Saturday, 8 April 2023

 

My 20th book compilation

https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:f2b2ffb3-a700-4779-98ab-4b1b02b253e2

Interesting Times in Modi’s Second Term

 

 Ali Ahmed

 

Ali Ahmed, an infantryman once, is a freelance strategic analyst.

 

 Preface

This is the latest of my series of compilations putting together my commentaries on issues in national, regional and international security between one set of covers. The last ebook compilation was South Asia: At a Strategic Crossroads, put out in March 2019, with the hope that its content would influence voters contemplating Narendra Modi’s play for their attention leveraging the Pulwama-Balakot episode. It had covered the strategic scene in the later part of Modi’s first term, the earlier part being covered by a previous ebook, India: A Strategic Alternative, put together in 2016. These two books, together with this one, comprehensively cover security in the Modi era. Along with two ebooks – Thoughts while Lying Flat and India’s Journey to #NewIndia:Through an Asokan Lens - that comprise my Substack writings on Ali’s Version over the past year since March 2022, the five ebooks address the question if India and Indians are safer under Hindutva champion, Narendra Modi. The answer on these pages is a simple and firm, “No”.

 

The narrative begins where the Balakot aerial surgical-strike-that-wasn’t left off. Though Pakistan’s Operation Swift Retort left an Indian plane down in its wake, India congratulated itself with another victory over Pakistan and voted Modi back to power. Understandably, Modi not only retained his loyalist security adviser, Ajit Doval, but upped his status. But the second term’s opening scene had Amit Shah as its protagonist. Grandstanding in parliament, he evacuated Article 370 of any meaning, proclaiming he would shed blood to regain Aksai Chin and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan. The Chinese, using the opportunity, came knocking soon thereafter, unperturbed by Covid. Dr. Jaishankar, who should have advised better, now has it that the Modi regime stood up to the Chinese by sending troops up into high altitude. Three winters on it is not quite certain what they were sent for. Since the deployment is interminable, the army has now on to give itself fresh blood periodically in the form of Agniveers.

So that no second front opened up, Doval had his contacts in the Gulf midwife an agreement with Pakistan not to make things worse. Pakistan had its own troubles to tidy up, hoping to use the hiatus to get the Taliban – who’d in the interim seen off the Western occupying powers and their hollow puppet regime in Kabul - onboard the international system. Sensibly, even as India throttled its jugular vein in Kashmir, it persisted with the Bajwa doctrine. The seeming quietude in Kashmir enabled Shah-Doval to claim victory in Kashmir, jarred occasionally by killings of the minority Hindu community members by terrorists to make a point to the contrary. Elections there have proved elusive with no Hindu Jammuite fitting the bill as chief minister so far. The Kashmir portion of this book takes forward brings up to date my work on the security dimensions through the liberal prism carried in Kashmir by my Lights and Kashmir: Strategic Sense and Nonsense.

The stability on both borders, where otherwise a Two Front situation was apprehended, time has been bought by the Hindutva-inspired regime to consolidate itself through its second term by expanding the strangle-hold over political culture in India. The aim is to facilitate Hindutva’s capture of societal imagination and state institutions to convert India, a secular, socialist democratic republic, into a majoritarian, capitalist and dictatorial Saffronite state. This is India’s right wing’s answer to India’s diversity that it sees as a national security threat. The answer is sought in an all-pervasive Hindutva, with Hindu nationalism to serve as a nationhood glue holding India together. The project has been on now for over a hundred years, with the mothership, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, centenary due in 2025. By way of celebration, the right wing might wish to get another election victory in 2024, so as to proclaim India in the image of Hindu extremists, a Hindu Rashtra. Akhand Bharat could follow in due course, as India transits Amrit Kaal to developed country status by 2047.

The internal security fallout of this has been borne over last 30 years by Indian Muslims. They have been Othered, a phenomenon analysed in my The Indian Muslim Security Predicament. Whereas earlier false-flag operations were used to castigate Indian Muslims as terrorists – taking advantage of Islamophobia unleashed by the West’s Global War on Terror - and marginalise them, lately micro-terror is in vigilantes setting upon Muslims to keep the cauldron boiling. For now, with Muslims pushed suitably into a corner, there is an outreach alongside to elements within the community to get them to pre-emptively reconcile to the shift to Hindu Rashtra, the assumption being that Muslims may be less than enthusiastic on its advent. This book brings up to date the Muslim quest for space in Modi-curated, Hindutva’s New India.

However, the push against Hindu Rashtra – that is overly a north Indian phenomenon with both Hindi and Ayodhya, that are central to the enterprise, being Gangetic anchored - will likely be from other quarters. One is in a possible ethnic backlash. The assumption is that the spread of Hindutva votaries and Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) governments across India will get all Indian ethnic groups onboard, precluding pushback. Hindu nationalism, that has been trotted out to allay the fears of an ethnic fracturing of India, could spark off such sentiments in ethnic groups that make up the Indian mosaic. Indian political federalism and societal salad bowl had accommodated India’s diversity. This is being undone by Hindutva.   

To Hindutva’s national security minders, the fissiparous potential of self-regarding ethnic groups is less of a worry than casteism. Voting along caste lines was seen as keeping Hindutva from political power, grabbing which is a prerequisite for its reset of India. Therefore, the BJP propped up Muslims as an internal Other to instil in caste-privileging Hindus a notion of self-hood in Hinduness, superseding caste identities. It’s not negated caste as much as deftly used it to its own purposes to manufacture an artificial majoritarian consensus. This internal contradiction can only persist – caste being as old as Vedic India, inspirational fount of Hindutva. It can yet prove Hindutva’s undoing. It has merely handed over reins to another set of dominant caste groups in the hierarchy, which can only be contested by those disadvantaged or deprived, particularly as and when the economic promise of a capitalist-governance fusion model slowly comes apart at the seams.

The undoing of the Rule of Law and undercutting of Constitutional verities could at some point constitute the Achilles heel of the Hindutva regime. The other dragon heads of the hydra could consume their fellow heads in a fratricidal anarchy at some point. The hydra-like structure can be imagined as three overlapping circles. There is the political front of the BJP; then there is the RSS and affiliates; and finally, are the rabid vigilante groups. The latter is provided a loose rope, with the assumption that it could be reeled-in when necessary. There is uncertainty if the first circle – political front - is entirely within the control of the second – societal front - since Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a known narcissist streak that may impel him – dutiful pracharak or otherwise – to hog all credit. A plausible scenario by decade end could well see the three circles at odds with each other – aspirants to prime ministership egging on the third circle to take on the first, while the second tries to ride out the fratricide.

Hindutva is thus the primary national security threat. Externally, this is so since Hindutva’s interests are seen as the national interest by the Modi regime, allowing for sacrifice of imperatives as territorial integrity – as in Ladakh. Internally, an Indian ‘deep state’ has delivered India to Hindutva clutches and currently serves to deepen the grip of its claws. Hindutva is not only dismantling the institutional structures inherited by the Republic, such as the Indian Army, but also inclusive Constitutional pillars: civic nationalism and fraternity.

As the first circle fails in delivering on the hoped for capitalism-powering growth figures, distribution shortfalls might not get papered over by diverting unrest in the third circle on to the minority anymore. Dissent might initially be put down with a heavy hand, but in due course can only fan the flames. The Modi-Shah duo can at best last this decade. Fears are, they might appear moderates in face of who takes power in the following decade as India gets less governable, Rule of Law having been Gujaratified in Amit Shah’s term.

Given the dire possibilities, Election 2024 is critical. Moderating Hindutva and delivering a democratic blow to its proponents is important. This book is an attempt to join forces with those already making headway to this end. The book shows up how national security is ill served at present, and as described above, to where the trends tend. Its commentaries, taken cumulatively, argue that Hindutva as a political philosophy is legitimate, but its methods – arbitrary, undemocratic and opaque - are much less so.

This ebook is to inform the electorate on this shortfall in national security, in order that the Voter makes an informed and reasoned choice. Her doing so will caution Hindutva into taking up its due space in national endeavour – at the right edge of the conservative spectrum short of religious extremism where it belongs. Hindutva cut to size, it would not be too long before genie of religious extremism, masquerading as Hindu nationalism, is put back into the bottle.  

The book is laid out in four parts. First is the national security scene, with commentaries arranged mostly chronologically knitting together the political and strategic levels. Commetary on Kashmir has been included in this section, rather than taking up a section of its own, since Kashmir is a national issue, with efforts to displace the secular crown on India’s map with a Hindu one. The second part dwells on what changes in political culture spell for strategic culture and the military’s place in it. It also talks of civil-military relations as Hindutva coils around the military. The third part lifts the sights to the regional scene, including a look at India-Pakistan relations stemming from the fallout of the ignominious and long delayed departure of Western military forces from Afghanistan. The book stops short where I shifted my writings to Substack with the onset of the Ukraine War.

The ebook completes the collection of compilations of commentaries going back two decades, that can be accessed at Academia and my two blogs, which provide both overview and detail of the national security trajectory of India in the period. The writings are a contrarian view of mainstream strategic discourse. Since the strategic discussion was in large proportion in the realist mode, I contested it in the Ashokan tradition in both print and on the web. However, these days it is driven by cultural nationalists. Wiser strategists are pulling their punches. Some find the first circle repulsive, while impressed with the selflessness of the second. Most abhor the third. Seeing all three as One precludes the luxury of waiting out the regime. All must join battle: digging trench lines, raids and counter attacks, no quarters given – though no heads be carted away.

 

 

 

For Editor Truth Tellers

 

Acknowledgements

 

I thank editors at the sites at which commentaries in this book appeared: Economic and Political Weekly, Milligazette, The Citizen, Countercurrents, Center for Land Warfare Studies, moneycontrol.com, The Wire, South Asian Voices, Kashmir Times and Indian Defence Review. But for their patronage, this book would not have been possible, though I take full responsibilities for shortfalls therein. I hope their perseverance in Truth is appreciated by students, faculty and practitioners in the fields of defence and strategic studies on the one hand and peace studies and conflict resolution on the other. The book is dedicated to Editors who have stood up to the test of the time.

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

Part I - National Security

1.      Cultural nationalism as a national security threat - 10

2.      Securitisation of cultural nationalism - 14

3.      Book review: A Life In The Shadows: A Memoir by AS Dulat - 17 

4.      Jammu and Kashmir: It is in national interest to conduct elections soon - 19

5.      Sino-Indian Entente–A Distant Dream? - 21

6.      How Partition Shaped One Family - 23

7.      India-Pakistan:  A missile misfired opens up opportunity - 23

8.      India needs a national security doctrine for furthering jointness - 25

9.      General Rawat’s legacy in civil-military relations - 28

10.   A problem from hell in India’s civil-military relations - 31

11.   There’s a political opportunity in Kashmir. Will the Centre grab it? - 33

12.   Punishing future Pakistani terror provocations - 35

13.   India’s ‘deep state’ no longer secret - 38

14.   A reading list for the defence minister - 40

15.   Reform intelligence agencies in the national interest - 43

16.   Civil war fallout on Kashmir - 45

17.   The Escalatory Risks of India’s Integrated Battle Groups - 47

18.   An assessment of new ‘strategies’ for Pakistan and China - 50

19.   In Kashmir, the GD Bakshi way - 53

20.   Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating Escalation - 56

21.   Talk: India’s Growing Strategic Capabilities: Dynamics And Consequences - 61

22.   The long-term implications of India’s do-nothing response in Ladakh - 64

23.   Why India Did Not Go to War with China - 67

24.   Book Review: TP Sreenivasan, Modiplomacy: Through a Shakespearean Prism - 72

25.   India-Pakistan: The price of information warfare - 74

26.   The portentuous India-Pakistan escalation dynamic - 79

27.   Modi must sack those misadvising him on national security - 84

28.   What should Shaheen Bagh stalwarts do now - 86

29.   India — The coming anarchy - 88

30.   The crisis in the Indian deep state - 91

31.   Gujaratification as the foremost national security threat - 93

32.   India: three scenarios out to 2030 - 95

33.   Kashmir is in a state of churn. Will 2020 mark a new dawn? - 98

34.   The options conundrum for Kashmiris - 100

35.   CAA-NRC: Those Who Voted for this Regime Need to Wake Up - 102

36.   Approaching Kashmir through Theoretical Lenses - 104

37.   Fallout of Article 370’s Withdrawal inKashmir: The Indian Military’s False Optimism? - 109

38.   How will New Delhi react to the civil disobedience in Kashmir? – 112

39.   Decoding India’s recent rhetoric on PoK - 114

40.   India’s Kashmir caper has given Pakistan reason for war - 115

41.   Kashmir: Calling Out Strategic Irrationality - 117

42.   Kashmir and the abrogation of Article 370: An Indian Perspective - 119

43.   Kashmir | India has prepared well, but Pakistan is unlikely to remain quiet - 124

44.   Kashmir: Unsolicited advice for Pakistan - 126

45.   War Dead Ahead - 128

46.   The improved situation in Kashmir is but a mirage - 130

47.   UN likely to continue its focus on India’s Kashmir policy - 132

48.   Agenda for the next defence minister - 133

49.   The Modi Era; Impact on Strategic Culture - 136

50.   Modi 2.0 | Where is India’s Pakistan policy headed? – 141

51.   Toting up Ajit Doval’s final score card - 143

52.   Kashmir: A first cut analysis of the just-concluded parliamentary elections - 145

53.   Options for addressing the Kashmir issue - 147

54.   The divergent prescriptions for Kashmir – 152

55.   Has Mission Shakti made India safer? - 154

 

Part II – Military Matters

56.   Right Wing Ascendance In India And The Politicisation Of India’s Military - 158

57.   Agni Prime and the Two-Front War - 176

58.   Operational Risks and Societal Militarization: Agnipath’s Entrenched Challenges - 179

59.   Book Review: Vijay Singh, POW 1971: A Soldier’s account of the Heroic Battle of Daruchhian - 181

60.   Nuclear Command and Control: Locating the Strategic Forces Command - 184

61.   Defence Reform: Giving teeth to the new Chief of Defence Staff - 189

62.   Defence reform: Jointness and command and control - 192

63.   What Will Be General Bipin Rawat’s Place in India's Military History? - 194

64.   Is the military brass transgressing the diplomatic LAC? - 197

65.   What an Angry General's Unwarranted Admonition of Kashmiris Says About the Army and Politics - 199

66.   Lessons from the commemoration season - 202

67.   Book Review, Vipul Dutta, Making Officers out of Gentlemen: Military Institution Building in India, c. 1900-1960 - 205

68.   Front-specific theaterisation is not the only way to jointness - 207

69.   Whither Northern Command? Getting theaterisation right - 210

70.   A consideration of options for the northern theatre - 213

71.   Civilian faculty at Professional Military Education institutions - 216

72.   Counter insurgency is not a policeman’s job - 218

73.   Cohesion in the army: The battle winning factor - 221

74.   A case for ceasefire in Kashmir - 224

75.   Book Review: Military Musings: 150 Years Of Indian Military Thought From The Journal Of The United Service Institution Of India, ed. R Chhina - 227

76.   An Assessment of Strategic Options post Uri Attack - 229

77.   ADC to General MA Zaki Recalls the Chinar Corps Commander in early 90s in Kashmir – Capt (later Lt Col, Retired) AP Kumar, 22 MARATHA LI - 233

78.   A fake encounter, yet again? - 236

79.   Book Review: The Indian Army: Reminiscences, Reforms and Romance - 238

80.   Why the déjà vu over the Shopian killings - 240

81.   Information war as India’s default strategy (abridged and updated) - 243

82.   An Army Day resolution for the new chief - 245

83.   Many a Chink in India’s Nuclear Chain of Command - 248

84.   Why Gen Rawat’s Political Statements Should be His Swan Song - 250

85.   Welcoming the new army chief - 253

86.   An agenda for the new chief - 256

87.   Military consequence management in Jammu and Kashmir - 258

88.   Why Pak Spin Doctors are Zooming in on Gen Rawat - 260

89.   Nuclear winter before this winter? - 263

90.   National Defence Academy and Societal Representativeness - 266

91.   Explaining the military’s new found penchant for political partisanship - 267

92.   Military Professionalism and Effectiveness - 269

93.   Cautioning the military against being politically gullible - 274

94.   No First Use - Escalation Scenarios - 277

95.   Rewarding Army Chief for Political Assistance? - 279

96.   The Chief of Defence Staff appointment: An inauspicious beginning - 281

97.   The military’s ethical imperative in the here and now - 283

98.   Kargil Vijay Diwas: 20 Years on, Has The Army Learnt its Lessons? - 285

99.   Consequences of operational decisions – 288

100. What would a military of Hindu India look like? - 289

101. Recontextualizing The Escalation Debate - 291

102. Reframe the Kashmir conflict from terrorism to insurgency - 293

103. The Coming Politicisation of the Military – 295

104. Viva Presentation: India’s Limited War doctrine: Structural, Political and Organisational Factors - 297

105. PhD synopsis - 302

106. Thesis Proposal For Direct Phd At Cipod, SIS, JNU - Jul 2008 - 313

107. IDSA Project Synopsis: Reconciling Military Strategies As Prerequisite To Peace In South Asia - 315

 

 

 

 

Part III- International Security

108. Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle - Case study of Somalia - 320

109. Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle – Case Study of UNISFA in Abyei - 326

110. MONUC And India’s Peackeeping Concerns – 2004 - 334

111. Out Of Area Operations Capability For The Indian Armed Forces - 338

112. For The Honour Of India: Rimcollians and UN peacekeeping - 354

113. UN Peace Operations: Protection of Civilians - 358

114. In Pakistan, Imran Khan faces a challenge fiercer than the World Cup – 363

115. 9/11 Anniversary | The global war on terror has done little to help India tide over its security issues – 365

116. Indian soft power as the missing ingredient in returning peace to Afghanistan - 366

117. Afghanistan Crisis | India must deploy its economic soft power - 369

118. What a civil war next door means for us - 371

119. A peace strategy for Afghanistan - 374

120. JMI Lecture on "Current Juncture in the Afghan Peace Process: An Appraisal from the Lenses of Peace Theory” - 377

121. Try UN peacekeeping in Afghanistan - 379

122. Book Review: Democracy And Authoritarianism In Pakistan: The Role Of The Military And Political Parties By Shiraz Sheikh - 382

123. Book Review: Yelena Biberman, Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India - 383

124. A suggestion for India on the Afghanistan peace talks - 385

125. The Iran-US spat has resonance for the region – 387

126. Book Review: Army Of None: Autonomous Weapons And The Future Of War By Paul Scharre - 389

127.                A lesson from crisis management in South Sudan - 390

128. For constructive Indian engagement in the Afghanistan endgame - 397

129. Afghanistan endgame | Options before India after Trump cancels talks - 399

130. Book review: Vortex Of Conflict: US Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan And Iraq, By D. Caldwell - 401

131. Peoples Power in Sudan Throws Out Omar al-Bashir After 30 Years - 403

Part IV - The Muslim Matters

132. Whose army is it anyway? – 409

133. What 5 August spells for India’s Muslims - 411

134. Questioning afresh Indian military’s social representativeness - 413

135. Modi 2.0: Indian Muslim survival kit - 416

136. Will Pakistan be happy if Modi returns to power? – 418

             Further reading - 421

Friday, 7 April 2023

 https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/Preventing-an-Afghanistan-Redux-in-Somalia.html

Abstract:

The article argues that an effective peace intervention results from a balance between the three sides of the peace triangle formed by peacekeeping (security), peacebuilding (development) and peacemaking (political settlement). It examines the situation in Somalia to highlight that in case peacemaking is neglected, it is likely that Somalia may fall to the al Shabaab on the draw down and departure of the African Union peace enforcement force. It therefore recommends a political prong of strategy to complement the military prong to address the challenge al Shabaab poses in Somalia.


An earlier article in this journal had made the case that for returning peace to a conflict afflicted area, a modicum of balance is desirable between the three sides of the peace triangle – peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.[1] During the lifecycle of any peace intervention, the center of gravity at a particular point in time and conflict circumstance will shift between the three sides. However, the three must be so poised that together they can contain and roll back a conflict. Operational Art in a peace operation lies in leveraging the three sides in a manner that the resulting balance mid-wife success. Somalia suggests itself as a case study for application of this hypothesis.

Somalia has been site of peace enforcement for some 15 years now. In the mid to late 2000s, the de-facto control of Somalia by the Islamic Courts was wrested away from it by intervention of Ethiopia to instal a transitional federal government, that had been formed in 2004 with the support of the regional organisation, the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).[2] Meanwhile the Islamic Courts’s administration mutated, with its militant youth wing forming the al Shabaab. In 2007, Ethiopian intervention was substituted by an African Union (AU) peace enforcement operation, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[3] Over the 2010s, the AMISOM progressively wrested control of territory from the al Shabaab, even as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was installed in Mogadishu and federal member states (FMS) were formed. In 2013, the United Nations’ (UN) Political Office in Somalia was transformed into a special political mission, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to assist with statebuilding and peacebuilding.[4] The al Shabaab’s association with the al Qaeda initially, and later the Islamic State (IS) in the 2010s, led to its figuring on the UN terror entity sanctions’ list since 2010.[5] This effectively placed it out of bounds for a peacemaking outreach. Thus, while peace enforcement and peacebuilding proceeded, peacemaking was not in evidence. The imbalance between the three sides of the peace triangle visualised in relation to Somalia continues till today.

Somalia today has a follow-on mission to the AMISOM, the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), in place since April 2022. Assessing that instability has reduced considerably and security sector reform initiatives were in hand to upgrade the Somali National Army (SNA) and police, in 2021, the ATMIS is expected to drawdown and depart within 30 months. The ATMIS is to assist the SNA regain government control through joint operations and capacity building, even as it draws down while the SNA gains strength and confidence.[6] Despite considerable progress with both statebuilding and peacebuilding by UNSOM, the situation does not lend confidence to the assumption that the SNA will hold up on departure of foreign forces. In other words, peacemaking absent, peacebuilding and peace enforcement has not been well served.

A scenario as obtained on the departure of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces from Afghanistan stares Somalia in the face. There is scope for the international community and the regional bodies to reappraise the three sides of the peace triangle in the two fraternal missions in place, ATMIS and UNSOM. While ATMIS is assisting with provision of security, UNSOM, integrated with the rest of the UN family of agencies, funds and programs (AFP) and in league with allied actors, concentrates on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Missing in the menu is peacemaking. In light of the recent precedence in Afghanistan, this deficit might yet sabotage not only the long-standing peace intervention, but Somalia itself. Consequently, the question explored here is whether an Afghanistan-like future can be escaped by Somalia, and, if so, how.

Background

Somalia has been in an unsettled situation since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, it was stable only in its first decade under democratic government. In the sixties, the first democratic turn-over of government in post-colonial Africa was witnessed in Somalia. However, as typical for the era, Siad Barre installed himself in power in a military coup, whereupon Cold War dynamics took over. The two superpowers switched clients in the Horn of Africa, with the US supporting Somalia against Soviet and Cuba-backed Ethiopia. In late seventies, a war broke out over Oromia in Ethiopia, an area occupied by Somali ethnic groups. Within Somalia, Siad Barre also asserted his authority with ruthless suppression in Somaliland, the erstwhile British colonial possession that in 1960 had merged with the Italy-colonised Somali territory to forge Somalia. The end of the Cold War pried loose the US umbrella over Siad Barre.

The Somali state dissolved in famine. The story thereafter is more familiar, with India deploying a brigade under UN Chapter VII auspices as part of an upgraded peacekeeping operation, UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The preceding operation, UNOSOM I, had a mandate to widen humanitarian access. Met with anarchy, the international community temporarily deployed a US-led peace enforcement operation, Unified Task Force (UNITAF).[7] It was to contain the clan violence, which it succeeded in doing by enforcing an elitist peace by deterring the warlords through a display of military might. The hand over from UNITAF to UNSOM II saw warlords back in action, targeting in infamous incident Pakistani peacekeepers. American forces outside the UN framework went after the warlord responsible, Farah Aideed, who incidentally had been Somali ambassador in Delhi for three years. The Black Hawk incident resulted. Withdrawal of Americans soon thereafter scuttled the UNSOM II.[8]

Somalia fell out of the international radar, with the international community fatigued by international humanitarian intervention post contemporary instances in Bosnia and Rwanda. A lesson from the American-led ‘global war on terror’ was on the dangers of persistence of ungoverned spaces. The federal government of Somalia (FGS) that initially functioned out of Baidoa and moved to Mogadishu, when the security situation was stabilised by AMISOM. Since 2012, when the FGS was finally emplaced formally, it has had two iterations of elections. Its most recent election in 2022 returned the first president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to power.

President Mohamud has set the SNA to undertake operations in conjunction with ATMIS and the clan militias against al Shabaab.[9] The idea is to soften the al Shabaab and create conditions for talks from a position of strength for the FGS. The idea of using clan militia is reminiscent of the Iraqi Awakening in which Iraqi Sunnis were used to wrap up the al Qaeda in the Sunni Triangle in 2007-08. However, it is predictable that as an insurgent group with demonstrated resilience against the AMISOM over past 15 years, the al Shabaab will melt away only to re-emerge elsewhere and by night.[10] Amply clear is that a solely military approach will not suffice.[11] Consequently, President Muhamud’s intention to follow through with talks ‘at the right time’ is a promising opportunity.[12] It gives peacemaking an opening to make a debut, with international community support.

Desirability

Whether to talk to the Taliban was a perennial question through the 2010s.[13] Consensus had it that military operations needed complementing with a talks outreach, even as peacebuilding by provincial reconstruction teams, proceeded alongside. In the event, talks did come about in Doha. The anticipated upgrade to the Afghan National Security Forces was slow in coming, as a result the Taliban were less eager at the talks table, awaiting the departure of the foreign forces. The fears were confirmed in their take-over of Kabul last year.[14] Given such a possibility in Somalia, it is only desirable that every effort be made to avoid an Afghanistan redux.

A perspective is that talking to terrorists is not a strategic move. Terrorists will take advantage of talks for gaining legitimacy. This will make them get ahead of the government in the stakes for peoples’ hearts and minds, especially since the FGS is hampered by allegations of corruption, clan-ism, incapacity and association with external powers. Terrorist entities are strategic players and might through talks take power they have been denied militarily. Regional states, as Uganda and Kenya that have borne the brunt of al Shabaab out-of-area terror attacks, would be unwilling to treat it as a legitimate interlocutor.

The constraint is that the ATMIS is slated to depart in the middle term. Under financial pressure, the European Union - that largely funded it so far - is downsizing the budget. The prominent regional state, Ethiopia, has been beset with internal security issues. Initially, when AMISOM was being inducted, a move to plant a hybrid or UN peace operation instead had been struck down. It is uncertain if the international community would reappraise this decision. The feeling of ‘community’ in the international community has been considerably strained in wake of the Ukraine War. There is a recession looming and the prospects of funding another giant UN mission are not appetising. This inability to up the ante militarily implies that a ‘politics first’ approach must compensate.

The lesson from the Afghanistan experience is thus, not against talks as much as to use talks productively. Both antagonists were loath to share power in Afghanistan, making talks infructuous. In Somalia, the al Shabaab is a nationalist outfit. Somalis are nationalist and - unlike in most places in Africa - are relatively homogenous as an ethnic group inhabiting a defined space. As with the Taliban, it is not only religious extremism that drives it, though Wahabbi influence has impinged on the Sufistic culture in Somalia.  

Somalia provides a timely opportunity to test the UN’s freshly minted motto, ‘primacy of politics’,[15] intended to get to peace through peaceful means. For long, other actors have tried to address their respective troubles in Somalia. Europe, contending with a migration influx from Africa, funded the AMISOM. The AMISOM, among others from as far away as Senegal, comprised troops from neighbouring countries seeking to tackle terrorism at its origin. However, alleged human rights violations and collateral damage by peacekeepers has partially alienated Somalis.[16] The US, fearing homeland terror from its Somali diaspora immigrants, intervenes militarily through its Africa Command base nearby, while at times causing civilian casualties.[17] Somalis have thus been subject to pursuit of aims of others on their land and at their cost. The UN’s shift to people-centric peacekeeping makes it inescapable that peacemaking must proceed apace to rescue people from the cycle of violence.

Feasibility

The UN has a policy guiding political approaches to armed groups. There is no proscription on such outreach intended to end violence. Any such outreach would have to ascertain if the al Shabaab wants to travel away from terror tag. Continuing humanitarian and peacebuilding support can act as incentive, particularly as Somalia faces its fourth year of drought. For now, the areas it controls have restricted humanitarian access. The possibility of exiting the terror list – as was the case with elements of the Taliban – is another carrot to influence the al Shabaab. The reputational risk from a rebuff or the talks going awry in an egregious terror incident would have to be factored. The FGS will require forging a consensus and a joint front with the FMS on talks.

There are multiple forums that can act as lead: the UN, the regional organisation and the FGS itself. If the FGS wishes to be in the lead, then capacity building support for both parties and logistics facilitation might be necessary. The regional organisations – both AU and the IGAD – are well experienced, though financing might yet be required. External actors – such as from the Nordic or Gulf states – could lend a hand. The multiple special envoys for the Horn of Africa would require a coordination forum. The UN is better positioned to play a supportive as against a protagonist role. Its mission on the country for the last ten years indicates its political capacity, while the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) that supported the AMISOM and, now supports the ATMIS and elements of SNA, can help with the logistics – particularly with helicopter support to access al Shabaab areas.

Taking cue from the Doha talks with the Taliban, the talks would require first ending the violence – an issue not taken up at Doha which resulted in continuing violence even as talks proceeded. This is especially important in Somalia to urgently open up the humanitarian space. Besides, the instrumental use of violence by both sides tends to influence the negotiations negatively. The table then becomes yet another battlefield. Violence at ebb, talks could dwell on a road map on the progressive co-option of the al Shabaab. Usually, an agreement spells out a transition period of power sharing, followed by an election. The ongoing Constitution review and the reform in election system away from being clan-based to ‘one person one vote’ can see al Shabaab participation. The national reconciliation program underway could post-conflict also cover al Shabaab controlled areas.[18]

The period of transition might require overseeing. Since the AU mission may be too closely associated with neighbouring countries, it may require substitution. Political momentum in the talks could perk up Troop Contributing Countries willingness to contribute blue berets and boots on ground in a monitoring and protective role respectively. A lean mission, with a civilian component including civil affairs and human rights officers with a pronounced national staff complement, can be foreseen. A clear timeline culminating with the next elections or as agreed in a comprehensive peace agreement can serve as focus for an exit strategy and handover to the UN Country Team.

A role for India?

India is in the midst of taking up its destined role as a leading state. It has been member over last two years of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It has recently taken over chair of the G-20. India has to seize opportunities to supplant UNSC declinist veto-holding pen holders, Britain and France. Envisaging a greater role for itself as a security provider in the ocean that bears its name is a first step.

Its strategic moves in the Indo-Pacific theatre have not been at the cost of the western Indian Ocean. It has been a player in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since inception of the joint naval operations. Managing security along Indian Ocean Rim in proximity of the Horn of Africa to South West Asia - and the scene of conflict in Yemen – is significant. The strategic weight of the region is seen in the setting up of bases in close proximity to each other by the US and China. The risk of instability multiplying, such as in the increased presence of Islamists southwards along the African coast in Mozambique, must be acknowledged.

Since India is now a pragmatic power, balancing China in Africa will not be far from its concerns. Africa is a site for power competition that India cannot find India missing-in-action. In taking a proactive role, India would only be returning to its historical role as an important rimland naval power, evidenced by communities originating in Horn of Africa resident across the Deccan and the Malabar coast. India must step up to complete a task left unfinished when in 1995 its navy evacuated troops of the UNOSOM II.

India, lending a hand as a ‘friend of the mediation’ through appointing a special envoy, would enable India to push for consensus in the UNSC on a light footprint mission to arrive at and help implement any agreement reached. It can lead with boots on the ground. It could contribute to the humanitarian Somalia Trust Fund or bilaterally increase humanitarian support

Conclusion

Peace operations cannot be done in a political vacuum. In Somalia, absence of a political prong of strategy to tackle the al Shabaab has resulted in the insurgency persisting. Current-day dire humanitarian straits compel a political outreach to the al Shabaab. By all means care must be taken not to empower terrorist affiliates, but this apprehension can be mitigated by enlightened design of the mediation or facilitation, taking on board the lessons of the peace process in Afghanistan. The terror tag to groups must be amenable to revision now that international terror has subsided considerably. An outreach can in a first step influence the group to distance itself from terror. The FGS is already contemplating a political solution. Once the regional organisations have bought into this line of action, the UN could lend a hand by including the remit in its next resolution on UNSOM. This will pave way for UNSOM to acquire political teeth and to transform into a short-duration, light-footprint peacekeeping mission overseeing induction of al Shabaab into the Somali national mainstream. The Somalia case study validates the hypothesis that all three sides of the peace triangle need ministration in varying degrees during the lifecycle of a peace intervention, failing which, peace is liable to prove elusive. Peacemaking must be added to the peace repertoire Somalia to complete the peace triangle.

Words - 3002

 



[1] Ali Ahmed, ‘Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle’, USI Journal, Vol. CLII, No. 628, April-June 2022, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/?sf_paged=2

[3] For background on AMISOM, see https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.

[4] For background on UNSOM, see https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unsom.

[5] Al Shabaab figures on the  sanctions list available at https://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/consolidated.htm#alqaedaent

[6] For details on ATMIS, see https://atmis-au.org/ 

[9] ‘Somalia Military Makes Gains in Large-scale Offensive Against Al-Shabab’, VOA, 26 September 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-makes-gains-in-large-scale-offensive-against-al-shabab-/6764305.html

 

[10] ‘Somalia and al-Shabab: The struggle to defeat the militants’, BBC, 24 August 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62644935

[11] International Crisis Group, ‘A Strategy for Exploring Talks with Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, Podcast, 30 June 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/strategy-exploring-talks-al-shabaab-somalia

[12] ‘Somalia will talk to Al-Shabaab when time is right: President’, The Guardian, 6 July 2022,  https://guardian.ng/news/somalia-will-talk-to-al-shabaab-when-time-is-right-president/

[14] For a background on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

[15] United Nations, ‘Report Of The Independent High-Level Panel On Peace Operations’, 2015, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations

[16] Human Rights Watch, ‘The power these men have over us’, 8 September 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces

[17] Amnesty International, ‘US military sheds some light on civilian casualties from shadowy war in Somalia’, 27 April 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/us-military-sheds-some-light-on-civilian-casualties-from-shadowy-war-in-somalia/