Op Sindoor: Rummaging for lessons in a fog of mis-/dis-information
The Modi regime’s sticking to the principle of war - selection and maintenance of Aim - has been the principal takeaway from the recently paused, Op Sindoor. Viewed through either prism of ‘high politics’ or ‘low politics’ the Aim was the same: administer a swift blow to Pakistan.
Viewed through the high politics prism, the blow cautioned Pakistan against testing its tolerance threshold. Through the prism of low politics that is domestic politics driven, the aim was to refurbish Modi’s strong-man image in time to influence the upcoming elections in crucial Gangetic belt elections.
The blow delivered, the regime was quick to take the first opportunity to clamber off-ramp. Though it had built-in off ramps for Pakistan to take cue from, it sensibly accepted the intervention of the United States (US) to bail out of a situation that threatened to disrupt the Aim set. The low politics prism better explains the regime’s denial of any such helping hand.
The off-ramp (a new introduction into popular vocabulary) built into the very first statement by its foreign secretary, that Operation (Op) Sindoor was ‘measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible,’ remained unused. Its second try - ‘the action was restrained; it was directed towards non-civilian, non-military targets; and confined to terrorist camps’ – also went abegging.
The jihadist general on the other side, functioning under the precedence of Op Swift Retort, did not readily get the message. This brings up the first lesson: strategy is a two-player game.
India did not make it any easier by omitting any mention of losses in the air. Had the regime admitted to losing Rafale(s) – inevitable in combat as the air ops chief put it later – the crisis could have ended on the first night itself. But with the Indian media and the right-wing cybersphere spoiling for Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, this was not to be.
In the bargain, the two sides went past their last skirmish in which missiles had been verbally bandied about, this time using missiles in a manner as to provoke nuclear nightmares in President Trump, prompting American intervention.
Initially, United States’ (US) Vice President JD Vance indicated a hands-off policy was on place. This allowed time for India to exercise its right to self-defence against terrorist assaults deemed as permitted under emerging international law when the host state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to neutralize the threat.
Stepping up the ladder in quick time, despite their pehle aap professions during respective military briefings, both sides needed a helping hand. The US, apparently triggered by the threat of nuclearization of the conflict, responded.
In close vicinity of Rawalpindi, the Nur Khan air base that was targeted is part of Pakistan’s nuclear network, with the Strategic Plans Division, that serves the National Command Authority handling nuclear matters, located close at hand.
Two other concerning developments occurred alongside. The first was reports of the convening of the National Command Authority; later back-tracked. And the second was the report on movement of Pakistani troops towards the frontlines.
The US stepped up its global hegemon act. Trump perhaps espied a peacemaking opportunity that has been so far denied him by Ukraine and Israel in their respective conflicts. If notable war mongers as Nixon and Obama could bag the Nobel, he is not amiss in fancying his chances.
Arm twisting both sides, with trade deals as incentive – per his narrative denied by India – he believes his administration averted a nuclear war.
Understandably, the regime’s lead spin master, the prime minister, has a contrary narrative assuaging his devotees horrified that their champion fell at the very first step up the ladder. Remember, Pakistan only named its operation, Op Bunyan Marsoos, on the third day.
The regime suggests that the ‘force of Indian arms’ got the Pakistani military ops general to ‘desperately’ get on the hotline to be let off.
Even so, the regime has tangentially admitted to US intervention, with Modi, in his first address to the nation held post-conflict, intoning never to be subject to ‘nuclear blackmail’. By implication, US pressure resulted from Pakistani nuclear signaling being taken at face value – with a less gullible India dragged along.
In other words, to shore up deterrence, he promises to ignore nuclear signaling next time.
This brings up the next lesson, on the way to live up to the threat: keep target lists clear off nuclear installations and assets.
This may have been done. Though the military was publicly given a ‘free hand’, it’s reasonable to assume that its targeting lists were fed intelligence input by the national security establishment under Ajit Doval. The briefing by the Defence Intelligence Agency head testifies to the ‘deliberate planning process’ behind Op Sindoor. Likewise, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), the follow-on target list must have been vetted by the nuclear strategy staff ensconced therein.
Indeed, the current military adviser in the NSCS snagged the job for his expertise in weaponizing the Su-30, presumably with the air-launched Brahmos supersonic cruise missile – used to take down the Nur Khan and Sargodha airfields, both associated with the nuclear set up in Pakistan.
The air operations chief’s response at the press de-brief on Op Sindoor to the question on Kairana Hills – that supposedly houses Pakistan nuclear infrastructure - suggests that due diligence was in play.
Yet that the Nur Khan airfield’s full significance was lost is concerning. Worse is that it is not impossible that knowing this, Indians targeted it anyway, perversely signaling resolve. They surely know Sargodha, likewise targeted, as a sensitive airfield.
Targeting Nur Khan by mistaking it as a mere transportation hub seemingly trespassed into Pakistani nuclear domain. Pakistan’s SPD could not have guessed that Indians were mistakenly over-zealous, rather than deliberately and insidiously downgrading its nuclear capability.
If so, it’s a lesson learnt at an altogether high cost to Indian diplomatic stance and status. Now, not only does Trump wish to indulge in some deal making on Kashmir, but in putting both sides on the same level, has rehyphenated the two.
This foregrounds a major lesson: there is nothing called giving the military a ‘free-hand’.
An over-learnt lesson from the Vietnam war, that the Americans fought with one hand tied behind their backs, resulted in an overcompensation in the Weinberger and Powell doctrines of the subsequent two decades.
Worship at the altar of over-whelming force was at the cost of the utility of force for strategic messaging on escalatory and conflict termination possibilities. Hopefully, planners are privy to Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict, though it fetched him the Nobel prize for economics!
With missiles flying both ways – Fateh 1 and the Brahmos - the danger of hitting dual-use infrastructure is higher. Until a missile strikes there can be no certainty on the nature of its payload. If assets normally seconded to the Strategic Forces Command were employed – and there is no way of knowing this is not so - India ran an unnecessary risk.
More importantly, the policy spelt out by Modi on national television hands over Indian nuclear decision making to terrorists that get lucky. Clubbing the two – terrorists and sponsors – denies agency to terrorists out to reduce Pakistan to an ungoverned space. Hardly strategic, the new policy is instead hate-contaminated.
Pakistan has twice-over demonstrated its intent of quid pro quo-plus response. Invoking the nuclear card is its sovereign prerogative. It has to get the card in play as the crisis mounts, which implies that nuclear moves would aggravate crisis. While India can evince nonchalance, it would be matching nuclear moves alongside.
A competition in risk taking is set up, making for a rather slippery nuclear backdrop to crisis.
Whereas the conventional steps of an escalatory ladder may do with playacting to the point of recklessness, counter-intuitively, a demonstration of resolve when on the cusp of nuclear stage may prove counter-productive.
Remember Indian nuclear doctrine posits an annihilatory nuclear strike-back, which can only prompt an avoidable nuclear first strike on part of the adversary, forcing India to go first, against a foe with second strike capability. To mistake nuclear signaling as blackmail and call the nuclear bluff is suicidal.
Lackadaisical likening of nuclear weapons with Diwali crackers does not lend any confidence that Indian political masters sitting in its Nuclear Command Authority have got this straight.
Modi needs reminding, firstly, in the run up to the juncture his job is preventive, and, secondly, at the nuclear threshold, is more to limit damage than to inflict it – contrary to what the doctrine maintains. (Interestingly, both government silos – PIB and MEA - that host the doctrine text are inaccessible!)
Finally, the two states appear to have respectively reassured themselves on a bolstered deterrence. This is only seemingly reassuring.
While India believes that Pahalgam was the original escalation , Pakistan for its part would point to the Jaffar Express incident. Both are liable to proceed without tackling what each respectively acknowledges as root cause in first place.
The Indian military has plumbed to greater depths in Kashmir. While protecting tourists at the Baisaran meadow is not its job, jungle bashing is. Doing so in the environs would have prevented the attack and by now delivered the perpetrators to justice.
Worse, it went overboard in participating in the illegal demolition of houses of militants by controlled explosions, in defiance of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling.
Further, the air force’s professional briefing stands scarred by statements as: “Putting together and operationalising the potent AD environment has been possible only because of budgetary and policy support from the government of India in the last decade."
On Pakistan’s part, the Baloch claim to have launched over 70 attacks on Pakistani security forces in the duration of the crisis. To the extent, Indian intelligence operatives lend a helping hand, there is bound to be crisis recurrence.
The interregnum was three years and five years respectively between the crises in 2016, 2019 and the current-day one, a notably shorter duration than in the much-reviled Manmohan Singh (MMS) years. The interval then was longer, six years on either side of 26/11, from 2002, when the policy MMS inherited began and onwards till 2014.
Consequently, the primary lesson is on dialogue. One, to keep crises in abeyance contacts between the two NSAs, that found mention, must be kept up, if only for a credible claim against third party intervention. In wake of the terror attack, Pakistan sensibly double hatted its intelligence chief as its NSA.
More importantly, talks at a neutral venue should be taken up, not to discuss outstanding issues, but those wrought by this round, such as suspension of treaties by both sides.
It is not enough merely to use the interval to refurbish crisis options, like the air force’s substitution of Spice bombs with Hammers. The impending pursuit of a technological edge to neutralize Pakistani access to Chinese arms and equipment - that seizes internet today – is inevitable for crony capitalism to bite into the expanded cake.
Organisationally, with an integrated theater command likely to coordinate the next round that is set to play out at a higher violence threshold, how centralised aspects as intelligence and nuclear factors will be factored in must begin to exercise minds.
In the final analysis, while Op Sindoor did achieve its aim of delivering a sharp blow to Pakistan, it is uncertain if the Aim met the national interest, viewed through either prism, of high politics or low politics.
Seen through the former, its newly minted doctrine of military response to terror, without tackling root causes through internal or external dialogue, will set India up as the ‘Israel of the East’.
Through the prism of low politics, Op Sindoor merits Ajit Doval a Padma Vibhushan, for Doval just handed Pakistan a potentially resounding win: extension in power by another decade for Modi.
