Dal Lake.

The surgical strikes of late September 2016 are advertised as signifying India’s indubitable casting off of its millennium-long Panipat syndrome. It had finally acquired the decision maker in Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the gall to use military power in the avowed national interest, casting into history India’s hitherto reticence to use force symbolized by the syndrome.

Other than the undeniable derring-do depicted in the movie, Uri – The Surgical Strike, there was little to show for the strikes themselves. The strikes gained the largest number of gallantry awards for an episode, surpassed only qualitatively by those dispensed for the counter to the terror attack on parliament.

Pakistan denied the strikes and no evidence was put out in the open domain of the damage Pakistan managed to hide to contradict Pakistan. The strategic fallout was incommensurate, since surgical strikes were repeated only a few years down the line, this time at an escalated level by using air power and targeting Balakot, within Pakistani territory.

This brings up the second purpose of overdoing commemoration: political appropriation. The following year, surgical strikes were used by the ruling party in its election campaign in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh. The positive elections results led to the subsequent anniversary in 2018 being observed as Parakram Parv since national elections were to follow.

The halo from Balakot – despite (yet again) of lack of credible bomb damage assessments - provided political ballast enough to also cover-up loss in the aftermath of one fighter jet to enemy action and a helicopter to fraternal fire.

Commemorations help manufacture consent

Currently, Mr. Modi is off to New York for addressing the General Assembly. He would also participate in New York in the in-person meeting at the White House of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners. The jigs through the week by the Surya Kirans of the air force across India can be expected to provide a fittingly muscular backdrop to lapdog media’s coverage.

Mr. Modi’s first post-Covid foray into jhuppi diplomacy with Biden at Washington caters for messaging to China, that India is not cowed by its continuing in situ in Ladakh. The second international appearance is in the General Assembly where either in ignoring or including a word on it, Pakistan can be expected to be taken down a notch or two from exulting over its protégé, the Taliban’s taking over Kabul.

The question is whether this - not unreasonable - aim requires the commemoration as backdrop?

For professional skeptics – skepticism is taken here as a democratic virtue that helps hold governments accountable – the abuse of commemoration - defined as honouring sacrifice - is avoidable.

After a promising beginning to the year in the reiteration of a ceasefire with Pakistan along the Line of Control, there has been a backsliding. The back channel that was supposedly active in the run up to that false dawn has presumably stalled.

It is unlikely to be revived any time soon since UP elections are on hand and precedence suggests a muscular approach to Pakistan proves useful as an additional ingredient in the polarizing domestic brew. Besides, in Kashmir, elections are slated for next year. This precludes any concessionary softening towards Pakistan, especially since Pakistan has required reversal of the Article 370 moves that set the stage for the upcoming elections in the union territory. 

A succession of such commemorations – year-round inter-alia observances of Balakot (February), Kargil (July) and Uri (September) – serve to condition the electorate, enabling the ruling party to genuflect to the majority sentiment for remaining averse to Pakistan. Missed in this logic is that the majority will is liable to being manufactured, and in this case has been assiduously steered in a particular, self-serving direction.

Two longer commemorations underway

The Swarnim Vijay Diwas on the resounding 1971 War victory The former is unexceptionable, being the most significant post Independence martial endeavour. Understandably, its observance includes reminiscences by veterans of respective communities of the diplomatic, intelligence and military run to the war and the military feats in it.

Additionally, alongside is also warranted a sober, self-reflection on the war.

The war’s larger aims – beyond cutting Pakistan to size - remained unmet since the military victory did not serve to settle India-Pakistan differences. The peace was lost in lack of appropriate follow up to the promise of the peace treaty at Simla.

On the contrary, the war instead served to aggravate differences, with Pakistan – reverting to military dominance – seeking vengeance, and Indian actions in Kashmir arguably enabling it an opportunity to do so.

In effect, an unintended consequence of the 1971 War was India’s very own ‘forever war’. Clearly, a war does not end with fighting subsiding. Introspection on why the war has not ended is in order. While not discounting the well-known villainy of the Pakistani military, India must acknowledge its ownership of that war’s strategic underside.

The ongoing reminiscences inform that India meticulously set the stage for the war in year-long preparations for a war with ultimately realpolitik ends. Scholarly attention has not yet scrutinised the extent of Indian culpability for the humanitarian disaster in terms of it resulting from interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs. As could be anticipated, it led to increased severity of the Pakistan crackdown, thereby playing into Indian hands. As for the genocide, it remains Pakistan’s cross since there are no mitigating circumstances or rationale for such atrocity crimes.   

As against the mythology so far that the war was in self-defence to Pakistan’s air attacks of 3 December, the revelations on India’s creeping military action dating to mid-November suggest that their action amounted to belated self-defence. 

The lesson from commemoration of wars is that it is an opportunity for truth telling, even if revisionist. Doing so does not in any way take away from the valiant deeds of participants. Critical appraisal as this negates the notion that a docile India has been at the receiving end of aggressive tendencies of neighbours, with the ensuing heightened self-regard opening up peace possibilities.

The importance of this goes up as the second year-long commemoration underway, Azadi Ka Amrit Utsav, moves India away from the India as envisaged 75 years back. The 1971 War commemoration outpourings show, the make-over to a muscular New India is superfluous.

Indeed, commemoration with sobriety may instead be the more desirable manner of observing anniversaries having strategic import.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/military-reforms-why-front-specific-theatreisation-is-not-the-only-way-to-jointness

Front-specific theaterisation is not the only way to jointness

unedited version

The Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, has recently elaborated on the progress of military reforms with theaterisation now underway. The army’s South Western Command has received its marching orders to begin taking over the operational aspects from the other two commands on the Pakistan front, Southern and Western. Apparently, a similar instruction has been issued for the China front, though it is uncertain as to which command headquarters, Eastern Command at Kolkata or Central Command at Lucknow, may be similarly privileged. With time, other aspects as logistics are to be taken over by the command headquarters designated as the theater command for the front. The Northern Command retains its identity and responsibility for the northern theater. This creation of front-specific landward theaters complements the creation of a single maritime theater encompassing both the peninsula littorals along the maritime front.

Since the reforms have been on for long, beginning with the announcement by the prime minister from the ramparts of the Red Fort on the appointment of a chief of defence staff (CDS) in 2019, there has been much deliberation both within and outside of the government on the end-state of the reforms and manner of getting there. As part of the debate, theaterisation too found mention. Definitionally, the area of responsibility of a field army or joint command is at theater. So, ‘theaterisation’ was synonymously used for the creation of joint/integrated theater commands.

What is concerning is that front-specific theaterisation has willy-nilly acquired a precedence, almost as if it is the directive of the government that the military is to work towards theaterisation interpreted thus, as the end-state of the reforms. There being no governmental imprimatur on movement in this direction, there is little reason to privilege front-specific theaterisation as the only or preferred route to jointness. Notably, Northern Command that faces both adversaries is retained as such, thereby standing to negate the very concept that makes a front coextensive with the boundary with a putative adversary.

There is no compulsion that geographical commands need to be theater commands in the manner currently envisaged: one command for respective front astride China, Pakistan and the maritime domain. A contending formula is that a front could well have multiple joint commands overseeing respective theaters of operations along a front. This retains the strengths of the current deployment with the amalgamation of the three services into a field army level formation.   

In end December 2019, when the government appointed the CDS, it laid out the mandate of the Department of Military Affairs, of which the CDS was to be the secretary. On the promotion of jointness, the mandate reads: “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint / theatre commands.” The insertion of a ‘forward slash’ (/) - meaning ‘or’ - implies a distinction between functional and geographical commands. All geographical joint commands are theater commands, since each has an area of responsibility called theater. The forward slash is for distinguishing these from functional commands such as for logistics, cyber, special operations, air defence, strategic forces etc.

It is not clear how the front-specific theater concept acquired traction and stole a march over the second option, of joint commands with a sub-front geographical spread. Front-specific theaterisation is not explicit in the mandate of the DMA, but merely an interpretation. Whereas the interpretation of the incumbent Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, may be significant, since he is merely ‘first among equals’ when arrayed with his service chief counterparts, his view is not enough to carry the day in reconfiguring the military. It needs ministerial imprimatur, either at the defence minister or the prime minister’s level, signifying governmental backing. Any ballast for the concept from the national security adviser (NSA) is not enough, though NSA Ajit Doval headed the implementation committee that set out the terms of reference of the CDS appointment. There is no official document in the public domain nor is there a press release that indicates a ‘go ahead’ for front-specific theaterisation as against its rival concept. Therefore, to proceed with theaterisation as currently envisaged is premature, since procedurally, even if the concept of ‘one adversary-one theater’ has the CDS, who has the mandate to oversee the reforms, persuaded and service chiefs on board, it still demands political sign-off.

A reform of the order such as this is not an internal-to-military matter nor can the CDS, who is not empowered over the service chiefs (as yet), have the authority to proceed down this route. Though the government this June formed a panel under the CDS to oversee theaterisation, the panel requires reverting to the government on the preferred way forward. It can at best arrive at a meeting of minds on matters that prompted it being set up in first place, such as the controversy between the CDS and the air chief on the appropriate employment of air power in modern conflict.

For the military to arrive at a consensus on front-specific theaters is not outside the possibilities. Does the military’s proceeding down the first option – front-specific theaters - mean there is no dissent in the brass on this score? Even if so, it still requires due diligence on the government’s part to vet the decision, since the said panel was not a decision making authority as much as a facilitative one meant to get stakeholders on board.

The closest to the government position and ministerial thinking on this question in the open domain is the recent speech of the defence minister at the Defence Services Staff College, appropriately titled, 'Defence reforms in a shifting National Security paradigm'. He informed that there was progress on theater commands, but there is no hint on the geographical spread these should have. The progress the defence minister alludes to must receive his explicit endorsement since critical decisions within the broad ambit of reforms are to be politically authenticated. That India is a parliamentary democracy requires the defence minister to be in the lead.

There are good reasons for the cabinet to take a dim view of the reforms proceeding down this road.

One impetus behind the integrated commands was the need to place joint force capabilities under a single commander-in-chief, while earlier there were 19 locations with command headquarters of the three services. Most of these would now be integrated as components of joint commands. However, to proceed to reducing the numbers of these headquarters down to the lowest possible figure obtainable in case of front-specific theaters need explication. The compulsions of budget are significant, but cannot be tyrannical.

Perhaps the air force’s fears of being spread thin and abused as an extension of the army’s firepower are sought to be taken on board by restricting the parceling out of the limited air assets to the least possible number of controlling headquarters for the appropriate use of air power, essentially centralized control and decentralized execution. This is possible to replicate even in case of joint sub-front commands, and therefore the option remains pertinent. Consequently, it is uncertain how (dispensing with a political sign off) and why (the underlying logic) the armed forces have embarked on the theaterisation option they have.  

It yet needs answering how the highest military headquarters – eventually centered on the headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) headed by an operationally empowered CDS – would avoid duplication of effort of the front-specific command. Even in a localized border war as the Kargil War, the field army was virtually missing in action with the army chief making some eight trips to war front in the two months of the conflict. This indicates the levels of control necessary in a conflict between nuclear powers. The potential for escalation precludes a field army headquarters from prosecuting a war on its own volition across a front with an adversary. It will necessarily require the HQ IDS to breathe down the joint field army’s neck, lest escalation result. In other words, a front-specific joint command is infructuous.

A long standing critique of theaterisation has been that aping the United States’s combatant commands is simply not on in the Indian context. Even though the Chinese have a single theater facing India centered on Tibet, India does not have the same luxury, configured as it is on this front along exterior lines of communication. This makes for different sub-regional complexes astride the front – North East, Central Sector and Ladakh – with differentiated demands on joint capabilities. The frontage and limitations of corresponding asset availability such as of space surveillance necessarily imply centralization. Also, conflict with a foe is not a single theater’s outlook as much as a national, conducted at HQ IDS level. A front-specific joint command will end up at a crunch as an additional, dispensable layer.

Finally, the two-front threat is of a lesser order of likelihood. Being configured for a two-front threat, as the front-specific theater concept helps with, is at the expense of being prepared for the more significant and likely threat – across a single front – which is best met by sub-front multiple (as necessary) theaters overseen by respective joint commands. 

Subordinate elements – joint formations in the integrated battle group avatar – can well be controlled by multiple joint commands across a front, answering for the sake of intimate control to an operationally empowered CDS and his HQ IDS, with service headquarters taken out of the loop. This arrangement has the advantage of minimizing air force reservations, subject in this arrangement to centralized allocation.

Questions as this are not yet answered in full. The ownership of the decision must be at the political level. The updates on progress towards joint commands indicates that progress is without a parent with either the CDS overstepping his remit under the belief that - being politically appointed and politically savvy - he has the backing of his political masters or the political masters are ducking their ministerial responsibility. Neither possibility is edifying. A pause is necessary at this juncture to have the strategic community also pitch in and allow the service chiefs to air reservations if any.  

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 http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=4

Whither Northern Command? Getting theaterisation right

With war’s metamorphosing to hybrid war, information war is now a central fixture in both war and peace. This is not self-evident from the website of the Northern Command (NC). The NC webpages on the army website depict the NC stuck combating terrorism alone, though much water has flown down the Indus and Jhelum. There is no mention of the heroes of Galwan, leave alone last year’s Chinese invasion that capped their intrusions since 2013. In effect, NC is in a time warp, best illustrated by the it’s webpage saying that it is deployed in the ‘state of Jammu and Kashmir’ that was consigned to history over two years ago. This observation is not casual nitpicking, but to highlight that the NC is rather busy with operations. This article makes the case that on account of this, it needs a helping hand.

The NC has been left out of the latest structural re-jigging of the army, advertised as the most consequential reform since Independence. Media reports have it that the theaterisation process has been kicked-off after much deliberation. General Rawat, who wears three hats (Chief of Defence Staff, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs), is working to a timeline of his retirement by when he wishes to deliver on his mandate. Happenstance is that the timeline coincides with the run up to the next national elections, allowing the ruling party at the Center to appropriate yet another military achievement as its own handiwork.  

Notably, the mandate itself does not necessarily call for theaterisation, as popularly interpreted and seemingly subscribed to in the military. The press release on the forming of the department of military affairs states: “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands.” If theaterisation was the directive, the forward slash (/) that depicts ‘or’ would have been replaced by a hyphen. When joint commands are sufficient, the aim of injecting jointness into warfighting does not compel theaterisation. In any case, the interpretation that theaterisation has been mandated appears to have carried the day and caviling about it now is moot.

The makeover underway

A recent update has it that the theaterisation concept has the maritime theater complemented by three landward theaters: western, eastern and the northern. NC therefore covers the territorial spread of the two adjacent theaters – western and eastern – into Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh respectively. The consideration here is whether the NC should be retained more or less intact in this manner or should be split with the Pakistan and China facing stretches of its geography taken over by the respective neighbouring commands.

As of now, since theaterisation is a work-in-progress, which of the two options above is envisaged for the NC over the long term is not known. Along the two fronts, the operational functions of the current day commands are to be first taken over by a designated command headquarters (one for each of the western and eastern fronts) that is to form the bedrock of the theater command, followed, over time, by other functions as logistics. But the NC has been kept out of this makeover, with only its boundaries with the neighbouring theaters liable to being adjusted slightly.

For now, this retention of NC as a theater of its own may owe to it being an operationally active command. Counter-insurgency operations are set to heighten after the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the Ladakh intrusion by the Chinese has not reverted to status quo ante yet. The military has perhaps kept NC as a third theater temporarily. Doing so prevents structural instability at a time when the operational challenge is nigh.

However, the second option has the northern theater persisting into the future.  The NC is where the much vaunted two-front threat is likely to be incident most critically. Geographical contiguity at the northern extremities allows India’s two adversaries – Pakistan and China - to act in sync. An integrated response under one theater command adds weight to this option and might have led to the northern theater being retained as such in the theaterisation concept.

Splitting the northern theater?

From its website, it is evident that the NC is rather preoccupied with counter insurgency, officially put as “counter terrorism”. This is perhaps what led to its being caught flat-footed by the Chinese intrusion. And once the Chinese intruded, Ladakh has become its preoccupation. More pertinently, it has shifted a proportion of the specialist counter-insurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), to Ladakh. This has been done when many apprehend a spike in the Kashmiri insurgency. Pakistan, having returned the Taliban to Kabul, may turn its attention back to its jugular vein: Kashmir. This may lead to the speedy reversion of the RR from Ladakh once the phony war breaks into a renewed bout of proxy war as early as next spring. From back and forth actions as this - reminiscent of the motion of the neck of a spectator sitting astride the net at a tennis match - it is evident that the NC has a rather a lot on its plate, that when shared is better digested.

If the northern theater is split, the theater command handling the Pakistan front – coming up at Jaipur - can have a holistic view of the Kashmir situation, enabling it to modulate conventional deterrence as necessary and, when warranted, conduct integrated conventional operations across the whole front. It would have the two mechanised strike corps and elements of the new mountain strike corps (the third mechanized strike crops duly realigned for a role in mountains) at its disposal. If the Pakistan front is instead reformed - as the current plan has it - by frontage split between two theaters – western and northern – then the very concept predicated on a front and theater being co-extensive stands negated. 

This is especially relevant since India has been at pains over the past two decades to doctrinally link the two levels of war – subconventional and conventional – in order to deter Pakistan’s proxy war at the latter level. India is reorganising its strike forces into integrated battle groups to make its conventional military advantage credible. A single, operational-level, theater headquarters thinking up the simultaneous assaults of IBGs across the western front is better than one each handling these across the international border and across the line of control respectively. This will keep the higher headquarters at Delhi - to be eventually based on the headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and answering to an operationally empowered CDS - free to maintain a strategic view of the conflict and keep a wary eye on the other neighbour under the two-front rubric. 

A similar argument is valid for the other front too. Having Ladakh under one theater and the remainder of the line of actual control with China stretching to Arunachal Pradesh under another, would yet again embroil the strategic level headquarters IDS in calibrating the response to future Chinese adventurism across two theaters, rather than maintaining an eagle eye on both fronts. At the operational level, any future intrusions would require to be met with speedy tit-for-tat grab actions, best mounted by one headquarters fully abreast with the strengths and vulnerabilities and the developing situation across the entire China front. Hiving off Ladakh from the eastern theater militates against the logic of theaterisation. At the strategic level, the likelihood of a hyena-like action by Pakistan is taken as more likely in a situation of a limited conflict on the other front. It would not do for the strategic level headquarters to be distracted by integrating the response of the two separate theaters on the China front, when the second front is also activated.

Keeping the northern theater whole?

The two-front situation is considered most pertinent at the northern extremity, where India has the vulnerability of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO)-Depsang plains on one side and the Siachen-Kargil area, where India is on a surer footing, on the other. Admittedly, managing this area requires an innovative approach. In the case of the northern theater being split into two adversary-specific fronts respectively, Siachen would fall to the western theater. Were the two adversaries to join hands in a collusive effort here, the two theaters can respond by opening up other sectors along respective fronts. For instance, in case of a grab of DBO by China, the northern theater can counter with pressure points elsewhere and outside Ladakh, even as the western theater can ‘go for’ Hunza-Gilgit-Baltistan, targeting the Chinese Achilles heel along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or elsewhere.

A persuasive argument for retaining NC has it that in such a circumstance, a single theater based on NC would provide for a better response, rather than have the Indian response divided between two theaters. With NC handling the situation, the possibility of keeping the conflict geographically limited is higher. However, the northern theater may not be able to counter the weight the two collusive adversaries might bring to their preplanned nefarious grab. Therefore, it may be prudent to recognize this vulnerability and deter it by an implicit of conflict expansion ab initio. A split of the northern theater along the Karakoram Range will broadcast that both fronts could open up along their entire respective length, making for robust deterrence of the scenario. 

Rethink the northern theater

The NC was carved out of the Western Command after the 1971 War. The idea was that the northern theater due to its extensive geographical spread merited its own theater, though the Western Command had proved itself efficacious against both Pakistan and China in preceding conflicts. However, earlier, relations with the two neighbours were never adversarial at the same time, as is the case in recent times. Consequently, the northern theater is beset. This predicament can be eased by splitting it.

The logic of accountability with Udhampur as it faces of the upcoming threat of insurgency is not persuasive, since NC is also simultaneously squaring off against China in Ladakh. Therefore, having Jaipur take on the responsibility of overseeing the two corps at Badami Bagh and Nagrota makes sense. There is no guarantee that proxy war resumption by Pakistan will not escalate. A single theater for taking on Pakistan in such a circumstance is better, thereby also proving a better deterrent too.  On the eastern side, the talks have had only partial success and the new normal is likely to stay. Therefore, the Ladakh stretch must devolve to the eastern theater, to be anchored either at Lucknow or Kolkata. Lucknow may perhaps be better placed to exercise an over-watch than the somewhat receded, location wise, Kolkata.  

With a single theater per front, the Delhi based headquarters IDS will be able to discharge its strategic role efficaciously and keep an eye on escalatory possibilities including the nuclear level, thereby fulfilling the promise of theaterisation. Delaying the switch over of NC area of responsibility to the other two commands may not prove the right decision since adversarial relations are set to persist with both China and Pakistan and a switch over, even if delayed, will have to contend with uncertainty even later. Consequently, India must get its theaterisation act together, even as it ensures that while it is doing so, it is able to tide over any challenge in the interim.

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 https://www.claws.in/options-for-the-northern-theater/

A consideration of options for the northern theater

The Northern Command (NC) appears to have been left intact in the latest structural rejigging of the army, the most consequential since Independence. The mandate for setting up joint commands reads: “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands.”

Notably, if theaterisation was the directive, the forward slash need not have been there. However, the issue moot since reports have it that the theaterisation concept being implemented. The maritime theater is complemented by three landward theaters: western, eastern and the northern theater. The northern theater is the current-day NC area of responsibility, with its boundary duly adjusted to accommodate the two new neighbouring commands in the offing. NC therefore covers the adjacent territorial spread into Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh respectively of the two abutting theaters, western and eastern theaters.

The consideration in this article is whether the NC should be retained as the northern theater or should be split with the Pakistan and China facing stretches of its geography taken over by the respective neighbouring commands, western and eastern. Of the two options – retain NC as a northern theater or down the road split it between the two adversary-specific theaters – this article argues in favour of the latter.

As of now, since theaterisation is a work-in-progress, it is not fully known how the end state is envisaged. Along the two fronts, reportedly the operational functions of the current day commands are to be first taken over by designated command headquarters, followed over time by other functions as logistics. But the NC has been kept out of this makeover for now, favoured with its own theater as hitherto.

Presumably, since it is an operationally active command, with the counter-insurgency operations set to heighten after the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the Ladakh intrusion by the Chinese not having reverted to status quo ante yet, the military – sensibly – has led to NC being a third theater for now. It would not do to generate structural instability at a time when the challenge is nigh. Doing so will reduce accountability, currently vested in one theater headquarters: the NC. 

In the first option, this arrangement is persisted with since the NC is where the much vaunted two-front threat is likely to be most incident. Geographical contiguity in the northern parts allows India’s two adversaries – Pakistan and China - to act in sync and manifest a threat. If the appreciation has it that such a threat is best met with an integrated response under one theater command, then the NC may be persisted with.

However, a drawback of retaining NC as a single theater is that its counter insurgency commitment is of the order that perhaps led to it being off-guard when confronted by the Chinese intrusion. Arguably, similar was the case with the Kargil intrusion. With the Pakistani proxy war apprehended to heighten in wake of the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the Chinese refusing to revert to status quo ante in Ladakh, the NC may be faced with dissonance. It seems that the NC has a rather a lot on its plate, that can be better digested when shared. In other words, its area of operations should be split between the two fronts facing respectively India’s two adversaries, Pakistan and China.

If the NC is split, the theater command handling the Pakistan front can have a holistic view of the Kashmir situation, enabling it to modulate conventional deterrence as necessary and conduct integrated conventional operations across the whole front when warranted. It would have the two mechanised strike corps and elements of the new mountain strike corps (reportedly created out of the third mechanized strike crops) at its disposal. If the Pakistan front, in such as circumstance, is split into two theaters – western and NC – then the promise of theaterisation is defeated and its very concept negated. 

This is especially relevant since India has been at pains to doctrinally link the two levels of war – subconventional and conventional – in order to deter Pakistan’s proxy war at the latter level. India is reforming its strike forces into integrated battle groups to make conventional military power credible. One operational level headquarters thinking up their simultaneous assaults is better than one handling those across the international border and the other across the line of control. This will keep the higher headquarters free to maintain a strategic view of the conflict and keep a wary eye on the other neighbour under the two-front rubric. 

A similar argument is valid for the other front too. Having Ladakh under one theater and the remainder of the line of actual control with China under another, would yet again embroil the strategic level headquarters at Delhi in calibrating the response across two theaters, rather than maintaining an eagle eye on both fronts. At the operational level, any future intrusions would require to be met with speedy counter grab actions, best mounted by one headquarters fully abreast with the strengths and vulnerabilities and the developing situation across the entire front. At the strategic level, the likelihood of a Pakistani hyena action is taken as more likely in a situation of a limited conflict on the other front. It would not do for the strategic level headquarters to be distracted by integrating the response of the two separate theaters on the China front.

The two-front situation is most pertinent at India’s northern extremity, where India has the vulnerability of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) on one side and the Siachen-Kargil area on the other, where India is on a surer footing. This may require to be innovatively handled if a split of NC places these two complexes respectively in the responsibility of two different theaters, with Siachen falling in the western front.

Even if the two adversaries join hands for a concerted effort here, the two theaters can respond by opening up other sectors along respective fronts. For instance, in case of a grab of DBO by China, the northern theater can counter with pressure points elsewhere and outside Ladakh, even as the western theater can ‘go for’ Gilgit-Hunza (specifically the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and/or elsewhere. Having the strategic level headquarters at Delhi oversee operational level details would distract it from its primary responsibility at such a juncture: paying attention to conventional escalation and nuclear thresholds. 

Admittedly, retaining NC for a better response is persuasive. It would keep the conflict limited geographically and make for a concerted response. But this would to play into the hands of the adversaries who would have catered for NC’s pushback. Escalation horizontally may be better in such a case, rather than have a repeat of Kargil. On balance, this argument in favour of a northern theater does not clinch the issue.

The argument for the northern theater being split into two putative theaters – western and eastern – is therefore plausible, but would require the current threat in the northern theater to stabilize before next steps are taken.

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 https://www.milligazette.com/news/Opinions/33915-no-terror-under-modi-a-reading-list-for-the-defence-minister/

A reading list for the defence minister

The defence minister, Rajnath Singh, speaking at a meeting of the state Bharatiya Janata Party in the shadow of the gigantic statue of the original Iron Man of India, said that ‘terrorists were afraid of the Narendra Modi government at the Center and there had been no major terrorist attack in the country since Mr Modi assumed office in 2014.’ The defence minister went on to say that by conducing surgical strikes (wrongly dated to 2018 in the news report, unless the defence minister faulted on the date), India had sent a message to terrorists that they were insecure even in their safe havens, in Pakistan.

Since the defence minister is the senior member of the cabinet and sits on the cabinet committee on security (CCS) and the national security council (NSC), what he says matters. This is even more so since we know his fellow members on any of the three forums are not particularly consequential. Therefore, Rajnath Singh’s utterances have some import.

In the same breath saying there have been no terror attacks, the minister also referred to surgical strikes. This appears a self-contradiction since the surgical strikes were presumably in response to terror attacks, at Uri and at Pulwama respectively. But then – as this columnist has earlier argued here and elsewhere – these were not incidents meriting the escalatory response of surgical strikes.

At Uri, in the skirmish with the intruding terrorists a tent in which our soldiers were sleeping burnt down, accidentally increasing the casualties. This is brought out in the then corps commander’s memoirs, thus: “During the firefight, a cookhouse also caught fire, which increased the death toll (Satish Dua, India’s Bravehearts) (emphasis added).” 

As for Pulwama, it is unthinkable that the perpetrator was in and out of police stations, after having been apprehended earlier in a firefight in which two of his fellow militants died, for some six times thereafter and did not catch anyone’s eye as a potential suicide bomber. Besides, the infamous Davinder
Singh – allegedly but credibly associated with the parliament attack - was posted in Pulwama till a couple of months prior to the attack. Today, Davinder Singh is being spared investigation on both counts in the name of national security, since to do so would see plenty skeletons spill out of the cupboard.

The upshot is that the minister is indeed right – there have been no terror attacks since the prime minister took office. But is the reason he gives accurate: that this owes to a policy of ‘zero tolerance towards terrorism’?  

Counter-intuitively, let’s begin with Kashmir. The police there required the media reporting on violent incidents to use the term ‘terrorism’ rather than their preferred term, ‘militancy’. This does not necessarily make the violence there terrorism. This author has argued that the term insurgency should instead be used since this is a phenomenon amenable to political resolution, whereas using the term terrorism makes political compromises intrinsic in negotiated settlement problematic. This advocacy is in keeping with the ground situation in which over 90 per cent of those killed these days are Kashmiri youth. The weapons recovered are at best a couple of pistols with an odd Kalashnikov thrown in. Not to forget, some of the terror attacks are liable to be black operations, such as possibly the one that won Davinder Singh a gallantry medal. The dividend is to help a safe landing by Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force grey list.

That brings one to the terror attacks elsewhere that according to the minister stopped because terrorists - and Pakistan - went chicken. Terrorism is no child’s play. Perpetrators have pathological features and are hardened by ideologies of violent extremism. They often put their lives on line. Some are mercenaries whose families are amply materially compensated. Therefore, the minister’s reasoning is self-serving.

As for the anti-terrorism strategy itself, let’s revert to Kashmir. The recent burial of the political stalwart, SAS Geelani, was done under a considerable security blanket, testifying to the government knowing well that the place is poised on a brink. Kicking the can down road is never a good strategy. The belief that the political solution – invalidating of Article 370 – constituted a political solution shall face its severest test yet. Commentary on fallout from Afghanistan has it that Kashmir will likely be singed. A ‘wait and watch’ policy, arguably valid for Afghanistan, is hardly apt from a prevention point of view in Kashmir. 

As for the counter terrorism strategy of zero tolerance, elevating alleged terror participants - against whom the case is in court - to parliament on a ruling party ticket is not good strategy either. Assuming Muslim perpetrators were behind terror prior to 2014, it challenges reason that such radicalized individual have been rather inactive over the last seven years. During the period, the right wing has gone out of its way to not only lynch innocent Muslims victims periodically but upload the visuals from these beatings on to social media. The idea has been to provoke a Muslim backlash for polarization purposes. Such strategic patience on part of the Muslim terrorists begs the question why are they keeping their powder dry.

Mr. Rajnath Singh may like to have his speech writer peruse recent works on terrorism. Josy Joseph in his The Silent Coup shows how narco tests were abused to depict Muslims subjected to them as terrorists. Abdul Wahid Shaikh brings out voluminous testimony in his Innocent Prisoners on the torture he faced and his fellow Muslim prisoners to force false confessions for participation in terror acts out of them. He substantiates allegations former senior police man, Mushrif, makes in his Brahminists Bombed, Muslims Hanged. Even the flagship counter terrorism innovation of the regime, it’s cutting off of terror funding, has other impetus behind it – yet another instrument to throttle non-governmental organizations and whittle the civil society space.

Elias Davidsson in his Revisiting the 26/11 Evidence pokes holes in the Mumbai terror attack evidence. While the terror attack was Pakistan conceived and originated, it appears India profited by exploiting the terror attack to its purposes. Irrespective of supercop Rakesh Maria’s version to the contrary, in the drawing room Muslim narrative, saffronite extremists took advantage of the chaos to eliminate policemen investigating them for prior bomb blasts elsewhere. India’s inept security response – perhaps kept deliberately so to corner Pakistan - led to heightening the toll. The showing of the National Security Guard (NSG) was intriguing in this, with the NSG taking 48 hours to clean out the hotel near Gateway of India, especially when the naval Marcos and an infantry battalion’s ghatak platoon were on hand but denied a shot on the very first night itself.

The clinching evidence is from the courageous RB Shreekumar. A senior cop, Shreekumar in his Gujarat: Behind the Curtain depicts how the cover up was deployed post Godhra. The Gujarat model in which fake encounters were used to build up the image of a political worthy as Hindu Hriday Samrat thereafter went national in the false narrative of Muslim terrorism. A case to point is of the bombs being fortuitously found and defused in Surat after the serial blasts in Ahmedabad in 2008 when the current Delhi Police commissioner was in charge there.

This is no doubt a counter narrative, but deserves to be mainstreamed. Else the narrative sought to be propagated in courses on terrorism as in the new course introduced in Jawaharlal Nehru University, that terrorism is exclusively jihadi perpetrated will gain validity. While no doubt there was a Muslim backlash to events as Babri masjid demolition, Mumbai carnage and Gujarat pogrom, this pales in comparison in its temporality and impact to the terrorism attributed to Muslims by appropriation of the backlash by the right wing by covert means and its media hyperinflation. No wonder the defence lawyer of Umar Khalid described the police charge sheet as spill over from right wing trolls’ script. Revisionism as here will help strategic thinkers and the attentive public to evaluate the actual state of security and how a questionable security narrative is being employed to further political party goals at the cost of national security.

 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/911-anniversary-the-global-war-on-terror-has-done-little-to-help-india-tide-over-its-security-issues-7449541.html/amp?__twitter_impression=true

9/11 Anniversary | The global war on terror has done little to help India tide over its security issues

Periodisation of the recent past customarily ends the post-Cold War unipolar moment of United States’ hegemony at 9/11. Though the US response to 9/11 epitomised its power at its zenith, its strategic overreach has turned its strategic trajectory indubitably downwards, not so much in aggregate power but in relative terms to its peer competitors, as also the suitability of its power to the issues of the day. Nothing illustrates this better than the manner of its exit from Kabul last month.

The observance of the 20th anniversary of the terror attacks in the US on September 11 is an appropriate moment to likewise appraise as to where India’s power is poised.

The anniversary finds India hemmed into its regional space, with the two-front challenge feared for more than a decade now a manifest reality. An economy under strain from missteps even prior to the onset of COVID-19 is stretched to find the necessary resources for the corresponding defence outlay.

India is coping by movement doctrinally (integrated battle groups) and structurally (integrated theatre commands), though its efforts to return to equable relations with China continue as a work in progress ever since the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh. Its strained equations with Pakistan are likely to heighten in wake of Pakistan seemingly stealing a march over India with the movement it backed, the Taliban, taking over Kabul in one fell swoop from the India-supported Ashraf Ghani government. The apprehended fallout has India gearing up for instability in Kashmir.

The clock appears to have rewound some 20 years.

Immediately prior to 9/11, India was stocking up for giving Pakistan a sock in the nose for its being unheeding of India’s outreach at the Agra summit and upping of its proxy war in Kashmir, then raging at a higher note since the Kargil War. The plan was called Operation Kabaddi and involved taking a few posts along infiltration prone routes on the Line of Control (LoC). In the event, 9/11 intruded and so rudely did the US into the region with the operation hastily renamed Operation Enduring Freedom from its earlier hubristic moniker Infinite Justice.

The impact of the global war on terror (GWOT) swirling in the close vicinity led to Pakistan’s deft footwork in reacquiring strategic capital from its location as a frontline state a second time round. This enabled it to wiggle out of a tight spot after the coincident terror attack on India’s Parliament. India’s military reaction — slow off the blocks — allowed Pakistan to rely on the US to bail it, then and in the next peak of the twin-peak crisis.

The upshot of the crisis was benign in the two countries able to work their earlier plan of engaging each other on issues of discord. Meetings followed, marked by ceasefire on the LoC and quietude in Kashmir. However, internal politics playing spoil sport, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf was deposed and then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s latitude eclipsed in the aftermath of Mumbai 26/11. In retrospect it is easy to espy a lost opportunity.

Having shot its bolt on peace initiatives, Pakistan turned its attention to its northern neighbour, nursing the Taliban back to insurgent good health while encouraging US President Barack Obama’s peace surge. It withstood US President Donald Trump’s fulminations by delivering the Taliban to the table at Doha. Strategic patience through some 10 rounds of talks since 2018 enabled it to finally see the US pack up and leave Afghanistan last month. A small price to pay for this strategic gamble was in playing down India’s surgical strikes, refraining from proxy war and its reluctant inaction on India’s dilution of Article 370 in Jammu & Kashmir.

For its part, India snuggled up with the US, starting with the nuclear deal and participating in Obama’s pivot to Asia, that has lately culminated in its co-option into the Quad. It hopes to balance against growing Chinese power, but the effect has arguably spurred China to through its intrusion caution India against proximity with the US, despite personal ministrations of the ties by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in successive summits with China’s Xi Jinping. The Ladakh intrusions, prompted in part by the changed political map of J&K, signify India’s current day strategic predicament.

The US having departed Afghanistan and poised by year end to leave Iraq, the GWOT has run its course. The GWOT in the backdrop did little to help India tide over its security issues that predated 9/11. The lesson is that India must be Atmanirbhar Bharat, a term popularly associated with economic regeneration, but also relevant for strategic autonomy. Self-reliance, interpreted as a return to non-alignment rather than external balancing, must be leitmotif of strategy hereon