Is Chief of Defence Staff as Supremo safe for Democracy?

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/is-chief-of-defence-staff-as-supremo

 Strategic discourse in India has it that the reason for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)-with-teeth is to have an efficacious military instrument against threats, such as the extant Two Front threat. The reality however is that this consideration is not necessarily what drives the military’s civilian superiors in their ongoing touching up of the higher defence organization (HDO). They could well be more interested in coup proofing the HDO.

The Narendra Modi regime has been more willing to chance an empowered CDS – one with command authority over significant and sizable military tools. It can afford this since it already has in place coup proofing measures. To the regime, the CDS is no longer the Man on Horseback. Such fears had kept the appointment at bay in the past decades.

Coup proofing – a primer

A coup could be ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. The former is military conduct of or participation in the forced displacement of a civilian government. On the other hand, a ‘soft’ coup is a more advanced form of the not unusual ‘shirking’ that militaries take recourse to in order to get their way or avoid disagreeable pressures. This includes disobedience and insubordination.

The Modi regime has taken care of ‘hard’ coup proofing by holding the military to the professional till in aggravating the national security predicament by needling China on the borders. Even as it does so, it has taken care to keep its escape hatch open, by also keeping China appeased, and counter-intuitively soon the military talks table. It has taken care not to settle matters with Pakistan, though the time was ripe, till instability in Pakistan robbed India of another credible interlocutor. This way, a military engaged in its primary task alongside and in the midst of transformative change would unlikely pose a threat, even if it could.

As for ‘soft’ coup, it has tried to throw in a cultural change as part of its transformation agenda. The CDS in a recent talk alluded to the Panch Pran as guiding light to take India, and its military, to Amrit Kaal by 2047. Decolonisation of the mind is the proverbial old idea being removed prior to the new one being inserted based on original, authentic and unpolluted Indian (read Brahminical?) ideals of yore. The former is especially difficult for the military mind, while the latter might first see the nation being conditioned – another iffy proposition.

This discussion shows coup proofing figures in the consideration, even if operational effectiveness through Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC) is the more visible topic in the HDO discussion. Whereas for the regime the problem has seemingly been rendered academic, for other political parties the CDS and its baggage of coup is a legacy question suddenly acquiring traction. Since a CDS-with-teeth – with some kind of command relationship with ITCs – may be a reality soon, prudence requires a look at whether democracy stands any more threatened than it already is under the Modi regime.

The past decades

Though Independent India started off with a CDS-like appointment in a Commander-in-Chief, it soon jettisoned it in favour of Chiefs of Staff for respective Service. Not only was the intent to empower the junior two Services by letting them come abreast of the land forces, but to cut the Army Chief to size. The fledgling democracy required the military to be politically neutered, a sensible precaution in light of events in other post colonial states, particularly the one next door.

The three Services growing up in silos led to suboptimal prosecution of war. The 1947 War, confined to Jammu and Kashmir, remained land-centric, with use of air power only for logistics. Even in the 1962 War, offensive air power remained untested. In 1965, the sister Services of the Army bemoaned being left out of war planning and, as result, were surprised by its outbreak. In the Sri Lanka episode, though a joint headquarters was anchored on the Southern Command headquarters, protagonist memoirs have it that it grew dysfunctional soon. The start of the Kargil conflict witnessed an unseemly face-off between the Army and Air Chiefs, the latter unwilling to spark off a war without political level say so.

India dithered on the CDS-equivalent appointment for about half a century. The debate started after its showing in the 1971 War. Inter-Services cooperative war effort served as argument for moulding structures and processes. What held India up was not so much the strategic sense behind the idea as much as fear that a military unduly empowered could prove a threat to Indian democracy, since by then democracies were falling like nine-pins across the under-developed world to military interventions – mostly super-power backed. The division of the armed forces into three Services was useful to prevent generalissimo pretensions. The security situation did not warrant an Indian Hindenburg-Ludendorff.

Indian democracy was a light house of sorts. This was not fortuitous. Enlightened coup proofing by political minders was in evidence, much derided by military men as a downgrading of the military. Early in the aftermath of the 1971 War, Jagjivan Ram had to assure parliament that Sam Bahadur – elevated to field marshal rank only a couple of months prior - had been spoken to for when in retirement, he, in his inimitable style, responded to a scribe’s hypothetical question. The journalist lost no time in transmitting the wisecrack to jittery politicians. The seemingly exaggerated issue of a military coup was very much alive in consciousness of politicians, testified to by the appointment soon thereafter - through manipulation of the chain of seniority - of an ethnic kin, General ‘Tappy’ Raina, by Indira Gandhi.

Ever since peer armies went in for amalgamation of the armed forces – the United States being the principal one in the late eighties – the push in strategic circles picked up for a tightening of the national security and military domain. Both could do with an organizational upgrade, particularly since the internal security scenario worsened, creeping nuclearisation took place and regional and global dynamics intersected on the periphery of the subcontinent.

After a false start in the early nineties, India proceeded by decade-end to acquire a fledgling National Security Council system, presided over by a National Security Adviser. A similar case for firming up the HDO was conceded in principle in wake of the Kargil conflict, but only worked towards with bureaucratic efficiency typical of Indian babudom. Though the military imagined the bureaucracy relishing being Acting CDS, this owed more to political reservations. There was no political consensus.

The wasted years

The Gandhi family held sway over the government for a decade at a time when the logical next steps could be taken. The presiding matriarch reportedly held the proverbial ‘remote’. Appointing a fellow devout, AK Antony, as defence minister, to ensure against a Bofors-scandal redux, Sonia Gandhi wished to prevent buffeting of the economic and social transformation India was attempting through trickle-down from liberalization (Sonia Gandhi headed the National Advisory Council to justify her holding the remote).

Expectedly, the Right Wing opposition kept chafing at the bit. They capitalized on revitalizing defence as a subject area. Within the Services was the understandable inter-Service pitch for a bigger slice of a better performing economy. Seeing peer militaries internalize the Revolution in Military Affairs – evident from the early gains from the so-called Global War on Terror – the military could not be faulted. It felt thwarted from getting back at Pakistan for its proxy war in Kashmir; successive crises fizzling out before turning into conflicts wherein it could show its mettle. The Right Wing tapped into its disquiet.

An easing of tensions with Pakistan in the period left the military without a compelling case. The military alighted on a China threat, induced by the normal operation of a security dilemma on China’s breaking out. After 26/11, this duly metamorphosed into threat of a Two Front War. India’s lack of response provided a handle for the military and the Right Wing the ammunition it needed to paralyse the Manmohan Singh government, already forced on the back-foot by a slew of corruption allegations.  

Fearing the Right Wing would outflank it, the Singh government did what it could under the circumstance – fall in line with the military’s argument on a Two Front threat. Aware that its strategic restraint could be misrepresented as pusillanimity, it had allowed the military doctrinal innovation. Though well practiced for a half a decade since the aborted Operation Parakram, the resulting Cold Start doctrine was not applied to 26/11. As answer to the fear of escalation – including to the nuclear level - the idea of surgical strikes was mooted. In face of a global economic downturn – the beginnings of which were apparent by then to the economist in Manmohan Singh – it was a decidedly sage decision not being provoked into war.

In compensation, the government upped defence spending, went in for high profile acquisitions (that included a deal for the Rafale), reluctantly adopted the Two Front threat and went slow on mending Kashmir. It was tough love for Pakistan. Laissez faire for military allowed it to mainstream the Two Front threat perception. Resultantly, competitive intrusions on the China front began towards the end of the Singh tenure. In retrospect, the initial confrontations in Ladakh can be seen as precursors to Galwan.

The Right Wing did not arrive at this happy conjuncture - where it could ride the national security horse to a win in national elections - by happenstance. It had over the past decade assiduously worked to create neurosis in society. Alongside, it built up a Champion in Narendra Modi. His image after the Gujarat Pogrom proved useful. He serenaded military veterans - led by the Army Chief of Date-of-Birth fame - with   promises of a national war memorial and museum, One Rank One Pension and fixing Pakistan and Kashmir.

Modi - ably backed by intelligence czar Ajit Doval - thus stepped into a national security environment tailor made for grandstanding. All the pieces were in place for smooth appropriation. As with other government schemes, Modi’s mug-shot was stamped on the fresh packaging. Going further, such as with the Rafale deal, Modi obliged those who’d put their money on him. The Right Wing came into its own, taking down institutions and sectors from education to judicial.

In retrospect, Sonia Gandhi’s fears of a Right Wing take-over - forged in dinner conversations in the Gandhi home during her informal political tutelage by two prime ministers - were borne out. India was not witness to a mere change of government. With the questionable Pulwama-Balakot episode being ridden to electoral victory it seems increasingly likely that India was instead subject to what can arguably be categorized as a Right Wing coup -  even if electorally sustainable.

The scene today

Those who opened the doors from within - Jaichand and Mir Jafar-like – were Facilitators. The Facilitators busy themselves with matters as HDO. Their flagship enterprise – CDS - is soon to be capped by ITC, allowing for final touches to the CDS post. Unknown as yet is who the command authority over theatre commanders will rest with.

The CDS of today is toothless. There is more thinking in the open domain on the configuration of theatres rather than on the authority that will oversee these. As a retired general who once dealt with the issue pointed out at a talk - under Chatham rules - in the national capital late last month, that is the difficult part. To him, the operationalising the ITCs would be to put the cart before the horse, since logically who will control them, how and with what needs to be decided first.

Logically, the CDS must oversee ITC in his capacity as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. A second option has a civilian defence minister as war lord, with the CDS as adviser. The second option can safely be ruled out in the Indian context of rank ignoramus often tenanting the defence ministry (as now). The CDS could thus get a fresh mandate. He would have to be supported by a spruced up Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. This should precede ITC formation.   

Coup proofing revisited

A military that suppresses information - that ought to be in the ken of a knowledgeable voter for an informed choice - stands suborned. Such military action undercuts democracy, a political act. For its silence, professional accountability has been dispensed with by its political overseers – further tying the military to the regime with strings of complicity. Cases to point are Balakot, Ladakh and even the scenario-building that legitimized evacuation of Article 370 in Kashmir. The military ends up a handmaiden of the regime, a camel within the tent.

For cast-iron coup proofing, further measures are in place. Deep selection has rendered asunder any cohesion the military could bring to a coup. The regime resurrected the career of a retiree, reinforcing the unseemly lobbying in the retired fraternity for its attention. Serving officers have evidently learnt not to speak up, the catchment for CDS being opened to all at three-star flag rank. The infliction of the Agnipath scheme compels the inference that standing up for professional convictions is now passé.

Agnipath deflates the military as a cohesive force. Weighed down by Agniveers who have come of age in the Modi era, the military would be hard put to mount a military operation, leave alone a coup. Besides, the paramilitary – that has curiously been spared the Agnipath scheme – is well poised, with experience in operations in Maoist zones and in Kashmir, to pose a formidable obstacle to any would-be coup maker.

Even a CDS-with-teeth poses little danger. Deep selection enables a Right thinking choice, testifying to the onset of subjective civilian control over the military in Indian civil-military relations. The CDS would thus be powerful, but only in his own domain, while being reduced to a camp follower – not unlike Hermann Goring.

Besides, theatrisation would render ITCs powerful and with the wherewithal. If any theatre commander were to get such ideas, he would be balanced out by the other theatre commander. The four four-star officers at headquarters would not only cancel each other out, but also would not have the resources. This is one lesson that the Right Wing learnt from the incident-that-wasn’t when the defence ministry was spooked with the Para Brigade’s surreptitious move from Agra to outskirts of Delhi without the civilian side getting to know. (Also, take a look at the house of the CDS in Lutyen’s Delhi when compared to the done-up residences of the three Chiefs!)

What of Democracy?

Coups are not necessarily military executed; Hitler’s in Weimar Germany and, nearer our times, the Trump insurrection are cases to point. At the latter juncture, the United States’ military’s backroom consideration would legitimately have been a counter-coup to save democracy.

A military cognizant of Constitutional duties to prevent a coup – from any direction - serves as deterrent. Neutering a military from misplaced coup concerns can amount to disabling its ability for a counter coup. This renders democracy vulnerable to passing authoritarians and predatory ideologies. Taken beyond a point, coup proofing compels a questioning of motives.

For the Modi regime, going ahead with a CDS did not raise any coup relevant issues, since the CDS has no command authority. It was a politically useful move. However, coup proofing considerations must attend next steps. The political spectrum must be taken onboard prior. Since ITCs are on the cards, an empowered CDS or otherwise is a topic that must figure in strategic thinking.

Coup considerations may be academic – after all, the regime intends to stay on till Amrit Kaal. That is not so with other political parties, now even more tuned in to the changes in the military’s organizational culture. Subjective civilian control leads to an internalisation of ‘nationalist’ dogma by the military. This makes a soft coup more likely in the increasingly improbable event of alternation in power placing a liberal government in saddle.

As for the military, demonstrating an apolitical character in this debate implies putting the brakes on hasty moves in HDO. It must recap that as a defender of the Constitution, it must have the political acumen and preserve the capacity to deter and prevent any illegitimate - even if legal – final touches to the Constitution that Hindutva may have in store.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/zadoora-missing-the-strategic-corporal?sd=pf

Zadoora: Missing the Strategic Corporal

It is a measure of the Narendra Modi regime’s dominance over Kashmir that an incident with Strategic Corporal connotations escaped being one. The incident-that-wasn’t in question is that of an Army Major of 50 Rashtriya Rifles deployed in Kashmir harassing early morning prayer goers at a local mosque in Zadoora, Pulwama.

Apparently, he was training his outfit on conduct of operations when he was incensed with the call for prayer from the local mosque. Per allegations from leading regional politicians, he had hapless Kashmiri Muslims chant ‘Jai Shree Ram’. According to military ‘sources’ – putting out their version of the incident later – the chant was of ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ instead.

Be that as it may, the Army reacted with a promise of action and has reportedly ‘shifted’ the officer – whatever that means. Perhaps an investigation is on and pending disciplinary action he has been attached to a different outfit.

The dust having settled, is there a case then to reflect on it any further? Would that amount to making a mountain out of a molehill? Was the major’s action an ‘aberration’ – the military’s favourite term to scuttle scrutiny? Or is it indicative of a turn the military is taking, albeit unwarily?

‘One swallow doesn’t a summer make’ is quite right. It needs to be appreciated that the others deployed – and there are hundreds of thousands – are not similarly embarked. It is for this reason that the incident stands out as an ‘aberration’, as the Army would have it. The Army has thus rightly taken it in stride and disposed it off. For now, knocking it off the headlines, with a follow through pending the usual legal merry-go-round. Stirring up the dust is unnecessary and to do so would invite a questioning of motives.

On the contrary, can this incident be taken as the tip of the iceberg? Is it being dressed down – Army sources only admit to villagers being forced to sloganeer only ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’, as though that makes it acceptable? Does it not portend of worse to come, when Agniveers - coming of age in the Modi era - are operationalised?

If so, is its relegation from the national consciousness then not itself ‘motivated’ – to avoid drawing attention to a significant step – if not a leap – in the Army’s ethos?

The Human Shield episode

Admittedly, the Army has done a better job of it this time round than when it was confronted with infamous case of Major Leetul Gogoi. Gogoi was caught on camera taking a tussled-up Kashmiri for a ride on his jeep’s bonnet. He explained it was in self-defence from stone throwers, who – in his reasoning – could not then stone those on election duty he was escorting.

What he could not explain was why then did he proceed with the spectacle on a route winding over some 24 villages over the next couple of hours, well past the stone throwers presumably gathered in the initial part of his route? Why did he have time to stick notes on him threatening similar retribution on stone throwers? How was Farooq Ahmed Dar picked up when he denies being part of the stone throwing mob?

The problem was compounded by then Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat, jumping to Gogoi’s defence, pinned him with an award, even as the inquiry progressed. Emboldened, Leetul Gogoi persisted in error, being caught – yet again on camera - with possibly a minor girl in a case of gender-based violence in conflict.

The case merited a dishonourable discharge from service and rigourous imprisonment. But having been feted by the Army Chief, no one in the chain of command had the gumption to put the officer in his place. He got away with a meaningless loss in seniority – testifying to the Army’s sharing the society’s dominant view on sexual predation – evident since the recently discontinued wrestlers’ protest.

So, do we have in the Army’s similarly underplaying of the case here, a Leetul Gogoi II? Is it risking creating clones of Leetul Gogoi for the future? How much is it deliberate – could they really want more Gogoi look-alikes?

How to handle Rambos

No doubt there is a need for Rambos in the ranks. It’s a counter insurgency (CI) common sense that an omelette cannot be made without breaking eggs. Proxy war and terrorism that attend insurgency necessitate kinetic operations resulting in ‘kills’. A certain breed of soldiers is better at delivering on this. Not all signing up to a soldierly life are equally competent on this score. Some compensate with soft skills which arguably serve CI purposes well, if not better.

If there are Rambos onboard, then the premium on the command element increases. They have to ride Rambos harder. It is certainly the case in insurgency, which, by definition, is ‘war among people’. People are our very own – so goes the theory anyway.  Looking after their rights, safety and well-being is as much a command responsibility as leading troops.

If the Chetwode credo – that animates the Army officer corps - is any guide in a CI environment, people place above troops under command. Recall the first line has it that the nation comes first. A nation comprises its people. It places a duty to the troops under command next.

The term ‘Area of Responsibility’ in the CI lexicon encompasses human terrain on the CI grid. The Area’s physical form is important from an operational point of view, but its the people living there that are the Center of Gravity.

Client orientation – a required competency for command on the CI grid – involves viewing the locals as primary clients, among other clients as the supported State administration, local authorities and police.

By this yardstick, if Rambos overstep, then the client orientation of the command chain has to kick in, preserving their clients – the people – from egregious attention of Rambos on the rampage. By all means, Rambos can be vectored without qualm on terrorists and insurgents in bloody knock-down and drag-out firefights. However, if their ambit gets to include people then the chain of command must preemptively rein in would-be Rambos.

General Rawat’s enduring legacy is in damage done to the differentiation between insurgents and people by his inability to discriminate between the fish and the sea. As a former student of a United States’ military institution, he borrowed heavily on their concepts applied in their Forever Wars far from their shores.

Unable to whistle up tactics to take on stone throwers - though a supposed expert on CI to which is attributable his promotion - he extended the meaning of over ground workers to include stone throwers and threatened them with indeterminate consequences. How much his rewriting of the CI doctrine influences those on the CI Grid is moot.

By all accounts of military derring-do, it is easy to identify Rambos and nurture them. They are usually self-effacing and rise to the occasion only when an opportunity presents itself. The veteran consensus is that Rambos are more likely to be unassuming than flashy, modest rather than upstart braggarts. It is well recognized that there are more pretenders than Rambos. It’s a command knack to identify the genuine article and expose the inauthentic.

It was let on that General Rawat’s pinning a medal on Gogoi’s chest was not only for his innovating his way out of a tight corner but also for his exploits prior. Rawat’s faith is evident from Gogoi being put to directly talk to the media on his actions.

Granting the devil his due, even if we are to concede Gogoi was a potential Rambo – volunteering for a skirmish and leading from the front – he didn’t fit the bill at the crunch.

He claimed to be interfacing with an informant when caught on camera. It was a case of sexual exploitation in conflict of a vulnerable member of the Army’s primary client – people.

Was General Rawat then taken in? At best, it was rather incredulous of the General. At worst, Rawat was brazening his way out of a tight spot – the Army caught in the headlights with its narrative of people-centric operations and ethical conduct of operations about its ankles. Worse still is if the General was swayed by his Hindutva-appeasing mentors in the national security woodwork, espying a handle to demean Kashmiris.  

That the command chain could not catch on is the lesser evil. The command chain believes in letting some have a looser rope, some they can use when needed. One such case is visible in the Amshipora murders.

The captain who killed three in a fake encounter claims to have been acting on orders. The Armed Forces Tribunal that let him off on bail has swallowed the story. Evidently, he was a Rambo being nursed, quite like a goat fattened for Eid.

The command chain – with the lower two levels likely complicit – perhaps believed that Captain Bhoopendra Singh had ‘it’ in him to up deliver bodies. Showing on the CI grid unfortunately continues to be body-count based. The confidential reporting season was on hand about then. The sector commander received a medal, curiously named Yudh Seva Medal.

The more significant implication

In the case here, the Army has been tightlipped. In due course this would-be Rambo could well be let off. Perpetrators have got away for worse; recall Pathribal and Machal. The danger is with eddies from the case having been tidied over, the Army might miss the greater evil.

By underplaying the chants – ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ as against ‘Jai Shree Ram’ alleged by villagers – it is liable to miss the wood for the trees.

To it, the former should not merit the hullaballoo. But even that amounts to cultural insensitivity and violates client orientation expectations. In CI, the cultural domain is as significant as the terrain and demographic terrain. Respect for local sentiment is sine qua non of Winning Hearts and Minds – the leitmotif of CI doctrine.

Kashmir, being Muslim inhabited, has Islam as guiding light. Islam is uncompromising on the Oneness of God. To the extent Bharat Mata is symbolic of a goddess, it can only resonate partially with Muslims. They can concede that the land nurtures, but would have their reservations on its sacrality. They’d prefer to stop at Bharat ki Jai, which expresses much the same sentiment.  

As for shouting out a ‘Jai Shree Ram’, that too shouldn’t necessarily be taken amiss by most. After all, if Ram is taken as a Hindu’s term for God, then the slogan is an equivalent of sorts of the Muslim’s ‘Allah o Akbar’. Its no one’s case that Victory (‘Jai’) could be for anyone but Allah’s or Ram’s – taken as terms for God.

The problem is that as of today the two terms are not readily interchangeable. When the Muslim already has a term for God, why should another be thrust?

In this case, though operating in Aid to Civil Authority and in an area declared ‘disturbed’ under the Armed Forces Special Powers’ Act, there is no mandate for the Army to be thrusting absolutely anything on anyone. Hubris should not becloud this.  

In the context of the times, the thrusting of ‘Mata’ and ‘Ram’ on Muslims has little to do with developing intercultural understanding but much to do with a wanton abuse of power. True for the Muslim in India today at the receiving end of a Hindutva-induced majoritarianism, it can only ring truer for the Kashmiri under the jackboot for some 30 years.

Don’t sleep with the enemy

Therefore, the Major’s action must be seen in context. It is of a piece with the happenings south of Pir Panjals. In the national hinterland, the forces at play within civil society are State-supported. Their hand in Kashmir stands exposed ever since the reduction of Article 370 to naught. But to see its eruption in uniform is - to put it mildly - stunning.

It is understandable for the Army to sweep the case under the carpet. After all, it would not want the case to sully the Mother-of-Democracy image of India that the Prime Minster Narendra Modi so assiduously conjured up at the White House the very same week in answering only the second untutored question he has faced from the press in nine years.

So long as the Army follows through internally on the implications is good enough. It must be alive to – and, if not already so, alerted to - these implications. That it has taken ‘swift action’ – appreciated even by skeptical regional politicos – is only good as a beginning. More is required of it, albeit off the radar screen.

Since an investigation is underway, it had better yield results. The Army must plough a lonely institutional furrow, holding fort for the straight and narrow. Even if it does not go public with it, it must within the Service disseminate information on the action taken. Deterrence is better than reacting a third time round later.

It must ascertain the extent the ills of society – communalism in this case - have penetrated into the Service. Admittedly, the Army is not an island. But then, its mandate requires it keep its distance from society. For instance, it cannot entertain Islamophobia when one of its preoccupations till late has been CI amidst Muslims.

It cannot even afford a ‘nationalist’ conception of patriotism. In light of its internal diversity somewhat reflective of diversity within the nation, it had better not buy into the right-wing ‘nationalism’. Majoritarianism – right-wing nationalism’s true face – is outside the pale.

For political purposes majoritarianism today privileges religion as its punching bag, to inveigle itself into the national imagination. Tomorrow - religion done with - it could be a disruptive referencing of ethnicity and language. We can see that in Manipur, Kuki’s being called a fifth column from Myanmar by the Hindutva-answering chief minister.

Obama inaccurately thinks Hindutva’s persecution of Muslims ‘pulls apart’ India. Muslims having an all-India spread are vulnerable everywhere. This accounts for lack of pushback such as seen on the streets of France today. This acceptance of the fait accompli will not be the case when majoritarianism bestirs ethnic subnationalism.

To the extent Hindutva surfaces within the Service, it is politicization - a sure-shot prelude to professional hara-kiri, reducing a once proud Army to a right-wing militia. The induction of Agniveers has the Army wrestle with a bad bargain. The very aim of its Hindutva minders is such relegation of the Army. The extent the Army falls short of Hindutva expectations is measure of success in its sternest test since Independence.

Consequently, the Army cannot be supping with the progenitors of India’s premier national security threat – Hindutva’s majoritarianism. Not only is its institutional integrity threatened but so is national security. By invisibilising the Strategic Corporal at Zadoora, the Indian Army risks missing implications that it must recognize and be seized with urgently.

 https://www.academia.edu/103783627/Indias_Doctrine_Puzzle_Limiting_War_in_South_Asia

Link for my book.