Aakrosh July 2014
India’s forthcoming nuclear
doctrine review
The process
A nuclear doctrine review is on
the cards. The BJP having promised in its manifesto to conduct a review would
likely follow through, in the least to keep up its credibility. The last review
was done in 2003 when the earlier NDA government adopted the official nuclear
doctrine. It is believed that the official, declaratory nuclear doctrine was
largely based on the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999. While the UPA government
that followed did not review – read revise - the doctrine, this does not imply
that it did not keep the doctrine under review. The National Security Advisory
Board, that are convened for two years, are tasked to review national security
and as part of this can be expected to have engaged with nuclear questions.
Their output has been kept confidential. Besides, the six monthly meetings of
the Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority have found mention in
the media. Therefore, it will only be fair to acknowledge that lack of
transparency on this score does not imply inaction. It can be inferred from the
fact that the declaratory doctrine has not been revised, that the UPA
governments in both its tenures either did not think it necessary to revise the
doctrine or that it may have revised the operational nuclear doctrine even while
keeping the declaratory nuclear doctrine in place and intact.
The BJP has broached the issue
owing to its projection as a nationalist and conservative party that is serious
about national security. Since traditionally conservatives are taken as ‘strong’
on defence universally, that the issue figured in the BJP’s concerns is
understandable. It has also been buoyed by the support of a cohort of retired
brass and diplomats, some of who have been on the strategic circuit taking pot
shots at the previous government. The BJP’s internal deliberations would
therefore have been informed by the strategic community input. Strategic
entreprenuers would also have been looking to use the issue for placing
themselves in positions of utility for the government in case the BJP. There
was also an upsurge of interest in nuclear questions in the fag end of the UPA
tenure, most perceptibly the one on No First Use. There is also the critique of
India lacking an explicit strategic doctrine. This would also have been
conveyed to national security minders in the new dispensation by supporters in
the strategic community. Though it has not given out its mind as yet at this
early stage in its tenure, it would likely also initiate a written document.
The fact that the BJP corralled reputed domain experts to present a Vision
document to the people when in power is harbinger of more doctrinal activism
yet to come.
This brief measure of the
political, institutional and personal drivers behind the BJP’s campaign promise
by no means precludes strategically weighty reasons to take a relook at nuclear
doctrine. Chief among these has been the
dilemma posed to India’s nuclear doctrine by the induction of the Nasr nuclear
missile system by Pakistan. In any case, nuclear developments in the region
comprising China, Pakistan and India have moved considerably over the decade
since the last review. A review of the doctrine is also necessitated by India’s
nuclear trajectory that will witness the induction of the nuclear submarine
with submarine launched ballistic missile capability and a long range nuclear
ballistic missile to cover all of China. Since the BJP would be at the helm in
the period that these are operationalised, the developments call for an
appropriate doctrine. Therefore, as the manifesto pointed out, there was reason
for revisiting doctrine.
Reconsideration can well result
in retention of the doctrine. It could also, as possibly done in the UPA
period, lead to changes in the operational doctrine that are then kept
confidential. It can also result in significant changes in the doctrine itself,
particularly if it is to come up with answers for the nuclear challenge
currently posed by Pakistan and possibly by China once India’s second strike
capability is operational by end decade. The process itself can be expected to
last into midterm of the government at the latest. Therefore, by the time the
freshly minted doctrine is out it could prove quite timely. If the doctrine is
synchronized with the outcome of any thinking on strategic doctrine, then
reasonably strategic doctrine, in the form of a defence white paper, would
require preceding nuclear doctrine. Since both would require a minimum of six
months to undertake, it can only be in about a year’s time that nuclear
doctrine emerges. In any case the government is at the moment only in formative
stage with its key appointments not all in place yet, such as at the time of
writing, that of the defence minister.
Of the process itself it can at
this stage be gauged that it would unlikely be led by the National Security
Adviser. Since Mr. Doval has an intelligence background with no known felicity
on nuclear issues, it is possible that the government may appoint a committee
with a respected denizen of the strategic community to head it. The National
Security Council Secretariat could provide the support. One lesson from the
1999 experience that would inform the question of how large should this
committee be is that the 1999 one comprising the first NSAB, itself full of
stalwarts on nuclear issues, was rather big and consequently came up with a
Draft that allowed India all manner of options.
The then government distanced itself from the Draft initially, only to
adopt major aspects of it, with modifications as the official nuclear doctrine
in 2003. Given this evolution of the doctrine in place, aspects such as the
mechanism and process for a new doctrine become relevant. There are also
institutional pulls and pressures, in particular from the scientific lobby and
the military, requiring a high powered committee to navigate. It is for this
reason the issue of a ‘blue ribbon’ committee has figured in the discourse
calling for change.
There is no shortage of
personages to head the committee and form its part since eminent practitioners
and thinkers, some of who may share the ideological credentials of the
government, have been the mainstay of Delhi’s strategic circuit. A problem
would be in the temptation for experts to ride their hobby horses. Used to
criticizing the government, defending favoured strategic or political positions
or determined to bring change for sake of change subjectivity in experts can
build up and skew the result. Some may function as Trojan horses of affiliated
institutions in the bureaucratic politics that can be expected to attend the
exercise. A keen eye and strong hand of the NSA can help but a significant
first step would be design of a process to ensure strategic rationality.
Thereafter, would be selection of the right people to deliver. A wide interface
of the mechanism tasked with the strategic community and civil society may be
necessary in addition to the essential input of institutions charged with
security. Involving the two, experts and society, will ensure a wholesome
debate and acceptability of the product. A cautionary word needs being said on
the likelihood of media manipulation by
players in the field, not least of which are foreign players with vested
interests such as for instance in the defence investment field that is
reportedly set to open up further to foreigners. That should however not keep
the final product from being placed in the open domain. This would help place
India among the great powers, a shared feature of whom is a national security
strategy, even if specifics are kept closed hold.
The advantage of the controversy
was that it placed the nuclear issue, that otherwise tends to the background,
towards the national spotlight. The commentary was also well informed with luminaries,
both in India and abroad, pitching in, making for an effervescent strategic
debate and informing and involving the public alongside. This sets the stage
for a vigorous debate. Generation of a consensus will be unlikely given that
the national debate includes those for abolishing nuclear weapons possession to
those wanting a tous azimuts
capability. It may also not be desirable to have a consensus for that would
imply dominance of a particular idea or position, leading to short cuts in the
contention of ideas that could include suppression and manipulation.
The controversy had the effect of
taking doctrine down from the realm of high politics and inserting it into the
public domain. If and since society is the object of security this was both useful
and democratic. In a nuclear world, that
security has to be society centric is even more critical in light of the
genocidal nature of nuclear warfare. Therefore even if doctrine is a decision
for the government to take, for the doctrine making process to take a view of
the public debate would be enlightened, even if a departure from the practice
of closed door doctrine making. The assumption that the public cannot know what
is good for it does not wash any more. Instead, the beneficial effect of public
interest is in ensuring that the doctrine caters for escalation control,
de-escalation, damage limitation, exit points and saliencies and engages with
the non-military and non-nuclear dimensions of the ‘all of government’ effort
at nuclear conflict termination.
The usual emphasis in deterrence
is on the threat of inflicting damage on the enemy and the ability to do so
when needed. However, limiting damage to one’s own society is of equal
significance since survival and recovery capacity is itself is threatened in
the era of mutual assured destruction. The compulsions of modern democratic
accountability, with India at the democratic frontline as the largest
democracy, are such that the exercise of doctrine making cannot be restricted
to a narrow security elite, but has to be responsive to people. This can only
to an extent be mediated by having the duly elected political decision maker
make the decision. It equally involves the process being sensitive to taking
societal tendencies onboard at the formulation stage itself. The security
processes so far have been under the belief that security is too specialized a
field for having public participation, relegated therefore to backrooms full of
experts. However, since the nuclear dimension involves societal survival
directly and crucially, its urges and eddies in its opinion cannot be ignored
any more. Therefore, the process has to be inclusive, non-partisan and in the
collation stage open. The deliberations of the mechanism could thereafter be
closed door and its recommendations also confidential. Following this, the
final product, with due redactions, can be shared with the people in whose name
security is enacted.
Incorporating this into the
process will have the beneficial effect of ensuring that the operational and
strategic considerations do not overshadow political considerations since the
political domain supersedes the strategic. The mechanism for doctrine
formulation will likely be populated by experts in nuclear strategy and their
input directed at deterrence and nuclear use strategy. However, nuclear use
decisions are unambiguously in the political domain on account of the nature of
nuclear weapons as a distinct category. Therefore, what may appear rational at
the strategic level may be subject to modification by political considerations.
Keeping this distinction between the strategic and political levels in doctrine
making is critical. A design and mechanism for doctrine review that starts off
with this informing it will be more likely to turn out a doctrinal product that
balances strategic and political considerations, while privileging the latter.
The review
The specific issues that may come
up in the review have already been aired during the controversy. The discussion
in the open domain basically sets the stage for the doctrine revision to
follow. Essentially, there were four points over which divergence was visible:
No First Use; ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation; the place of ‘minimum’ and
‘credible’ in relation to each other; and finally on nuclear weapons and
security in a situation of mutual assured destruction.
The popular verdict on No First
Use is largely in favour of retention. There are three views. The challenger
view is that this needs to be done away with. Firstly, in the strategic culture
perspective, it is expression of an effete strategic culture that India needs
going beyond. This has philosophical resonance in the political ideology of the
government, in that there is a belief that India’s strategic reticence has been
mistaken for weakness historically and taken advantage of by neighbours. Remedy
calls for a more assertive India. Since NFU seemingly epitomizes a defensive
and reactive mindset, vide this logic it needs being overturned. Also in this
perspective, India’s political elite is timid. Therefore, in case of nuclear
attack, it may well throw in the towel under foreign pressure and under
operation of self-deterrence. It therefore may not be sensible to await a
nuclear attack before response. Secondly, in a strategic perspective India does
not have the capability of appropriate response in face of nuclear attack. Its
recovery capability is also suspect. It may well go first, particularly for
preemption.
The contrary view is that NFU has
served India well for many reasons. It is in keeping with India’s strategic
culture of prudence. It recognizes the political reality, in that India’s
ruling elite has been attuned to its developmental trajectory and therefore
would not like to see a back slide by initiating a nuclear war. Mr. Modi in dampening
the nuclear controversy had said as much indicating that the policy of
moderation followed by his predecessor, Mr. Vajpayee, would be his line as
well. India would not like to pay the political and moral cost of breaking the
nuclear taboo that has developed since nuclear weapons were last used. It would
not have the political capital to explain away such resort. Allowing the enemy
to choose first use may enable retention of the high ground and would help post
war political and legal maneuvers. In the strategic perspective NFU is required
to keep nuclear fingers steady, lest in the fog of war misperception of India
going first with nuclear weapons may trigger nuclear first use by the enemy. An
avoidable competition in preemption could develop. India has conventional
advantages that it first seeks to exploit. Unlike other states that need
nuclear weapons to help balance an adversary, India does not need this even on
the China front. It is currently evening the balance there with an additional
deployment of two divisions in a defensive role and a mountain strike corps. Since
India can achieve its objectives of territorial defence and if necessary
limited offensive by conventional means, there is no need for it to go first
with nuclear weapons. Finally, on the argument of preemption, the nuclear moves
made by the enemy for deterrence purposes are liable to be mistaken as nuclear
readiness for strike. This may push India into first use where it need not have
opening up its military and society to unnecessary nuclear strike and counter
strikes. Given this reasoning the motion in favour of NFU appears to have
carried the day for the moment.
The second area of divergence in
opinion is more significant. The votaries of India’s current doctrine of
‘massive’ nuclear retaliation are firm that it does not merit dilution. In
strategic cultural terms, it projects India’s resolve serving deterrence,
especially where Indian resolve has consistently been mistaken by its
adversaries. It may also be internally directed in that in case ‘massive’ is
promised to be delivered then even a weak kneed political leadership will at
least resort to a proportionate attack. This caters for any infirmities in
strategic culture. The institutional reason for keeping course has been
referred to in a rather tongue in cheek fashion. Since the alternative of
proporationate response or contemplation of limited nuclear operations involves
operationalisation that would bring the military into the loop, the prospect of
losing proprietary control over the crown jewels does not enthuse them. They
couch their argument in civil-military terms, but the more likely origin is in
institutional interest in which the status quo favours the scientific lobby and
bureaucrats, specifically foreign service officers involved in disarmament
matters, as against the military that has only lately come on board. The
strategy programs staff that includes military officers and the presence of two
three-star general officers in the NSCS, one as military adviser and the other
who has headed the Strategic Forces Command earlier, are harbingers of
operationalization necessary not only for credibility of the deterrent but also
of response in case of its breakdown.
Strategically, to them the
doctrine is one for deterrence. Their argument is that inevitable escalation
takes place in nuclear war and notions of a ‘graduated nuclear ladder’ are just
that, notions. The surety of absolute harm deters better than other options of
deterrence such as proportionate deterrence. Aware that it would escape
unacceptable harm, Pakistan in particular could well use nuclear weapons. When
it is absolved of this notion through Indian acquisition of capability and
display of will, then it would be suitably be mellowed. This will allow India’s
conventional might fuller play since it would tend to heighten Pakistan’s
nuclear threshold. As far as China is concerned, the threat of ‘massive’
retaliation signifies intent to hit it where it hurts, on the eastern seaboard.
This will keep India’s heartland that China is able to access more easily due
to proximity from Tibet more secure. Since even a limited nuclear war would in
this case amount to total war for India, India would require redressing the
imbalance in damage received by going ‘massive’.
The key argument of votaries of
‘massive’ with those challenging them is on whether ‘massive’ nuclear
retaliation deters lower order nuclear first use. The second argument against
‘massive’ is over the quantum of ‘massive’: what does ‘massive’ mean and its
consequences. The first argument has been prompted by Pakistan’s introduction
of the Nasr missile system suggesting lower order nuclear in a low threshold,
early first use mode. This implies that the deterrence sought by the declaratory
nuclear doctrine is not quite working. Lack of credibility can be remedied by
moving away from ‘massive’ to ‘flexible’ or ‘proportionate’. Pakistan, perhaps
finding ‘massive’ incredible, may consider balancing India’s conventional limited
war strategy guided by precepts of the so-called ‘cold start’ doctrine. In case
India responds massively, under the circumstance of the nuclear lead in numbers
that Pakistan maintains, it would be in a position to counter strike equally
potently. This may not only place India’s military objectives out of reach, but
also place India in harm’s way. Prevention of such exposure can only be in case
India takes out Pakistan’s retaliatory capability in the retaliatory strike.
This is not possible given the numbers and their likely dispersal and
concealment. Attempting to take out the retaliatory capability of over 100
nuclear weapons spread over ten locations may spell nuclear doomsday
environmentally, certainly for the region, and as studies on wider climatic
effects of regional nuclear war point out for the globe. Therefore, India
cannot execute a ‘massive’ strike for two reasons: one is that it would receive
a massive counter strike right back in case Pakistan’s retaliatory capability
is left intact; and, two, in case it tries to take out the retaliatory
capability, firstly, it will not succeed and, secondly, it would bring
environmental disaster. Given the latter, the international community will not
permit India to retaliate in this manner. Therefore, since a lower order
retaliation is the only possible answer to lower order first use, India would
require moving beyond ‘massive’ to ‘flexible’, if not ‘proportionate’. Whereas
‘massive’ appears incredible, at least to Pakistan, ‘flexible’ may deter better
since India would have the answers for Pakistani nuclear first use at every
level, whether lower order or higher order introduction by Pakistan of nuclear
weapons into a conflict.
The third aspect of review is the
inter-se relationship between ‘credible’ and ‘minimum’. Minimum has been
India’s longstanding position and has been threatened by the emphasis on
‘credible’. Credibility is taken to require both numbers and variegation of
arsenal to confer second strike capability. A former deputy national security adviser
writing for the IDSA websites advocates aiming for numbers in the middle three
digits! This would place India as the third largest nuclear power in the world,
ahead of both its rivals, Pakistan and China. It would spark off an arms race
that the two together would likely outpace India, besides putting both geopolitically
onto one side unambiguously. While the mid-three digits may be extreme, the
trends in India’s nuclear developments suggest a move towards eclipse of
‘minimum’. The missile shield coupled with variegation of missile systems to
include MIRVs and developments in accuracy and satellite based surveillance
capability are suggestive of first strike capability, even if NFU is in place.
In case NFU is disturbed, then the first strike option gets ruled in. In any
case NFU is a pledge that can be rescinded any time. Since a ‘massive’ attack
would be required to keep Pakistan from retaliating effectively, a first
strike, defined here as the attempt to take out the enemy’s retaliatory
capability, could be attempted. In war conditions, where misperceptions can be
formed by even defensive and deterrence related moves of the enemy’s nuclear
deterrent, this would make for very nervous nuclear fingers on both sides.
Clearly, then a review is called for not only on the eventual size of the
deterrent, but also it’s the manner it appears to be shagging up. This will ensure that technological
determinism does not overtake strategic prudence and political oversight.
A relatively minor aspect on the
credibility issue is the perceived need to go for another round of testing for
the thermonuclear device that is reported to have turned out a ‘dud’ in the
Pokhran tests. By now it is possible that cold tests have enabled creation of a
thermonuclear deterrent that does not require India to buck the emerging global
norm against nuclear tests and India’s unilateral nuclear test moratorium. The
review could ascertain the place of the thermonuclear bomb in India’s arsenal.
It must ensure against the necessity of tests and if that is not possible then
decide on whether it is essential to deterrence. There is a view that with MIRV
capability, increased accuracy and ranges of missiles and numbers of missiles
and warheads, city busters may not be necessary to deter. In any case they would
not be usable since Indian cities will be likewise exposed, particularly to
Chinese strikes. Acquisition of these also cannot be placed beyond Pakistani
ingenuity in light of their playing catch up at Chagai despite the push in
India’s technological community for Pokhran II in order to call Pakistan’s
‘bluff’.
The final issue discussed here is
on expectations of nuclear weapons. This can best be done by situating the
capability in wider grand strategy. The government that will take a final call
on the nature of the doctrine will have to evaluate the product of the
mechanism it deputes to reformulate doctrine in light of its professed
objective of development. Development cannot envisage a decisive backslide that
a nuclear war will bring. Therefore a doctrine must not only cater for
deterrence, but also be reassuring for prospective foes in that it must not
project a threat that can then prove a self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance,
a critique of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation is that it exposes India to enemy first
use more likely in the form of a first strike, or an attempt to reduce India’s
retaliatory capability maximally. Even if India has a survivable second strike
capability, there is little reason to run the risk, particularly one brought on
by an ill-considered doctrine. This argument led to calls for a reversion to
the formulation of the Draft that called for infliction of ‘unacceptable
damage’ with ‘sufficient’ force and did not use the term ‘massive’. The surety
of ‘unacceptable damage’ deters even as it does not provoke. However, there are
other doctrinal options, not least of which is that of General Sundarji. He
called for ensuring conflict termination in case of a nuclear conflict at the
lowest threshold possible, if necessary by the use of political outreach and
diplomatic engagement to include concessions short of the national bottomline.
This option is sensitive to the mention earlier that doctrine must be democracy
friendly. Society is not interested in being secured by the threat of being exposed
to threat of being bombed to extinction. This Cold War spillover into the
region and the current era is eminently avoidable. The flippant statement that
while Pakistan would be finished, while India will survive may have been true a
decade or so ago. Pakistan’s second strike capability is patent and that of
China only more so. This argument rules in the Sundarji doctrine. It only
remains to make it workable.
The counter would be that it is
inconceivable to think about diplomatically engaging the opponent in a nuclear
war. However, it bear consideration that though counter intuitive it would be
most necessary to do so lest inexorable escalation, that votaries of ‘massive’
retaliation refer to, take place. Escalation control and de-escalation are in
the interest of both states in nuclear exchange(s). They can therefore be
expected to cooperate and the international community would enable the same.
This is not going to come about of its own. Recognising that this is possible
and making prior contingency arrangements may be in order. This could be in the
form of a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. While precedence exists of the one in
the Cold War, it came about when the Cold War was about to end. There is little
reason for regional initiatives to wait till the détente here. Hot War might
well intervene, irrespective of the periodic upturns in relations such as the
bonhomie between India and its neighbours being experienced in the initial
period of the new government’s tenure. A doctrine that reassures such as does
the Sundarji doctrine and one that enables taking nuclear CBMs to the next
higher level of must on this score carry the day.
Conclusion
The nuclear doctrine review in
the offing is an opportunity for a relook at whether nuclear weapons and the
trajectory of their development are leading to a more secure India. A
dispassionate answer would be that this is not so not only because of what
neighbours are doing but also because of India’s own nuclear developments not
being served by a reckonable doctrine. India has to domesticate the nuclear
establishment and the means to do so is to draw up a doctrine that is nothing
but a blueprint for their action. The doctrine has to be situated in the
overall national grand strategy and policy context. Clearly, while the
government, that is the decision maker, will have its ideological preferences
influence its imprint on doctrine, it must keep accountability to fore by
ensuring that doctrine is compliant with the developmentalist plank on which
the government was elected. Specifically, the ideological preference of
demonstrating a ‘strong’ India must not skew doctrine into an aggressive
direction ill-suited for India’s security. For doctrine to come out right, the
design of the process and the mechanism for formulating it would require being
sensibly arrived at. The government may like to anchor the doctrine in the
strategic doctrine and therefore may sequence the two. Since its early
diplomatic initiatives have bought it time, it can use this to good effect. It
would require warding off its supporters in the strategic community who may be
more interested in advancing respective pet theories and projects and
self-interest and proving a point in regard to the previous administration,
rather than India’s longer term interest at heart. The government must on
receipt of the product ensure that it is political factors are not over
shadowed by strategic level considerations. Only then would India have used an
opportunity well. Else, retrospect will only be in a nuclear winter.
