https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/reprising-the-manual-of-military?s=w

Reprising the Manual of Military Law provisions on Martial Law

In a passage in his book, Sarkari Mussalman, General Zameeruddin Shah, recalls wracking his memory to recall a few pages of the military’s Manual of Indian Military Law. He had been charged by the Army Chief to take his division to stop the outbreak of violence in Gujarat. The internal security situation had taken a turn for the worse in wake of the Godhra tragedy in which over 50 people perished in a train bogey that had (accidentally (in the view of the railway inquiry that was set up later)) caught fire. The Army had been called-in in ‘aid to civil authority’ after the bodies of the victims were wantonly taken in a politically-charged procession to Ahmedabad with the authority of the then chief minister there, Narendra Modi.

Shah’s formation had been deployed in Rajasthan, practicing maneuvers it was expecting to execute in case the military mobilisation after the attack on the Indian parliament the previous December turned into a hot war. Sent post haste in the reverse direction, to Ahmedabad, he did not find anyone knowledgeable to brief him on the situation, since even the military’s static formation in the Area and Sub Area hierarchy were also ahead, providing logistics along the border.

Confronted with the magnitude of the mass one-sided violence unfolding against the Muslim community, he rightly contemplated extreme measures to end the mob violence. He recalled vaguely his training curriculum passages on martial law, but a copy of the venerable tome on military law was not readily available. Had he got the passages right, he may well have taken legitimate recourse to the powers under the paragraphs in question and could well have proactively put out the communal conflagration.

In the event, he was way-laid by the defence minister, George Fernandes, who turned up untimely and wasted the opportunity of a meeting with Modi, to deploy the military force at hand. It was only after some two days of the military’s arriving that it - without further ado - returned Ahmedabad and Gujarat to sanity. That was just about the duration of time the alleged meeting late night 27 February 2002 at the chief minister’s camp office at his residence had decided the mobs needed to teach Muslims a lesson.

A counter-factual would have it that had Shah followed what the rules for martial law eminently permissible in the circumstance, he may have preempted two days of violence. He was instead constrained to act ‘in aid to civil power’, which - by definition - placed him at a position of disadvantage since it privileged the administration in calling the shots. As he meticulously recorded in his subsequent report to the Army Headquarters – now lost to history in the dusty cupboards of South Block - he was led up the garden path by the Gujarat administration. Had martial law regulations been implemented – an option empowered by the situation – his division could have changed the course of history.

Continuing with the counter-factual, here’s what could have followed. Vajpayee’s hand would have been strengthened when he invoked Rajdharma, making Modi answerable for holding at abeyance his law and order duty. Denied impunity timely, Modi could not have made a hat-trick of state election wins thereafter, that set him up to the win in national elections. The country’s record would not have been besmirched by the Gujarat pogrom. The near ‘police state’ that Gujarat formed thereafter - now aped by fellow ruling party-run states - would not have seen light of day. The spate of murders of Muslims - passed off as of terrorists out on an avenging mission - would not have happened. The dialogue of sorts between extremists on both sides of the deepening religious divide through terror bombing, supplemented by ‘black operations’ in which majoritarian perpetrators projected Muslim provenance, might not have occurred. The use of Muslims as the Other, to bring the majority community together into a vote-bank may have been less blatant, preventing Hindutva hegemony of political culture today. And - who knows - India’s Pakistan policy, initiated by Vajpayee and kept on track by Manmohan Singh, may have resulted in a substantive conclusion, enabling Kashmir to enjoy azadi as do other fellow Indians.

Counter-factuals, being wishful, are a futile indulgence. However, the opportunity has been flogged here for the express purpose of proving that martial law provisions in the military law manual are not window dressing. They are to affect outcomes. Given the direction the internal security situation appears to be heading, it is not impossible that such instances, as confronted Shah, may reemerge. These are once-in-a-decade incidences, but with profound consequences for the Republic. The demolition of the Babri Masjid was ongoing even as an infantry battalion sat in a high degree of readiness barely a few kilometers away, at Faizabad. Today, perpetrators vie for credit for the demolition. The homily, ‘a stitch in time saves nine’, could not be more apt.

Not only is the State increasingly partisan, but mobs emboldened. Active participation by police in violence that book-ended the democratic protests surrounding the anti-Citizen’s Amendment Act (CAA) was witnessed. At the inception of the backlash to CAA, the police entered two central university campuses and flog Muslim students (along with others), and, later, in northeast Delhi’s one-sided violence, they supported majoritarian mobs. In the process the police killed at least one Muslim youth, Faizan, while forcing him, along with other youths, to sing the national anthem. This is of a piece with partisan behavior of the police in riots such as in Bombay 1992-93, in pogroms in 1984 and 2002,  and in administering direct violence as in Meerut in 1987. There has been talk of genocide-in-the-offing, in wake of a dharm sansad that made calls along those lines.

The multiple targeted communities - India’s Muslims in various vulnerable pockets across India - are being deprived of the right to self-defence by the post-mob violence punitive deployment of dozers by the administration to bring down their properties, without due process. The upshot is that not only does the State not hold out the promise that it will protect the community, but will penalize it should it resort to its own devices. The movie, The Kashmir Files, proactively plugged by officials including the prime minister fully cognizant that it is fiction for most part, has an agenda-setting function. The subtext justifies retributive violence against Muslims as comeuppance.

This has been normalized to the extent that the so-called Concerned Citizens (CC), comprising assorted bhakts on a pension, have  pronounced that  the “multiple violent incidents in various states ruled by different political parties” amount to “pre-meditated attacks on peaceful processions during Ram Navami, Hanuman Jayanti, and other sacred festivals in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and New Delhi.” So that no one misses this version of the violence, they repeat it, calling such violence, “premeditated attacks on peaceful processions during Hindu festivals, be it in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat or New Delhi.” If not an instance of poor drafting, they know a lie repeated often enough gets to be the truth.

They claim that, “(T)he reality is that instances of major communal violence have palpably decreased under the BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party) government and this is appreciated by the public.” To them, “this has instigated groups like the CCG (Concerned Citizens’ Group (an anti-right wing set of retirees)) to highlight beyond proportion sporadic instances of communal violence that no society can entirely eradicate.” In terms of statistics, they are arguably right. But this bears interrogation.

Firstly, the terror incidents having miraculously vanished all but gives away that they were manufactured in first place. It cannot be that the police and intelligence have become competent overnight. Secondly, the manner dissent has been suppressed has been deliberately kept obvious and upfront; to deter. The extent is clear from the use of hackers to emplace ‘evidence’ in laptops and illegal surveillance by the Pegasus spyware. Thirdly, ruling party states have abused the police, evident from casualties in ‘encounters’ toted up by Uttar Pradesh (UP) (over 3000 in over 8000 encounters over last five years) and Assam (28 over last 8 months in 80 encounters). Needless to add, that in both cases, most victims have been Muslim. Lastly, UP’s repression of the peaceful anti-CAA stir accounted for some 22 Muslim lives. Intimidation alongside included public release of names and addresses of activists, reprisal demolitions of private property, punitive payments later declared illegal, public participation of right wing goondas alongside police in repression etc.

These trends suggest deliberate obfuscation by the CC. The willful distortion of facts – such as eliding the provocative conduct of ‘peaceful’ processionists – makes credible the genocide-in-the-air talk. That the same ‘chronology’ (to borrow Amit Shah’s now immortal phrase) to mob violence has been seen across multiple states suggests a centralized control to the communal madness. Diverting from this easy-to-arrive-at observation is quickly attempted by the 189 signatories to the collective missive to Modi. They trot out time-honoured diversionary narratives blaming a ‘foreign hand’: “The narrative alive of minority persecution, majoritarianism and Hindu nationalism under the present government. Such a narrative gets recognition and encouragement from international lobbies that want to halt India's progress.”

A din is on over a Hindu Rashtra on-the-make, New India. Over time, this could eventuate on another assault on the Constitution normalized under the catch-all, “this is appreciated by the public.”  Hold-outs might resort to pushback, preemptively characterized by CC as “anti-national” to prospectively legitimise a crackdown. The parliamentary processes on CAA and the Article 370-nullity are indicative forerunners. The pushback these received and the accompanying security measures – in the first case, reactive, and in the latter case, preemptive – shows possible security trajectories. Ahead are similar legislative actions perceived by Muslims as threats – dismissed by the CC as “non-issues” - such as the National Register of Citizens and the Uniform Civil Code. Localised suppression may acquire proportions of a pogrom in light of convergence between the right wing, the State and the police. It is in such a hypothetical – if increasingly plausible - scenario the martial law provisions are pertinent.

So, what are these martial law provisions, which military officers need a timely refresher on?

The martial law provisions date to pre-Independence times, when the authorities required extensive powers to suppress the freedom movement if its energy went beyond a certain level. They persist in the rule book in case there is a bid by forces to overawe the government, though there is no mention in the Constitution or legislation on martial law. Martial law can be declared by the military commander, preferably at the highest possible level with due reference to and permission of the government (Manual of Military Law, 2010, Vol I, Chapter VII, para 15, 16). A military commander may in emergencies take it on himself to act according to his lights under the principle of self-defence, including the defence of the State, its assets and people in its ambit. The logic is that in case of large scale breakdown of law and order, the duty devolves on citizens, including the military, to return the situation to normalcy under the legal maxim (Salus populi suprema est lex (safety of the people is the supreme law)) (Ratnabali, K and UC Jha, Martial Law in India: Historical, Comparative and Constitutional Perspective, New Delhi: Vij Books, 2020).  

The CC’s assumption that a carte blanche can be wrested from electoral victories is false. India is not a majoritarian democracy nor can secularism be trifled with, being intrinsic to the basic structure of the Constitution. If and since the direction of New India is to Hindu Rashtra, backlash is possible to visualise. By default, the State will rely on its suppressive template, being honed rather well in UP, Kashmir and Central India. Should the right wing pose an existential threat to Indian communities, specifically Muslim, then those in authority confronted with such situations must be aware that provisions exist to protect targeted people.

This is in keeping with India’s acceptance of the content of Pillar I of the Responsibility to Protect that has it that the State is primarily responsible for protection of people. Taking the concept further, when State resources designated for the purpose are unwilling or unable - or are complicit in the threat or constitute the threat itself - then State elements that can and should act meaningfully, must. The concept here is also in accord with the United Nations’ theory, develped with Indian participation as a leading troop contributing country, on Protection of Civilians (POC). POC requires military resources in particular to protect civilians, where necessary with miitary force, within their resources and in areas of proximity to their deployment. The three-tier POC strategy has political action at Tier I, military action at Tier II and preventive peacebuilding at Tier III. Tier II theoretical content, which includes ‘Do No Harm’ and other just war factors, serves as a useful guide.

Such extreme circumstance will unlikely arise, not least because the ‘boiling the frog’ metaphor (that has it that a frog in water slowly building up to boiling point misses jumping out timely) is operational in India’s ongoing transformation. Should the situation boil over, however, the military – as last bastion of the Republic – has the legal cover recounted here for stepping up, with due deference to the government. Awareness of this may deter, prevention being better than cure.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/on-the-deletion-of-the-iftar-tweet?s=w

On the deletion of the iftar tweet

The recent episode of a ‘deleted tweet’ has set of warning bells in the military commentariat on the possible infusion into the military of majoritarian communalism. The defence Public Relations Officer (PRO) in Jammu – who is an army man - had put out a tweet on the army’s keeping secular traditions alive by its Rashtriya Rifles Force in Doda hosting an iftar function for locals. Taking umbrage, a Hindutva-allied media worthy, Suresh Chavhanke, called it evidence of the army being infected with the ‘disease’ (bimari) of secularism.

It’s likely that the deletion of the tweet was at the behest of the PRO’s hierarchy in the civilian Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) at the Ministry of Defence. Even so, there is a link of the PR with the information warfare branch of the operational headquarters, 16 Corps. That the army did not remonstrate with the PR hierarchy enough prior to the deletion and has since not insisted on its reinsertion – to some - indicates the portents, made worse by its seeming ambivalence on secularism.

The army had sufficient ammunition to push-back on directions received by the Jammu PRO. Not only was the event part of its public outreach, normal in counter insurgency environments where ‘winning hearts and minds’ is a doctrinal principle, but also because there is nothing to being ashamed of in subscribing to secularism. So long as secularism is in the preamble of the Constitution, which the military is sworn to defend, there is no shying away from being secular. Besides, a diverse army requires secularism as glue for cohesion, a prerequisite for operational effectiveness.

The army is familiar with all this. A look at the twitter handles of the two Corps involved in counter insurgency respectively on either side of the Pir Panjals indicate there has been the traditional outreach to locals by field formations during Ramzan. Interestingly, so is the case with the Srinagar DPR handle – the counterpart of the Jammu PRO – that also puts out effusive tweets on army-furthered inter-communal harmony.

On the contrary, the Jammu DPR twitter handle is remiss in studiously avoiding Muslim religious observances. The lone instance when it dwelt on a religious observance of Muslims now stands deleted. It has otherwise been faithfully reflecting the fraternization of the military with host communities, be it in Muslim or Hindu predominant areas. It also put out a tweet on the Baisakhi interaction of a Sikh military outfit and people in their area. It carries the military interfacing with the Muslim community on Yoga Day and other such commemorative days, as the Earth Day. It is clear from 16 Corps twitter handle that the military continues make inroads into the good books of the people in Muslim pockets including through participating with Muslims in observing Ramzan breaking of fast.

The question is what holds up the Jammu DPR from reflecting this activity as do the other twitter handles reporting to both the DPR and the army information warfare relevant, public information hierarchies?

It is apparent that he has his marching orders from prior to this episode and was wrapped on the knuckles for departing from them. It is also clear that it is not an autonomous, idiosyncratic action on the part of the PRO, but policy for his handle made outside of the DPR – since the DPR Srinagar representative suffers no such restricting on depicting Muslims in religious observance. Since the inner workings of the regime will only be clear on hindsight when on its departure memoirs and social media posts clarify aspects as this, only plausible theories can be guide for now.

Presuming the Jammu PRO’s twitter handle has a following in Jammu region, the answer lies in Jammu politics. The civilian minders of the PRO - outside of the DPR - are aware that there is an election on the cards, which may be as early as this autumn. The delimitation exercise drawing to a close now has given an advantage to Jammu, improving on its seat share in the legislative assembly for the Union Territory (UT). Some of the constituencies along the ethnic faultline between the two communities on the Pir Panjals have been reengineered to enable Hindu majorities, which could potentially make the difference to who gets the majority in the UT legislature. Winning the Jammu region would stand the ruling party at the Center, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), well to take over the reins in Srinagar, anointing a Hindu chief minister in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for the first time.

No stone can be left unturned towards this end, an aim of the majoritarian party particularly interested in seeing its writ run in J&K. Indeed, the Article 370 related Constitutional exercise can be taken as forerunner. Therefore, the Jammu PRO has to be deployed in compliance with the policy the ruling party follows in rest of India in its election strategy: polarization. The handle cannot afford to go soft on Muslims, show bonhomie between Muslims and the military. Showing such fraternization does no good for polarization, in which the Muslims are instead to be seen as the threatening Other. A consolidation of the Hindu vote bank requires intercommunity bonds be rent asunder. Showing the Muslim inhabited areas relatively stable does little to build the narrative of threat necessary for polarization. If the secular army is seen as mixing with Muslims without reservations, it would create dissonance in the mind’s eye of voters targeted by the narrative.

Muslims in the areas of 16 Corps, south of the Pir Panjal and part of the mentioned borderline constituencies, hold a key to the election result. Such blanketing them out is one part of the strategy. Its other prongs will likely unfold over the summer in the run up to elections. One is already on the cards. A Muslim former police officer from the southern belt, who created the notorious police outfit, Special Task Force, is set to woo Dogri speaking Muslims. However, the BJP has learnt its lessons from the coup pulled off by the Gupkar Alliance when it denied the BJP a favourable outcome in the local body - the district development council - elections. Though the Alliance has had ups and downs, including the departure of one of its constituents, it is contemplating fighting the upcoming elections as one. Therefore, there are other tricks up the BJP sleeve, including declaring some Muslim majority constituencies only tenable by Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes candidates, thereby undercutting the Alliance, since the SC candidates are per force Hindu. Along with its perceived allies in the Valley, such as the People’s Alliance and the Apni Party and the majority BJP-supported independents, the BJP hopes to stride home confidently.

This is the context of the resounding silence of the DPR’s Jammu representative. That this is not a policy for DPR as such indicates that someone outside the defence ministry hierarchy calls the shots in Jammu. It is easy to include the minister in the prime minister’s office, Jammuite Dr. Jitendra Singh, in such a speculative list. He was part of the delimitation exercise as the BJP member. It is possible that the order to delete the tweet therefore has origin outside both hierarchies: the defence ministry and the military. This explains why it could not be contested with any vigour, centralization being a long standing characteristic of the regime.

The good part is that the ministry and the military are not entirely on different and separate pages, even though the ministry can be faulted for letting the military down in not pushing back against unreasonable directions from external quarters in what is essentially its ambit. The bad part is that elements of the defence sector can be selectively intruded into to carry out the behest of the ruling party. Since the defence sector is traditionally taken as bipartisan, this is unacceptable, though in the context of the times, not unexpected.

While this time round, only the DPR has been trampled on, tomorrow it could be worse with the military being asked to be compliant to some or other unreasonable diktat. Preventing this requires the commanding general in the northern theatre take a stand. He must unequivocally adopt a porcupine or hedgehog like posture against any manipulation of the military domain for parochial political purposes.

For now the military has gone quite a way in a tacit pushback, highlighting the participation of its Badami Bagh-based formation head, General DP Pandey, in the prayers and repast after the breaking of the fast by his fellow soldiers and locals. General DP Pandey’s photos are all over social media in a pose reminiscent of Hrithik Roshan’s portrayal of Akbar in Jodha Akbar. Whereas a routine annual event, that its observance has been avidly disseminated appears to be a deliberate blow to the right wing’s insinuation that the military suffers from the secularism virus. Instead, the military is wishing to unmistakably demonstrate that this is indeed the case and all for the good of national security.

This round has been won by the military. There are rounds still ahead in the bout. As they say, ‘Abhi toh picture baki hai dost.’ It must recharge between rounds on the fount of its traditional trinity: apolitical, secular, professional. It is equally clear from the contretemps that the army remains in the cross hairs of the right wing. The right wing has taken a 100 yeas to get this far. It is not averse to losing some rounds in their winning the bout, finally. The ultimate round will be when they mount a challenge to secularism, unhinging it from the basic structure of the Constitution. Through small victories in rounds such as this time round over the tweet, the military does well to deter such a challenge. Its standing up for such principles emboldens the political spectrum, relatively flattened by repeated electoral defeats, to get its act together. All is not lost if institutions continue to stand.

If this proves insufficient and when push comes to shove on the basic structure, the military must seek the prompt of the dharma in the circumstance. The received wisdom from the West has it that the military has no part in such circumstance, but events in Trumpian United States suggest that this part of the theory on civil-military relations stands superseded even in the Mecca of civil-military relations theorizing. The yet-to-be-named Chief of Defence Staff and his army counterpart, General Pande, assisted by newly appointed Vice Chief, General Raju, have their role cut out, though all this will remain unsaid in their mandate.   

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/whats-hindutvas-strategy-for-indias?s=w

What’s Hindutva’s strategy for India’s Muslims?

A commentator with extensive connections in the intelligence establishment recently wrote that the hooligans going after Muslims across India need to be bottled up. This distancing from Hindutva storm troopers is in wake of Americans frowning on human rights going south in India. The piece seemed to suggest that the wave of Hindu communalism was not Hindutva establishment instigated, triggered or fanned. This is a typically glib ducking of responsibility by the right wing for what it has wrought. It’s at best a tactical stepping back temporarily while obscuring clarity on whence came such hatred to engulf India on the backs of two Hindu festivals.

Such a reading of the latest episode in intercommunity relations implies that there is a method to the communal madness, in turn implying that there is a mastermind at work. The obfuscation by the scribe in question is proof there is something to hide, which begs the question: What?

Hindutva aims have been articulated by its progenitors a century ago. Organizations that adhere to it like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have propagated these all along, in full view and subterranean. Today, they are at the ascendant having captured political power nationally, through - among other means – infiltrating the political spectrum. One such insertion from their ilk, Narendra Modi, has been voted in prime minister twice over.  

While aims are rather well-known, the strategy to beget these aims is not quite self-evident. Whereas a century ago, the aim of creating a particular order in post-Independence India was legitimate to articulate, aligning it to be in accord with the extant Constitution needed Hindutva to be mealy-mouthed. Hindutva propagation is legitimate, though some of the aims are afoul of the basic structure of the Constitution. The problem is that now that it is consolidated in power, it will exert to upend the basic structure at some point in the future. Besides, there is the question of how it got to power in first place, through somewhat dubious means - even if vindicated by democratic election victories.  

This article deals with one prong of Hindutva’s relations with Muslims. This strategy prong helped Hindutva get to power and a pole-position by polarizing society to profit electorally from making Hindus a vote bank.

The initial phase witnessed Hindutva strategic minders turn tables on Pakistan-abetted terrorists. The violent extremism from within Muslim ranks - prompted by the communal landmarks of the nineties - had Pakistani provenance, as part of Pakistan’s engagement in the interminable South Asian Cold War. Hindutva strategic minders took to depicting terrorism as solely a Muslim handiwork. Media purveyed this into drawing rooms, making of the canard a commonplace. Black operations, projected as terrorism perpetrated by Muslims, spurred the narrative.

Hundreds of Muslim youth picked up for the terrorism in the 2000s and later released, some after a decade in jail, shows that someone did resort to terrorism, and it was not these alleged culprits. Though some Muslims were gunned down in encounters and some are sentenced to hang as alleged perpetrators, some – not necessarily Muslim - who carried out some of the bombings - and plotted these - have evidently got away. It would require the rollback of Hindutva to uncover the evidence and make the claim with a degree of certitude.

The terrorism was also to depict the Manmohan Singh government as weak, to clear the way for the Hindu Hriday Samrat, Narendra Modi. He had acquired majoritarian icon status on the back of the myth that Muslims were out for vengeance for the Gujarat pogrom and had been felled in over 22 encounters. Taken together with the projection of ‘India in danger’ and ‘Hindus in danger’, both India and Hindus willy-nilly acquired a protector.

Post 9/11, vilification of Muslims was easy. This was made even easier after 26/11 with the killing - under controversial circumstances - of the lead investigator, Hemant Karkare, who had turned up the dirt on majoritarian Hindu-perpetrated terrorism. The uncovered evidence was dispatched into oblivion and the promising line of investigation ceased. The elevation of a suspected majoritarian perpetrator to parliament and reincorporation into ranks of uniformed forces of an accomplice, only heightens suspicion that there is much to hide. The strategic community bought into the line of development bandied by electoral strategists, overlooking the controversial aspects of the rise of Hindutva. None questioned how terrorism ceased instantly with the present government taking over or argued that this amounted to circumstantial evidence that the hand on the terror tap was not Muslim.  

Micro-terror took over. Lynching was now the weapon. A court let off the perpetrators of one of the early instances of lynching, arguing that he was ‘looking Muslim’ at the wrong place at the wrong time. The current-day evolution of these instances is a mob violence lead by majoritarian extremists. The similarity in pattern of provocation followed by mob violence across India proves a method to the madness, and a centralized impetus to it. The uniform response of razings of Muslim properties, even in non-ruling party ruled states, points to this. The strategy prong directed at Muslims – of use of violence targeting them – has metamorphosed from implicating them in terror to intimidating them in their ghettos.

The consequence of polarization now having consolidated – the second electoral victory both nationally and in the most electorally significant state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), testifying to this – the goalposts have shifted. The Muslims are in a corner, but that’s not enough. Akhand Bharat has to be materialised on a fast-tracked time-table, according to the head of RSS, Mohan Bhagwat. This will require the Muslims to be incorporated into the Hindu fold, as has been the attempt with Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. What this entails in incessant pressure on Muslims to condition them, not so much to moderate the principles of their monotheism – which can be accommodated in the Hindu pantheon given the philosophical diversity within Hinduism – but to accept that theirs is not the only God-validated path. Since Indian Islam has been syncretic, this is also a doable proposition. It only requires dilution in the orthodoxy that maintains that Islam is the only true path, a literalist interpretation of the call to Islam.

This would entail keeping up the pressure on Muslims, through such legislation as Amendment to the Citizenship Act (CAA) and those that had been expected to follow as per the Covid-interrupted famous ‘chronology’ proffered by the home minister once. These are back on the agenda and can be expected to be rolled out with a vengeance. A community already on the ropes would be able to see on which side its bread is buttered. The Stockholm Syndrome would set in, with a safety valve on offer asking that they fall into their slot at the bottom of the social pyramid – whence most had escaped from some centuries back.

The choice is between mere survival – as now – and what might spill out of the feeding trough for lowest castes. Already behind the Dalits, Muslims masses cannot afford the labyrinth. As for the privileged Ashrafi Muslims, they can ‘go to Pakistan and please take their orthodoxy with them’. Their leadership of the wider community is under challenge by Pasmanda leaders, and, any unity in the community stands disrupted by the historical Shia-Sunni cleavage. A twin-pronged assault on the Muslim masses and elite will fissure Muslims, softening them up as prelude to a mafia-style offer that cannot be refused – rejoin the Hindu fold in a ghar wapsi of sorts, or else.

If Hindutva’s strategic minders, who together with likeminded officials and intelligence agency practitioners that constitute India’s ‘deep state’, could create the conditions through the UPA government’s 10 somnolent years for India’s turn to Hindutva, now that they have the reins of power, surely much more can be expected from and of them. The strategy is already discernible.

The masses continue to reel under innovative schemes keeping up the pressure: love jihad to land jihad, hijab ban et al. The intimidatory violence by mobs being only the latest is forerunner to more of the same. This time there is not merely tacit support by the regime evidenced by its looking away from prosecuting majoritarian perpetrators. The difference between the two governments – United Progressive Alliance and the National Democratic Alliance – on this is that while the former was unwilling to chance the Hindu vote, the latter feted perpetrators.

This time round the State is active participant. Its backing of the one-sided violence in the course of the North East Delhi is indicator. In this it took the usual partisanship endemic to India’s policing culture to another level. It has since taken to bulldozing Muslim properties that cannot be left to mobs lest it besmirch the State. The UP government’s smugness on the latest bout of communalism sparing UP owes to it having already set the pace and gold standard on this, with its response to the anti-CAA protests. The idea is to strip the minority of their right to self-defence. 

Arbitrary jailing of Muslims in the intelligentsia, without the relief of bail, is a commonplace. The National Security Act suffices for the masses. Students in two Muslim-affiliated central universities were attacked by police during the anti-CAA protests. Former Vice President Hamid Ansari’s early warning was met with an assault by right wing trolls. The voice of prominent liberal Muslims is marginalized along with their Hindu compatriots. The plight of Kashmiris needs no highlighting, whereas what’s in store for the Bengali Muslims, referred to as Bangladeshis, conjures up visuals of concentration camps.

The yet-to-come legislations on populating population registers will be accompanied by detention centers to house those who are unable to produce plausible papers detailing their ancestry. Assam provides a glimpse of an all-India exercise. Even if opposition-run state governments drag their feet, there is enough Hindutva social and political capital in a political culture taken over by Hindutva to ensure enough problems for Muslims. And then there is always the Uniform Civil Code as another stick to beat them with!

All this makes for talk on genocide prospects, though a cultural genocide is more plausible. The government will not allow the situation to go out of hand to an extent as to attract adverse attention to its policy of reduction of the minority to by stealth. Besides, it would not like to sully its record on law and order, a prerequisite for its ambition for a USD 5 trillion economy. Already, voices from the corporate sector cite economic reasons to rein in communalism and other commentators claim it detracts from India’s global image building as a Vishwaguru. This only indicates that communalism is kosher; only consequence management needs finesse.

The international environment is favourable for the surge Bhagwat promises. There is a beeline to New Delhi by those – principally the United States - who could have otherwise flagged India’s human rights record. The Antony Blinken reference to this in his India trip was blatantly a prop to the US’ weaning away of India from Russia. So it could be shot down out of hand by his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Pakistan, ever interested to fish in India’s troubled waters, has been given a taste of its own medicine and is also otherwise internally beset, besides having resurgent Taliban as neighbour. China, that could plausibly like to see India distracted internally, is not too keen on interfering in internal politics of other states as a matter of policy; no doubt a policy not so much informed by principles as much as brought about by its own abysmal record on that front.

The suave Jaishankar has let-on that the regime believes it’s a ‘moral responsibility to correct historical wrongs’. If the regime’s actions in respect of Article 370 and the Ayodhya Temple provide a clue, these go back beyond what Nehru did to include what Aurangzeb wrought. The timeline for the undoing of historical wrongs has been recently brought forward to 15 years by Bhagwat. The Hindutva strategy therefore will be accordingly compressed in time and its incidence will consequently be with greater intensity.

Already the makeover of India to New India finds ready acceptance. Pointing to Constitutional shortfalls is taken as an anti-national act prompted by hate, opening doors for arrest for sedition, hurting feelings and instigating unrest – even though the unrest would be from hurt, Hindutva forces and sedition, if any, is in terms of an willingness and capacity to overturn the Constitution by Hindutva. It just succeeded in getting the army strike off a word it had used in a tweet that appears in the Preamble, Secularism, calling it a ‘disease’. Hindutva’s strategic minders need reminding that strategy is a two-player game. Their actions may prompt aggrieved responses challenging India’s impressive suppressive template, with consequences that could void Bharat of Akhand.