| ||||
In the post-Afghan elections scenario, the US is contemplating another ‘surge’ and a rethink on its counter-insurgency strategy. Though the US is determined to stay the course, it may have to switch from a militarily dominant to a politically dominant strategy, in which case, reaching out to the Taliban will be possible. In case the Taliban were to abandon its al Qaeda connection and moderate its extremist religious stance as part of a negotiated deal, the feasibility of such a political approach is not impossible to envisage. The ‘surge’ could position the US favourably by enabling it reach a position of military strength, thereby facilitating the negotiations. The underside of this strategy is that it could result in an escalation of war with the Pakistani Taliban resorting to an expansion of the theatre of war into Pakistani Punjab, thereby, destabilizing the nuclear armed state. This paper argues that to prevent such an eventuality, the political prong of the Af-Pak strategy must go beyond the ‘moderate’ Taliban to also reach out to the hardcore Taliban. It calls for an ‘engage and moderate’ strategy. The paper makes the case that attempting to defeat the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban combine will place the stability of Pakistan at great risk. Therefore, accommodating it, in return for moderation, may be preferable. This however, could be taken to mean an undesirable ‘appeasement’, especially if the Taliban is seen as an expansionist force, incapable of reforming itself. The paper debates this and arrives at the position that the Taliban can be tamed without the undue risk that predominantly military action entails. It recommends a proactive role for India in bringing about a ‘political first’ strategy for the international community
|
Friday, 2 August 2013
Monday, 29 July 2013
azm e nau and cold start
India and Pakistan: Azm-e-Nau as a Response to the Cold Start
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-and-pakistan-azm-e-nau-as-a-response-to-4056.html
The Pakistani Army has just completed its summer war games, Azm Nau IV. The press release has it that with the Azm-e-Nau series of exercises held since 2009, Pakistan has arrived at an answer to India’s Cold Start. Its distraction so far with the ‘Af-Pak’ related security situation on its western border appears to be now behind it. With the Americans packing to depart, it’s back to business in South Asia.
The nuclear backdrop does make this worrisome. There is also no guarantee against a war breaking out. A conventional war cannot be guaranteed to stay conventional. It can be argued that Pakistan’s signalling that it is prepared conventionally is good in the sense that it will deter India on the conventional level. But the problem is that this gives Pakistan the confidence to provoke India at the subconventional level; providing a trigger for India to go conventional in response.
The ‘unthinkable’ cannot be wholly discounted. Pakistanis have gone down the plutonium route to miniaturise warheads so as to place them on missiles. Being short on planes, missiles are the mainstay of the Pakistani nuclear force. The latest of these missiles is a nuclear-tipped battlefield missile designed for use against Indian conventional forces. Its battlefield employment serves to bring nuclear war outbreak that much closer. Pakistan’s rationale for such lowering of the nuclear threshold is that it would deter India from launching Cold Start offensives; thereby, making nuclear war more remote.
This has got India debating its options. India could pay Pakistan back in the same coin of proxy war. It is easy to destabilise Pakistan, perpetually on the brink of being a failed and terror sponsoring state. However, there is no guarantee that this will end the terror provocations, and an unstable Pakistan is not necessarily in India’s interest.
India could rely on conventional asymmetry in its favour, deepened by successive defence budgets such as this year’s crossing of the INR250 thousand crores mark. The intent is to deter Pakistani adventurism and, if push comes to shove, to prevail at every level of the conflict, including nuclear. The idea is to gain ‘escalation dominance’, which means to convince the adversary to give up the fight rather than take it to the next higher level at which, yet again, it cannot hope to win.
India’s military has been on a learning curve ever since its conventional war doctrine was rendered obsolete by Pokhran II. While arriving at the concept of Limited War soon thereafter, it was unable to rise to the occasion when it was sorely tested at the next crisis in wake of the parliament attack. The embarrassment of having taken over three weeks to ready itself, led to the intensive thinking that resulted in the Cold Start doctrine.
The doctrine required multiple attacks into Pakistan at-the-double. Genuflecting to the nuclear backdrop, the army sought to limit these thrusts to shallow depths. Even so, this amounted to nuclear flirtation since the attack was to be rapid and along a broad front using resources with ‘pivot corps’ or defending formations and offensive formations staged forward closer to the border for the purpose. With the balance of its strike corps forming up in wake of the limited offensives and an air offensive unfolding simultaneously, Pakistan could well be stampeded into a nuclear decision in a truncated timeframe. This made Cold Start difficult to sell to the political masters.
Consequently, India has since distanced itself from Cold Start. An army chief has gone on to say that there was nothing called Cold Start. The contours of what it has come up with instead are indistinct. The publicity that attended Cold Start, intended no doubt to enhance its deterrent effect, is missing. Consequently, little is known of its successor, ‘Cold Start lite’. It apparently involves quick punches at key locations to punish Pakistan’s army and force its hand against destabilising forces within. While Pakistan could choose to up-the-ante, it is logically expected to be self-deterred when faced with the nuclear overhang. The nuclear scare is to help Pakistani army along in reining in its jihadists in a ‘Pakistan first’ strategy.
At the end of its summer exercises, the Pakistani army has claimed that it is in a position to deploy fast enough to the borders to give Indian attacks a bloody nose. This challenges India’s expectation that Pakistan would choose to lose cheaply than resoundingly at the next higher level. India will need to take the fighting up a notch higher. Its air force is also unlikely to sit out the war. This amounts to getting back into nuclear danger zone.
Clearly, even if a summer’s end finds both militaries more practiced, it does not mean either nation is any safer. The writing on the wall is to not only draw up the calendar for talks agreed on by Salman Khurshid and Sartaz Aziz at their meeting in Brunei recently, but have the two prime ministers meet swiftly to take the reopening forward.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-and-pakistan-azm-e-nau-as-a-response-to-4056.html
The Pakistani Army has just completed its summer war games, Azm Nau IV. The press release has it that with the Azm-e-Nau series of exercises held since 2009, Pakistan has arrived at an answer to India’s Cold Start. Its distraction so far with the ‘Af-Pak’ related security situation on its western border appears to be now behind it. With the Americans packing to depart, it’s back to business in South Asia.
The nuclear backdrop does make this worrisome. There is also no guarantee against a war breaking out. A conventional war cannot be guaranteed to stay conventional. It can be argued that Pakistan’s signalling that it is prepared conventionally is good in the sense that it will deter India on the conventional level. But the problem is that this gives Pakistan the confidence to provoke India at the subconventional level; providing a trigger for India to go conventional in response.
The ‘unthinkable’ cannot be wholly discounted. Pakistanis have gone down the plutonium route to miniaturise warheads so as to place them on missiles. Being short on planes, missiles are the mainstay of the Pakistani nuclear force. The latest of these missiles is a nuclear-tipped battlefield missile designed for use against Indian conventional forces. Its battlefield employment serves to bring nuclear war outbreak that much closer. Pakistan’s rationale for such lowering of the nuclear threshold is that it would deter India from launching Cold Start offensives; thereby, making nuclear war more remote.
This has got India debating its options. India could pay Pakistan back in the same coin of proxy war. It is easy to destabilise Pakistan, perpetually on the brink of being a failed and terror sponsoring state. However, there is no guarantee that this will end the terror provocations, and an unstable Pakistan is not necessarily in India’s interest.
India could rely on conventional asymmetry in its favour, deepened by successive defence budgets such as this year’s crossing of the INR250 thousand crores mark. The intent is to deter Pakistani adventurism and, if push comes to shove, to prevail at every level of the conflict, including nuclear. The idea is to gain ‘escalation dominance’, which means to convince the adversary to give up the fight rather than take it to the next higher level at which, yet again, it cannot hope to win.
India’s military has been on a learning curve ever since its conventional war doctrine was rendered obsolete by Pokhran II. While arriving at the concept of Limited War soon thereafter, it was unable to rise to the occasion when it was sorely tested at the next crisis in wake of the parliament attack. The embarrassment of having taken over three weeks to ready itself, led to the intensive thinking that resulted in the Cold Start doctrine.
The doctrine required multiple attacks into Pakistan at-the-double. Genuflecting to the nuclear backdrop, the army sought to limit these thrusts to shallow depths. Even so, this amounted to nuclear flirtation since the attack was to be rapid and along a broad front using resources with ‘pivot corps’ or defending formations and offensive formations staged forward closer to the border for the purpose. With the balance of its strike corps forming up in wake of the limited offensives and an air offensive unfolding simultaneously, Pakistan could well be stampeded into a nuclear decision in a truncated timeframe. This made Cold Start difficult to sell to the political masters.
Consequently, India has since distanced itself from Cold Start. An army chief has gone on to say that there was nothing called Cold Start. The contours of what it has come up with instead are indistinct. The publicity that attended Cold Start, intended no doubt to enhance its deterrent effect, is missing. Consequently, little is known of its successor, ‘Cold Start lite’. It apparently involves quick punches at key locations to punish Pakistan’s army and force its hand against destabilising forces within. While Pakistan could choose to up-the-ante, it is logically expected to be self-deterred when faced with the nuclear overhang. The nuclear scare is to help Pakistani army along in reining in its jihadists in a ‘Pakistan first’ strategy.
At the end of its summer exercises, the Pakistani army has claimed that it is in a position to deploy fast enough to the borders to give Indian attacks a bloody nose. This challenges India’s expectation that Pakistan would choose to lose cheaply than resoundingly at the next higher level. India will need to take the fighting up a notch higher. Its air force is also unlikely to sit out the war. This amounts to getting back into nuclear danger zone.
Clearly, even if a summer’s end finds both militaries more practiced, it does not mean either nation is any safer. The writing on the wall is to not only draw up the calendar for talks agreed on by Salman Khurshid and Sartaz Aziz at their meeting in Brunei recently, but have the two prime ministers meet swiftly to take the reopening forward.
Saturday, 16 February 2013
The Book Review
February-March 2013
http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/issues/the-book-review/50.html
http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/issues/the-book-review/50.html
Book Review
INTERNAL CONFLICTS MILITARY PERSPECTIVESBy
V.R. Raghavan (ed.) Vij Books, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 324,`1250.00
Internal Conflicts, an output of the Center
for Security Analysis, Chennai whosemandate is to look at the non-traditionalsecurity
lens, of necessity reflects on the issueof internal security that has been
germane totraditional security for at least a quarter centurynow. It comprises
papers presented atseminars that notably were also conducted atplaces other than
the national capital,organized as part of an ongoing three-yearproject on
internal conflicts and transnationalconsequences.
The editor in his strategic overviewexpands
the coverage to include Sri Lanka andMyanmar. This widening of scope of the bookis owed to the
Center, co-founded by theeditor along with M.K. Narayanan in 2002,also engaging
with security of South and SouthEast Asia. It is one of two organizations
inIndia that are part of the strategic studiesnetwork of the Near East South
Asia Center(NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, NationalDefence University,
Washington D.C.. Thesecond section of the book carries papers byretired
military brass, with VedMarwah beingthe exception. While the papers are
Indiacentric, there is one on consequences of internal security operations on
the Nepal Army.
The editor’s extended essay over 150pages
is masterly. His discussion of internalconflicts in India covers North East
India, J&Kand Naxalism. The Maoist conflict in Nepaland ethnic conflicts in
Sri Lanka and Myanmarare the other areas of focus. He discusses stateresponses,
peace processes, economicconsequences, militarization and politicalimpact in
its internal and external dimensions.The editor’s conclusion is that the four
stateshave used some or a combination of the fourapproaches available: security
approachwherein police forces are used, militaryapproach, political
accommodation andeconomic/development approach. India’s owncase has been that
of a ‘combination approach’but with mixed results whereas for the otherthree,
it has been predominantly a militaryapproach. His reflection on peace talks,
peaceaccords and ceasefire agreements, also termedSuspension of Operations
agreements, is usefulin extending the discussion on internalsecurity otherwise
restricted to the conflictmanagement aspects to conflict resolution. Herightly
highlights that the main deficiency insustaining peace is inadequate political
followup. Given that most conflicts are aboutidentity related greivances,
‘states have toaddress the possibility of accommodation inmulticultural,
multiethnic and multireligiouscontext’ (p. 173).
Lt. Gen. Raghavan’s military insight is
inevidence in his Foreword on the ‘trilemma’faced in countering insurgency. He
writes that‘in an asymmetrical warfare it is impossibleto simultaneously
achieve, 1) force protection,2)
distinction between enemy combatants andnon-combatants and 3) the
physicalelimination of insurgents. In pursuing any oneof these options, the
armed forces need toforgo the other two options (p. x).’ Theexistence of the
‘trilemma’ is borne out in thecryptic reference by Lt. Gen. Sudhir Sharmain his
paper on the debate within the army:‘It has been argued by some, that
winninghearts and minds is in frucuous (sic) as it doesnot contribute to
military success’ (p. 197).It is to his credit that he does not agreewith this
line of agrument. This begs thequestion of the strength of the
constituencyamidst the brass that does. Clearly, the SriLankan model of
military elimination of theLTTE has not come about in a conceptualvacuum. The
danger is in the militaryresolving the ‘trilemma’ in favour of point
threelisted by Raghavan. The Myanmar andNepalese examples suggest as much
andexpectations are that in case the Sri LankanGovernment remains oblivious of
postconflict justice for neglect of point two, thenits military victory will be
pyrrhic. Theinability of the superpower, the US, to achieveall
threesimultaneously in Afghanistan shouldcertainly make any debate rest.
The chapter by Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoimakes
the distinction between the traditionalinsurgencies ‘indigenous’ (p. 189) to
Indiaand those that are fostered from outside, suchas proxy wars with jihadi
overtones. He isdoubtful if India’s traditional approach ofminimal force can
sustain into the future.Seeing that the military’s continuingemployment is
inevitable, he is of the viewthat an internal security force of the army
becreated distinct from its force for conventionaloperations. There will
therefore be a two-tierapproach: traditional insurgencies beingtackled by the
central police forces and the‘externally sponsored high grade
insurgencies’being combated by the army’s internalsecurity force. He wants that
this force shouldbe ‘an integral part of the army and should bedeployed,
employed and controlled by theArmy Headquarters (p. 194).’ This seems tobe the
case even now with India’s twoparamilitary forces, the Rashtriya Rifles andthe
Assam Rifles, operating under the Army. Acriticism that can easily be
anticipated is thatthe Army in such a case will end up lessaccountable and
become a vested interest ininsurgency. From the Army’s foot dragging onissues
such as Armed Forces Special Powers Act(AFSPA), some believe that is already
the case.
Lt. Gen. Arvind Sharma, a former
EasternArmy Commander and overall in charge ofoperations in the North East,
writing on thepsychological effects on soldiers opines thatsenior commanders
must be ‘involved inshaping the environment to include smoothfunctioning with
state government, sociocultural organisations, relations and dealingwith the
public, the media and local authorities’(p. 218). He says this in the context
of toomany commanders wanting to lead from thefront and imposing on tactical
level operations.This debate goes back at least to the midnineties. The problem
with arm-chair generalship is in the ‘strategic sergeant’ losing the warfor
‘hearts and minds’ by misapplication offorce. The result is in the commander
then‘managing the environment’ by ‘perceptionmanagement’ rather than taking
action against inappropriate force
application. Such actiononly draws scepticism about the Army’s recordon human
rights, detracting from itsinstitutional credibility. With the state
ofrectitude of the military increasinglyapproximating their civilian
counterparts, thereis a case to the contrary, for the commander’somnipresence,
particularly in high intensitycounter-insurgency.The book is a useful record of
the military’sdoctrinal approach at the current time.
BOOK REVIEW
ASIAN RIVALRIES: CONFLICT, ESCALATION, AND
LIMITATIONS ON TWO-LEVEL GAMES Edited by SumitGanguly and William R. Thompson,
Foundation Books, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 259, price not stated.The Book Review /
February-March 2013
Two-level games are interactions in
whichdecision makers operate in competitivedomestic and international environments.Elites
not only have to initiate and respondin the international domain but also have
totake domestic constituencies along. Suchinteractions are usually in the
context of longlasting and ongoing ‘rivalries’—discordbetween serial disputants
with potential forconflict and armed confrontation.
The book edited by Ganguly andThompson
situates the analysis in Asiabecause of its ever-increasing importance andits
‘high potential for conflict over regionalhegemony and global leadership of
anyregion’. The region has witnessed thirty-tworivalries in the modern era, of
which nineare ongoing ones. The book covers thefollowing dyads: China-Taiwan,
US-China,India-Pakistan, Sino-Indian, Sino-Russian,the two Koreas and
China-Vietnam. To theeditors, this makes Asia ripe for a freshoutbreak of
rivalry in a multipolar future.The ‘Middle East’ is excluded from theregion
since it has already received adequateattention and there is corresponding
deficitin relation to the rest of Asia that can arguablyprove more significant
in the future.
The two chapters of interest to readersin
this part of the world involve India in itsrelations with both its significant
neighbours:China and Pakistan. This fact is itself a tellingstatement on its
levels of (in)security.Through the
two-level game prism, such apotentially hazardous situation cannot havebeen
brought about by factors solely in eitherdomain: international and domestic.
Indiais in an intractable or protracted conflict withits neighbours not only
because of factorsthat cannot be wished away such as criticalterritorial
issues, but also because issues withresonance in domestic politics, such
asnationalisms and identity, have made itdifficult. Consequently, when faced
withcrisis or events, it would be imprudent torule out domestic sphere factors
asinfluencing decisions on escalation or deescalation.
S. Paul Kapur’s chapter on the
Indo-Pakrivalry does bring out the salience of thedomestic sphere. However, his
argumentationdoes not rise to the expectations raised byhis intricately argued
book, DangerousDeterrent but merely
retraces the well knownmeandering of Indo-Pak relations over threeperiods: the
first conflictual period fromIndependence to the 1971 War; the ‘longpeace’
between 1971 till the outbreak of theinternal troubles in Kashmir in 1989;
andthe troubled period since. The author rightlycharacterizes India and
Pakistan as the‘quintessential Asian rivals’. His argument isthat the rivalry
has been driven by thedispute over territory of Kashmir that hasidentity
related portents for both states, aconstant in domestic politics.
Theinternational factors—or factors related to theexternal strategic
environment—have driventhe rivalry within this context. The domesticdomain has
provided the permissive cause oftension while the efficient or proximatecauses
lie in the realm of international strategic variables.
Manjeet S. Pardesi, a doctoral candidatein
Indiana University, aims at understandingthe role of domestic politics in the
rivalrydynamics between India and China. Heconsiders two cases: the late
fifties and earlysixties and the late eighties. His conclusionis that the
domestic sphere has littleinfluence on the decision to escalate butbecomes
significant once a decision has beenmade. Escalation is more likely when
thethreat perception becomes more acute anddeescalation when there is
littleaccentuationin the threat. To him, Nehru adopted theforward policy once
the internal situation inTibet deteriorated due to China reneging ontheir 17
point agreement with the DalaiLama signed when they reasserted theirsovereignty
in 1950. This resulted in reducedTibetan autonomy and increased Chinesepresence
in Tibet and pressure. While thedecision to escalate did not have
domesticpressures behind it, once the die had beencast, nationalism ensured
that the tiger couldnot be dismounted. While the latter is true,to discount the
input of the domesticdimension into Nehru’s decision isdebatable. Though Nehru
had centralizedforeign policy, he was concerned withdomestic opinion on his
leadership sincequestioning in one sector could spill over tojeopardize the
whole, or his vision for India.
This can also been seen in his policy
onKashmir and in relation to nucleardevelopments.
Likewise, Pardesi believes that in the
lateeighties the Chinese threat not having beenprominent, India chose to
de-escalate afterthe Sumdorong Chu crisis of 1986. This ledup to Rajiv Gandhi’s
landmark visit of 1988.However, the preceding OperationChequerboard and the
militarily activeresponse to the crisis can be seen equally asIndia demonstrating
its muscles to a domesticaudience in order to undertake the deescalation
without its credentials as a credibleactor being questioned.This sensitivity of
strategic decisionmakers to the domestic sphere is liable forunderestimation
and thereby a misreadingof India’s intentions and actions. It makesfor the
dominant perception that areasonable India has been imposed on byinsistent
neighbours, who have even gangedup on occasion to corner India. This lies
atbase of the ‘two front’ thesis that has beenascendant over the past half
decade. Thenational resources that then get diverted intostrategic deterrence
and military preparedness are thus legitimized. These havebeen seen instead as
India reassuring itselfthat it can negotiate
from a position ofequality with China and can compel Pakistanby placing it in a
position of asymmetry. Inother words, the domestic factor predominates in
India.
The other chapters will be of interest
tothe expanding numbers of China specialists.China is seemingly at the center
of Asia withmarked rivalries along its periphery. This isuseful for the third
party, the US, to get afoot in the door and to justify its ‘pivot’
or‘rebalancing’. TheAmerican editors justify US
engagement with the region as an Asian power.It is no wonder then
that they prognosticatethe potential for
conflict in the region.
Sunday, 27 January 2013
Writings on IDSA website
http://www.idsa.in/taxonomy/term/99
Ali Ahmed
Ali Ahmed was Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile
India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor
The aim of the monograph is to examine the structural factor behind the development of India's Limited War Doctrine. In discussing India's conventional war doctrine in its interface with the nuclear doctrine, the policy-relevant finding of this monograph is that limitation needs to govern both the conventional and nuclear realms of military application. This would be in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear age.
Political Decision-Making and Nuclear Retaliation
July 2012
Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere.
A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
March 2012
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam is Reader in Comparative Politics and International Relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Reopening the Debate on Limited War
February 29, 2012
The commentary makes the case for reopening the Limited War debate in order to inform explicit articulation of a Limited War doctrine.
Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation
January 2012
Towards A New Asian Order
2012
Publication: Shipra Publications
ISBN : 978-81-7541-615-4
ISBN : 978-81-7541-615-4
The volume contains contributions by leading Asian analysts and Asia watchers on the theme of prospects for Asian integration. It discusses regionalism at the continental level and investigates overarching trends. It focuses on Asia's 'rise' and the key factors shaping the Asian regional order. The volume also provides valuable perspectives on Asia's sub-regions. Another salient feature of this volume is its coverage of increasingly significant non-traditional issues in the Asian context.
The Indian Army: What the stars foretell for 2012
December 7, 2011
The Indian Army can be expected to deliver on the strategic challenges it faces, although how it does this depends on how it measures up to internal change.
Saturday, 29 December 2012
Monday, 17 December 2012
IDSA MONOGRAPH SERIES
The aim of the monograph is to examine the structural factor behind the development of India's Limited War Doctrine. At the structural level, the regional security situation has impacted India's strategic posture - primarily the threat posed by Pakistan, India's revisionist neighbour. Given its revisionist aims and relative lack of power, Pakistan covertly went nuclear. This has accounted for its prosecuting a proxy war against India. India was consequently forced to respond albeit with restraint, exemplified by its response during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram and in the wake of 26/11. Emulating Pakistan's proactive posture at the subconventional level, India reworked its conventional war doctrine to exploit the space between the subconventional level and the nuclear threshold for conventional operations. This has been in accordance with the tenets of the Limited War concept. In discussing India's conventional war doctrine in its interface with the nuclear doctrine, the policy-relevant finding of this monograph is that limitation needs to govern both the conventional and nuclear realms of military application. This would be in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear age.
To
Late Maj Gen S. C. Sinha, PVSM
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................... 7
1. INTRODUCTION .................................... 9
2. DOCTRINAL CHANGE ............................. 16
3. THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR .................. 42
4. CONCLUSION ....................................... 68
REFERENCES ......................................... 79
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This monograph is the outcome of my fellowship at IDSA in 2010-
12. I am thankful to the Cluster Coordinator, Brig (Retd.) Rumel
Dahiya, and members of the Military Cluster for their support. I
am deeply grateful to former Director-General, Mr Narendra
Sisodia for his encouragement. The monograph was made possible
by the IDSA providing me an intellectually stimulating working
environment, world class infrastructure, competent support staff
and an inspiring set of colleagues. The monograph draws on the
research for my doctoral dissertation in International Politics at
Jawarharlal Nehru University, which the IDSA was kind enough
to grant me permission to pursue alongside my fellowship. I stand
greatly indebted to my Supervisor, the very capable and always
kind Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan. I thank the three anonymous
referees for their comments that have helped improve the
manuscript and the copyeditor for making the monograph readable.
However, despite the advantages I have had in preparing the
monograph, there are the inevitable lacunae for which I am solely
responsible.
Ali Ahmed
Introduction
India developed its Limited War doctrine in the wake of the Kargil
War. Officially, the land warfare doctrine dates to publication of
Indian Army Doctrine in 2004. It was for a period of time, in the
century’s first decade, colloquially referred to as ‘Cold Start’. The
doctrine per se is for conventional war, but embedded in it are the
tenets of Limited War. The understanding is that whether a war is
‘Limited’ or ‘Total’ would depend on political aims of the conflict
and their strategic and operational translation. Since political aims,
can reasonably, only be limited in the nuclear age, the doctrine
can be taken as being a Limited War doctrine.
The doctrine has evolved from the military developments of the
past four decades. While India’s earlier doctrine - post the 1971
War period - had been a defensive one, organisational and doctrinal
innovations in the eighties served to enhance the offensive content
of military doctrine. Initially, changes were prompted by the
necessity of conducting conventional operations under conditions
of perceived nuclear asymmetry. This took the form of
mechanisation, deemed as more suited to a nuclear battlefield. The
doctrine was one of conventional deterrence comprising a dissuasive
capability (deterrence by denial) along with a counter offensive
capability (deterrence by punishment). In the light of Pakistan’s
acquisition of nuclear capability by the late eighties, the counteroffensive-capability, embodied by strike corps operations, became
problematic. This was capitalised on by Pakistan to enhance its
sub-conventional provocations taking advantage of the ‘stability/
instability paradox’. Consequently, India was forced, among other
reasons, to adapt its offensive capability to bring its conventional
edge back into the reckoning. The idea was to reinforce
conventional deterrence and in case that was found wanting, then
to be in a position to execute coercion or compellence as required.
and nuclear planes has an escalatory potential that could do with
some mitigation.
The monograph makes the suggestion that limitation must attend
both conventional operations (as is indeed the direction of
thinking), and also equally importantly, nuclear operations. Its
chief recommendation is that India’s strategic doctrine should be
informed by defensive realism. The compatible strategic doctrine
is therefore one of defensive deterrence. India’s military doctrine
therefore needs to be tweaked away from the proactive offensive
stance to one more mindful of the nuclear overhang. Merely
acknowledging its presence as the nuclear backdrop is not enough
in light of escalatory possibilities. The deterrence logic has its
limitations. Given this, not only must conventional doctrine be
cognisant of this, but indeed also nuclear doctrine.
India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor
IDSA Monograph Series No. 10
2012
The aim of the monograph is to examine the structural factor behind the development of India's Limited War Doctrine. At the structural level, the regional security situation has impacted India's strategic posture - primarily the threat posed by Pakistan, India's revisionist neighbour. Given its revisionist aims and relative lack of power, Pakistan covertly went nuclear. This has accounted for its prosecuting a proxy war against India. India was consequently forced to respond albeit with restraint, exemplified by its response during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram and in the wake of 26/11. Emulating Pakistan's proactive posture at the subconventional level, India reworked its conventional war doctrine to exploit the space between the subconventional level and the nuclear threshold for conventional operations. This has been in accordance with the tenets of the Limited War concept. In discussing India's conventional war doctrine in its interface with the nuclear doctrine, the policy-relevant finding of this monograph is that limitation needs to govern both the conventional and nuclear realms of military application. This would be in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear age.About the Author
Dr. Ali Ahmed is currently political affairs officer in the UNMISS.
The monograph was completed during his fellowship at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi in 2010-12.
The monograph was completed during his fellowship at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi in 2010-12.
Download Monograph
Order Hard Copy
Please email us at publication [at] idsa.in or call +91-11-2671 7983 (Ext. 7322)
To
Late Maj Gen S. C. Sinha, PVSM
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................... 7
1. INTRODUCTION .................................... 9
2. DOCTRINAL CHANGE ............................. 16
3. THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR .................. 42
4. CONCLUSION ....................................... 68
REFERENCES ......................................... 79
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This monograph is the outcome of my fellowship at IDSA in 2010-
12. I am thankful to the Cluster Coordinator, Brig (Retd.) Rumel
Dahiya, and members of the Military Cluster for their support. I
am deeply grateful to former Director-General, Mr Narendra
Sisodia for his encouragement. The monograph was made possible
by the IDSA providing me an intellectually stimulating working
environment, world class infrastructure, competent support staff
and an inspiring set of colleagues. The monograph draws on the
research for my doctoral dissertation in International Politics at
Jawarharlal Nehru University, which the IDSA was kind enough
to grant me permission to pursue alongside my fellowship. I stand
greatly indebted to my Supervisor, the very capable and always
kind Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan. I thank the three anonymous
referees for their comments that have helped improve the
manuscript and the copyeditor for making the monograph readable.
However, despite the advantages I have had in preparing the
monograph, there are the inevitable lacunae for which I am solely
responsible.
Ali Ahmed
Introduction
India developed its Limited War doctrine in the wake of the Kargil
War. Officially, the land warfare doctrine dates to publication of
Indian Army Doctrine in 2004. It was for a period of time, in the
century’s first decade, colloquially referred to as ‘Cold Start’. The
doctrine per se is for conventional war, but embedded in it are the
tenets of Limited War. The understanding is that whether a war is
‘Limited’ or ‘Total’ would depend on political aims of the conflict
and their strategic and operational translation. Since political aims,
can reasonably, only be limited in the nuclear age, the doctrine
can be taken as being a Limited War doctrine.
The doctrine has evolved from the military developments of the
past four decades. While India’s earlier doctrine - post the 1971
War period - had been a defensive one, organisational and doctrinal
innovations in the eighties served to enhance the offensive content
of military doctrine. Initially, changes were prompted by the
necessity of conducting conventional operations under conditions
of perceived nuclear asymmetry. This took the form of
mechanisation, deemed as more suited to a nuclear battlefield. The
doctrine was one of conventional deterrence comprising a dissuasive
capability (deterrence by denial) along with a counter offensive
capability (deterrence by punishment). In the light of Pakistan’s
acquisition of nuclear capability by the late eighties, the counteroffensive-capability, embodied by strike corps operations, became
problematic. This was capitalised on by Pakistan to enhance its
sub-conventional provocations taking advantage of the ‘stability/
instability paradox’. Consequently, India was forced, among other
reasons, to adapt its offensive capability to bring its conventional
edge back into the reckoning. The idea was to reinforce
conventional deterrence and in case that was found wanting, then
to be in a position to execute coercion or compellence as required.
Doctrinal development has been driven by the military experience
since the mid-eighties. The period witnessed the crises of 1987 and
1990 and the peace enforcement operation in Sri Lanka. Internal
conflict in Kashmir reached a climax with the Kargil War of 1999.
Pakistan’s proxy war culminated in the parliament attack that
prompted Indian coercive diplomacy, and Operation Parakram,
in 2001-02. Conflicts in the Gulf in 1991 and 2004 and Operation
Enduring Freedom which showcased the changes in the character
of conventional war influenced thinking. Organisational changes
and equipment acquisitions prompted by the revolution in military
affairs accelerated during this period. Cumulatively, these have
led to considerable doctrinal evolution. However, it was overt
nuclearisation that had the most profound effect and made conflict
limitation an overriding imperative.
An offensive and proactive capability that under-grids the war
doctrine speaks of a readiness to go to war, and, further, to take
the war to the enemy. The conventional doctrine and the nuclear
doctrine combined go beyond deterrence, to potentially enable
coercion through offensive deterrence. The nuclear doctrine posits
‘massive’ punitive retaliation in its 2003 formulation by the Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS). This expansive formulation, it
would appear, is designed for enhancing the deterrent effect and
push up the Pakistani nuclear thresholds. Doing so enables the
leveraging of India’s conventional advantages in case Pakistani
subconventional provocations are emboldened by nuclearisation.
Pakistan’s offensive posture at the sub-conventional level and the
consequent Indian offensive orientation at the conventional level,
leads to heightened nuclear possibilities. The nuclear backdrop
serves as reminder that escalation could occur, either by accident
or design. The problem therefore has been as to how India should
cope with sub-conventional provocations. It has responded by
leveraging its conventional advantage. This needs to be tempered
by an inbuilt limitation at the conventional level in order that the
nuclear threshold is not breached. This challenge has proven
difficult, with Pakistan attempting to posture a low nuclear
threshold. India for its part has attempted to raise this threshold
by promising higher order nuclear retaliation. This intersection
of the Indian and Pakistani doctrinal postures at the conventional
and nuclear planes has an escalatory potential that could do with
some mitigation.
The monograph makes the suggestion that limitation must attend
both conventional operations (as is indeed the direction of
thinking), and also equally importantly, nuclear operations. Its
chief recommendation is that India’s strategic doctrine should be
informed by defensive realism. The compatible strategic doctrine
is therefore one of defensive deterrence. India’s military doctrine
therefore needs to be tweaked away from the proactive offensive
stance to one more mindful of the nuclear overhang. Merely
acknowledging its presence as the nuclear backdrop is not enough
in light of escalatory possibilities. The deterrence logic has its
limitations. Given this, not only must conventional doctrine be
cognisant of this, but indeed also nuclear doctrine.
Thursday, 29 November 2012
Comparative Strategy
Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine
Ali Ahmed a
a Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution Jamia
Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India
To cite this article: Ali Ahmed (2012): Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine, Comparative Strategy,
31:5, 453-468
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.731964
India’s conventional war doctrine has been extensively discussed over the past decade.
It has been dubbed Cold Start, though the term has been dropped from usage recently.
The article discusses India’s limited-war doctrine in its origin, impetus behind it, tenets,
and reasons for the current distancing from the doctrine. The doctrine was India’s
rekindling of its conventional deterrent in the face of Pakistani subconventional proxy
warfare. Its implications in terms of escalation possibilities to the nuclear level attracted
considerable attention. Its “quick on the draw” nature added to concerns on crisis
stability. These conspired to shift the latest doctrinal movement in India away from
default reliance on traditional conventional operations to a proactive strategy that
includes in addition punitive military response options.
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