https://www.thefridaytimes.com/nuclear-learning-in-south-asia-indias-case/

Extract from Ejaz Haidar's book review quoting my book chapter contribution:

One of the most important chapters is penned by Ali Ahmed, a former Indian infantry officer and an international diplomat. The chapter titled, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stasis or Dynamism,” details the growing difference between India’s declaratory policy of no-first-use (NFU) and its operational policy.

After the May 1998 nuclear tests, India’s National Security Advisory Board came up with a draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999. Later, in January 2003, India put out an official nuclear doctrine, which was adopted by the Cabinet Committee of National Security. The official doctrine largely picked up the salient features of the draft doctrine but also made some changes to it. A key feature of it was NFU. However, as Ahmed shows, India has moved from apparent transparency to ambiguity and while the declaratory policy still iterates the idea of NFU, there’s enough evidence that the operational doctrine does not stick to the declaratory policy. In fact, India might well be thinking of pre-emptive strikes to degrade Pakistan’s capability and also command, control and communications nodes.

For its part, Pakistan never believed in India’s NFU declaration because such declarations have no real significance in operational terms. When the Berlin Wall came down and NATO had access to Warsaw Pact’s war plans, they were surprised to find that Warsaw Pact forces were operationally wedded to first use.

Evidence emerging from statements and writings by India’s former National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, former Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and the current Indian defence minister, Rajnath Singh, prove Ahmed’s assertion.

Ahmed says: “India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine is implausible. Acknowledging the shift in owning up to an operational nuclear doctrine at variance with its declaratory doctrine is the need of the hour. Persisting with the declaratory doctrine does nothing to add to Indian security under peacetime conditions when deterrence is in play or in nuclear conflict when nuclear use is contemplated.”

But Ahmed also realises in the same chapter that: “The brakes are applied at the political level. India wishes to be in the big league.” India’s balancing partners, the US and Japan, do not wish to “see India proactive on the nuclear front, doctrinally….The stasis depicted by the declaratory doctrine is to serve as a fig leaf for closed-domain doctrinal innovation.”

Another problem relates to India’s declaration of “massive response,” which only caters to higher order nuclear attacks and does not take into account lower order attacks. However, as Ahmed mentions, Menon’s book notes that India contemplated resort to first strike levels of attack in case of Pakistan’s use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons and even when readying to do so in a preemptive mode.

National Defence Academy and Societal Representativeness

Aussie Trishakti, 2019, Vol 1, No 3, October

The figures are unavailable, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the intake at National Defence Academy (NDA) lacks societal representativeness. Not all of India’s multiple subnationalities, ethnic groups and communities have a foot in the door at the cradle of India’s military officer corps. This is neither good for NDA nor good for the nation.

An example is that of India’s largest minority, its Muslims. No monolith itself, given its pan-Indian geographical spread and diverse ethnic composition, the Muslim community sent merely two of its sons for the latest NDA course. This is much below its usual average of about six per course. This implies that less than two per cent of ex NDAs are Muslim, of a segment pegged at some 15 per cent of India’s population.

Not only are major ethnic groups from India’s south and north east underrepresented, but also underrepresented – as may be surmised in absence of data – are India’s lowest castes.

One could plausibly argue that the NDA takes the best of those who volunteer. So it would be unfair to blame the military if some, or indeed, several, ethnic groups do not sign up for a life in uniform. After all, there is no shortage of good officer material from amongst those groups wishing to contribute to India's military. There is thus no case for meddling against the current system and doing so may have adverse security-related consequences.

The argument against the status quo and in favour of broadening the representativeness at the point of entry is that this measure would enable the officer corps to reflect India’s diversity. This has democratic dividend in that inclusivity would prevent usurpation of the military by a narrow – geographically and socially – set of communities. Moves are reportedly afoot to set up in Bulandshahr a feeder school by right of centre ideologues.

A deliberate effort to widen the intake will ensure that all social streams debouch the cream of their youth into the Khadakvasla reservoir, diluting the potential impact of any niche social engineering that may be underway in any part of our democracy.

This case for social representativeness does not imply making the military a site of affirmative action activism. Instead, the case calls for introspection by the military and selfinitiation of steps towards making our armed forces truly representative. Simple steps could go a long way. For example, the UPSC entrance exam dates could be advertised extensively in the vernacular press popular among underrepresented communities. Not only will such steps enable the armed forces to retain control of the situation, but it will also preempt any political interference on this score.

The NDA does not figure on any of the annual 'best colleges' lists. One reason could be that it looms large as an opportunity in the imagination of fewer groups. One way to expand the NDA’s footprint is to make a genuine and all-out effort to attract the best talent from all sections and areas of our society. Status quo thinking needs casting aside in the here and now. 

https://www.newsclick.in/Armed-Forces-India-Birender-Singh-Dhanoa-Rafale-LOC
UNEDITED VERSION

Explaining the military’s new found penchant for political partisanship

The soon-to-retire air chief has yet again chimed-in in a partisan manner. This time round he claims that the Pakistani military leadership has consistently under-estimated India’s national leadership. He was clubbing Narendra Modi’s decision on the Balakot aerial strike with the strategic decision making of the then national leaders in the Kargil, 1971 and 1965 Wars, equating an aerial strike with wars and Modi’s decision with that of Vajpayee, Indira Gandhi and Shastri in those wars. Since there is a self-evident lack of equivalence and proportion, it is apparent what the air chief is up to.

‘Yet again’ has been advisedly used. Earlier, he claimed that but for lack of the Rafale in India’s inventory, India would have walloped Pakistan in its retaliatory aerial strike to Balakot launched the following day by daylight at Naushera-Rajauri along the Line of Control (LC). The subtext was that the previous government dilly-dallied in procuring the Rafale while Modi fast-forwarded the deal at his Paris visit in 2015. Coming as these did in the midst of the controversy over the procedural shenanigans in the new Rafale deal, the remarks were partisan, favouring the ruling party. Elsewhere, he tried falsifying history, asserting that the Pakistani counter strike did not venture across the LC, contradicting the ministry statement on air intrusions that day.

Alongside, it needs recall that the air chief indulgences have been comparatively much less. The army chief has been rather brazen through his tenure, perhaps emboldened by the new process of deep-selection that fetched him the rank and by his ethnic affinity – noted by a scribe – with the reigning security deity, National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval. The two have together set a new benchmark in India’s civil-military relations (CMR) of atypical military subservience.

There are three possibilities that cover the direction of India’s CMR.

The first is banal. There is the chief of defence staff (CDS) appointment up for grabs since the prime minister from his Red Fort podium, merely announced the creation of the position but not the name of the incumbent. That the announcement is no surprise is clear from the positioning undertaken by the two over the year and more. The army chief was on a better wicket for he has been the more vocal of the two in broadcasting this political pliability, be it on Kashmir, Pakistan, internal security and, in one memorable instance, on domestic politics in Assam. The air chief perhaps fancied his own chances, believing that to get the air force that has been the hold out for long on the CDS idea, the first incumbent being from the air force would help make it fall-in in line.

This partially explains the politically partisan interventions of the two service heads over the year. It is well known the regime uses its discretion as the appointing authority to place institution heads into position, enabling manipulation of these agencies and institutions. It is one way it has managed to damage the institutional health across the board over the past five years. The loaves of office have always been enticing for those accustomed to power and perks. In the case of retiring brass, governorships are also much valued sinecures. In this case, the air chief has a week to go and can yet be recalled from retirement for taking up the CDS job – as was Maxwell Taylor in the United States.  

A second explanation could be information war. According to the new army doctrine, hybrid war substitutes for peace time these days. Since Pakistan keeps up its proxy war, hybrid war is ever ongoing. Information war is leading characteristic of hybrid war. This requires the military to keep up the din of a war impending. The army chief let on as much recently, saying that fear keeps Pakistan deterred. Today this is very much necessary as Modi is appearing at the United Nations General Assembly session. A crisis back home would be embarrassing, one sparked by Pakistani setting off of domestic unrest in Kashmir. There is widespread expectation that the dam of disaffection is yet to burst in Kashmir. India would like to stay Pakistan’s hand in setting it off. Deterrence messaging time to time is useful on this score.

The air chief’s statement is thus part of the orchestration by the national security establishment, which has lately tapped the defence  minister, the minister in the prime minister’s office, the army chief etc for statements on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to the army’s readiness to grab it. In this case, the air chief is underlining the new doctrine of strategic proactivism, so that Pakistan is not kept guessing.

Even so, it is a bit of stretch. He appears instead to be publicly taking on the criticism one of India’s leading strategic minds, Manoj Joshi. Joshi, from his think tank perch had punctured the hype around the Balakot decision. He had it that decision making around the strike was not of strategic levels as undertaken by previous prime ministers.

A similar public punch up was indulged in by the northern army commander with his predecessor in the chair, DS Hooda, over whether the surgical strikes ever took place under anyone before Modi. Ranbir Singh – in line for army chief – had it twice over that this was not so, directly contradicting his retired predecessor. The first time round the controversy played out well prior to elections and Pulwama-Balakot. However, it was egregiously raised yet again at election time by the operations branch – backed by the northern army commander. Given this election time backdrop and Hooda’s writing up of a security doctrine for the Congress, it was clearly political partisanship on part of the military, either at its own or at the behest of powers that be.

The air chief, perhaps mistakenly feeling his service’s Balakot dare devilry was being put down, has now waded in to take up cudgels with Joshi. To him, the Pakistanis went ahead with Pulwama terror attack believing that India would be cowed down as usual. Instead, from the near real time counter strike by the Pakistanis they were pretty much awaiting such knee-jerk response by India.

This puts a question mark over India’s new policy of mow-the-grass. The next time, the onus would be on India to escalate. After the dogfight at Naushera-Rajauri we took recourse to information war – claiming to have shot down an F-16 for the loss of our fighter. It did not work too well then either; it cannot be expected to work another time. India would have to follow through with missile strikes - which it refrained from this time. The need to avoid this escalatory ladder charitably explains the periodic information war salvos, including that of the air chief. Uncharitably put, it is well nigh likely that the chiefs are being used by their political minder – who is no longer the defence minister but the NSA – for stating the party line. 

Finally, and more importantly, there appears to be a shift in India’s civil-military relations. The shift can be visualized as two sets of three circles: of political culture, strategic culture and the military’s organizational culture. The first visualization is in concentric circles, wherein the organizational culture is nested in strategic culture, itself layered by political culture. The second visualization is of the three as overlapping circles.

The first is theory compliant in which organizational culture of the military is detached from the political culture and changes in political culture are mediated by the intervening circle of strategic culture. There is a change in political culture brought about by ascent to power of cultural nationalism. This has resulted in a muscular strategic policy, shifting strategic culture from defensive to offensive. In turn, the military’s organizational culture has proven responsive, taking like a duck to water, throwing aside strategic restraint in favour of strategic proactivism.

The second visualization - of overlapping circles – is more troubling, but likely closer to reality. This has political culture impacting the military’s organizational culture directly. This is through penetration of cultural nationalist verities into the organizational cultural spaces. This is through appointment of pliable generals, such as the army chief, and, through an ideational conveyer belt with the veterans’ community setting up an assembly line into the military.

Many retired military men signed up for the BJP. Modi first addressed an ex-servicemen rally before he inaugurated the national war memorial, muscling out the president from his privilege. Thus, the cultural nationalist verities have been internalized by the service members and the military is no longer the pristine apolitical and secular organization as hitherto. This explains the service chiefs’ partisan behavior and with none finding it amiss and calling it out on that count.

The military’s partisanship – of which the air chief’s recent intervention is illustration - is on account of all three explanations. There is the mundane one at the individual level; the second is functional, which allows the military some slack; and the third is the more sophisticated one, requiring surveillance of the military’s future behavior to verify if indeed the ground has shifted in India’s CMR.

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https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/politics-decoding-indias-recent-rhetoric-on-pok-4440211.html

Decoding India’s recent rhetoric on PoK

After the end of the United Nations Security Council’s closed door meeting on Kashmir — its first in over half century — India’s permanent representative underscored India’s constitutional initiative on Kashmir was an ‘internal matter’ while maintaining that India would speak to Pakistan once that country ceases support for terrorism.

The externally-directed official Indian stand has worked to stave-off legitimate concerns, stoked liberally by Pakistan, on yet another India-Pakistan crisis. It has managed to get United States President Donald Trump walk back his offer of mediation.

However, internally, the official stand appears to have created dissonance among constituents of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The initial euphoria was such that many believed India had ipso facto in one fell swoop veritably solved the Kashmir problem.

That little had changed — other than the administrative map of J&K and its relationship with Delhi — even though the indomitable duo, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and BJP President and Union Home Minister Amit Shah, resorted to the by-now-patented ‘shock and awe’ tactics turned out to be less than the bluster warranted.

Consider the timing of the recent references to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), suggestive of a diversionary tactic.

The first salvo was from Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on the day following the impromptu interaction by Akbaruddin in New York. Singh, following his controversial intervention in the latest crisis that India’s No First Use commitment continuing was contingent on future circumstances, had it at a party event that any discussions with Pakistan would only be on PoK.

The same day, the minister for the north east in the prime minister’s office (PMO) and parliamentarian from J&K, Jitendra Singh, exhorted a party audience, saying, ‘let us move forward with a positive thinking of freeing PoK from the illegal occupation.’

The next round of PoK references appear timed with the second India-Pakistan bout, at the 42nd session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.

Immediately prior, in a briefing on the first 100 days achievements of the Modi government’s second tenure, Jitendra Singh showcased the government’s constitutional action in Kashmir as its ‘biggest and greatest achievement’ that required, in his words, ‘tremendous amount of will power, conviction and determination’.

This time around he claimed that retrieving parts of PoK was the ‘next agenda’, mandated by the non-binding Narasimha Rao era, unanimously-adopted, parliamentary resolution on Kashmir. The February 1994 resolution demanded that, ‘Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression.’

The ruling party, perceiving a certain reservation in its cadre, is pepping them up in a way it knows — projection of a problem onto Pakistan. The removal of Article 35A, collateral damage of the de-operationalisation of Article 370, has affected Jitendra Singh’s voter base. The Dogras look for like protections on offer in Article 371 as a substitute. The sweetener of a future Jammuite domination of the new J&K union territory has not quite worked in face of the underside of integration.

Besides, India’s upping-the-ante along the Line of Control (LoC) has led to a partial hit-wicket in terms of displacement, requiring Jitendra Singh to up the rhetoric on PoK.

The government has kept up an accusatory line on Pakistan, alleging Pakistan’s retaliation is unfolding. Apparently, jihadist infiltrators are in launch pads, with some 50-plus having made it past India’s three anti-infiltration lines at maximum alert.

The rhetoric is likely twin-pronged: One to deter Pakistan, and, two, to lay the ground for a military riposte against Pakistan in PoK if Kashmiris were to attempt unshackle the lockdown in an explosion of disaffection.

This accounts for the army chief stepping into the headlines on the PoK. On the day of the India-Pakistan exchange of words over Kashmir at Geneva, he said that the Indian Army was always ready for action in PoK. He took care to caveat his answer that the decision was a governmental prerogative.

In so far as the choreographed information war two-step between the PMO and the army chief over PoK deters it is unexceptionable. However, hopefully when the government considers such a step, it would consult him prior. He best knows that with our hold over Kashmir after 30 years being as it is, what venturing into PoK entails.

War planners sensibly restrict their threats to ‘parts of PoK’, knowing the China factor intrinsic in Gilgit-Baltistan and Aksai Chin — though referred to by Shah in his grandstanding in Parliament. Also, a cursory glance at the map would show up how Pakistan’s national capital territory abuts PoK. Even so, they need reminding — if Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s drum-beat of early warnings are heeded — that will not be the only area affected.

Therefore, the J&K governor’s alternative manner of taking over PoK makes sense: by developing J&K in such a manner that PoK, enticed, opts in. Unfortunately, this is not what former army chief and minister VK Singh meant when he said that India has a ‘ran-niti’ (special strategy) for PoK. If it were then why be secretive?

https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/37/strategic-affairs/military-professionalism-and-effectiveness.html

https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2019_54/37/CL_LIV_37_140919_Ali_Ahmed.pdf

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 54, Issue No. 37, 14 Sep, 2019 

Military Professionalism and Effectiveness

The Indian military takes pride in its reputation as a professional force, defined in civil–military theory as valuing expertise, corporate autonomy, and social responsibility (Huntington 1967: 8–18). The military is also known for being secular and apolitical. While “secularism” reflects the anchoring of the military in the Indian culture and social environment, “apoliticism” owes to its staying out of politics unlike many peer militaries such as in Pakistan (Wilkinson 2015: 3). The three pillars—professionalism, secularism, and apoliticism—contribute to its effectiveness or ability to provision military security for its client, variously defined as the state and the nation.

Of late, there are concerns over the possible erosion in its two characteristics: secular and apolitical. As regards secularism, the apprehensions spring more generally from secularism being under assault in Indian politics by votaries of Hindutva or cultural nationalism. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) continuing in power with a renewed mandate—earned by a larger voting percentage than in 2014—could embed cultural nationalist verities into the Indian political culture. There is threat of a decisive turn away from civic nationalism that has defined the proverbial “idea of India” so far towards ethnic nationalism (Ansari 2019).

As for the apolitical characteristic, it is possible to discern a shift in the manner of political control by the government. In theory, there are two options of civilian control. Objective civilian control is the “maximisation of military professionalism” in order to keep it politically “sterile and neutral.” On the other hand, subjective civilian control is maximisation of the power of some particular civilian group in relation to the military (Huntington 1967: 80–85).

Thus far, Indian civil–military relations have largely been characterised by objective civilian control, wherein the military is kept distant from politics by an emphasis on its professionalism. The onset of majoritarian democracy—entailed by the Hindutva project—requires that the military remain politically inert or act as a handmaiden. The former can be maintained by continuing with objective civilian control. However, it increasingly appears that the government wishes a closer embrace of the military, implying the onset of ­subjective civilian control. This could culminate in inculcation in the military of a cultural nationalist world view, implicating its apolitical and secular character.

Politicisation is a move away from a theoretical ideal of a mutually respected political–military distance and towards a degree of like-mindedness between the two spheres. The problem of a military subscribing to a political ideology is that it would lose its apolitical status, placing it afoul of any successive government led by a different ruling party with a diverse political orientation. Its secularism stands to be compromised by its borrowing from the understanding of the term in the Hindutva lexicon, wherein there is little regard for religious and cultural diversity (Jaffrelot 2019). Such implications for the military of the ongoing turn to majoritarianism need acknowledging and should be studied for the impact on its professionalism.

Military’s Partisanship

In the run-up to the national elections this year, a letter from over 150 veterans of the armed forces to the President of India was put out in the open domain (Wire 2019a). Noting the reference to military operations in electioneering, in particular by the ruling party, the letter expressed apprehensions over the politicisation of the military. The concerns of the veterans were dismissed as fake news by the defence minister. The controversy attending the letter served a purpose of bringing the threat of the politicisation of the military into the open.

The national elections witnessed the surfacing of national security as a major election issue. Though, over the turn of the year, national security was not on the horizon since persuasive narratives had been built up around unemployment, the effects of demonetisation, the implementation of the goods and services tax, farmers’ suicides, rural distress, etc. However, the game changer as the elections approached was the Balakot aerial strike on 26 February 2019. The aerial strike was in retaliation for the car-bombing in Pulwama of a security forces convoy on 16 February 2019.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick off the blocks taking credit for the strikes and calling for votes on the basis of a leadership that is strong on defence. The government had similarly played up the surgical strikes on 29 September 2016, when the army had launched multiple trans-Line of Control raids across a wide front on terror camps in retaliation to the terror attack earlier on the army garrison at Uri on 18 September 2016. The military success—though denied by Pakistan—was put to political use then by the ruling party in the state elections in Uttar Pradesh early the following year, resulting in its sweeping victory in the crucial state. Taking cue, the ruling party used the opportunity of the Pulwama terror attack and its aftermath to reframe the national elections away from other electorally significant issues and towards national security. Sensing the reframing of the electoral agenda post Balakot, the Congress party claimed that while in power it had similarly launched trans-Line of Control raids (Scroll 2019).

In so far as the claims and counterclaims played out between the two political parties, it could be taken as par for electioneering course. However, as voting came to an end, the army operations branch claimed that it had no record of any previous surgical strikes (Bhat 2019), contradicting the opposition party. Immediately as voting ended, the northern army commander seconded the operations branch (Business Standard 2019). The army implicating itself into the political controversy, worked in favour of the ruling party’s design of electoral victory mediated by its approach to national security.

Arguably, if a government is bent on taking credit for strategic decision-making, it is not illegitimate of itself. For the Prime Minister to take credit for decisiveness to contrast his government from its predecessor government is explicable. The prospects of escalation being higher in both cases of surgical strikes—by land and by air—required the government to take ownership of the decision. Shouldering responsibility permits taking of the credit too, which the BJP proceeded to do to the chagrin of the opposition. However, involving the military for partisan reasons, amounts to the politicisation of the military.

A similar case can be made out on the controversy surrounding the Balakot aerial strike and its aftermath that witnessed a counter aerial strike by Pakistan in the Rajauri–Nowshera sector on 27 February 2019. As the controversy unfolded at the political level, the air force went further than it need have. The air chief publicly rued the non-availability of the Rafale aircraft (Peri 2019), with the sub-text implying that non-materialisation of the deal in a timely manner deprived India of a technological edge. This was suggestive of a slovenly approach to defence procurements by the Congress-led predecessor government, a deficiency made up by the Prime Minister’s controversial intervention in fast-forwarding the Rafale purchase. Given the political backdrop of the Rafale deal, the air chief’s reference to it was questionable.

After the election, the air chief went on to claim that there was no intervention by the Pakistan air force into Indian airspace in their counterstrike (Times of India 2019). This contradicted the government’s statement complaining of an air intrusion (Ministry of External Affairs 2019). No clarification ensued.

Another example is of the army’s participation in misleading the country on the reason for the emergency-like lockdown in Kashmir. The Srinagar corps commander went on national television informing of a heightening of a Pakistani proxy war, pointing to the recovery of warlike material along the Amarnath yatra route and to a thwarted border action team assault on the Line of Control. This led to the cancellation of the pilgrimage and advisory for all tourists and migrant workers to leave the Valley. As events turned out, it became clear that the clampdown was occasioned by a decision to reduce Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from a state with a special status to bifurcated union territories (Das and Bhaskar 2019). The government, aware that the decision would evoke a backlash and possible violence, pre-empted this by a security blanket. In effect, the country ended up as target of information war, with the army as the instrument.

But, more importantly, its contribution to the threat perception assessment informing the decision is questionable. Anticipating that the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A would have led to civil unrest and a possible heightening of insurgency and proxy war thereafter, it is worth speculating whether the army’s input on managing the security enabled the government to go ahead with its initiative. The question arises if the army trimmed its input to what the government wished to hear. If so, it paved the way for a politically problematic decision.

Politicisation Pathways Ahead

A re-imagination of the idea of India in the Hindutva image is underway by the right wing in power for another five years. In its relationship with the military, the right wing would like to preserve military professionalism, even as it wishes to realign the other two characteristics, secularism and apoliticism. The government has two choices: first, to maintain the status quo in that it continues with civil–military relations as hitherto, or, second, to make the military imbibe cultural nationalism.

In Prime Minister’s first term, a significant change was the institutionalising of a new selection system for a service chief, moving away from the traditional system of seniority to that of deep selection. Currently, the government is considering successors to the air and army chiefs, who are retiring, and has created the post of chief of defence staff (CDS), though it has yet to name an incumbent. That the appointment of the CDS was in the offing may have prompted the political stances taken by the two services in the illustration above. The army chief has better chance of elevation as CDS, positioned better for the job through his political pliability during his tenure (Wire 2019b). The northern army commander, referred to in the example above, is in line for army chief, the candidate consideration for which has reportedly begun (Pubby 2019). The illustrations of the military’s partisanship recounted here indicate the vulnerability of the military—in anticipation of being rewarded—to political manipulation.

The military is a conservative institution with its members being of a largely realist and nationalist persuasion (IDS 2017: 59). Therefore, the ruling party ideology holds partial appeal for the military. If Indian secularism is interpreted as a cultural trait attributable to the prevalence of Hinduism, there is little change necessitated in the military’s secularism. On the aspect of its remaining apolitical, if the BJP sticks broadly to the constitutional route, even if not strictly bound by the constitutional spirit, the tradition-bound military can be expected to remain politically inert. This enables the exercise of objective civilian control, keeping the traditional political–military distance. Even though objective civilian control can serve the ruling party’s interest well enough, the instances of politicisation noted in this article indicate that, over the coming five years, the apolitical attribute stands to be diluted.

A change in secularism and apolitical facets can be expected to have a corresponding knock-on effect on the military’s professionalism, and, at one remove, its effectiveness. Since the government’s hardline policy towards Pakistan is predicated on continuing military effectiveness, enabling the relative stability of the three facets would be wise. In the case of the ideological penetration of the military, the strategic and operational thinking can potentially suffer. Its input to national security may be swayed by ideological winds if it loses its apolitical moorings. Maintaining the status quo on civil–military relations is, therefore, desirable.

Even so, it is unlikely that the right wing would leave the military alone in its India reset. It would prefer the majoritarian turn in political culture be reflected in the military’s organisational culture. The government needs warning off that this could prove to be at the cost of military professionalism and effectiveness. The military too needs cautioning that, for the sake of national security, it needs to stand up to any such attempt. A clue as to the direction the winds blow will soon be known from the apex military appointments that the government makes.

Note

The author would like to thank attendees for comments on the content of my presentations at Carnegie India, New Delhi, on 28 June 2019, the Centre for Gandhian Thought and Peace Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, on 2 August 2019, and at the Human Resources Development Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, on 3 August 2019.

References

Ansari, Hamid (2019): “The RSS—A Menace to India’: Hamid Ansari’s Speech at the Book Launch,” Leftword, 15 April, viewed on 15 August, https://mayday.leftword.com/blog/post/hamid-ansari-speech-at-noorani-rss-book-launch/.

Bhat, Sunil (2019): “In RTI Reply, Centre Says No Records of Surgical Strikes during UPA Regime,” India Today, 7 May, viewed on 10 August, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/rti-reply-upa-surgical-strikes-1519181-2019-05-07.

Business Standard (2019): “First Surgical Strike Was Carried Out in September 2016, Confirms Lt Gen Ranbir Singh,” 20 May, viewed on 11 August, https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/first-surgical-strike-was-carried-out-in-sept-2016-confirms-lt-gen-ranbir-singh-119052000515_1.html.

Das, Shaswati and Utpal Bhaskar (2019): “The Events that Led to Jammu and Kashmir Losing Its Special Status,” 7 August, Mint, viewed on 15 August, https://www.livemint.com/politics/policy/article-370-scrapped-the-events-that-led-to-jammu-and-kashmir-losing-its-special-status-1565143199592.html.

Huntington, Samuel (1967): The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

IDS (2017): Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi.

Jaffrelot, Christophe (2019): “The Fate of Secularism in India,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 April, viewed on 13 August, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/fate-of-secularism-in-india-pub-78689.

Ministry of External Affairs (2019): “Pakistan Demarched on the Act of Aggression against India,” 27 February, viewed on 1 August, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/311
00/Pakistan_demarched_on_the_act_of_aggression_against_India.

Peri, Dinakar (2019): “IAF Achieved Its Objective in Balakot: Air Chief Dhanoa,” Hindu, 15 April, viewed on 1 August, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/had-rafale-been-inducted-on-time-balakot-result-would-have-been-even-more-in-our-favour-air-chief-dhanoa/article26844542.ece.

Pubby, Manu (2019): “Vetting Process for Next Army Chief Begins,” Economic Times, 27 June, viewed on 5 August, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/vetting-process-for-next-army-chief-begins/articleshow/69951737.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

Scroll (2019): “Ex-Army Officer Who Oversaw‘Surgical Strikes’ Says Cross-border Operations Were Conducted Before,” 5 May, viewed on 5 August, https://scroll.in/latest/922364/ex-army-
officer-who-oversaw-surgical-strikes-says-cross-border-operations-were-conducted-before.

Times of India (2019): “Pak Planes Did Not Cross LoC during Feb 27 Dogfight: Air Chief Dhanoa,” 24 June, viewed on 4 August, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/69926362.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

Wire (2019a): “Veterans Ask President to Urge Parties to Stop Using Military for Political Gains,” 12 April, viewed on 12 August, https://thewire.in/security/veterans-ask-president-to-urge-parties-to-stop-using-military-for-political-gains.

— (2019b): “Why India May Need a CDS—But It’s Not Bipin Rawat,” 21 August, viewed on 22 August, https://thewire.in/video/watch-why-india-may-need-a-cds-but-its-not-bipin-rawat.

Wilkinson, Steven I (2015): Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence, New Delhi: Orient Blackswan

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=94571

For constructive Indian engagement in the Afghanistan endgame

After nine rounds, the talks between the United States and the Taliban, even as the goalposts were within sight, President Trump cancelled the prospective peace deal touted only early this month by his lead negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad. Though the US has misgivings over some aspects of the emerging agreement, making its secretary of state unwilling to sign up, it is only a question of time for a deal to emerge. This is evident from Trump firing his hardline national security advisor, John Bolton, who had reservations on the emerging deal. Secretary of State Pompeo has left the door open, saying that the talks are called off ‘for now’.

The pressures on Trump are from his reelection campaign kicking in next year and the little known fact that over one lakh veterans for Bush’s war on terror have committed suicide when back from their war stints abroad. He tweeted his about-turn, cancelling the talks, after the latest bombing in Kabul that accounted for, among 12 others, one US and a Romanian soldier.

At the table, the US had required the Taliban to promise keeping Afghanistan from being a sanctuary for anti-West forces in return for a US draw down in preparation for a pull out over the coming year. Intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government were slated in Oslo to set the stage for a return of Taliban to Kabul in some form of power sharing in an interim arrangement. All this will now presumably have to await the Taliban signing up to a ceasefire agreement first.

Clearly, the superpower requires help in extricating from Afghanistan. Absent imaginative interventions from strategic partners, like India, the US will continue to wallow in Afghanistan at a continuing cost to Afghans. This explains the calls not only by the US but also friendly countries, as Germany, for India to lend a hand.

With Taliban on the ascendant, commentary in India took a turn from its usual conflation of Taliban with terrorism to reaching out to the Taliban. The new thinking has it that repositioning in relation to the Taliban would serve India well on multiple fronts. Departing from the usual power-centric narrative, this article highlights an area of constructive Indian engagement in Afghanistan.

The new arrangement that will likely emerge from the eventual intra-Afghan dialogue in Oslo will inevitably require wide international support. The international community is interested in preserving the socio-economic gains made in Afghanistan, such as in matters as education, minority rights and gender. Besides, Afghanistan in a post conflict situation will require extensive state and nation building assistance. The US’ peace surge could not ensure this since it was party to the war.

In the short term, this would be humanitarian and recovery assistance. A return of refugees and internally displaced will follow stabilizing of the security situation. The interim joint security structures would require overseeing the cantonment, retooling and demobilization of irregular fighters, particularly of the Taliban who are not absorbed into state structures. Structural peacebuilding will be proceeding alongside, in terms of implementation of any peace agreement that emerges from the talks. This would likely include an intra-Afghan dialogue at the local level, constitution making at the national capital and elections down the line. Cultural peacebuilding will have to proceed apace in order to bring about inter-tribal reconciliation after forty years of war.

The prospective peace agreement cannot but have a prominent section on security. A joint military commission and security structures are likely to be in place as part of an overarching agreement. However, the history of bloodletting over the past decades suggests that international oversight and engagement may be necessary.

There are two regional organizations that could play such role, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Even if an obituary is too early to write up on the SAARC, it can be ruled out for now. As for the SCO, Afghanistan is not a member as yet, but can be inducted since its application is pending. The SCO has the heft of having Russia, China, India and Pakistan as members, and Iran as an observer. However, since a proportion of US troops may stay on for longer, the US would not want to hand over the situation to its rivals, Russia and China.

That leaves the UN, with its political mission in place having its peacebuilding mandate upgraded with an additional peacekeeping one. The idea of peacekeeping in Afghanistan is not new. There has been mention of Muslim states such as Turkey, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Indonesia, providing peacekeepers. Incidentally, the regional states – Nepal, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan – provide the UN its best peacekeepers. The two sides, India and Pakistan, have a history of bonhomie on UN missions.

This brings forth a counter-intuitive idea, of regional peacekeepers – amongst others - under a blue flag. Indian and Pakistani troops serving together may help blunt the competition of interests between the two states in Afghanistan and preclude a prospective proxy war. Depending on how things shape up in Kashmir and how India’s forging of relations with the Taliban plays out, operationalising the idea would enable India to be responsive to the US entreaties to do more in Afghanistan.

Even if premature for now, India - in the interim as talks restart - could assist with politically shepherding the idea of a widely mandated UN mission. Such a UN mission could resemble the one in South Sudan. That mission was designed to get the new state up and running, even if it ran into rough weather two years into its life cycle. It’s being waylaid by a civil war should not deter out-of-the-box thinking, with the lessons-learnt from the crises informing the design. There is sufficient stomach for such a mission, with the US likely to reprise its strategy of starving the UN of funds in order to help the UN bail it out of its longest war. Regional states being onboard can make the idea tick.

Continuing engagement will help with moderation of the Taliban. It will help keep Taliban accountable to the agreement it signs up to. Such support will help the Taliban balance any Pakistani pressures on it, enabling it to cast aside Pakistan’s shadow as an autonomous actor. International presence and oversight will ensure that the government forces, women and minorities are not imposed on adversely. Absent such oversight, it can only portend a return to civil war and multiple proxy wars.

India has the capacity to engage with this process of socialisation of the Taliban. Its participation would be indispensible for the international community because of the political weight it brings to the table as a regional power, and as an economic heavyweight. Continued engagement will help India preserve its over-USD 2 billion investment in Afghanistan, besides deepen India’s soft power sway. It will help India keep a foot in the door in Afghanistan, that otherwise is set to be dominated by its other competitor, China.

India would also be able to influence Taliban’s perspective on regional security issues as Kashmir, preempting any redeployment of Taliban fighters by Pakistan from a stabilized situation in Afghanistan towards a restive Kashmir. This would help build on the Taliban’s preference expressed in its statement on the changes in Kashmir that the two states, India and Pakistan, keep their difference over Kashmir out of the emerging situation in Afghanistan.

As of now, it appears that India has fired off its first shot in the Afghan endgame by its timing the changes in Kashmir. Such a strategy places India as a potential spoiler. Indian hardliners would not be averse to seeing Afghanistan as a site of proxy war sucking in Pakistan. However, continuing of instability in Afghanistan can only have a backlash in Kashmir. Therefore if India instead plays along with the developments, it would alleviate Pakistan’s security dilemma. A tacit understanding must be arrived at between the two neighbours through the backchannel in which Pakistan lays off Kashmir in return. 

This tradeoff allowing Pakistan some success in its quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan has immediate term implications in keeping a lid on the situation in Kashmir. India can sugarcoat this by conferring statehood on Jammu and Kashmir and making provision of cultural and land protection under Article 371. India can thus imaginatively target two birds with one stone: stabilizing Kashmir while inserting itself constructively into the endgame in Afghanistan.

Currently, India is headed into a proxy war in Afghanistan to pay back Pakistan for its proxy war in Kashmir. Such an outcome is product of the muscular strategic outlook India has taken to lately. Alternative strategic options are available such as the innovative one broached here. A regional power with great power aspiration should be held to no less an ambitious strategy for shaping its region.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/16793-cautioning-the-indian-military-against-being-politically-gullible

Cautioning the military against being politically gullible 

Of late the pressures to place Pakistan into a corner so that India can get out of the corner it has painted itself into, are aplenty. Having deoperationalised Article 370 and awaiting the popular backlash in Kashmir, India is readying to deflect the blame onto Pakistan. It is a case of projection, putting on another’s shoulder what embarrasses. The military appears to be lending itself willingly to such a strategy. It needs cautioning of the underside of the strategy.

The latest information war intervention by the military has been in the southern army commander going on national television to claim that recovery of abandoned boats in the Sir Creek suggest a terror threat across south India. His statement was preceded by reports by intelligence agencies of Pakistani agents activity in the area. At best a threat could develop in Gujarat from boats landed there.

It is inconceivable that anyone would land in Sir Creek to take on targets in Kerala, but as if on cue, the Kerala police jumped on the bandwagon with their own sounding of an alert. Recall, the state had also figured in the prospective sites for terror backlash to India’s constitutional bungling Kashmir. Then it was no doubt to divert attention of the country aghast from happenings up north. Kerala as is well known is the site of the next intended penetration of the Parivar for social and political engineering. An advance element in the form of a new and suitable governor is already in position.

This indicates the problem, not comprehended by the military so far, that accompanies its periodic crying wolf. The information war painting Pakistan black has internal political consequence. So while the military may think that it is acting out its part as part of an ongoing hybrid war with Pakistan, of which information war is a salient part in peace time, it may be playing into the hands of political forces it has little comprehension of. The Parivar is fully capable of using the gullibility of the military for its political ends (even if it claims to be merely a cultural organization).

Lately such instances have increased, indicating the military is playing along. Take a few illustrations.

First, the air chief went overboard once claiming that the Pakistani aerial counter attack at Rajauri-Naushera to India’s Balakot strike did not cross the Line of Control (LC). This is false since it contradicted the ministry statement accusing Pakistan of an air violation.

Second, the army operations branch and the army commander northern command misinformed Indians that no surgical strikes were carried out prior to the trans-LC operations in late September 2016. This lie worked in favour of the ruling party in elections, since the operations branch made its egregious intervention on this politically charged question prior to elections end and the army commander chipped on the day following the end of elections. Surely, this was no co-incidence. Were they being their master’s voice?

Third, the corps commander in Kashmir – perhaps to over-compensate for sleeping on the job and allowing the Pulwama terror attack to happen – on national television claimed a threat to the Amarnath Yatra when his troops chanced upon a mine and some warlike stores. This resulted in the calling off of the Yatra, return of migrants and eviction of tourists. In the event, it turned out to be lies to facilitate the lock down preceding the farce enacted in parliament on Article 370.

Fourth, the corps commander had then claimed killings of five terrorist members of a border action team out to attack an LC position or activity. While Pakistan disputed this, it was never followed up by the media as to what happened to the bodies, of which photos from a distance were put out in the media. Recently, India released a video on the operation in which they were allegedly killed, indicating that it felt that it had not convinced its audience enough back then. He was yet again on national television trying to - in anticipation of the inevitable outbreak of impending civil unrest – shift the blame on to ‘Pakistani puppets’ for attempting fresh infiltration. While no doubt Pakistan would be up to its old tricks, what else did the security establishment imagine when it advised the Modi-Shah duo that it would manage the aftermath?

It is by now clear that the advice – if sought and tendered – was an over reach. India is risking war and internal rebellion. This has little security value for the country, though is of great political dividend for Modi. It enables diversion from the economic bad news. In case push comes to shove, then Pakistan can be blamed for a tanking economy – whether India wins or loses. It has value for polarizing India further. It has potential to plunge India into an authoritarian mode of governance. The much feared fascism will have a vitiated security environment as cover.

The supposed terror threat in the rest of India, for which at least two alerts have been issued so far in south India, has a subtext; it being that terror in the hinterland requires support and such a support base can only be in India’s subverted minority that has a pan-India presence. This is where the black operations of terror bombings by political Hinduism fanatics kick in. In the popular narrative these have been attributed to Muslims. There is a surfeit of commentary from the usual sources that Muslims – otherwise not particularly concerned with the Kashmir question - are put out by the right wing’s actions in Kashmir. Thus Muslims stand in the dock yet again, for no fault of theirs, but as testimony to the ingenuousness of Hindu voters and success of intelligence agencies marching to a Sanghi tune.

Given this internal political context to the heightened India-Pakistan tension, it would be wise for the army to distance from being an instrument of scaremongering. It may like to overlay its strategic input with political sensitivity. At the apex level, the expectation from the military brass is not ‘Yea Sir, three bags full, Sir!’. Instead, they are to have political understanding. This may sound counter intuitive and against the acclaim for the military being apolitical. However, how can a military be apolitical if it does not have political sensitivity enough to keep out of politics and ensure politics keeps off the military?

This is a critical time in civil-military relations for the military to stand up and ward off – not disobey – orders from the Doval led national security establishment that though seemingly Pakistan focused also have an internal political component. The military needs to be prickly and in so being exercise a deterrent for improper tasking. It cannot have its uniform sullied by being used on account of its credibility and authority for putting out questionable ‘facts’ that have a pronounced internal political bias.

This is not a call for disobeying the government but only requiring that such orders either be routed through the proper channel – the defence minister – or be put out through the bona-fide information channels of the government. Why must the brass be paraded in front of television cameras? Whereas the brass undertaking this may be looking at the external dimension of the messaging, the message for its political minders is more internally directed, targeting Indian people and their voting base in the majority.

The military – familiar as it is with headlines – must know that institutions across the governance sector have been sent to the rock bottom over the past five years. Its head is on the blocks next. It appears to be losing the battle to preserve its institutional apolitical culture and ethos. It is doddering but not down for the count yet. The nation waits to see if the brass measure up to the test of history. 

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/politics/afghanistan-endgame-options-before-india-after-trump-cancels-talks-4416631.html/amp?__twitter_impression=true

Afghanistan endgame | Options before India after Trump cancels talks

At the start of the month, the talks with the Taliban appeared to be headed to a culmination. After nine rounds over almost a year, the lead United States’ (US) negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad, had touted a putative agreement in which the Taliban promised good behaviour in exchange for a draw down preceding a full withdrawal by the US.

However, the latest bombing by the Taliban, that accounted for a US soldier among 12 killed in Kabul, had US President Donald Trump tweet his cancelling the talks. Presumably here on talks would be on a ceasefire preceding further negotiations, including intra-Afghan talks that were to take place in Oslo following the now-shelved peace deal.

Three scenarios lie ahead in case the US sticks to its schedule for departure by the end of next year, predicated as it is on Trump’s promise to leave foreign war zones by re-election time.

The first is progressive take over by the Taliban of Afghanistan, from their current sway over short of two-thirds of the country. The second is a balancing of the Taliban by increasing investment in the Afghan military by countries, including India, apprehensive of the Taliban overrunning the state. The third is aggravation of civil war by proxy war, resulting in deepening chaos with impending departure of US forces as backdrop.

If the US stays on longer to get the job done, the second is more likely. If it sticks to departure schedule, the third emerges as likely since proxy war — including an India-Pakistan one — will replicate the scenario in which the Northern Alliance held off the Taliban preceding 9/11.

Of the three, India would prefer the second. It appears to have fired the first shot already, having timed its abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir in light of the emerging regional developments. It took advantage of Pakistani preoccupation to the west, hoping that the window of opportunity would enable the fait accompli to stabilise.

The strategy has its drawbacks. With Pakistan thwarted in Afghanistan, it would turn to its proxy war in Kashmir with a vengeance. The portents of this have been indicated by the national security adviser in his atypical meeting over the weekend with the press.

Neither continuing civil war nor chaos in Afghanistan would help preserve the developmental gains by the international community, of which India was a leading light. It would also further endanger the ethnic groups affiliated with India.

The likelihood of a default profiting of Pakistani discomfiture by India is explicable. India is embarked on a muscular policy towards Pakistan and tying Pakistan down in Afghanistan may prove tempting to even the score over Kashmir.

Besides, the likelihood of such a strategy increases with the ascendance of hardliners on the strategic circuit and of the intelligence community — that would be the implementers — within policy circles.

Such a strategy entails upping the military support for Afghan national security forces. Already this is at a considerable level, particularly in terms of training. Other states, such as the US, provide the more lethal and material support. That the Afghan government side continues to lose ground nevertheless suggests the likely ineffectiveness of the strategy.

At best it would keep the pot boiling in Afghanistan, making for scenario two to turn into scenario three. This may have the advantage of sucking in and damaging Pakistan — giving it a taste of its own medicine applied to the Soviets earlier and the US.

However, the cost will be in keeping Kashmir as a proxy war front and the region crisis prone. It cannot be sold as a low-cost option, since the backlash will lead to upping military spending in a time of an economic down turn. Boots on ground may follow in case of escalation.

Therefore, Trump’s call for India to do more needs to be taken imaginatively. India needs stepping up politically. As a regional power, this is an opportunity.

It has the political, economic and soft power heft to engage the Taliban. Doing so can help it — along with others — socialise the Taliban, wean it away from Pakistan and get a foot in the door of the Afghan peace process. This will enable India to balance the expanding role of China in the Afghan endgame.

The first step is an outreach to the Taliban. As a deterrence signal, alongside, strengthening Afghan security forces must continue. The parlays with the Taliban must reinforce the message of the international community of support for its return to a power-sharing arrangement and continuing peacebuilding support thereafter in return for moderation.

The narrative thus far on the Taliban villainy makes such advocacy appear far-fetched. However, the Taliban — as the new commentary emerging from Delhi’s strategic circuit indicates — is a strategic actor. With an assisted return to power in Kabul within its sights, it would be unwilling pass up a trade-off, even as it throws off Pakistani shackles.

It’s time for India to re-examine its strategic verities and act like a regional power finally out to shape its region.

UNEDITED VERSION

India’s Kashmir caper has given Pakistan reason for war

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/17497/Has-Indias-Kashmir-Caper-Given-Pakistan-Reason-for-War

The trio, Modi-Shah-Doval, can be excused for being in a self-congratulatory mood. They have stared war and internal rebellion in the face for a month now and neither feared possibility has made an appearance. Kashmir has not erupted just yet because it is under the jackboot of an undeclared emergency and its associated measures. Pakistan is taken as deterred by periodic messaging, such as by the defence minister - on No First Use - and the army chief on preparedness.

From this position of strength, India has through its foreign minister reiterated its longstanding position to interlocutors, in this case, the European Union, that it is open to talks with Pakistan once terrorism ceases. It has taken care to muddy waters for any future talks by having its defence minister claim that any such talks will only be on Pakistan’s vacation of occupied Kashmir.

Even if it comes to talks, with the new constitutional arrangement in place reducing Kashmir to a union territory, it is inconceivable that Pakistan can persuade India to undo the same. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, miffed at his offer of talks being ignored, has written of talks on the condition that India rolls back its actions. Even so, Pakistan’s foreign minister has kept open the door for talks, sensibly decrying the only alternative Pakistan has other than abandoning all hope: war.

With both sides talking of talks, optimistically, it may be taken that the worst of the latest crisis is over with. Doing so would be to breathe easy rather prematurely. Instead, the two sides are more likely posturing to appear the more sober of the two in the run up to the General Assembly session to be addressed by the two prime ministers.

Both are waiting with bated breath to see what the Kashmiris might do over their loss of special status and incarceration ever since, once the restrictions in place are progressively removed as promised by the government. On that will turn the next moves of the two sides.

If the Kashmiris are vociferous and the Indian security forces ham-handed, then Pakistan would likely be willy-nilly sucked into the situation. Its army cannot be seen to be standing idly by. Even as it would lay the ground work for a renewed insurgency, using new found cannon-fodder of enraged Kashmiri youth, it may force a crisis to provide cover to insert the required war material and influx of foreign fighters. Business-as-usual infiltration cannot help put in place to the infusion for an insurgency surge.   

India could wait out Pakistan and deal with the situation as it develops or it could choose to be proactive. It claims to have changed tack on infiltration and may follow through with its new policy on surgical strikes by preempting Pakistani re-ignition of proxy war. Pakistan has voiced its fears that this could be under cover of a ‘black operation’ as an excuse.

In short, South Asia is not out of the woods quite yet. In inadvertent war may yet occur. But, can a planned, deliberate resort to war, albeit a limited one, be ruled out altogether?

It is well said that war initiation is perhaps the most fraught sovereign decision. No side risks war it cannot win. Up front, a planned war is not one that either side could want for now. Both are on a downward economic turn. Neither can prevail over the other in a short war. This is true for India too despite its conventional advantage kept honed by selective procurements lately.

This military equation has the underside. The Pakistan army cannot take the setback it has suffered in what it considers a key area of national interest with equanimity. It cannot be discounted that Pakistan may well be the first state to start a war unsure of winning it.

For the moment, it appears to have allowed the civilian side to take the lead. Pakistan’s diplomatic offensive, led by Imran Khan, self-styled as ‘Kashmir’s ambassador to the world’, has drawn blood in it forcing the first consideration of the Kashmir question at the United Nations Security Council, albeit in a closed door, informal session. Since India has swiftly moved to consolidate the change, for instance, through having President Donald Trump backtrack on his earlier offer of mediation, the civilian side may not gain an appreciable traction.

Yet, Pakistan would have set the stage for military action. Its messaging internationally, including by reference to the nuclear context to the crisis, has been that India’s constitutional maneuver has vitiated security. Having put the international community on notice and in light of inaction on its part, Pakistan could then survey a military option. This explains Imran Khan’s reference to Munich and his extending of the tenure of the army chief.

Two factors shall influence such consideration. First, in case any uprising in Kashmir is heavy-handedly put down. The UN human rights watch-dog envoys, ignored by India for now, may pitch in. If the civilian uprising succeeds in embarrassing India, Pakistan may not wish to be seen interceding overtly.  Second, the situation on the Afghanistan front, with Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban at the negotiation table, is culminating. India may wish to spoil Pakistan’s party in case of a turn to negotiations going Pakistan’s way. Both factors will increase Indian propensity for military showdown, increasing its inclination for preemption under its new policy of proactivism.

Military resort by Pakistan would certainly amount to a situation of a threat to international peace and security, forcing the Security Council’s hand. It risks being called out as the aggressor. However, the next crisis outbreak would likely be muddy since India may also make a bid for preemption. Thus, the Security Council, with China playing its part, may be inclined to let Pakistan off the hook.

While there are costs to war, which will surely see Pakistan hit the bottom economically, war initiation has some gains too for Pakistan. It will focus Security Council attention, helping mitigate any nuclear risks run, besides putting Kashmir – the bone of contention – indubitably in the Council’s sights. It will set back any notion of a $5 trillion Indian economy by at least a decade. It will keep Pakistan army atop the domestic power structure, for having acted against India’s willful puncturing of Pakistan’s jugular.

War being a gamble, Pakistan could either win or lose, but, curiously, India loses either way. Even in a case Pakistan forces a draw – not unlikely in a short war - it could prove Narendra Modi’s 1962, his Nehruvian moment. Setting back the Hindutva project thus, will alleviate Pakistan’s fears voiced by Imran Khan.  

However, if India manages to punch credibly – even without a knock out - it would make Narendra Modi a ‘lord of war’, giving Modi his 1971, or Indira, moment. Counter-intuitively, Pakistan may not be averse to such an outcome since it would serve to propel Hindutva and speed India down the tunnel it has been hurtling into. Strangely, even if India wins, over the long term, it stands to lose.  

On the other hand, Pakistan may desist from chancing war since India does not need a push down the tunnel it is in anyway.