From the archive, 4 Jun 2002
CHANGE AND THE INDIAN MILITARY: THE UNADDRESSED DIMENSIONS
This essay deals with the subject of
‘Change’ by avoiding recourse to the more popular managerial approach to it
that generally confines itself to the amply dissected terrain of structural
engineering; the optimal weapons and equipment mix; and realist inspired
geo-strategic reflections. On the contrary, in order to illumine its
under-explored dimensions it takes a ‘long and hard look’ at the changing
Indian military in the backdrop of its changing socio-technological and
politico-strategic context. The aim of attempting to approach the subject in
this manner is to inform and thereby forearm the policy maker with
sophisticated insights on fresh intellectual terrain. This has been
necessitated by the absence of such reflection in the military literature
churned out over the recent past.
It deals with the relatively
under-exposed facets in Parts I and II: namely, the sociological changes
required to cope with the ongoing RMA in Part I; and interprets the meaning of
‘apolitical’ in the changing political context in Part II. In the subsequent
two parts, we examine issues of topical interest in a radical manner. Part III
takes a radical look at the oft-discussed subject of Indo-Pakistan relations
with respect to Kashmir; while Part IV revisits the nuclearisation instigated
limited war doctrine. By doing so the essay casts fresh light on the meaning
‘change’ has for the military – an aspect dealt with in getting the four
dimensions addressed together into a coherent whole in the Conclusion.
PART I: THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The Society-Military Relationship
There are indeed portents of a generational
change within the militaries on the manner of viewing and conducting war. This
has been occasioned by the emerging technologies being adapted to war fighting,
thereby changing the nature of the battlefield in terms of tempo, scope and
relationship between skinware, software, and hardware. This aspect has not
escaped the Indian military. In this endeavor, Indian society may be seen as
being generally supportive of the military for the military has been performing
its social responsibility with dedication and apolitically. However, the
national trend is towards positioning India for an economic takeoff. To this
end, the government, even at the cost of the military, is harnessing budgetary
resources. It has also sought to allay criticism of neglecting military
preparedness by an investment in the high profile sectors of nuclear and
missile defense. The downgrading of the military sector over the past decade
also owes to the cost-benefit analysis ruling out war as an option. Therefore,
the military has entered the nuclear age in which the prime purpose is not to
fight war but to deter it.
Therefore, the military has been constrained to
cater for the strategic imperatives as also contend with ongoing low intensity
conflict deployment within these resources. The incorporation of RMA related
programs to bolstering conventional dissuasive capabilities is thus a
relatively slow process - made faster in the short term by the fallout of the
Kargil War. The onset of nuclearisation has made conventional conflict recede,
though limited wars under its umbrella are not ruled out. Thus, though the RMA
is deemed as required, its pace will be regulated by the availability of funds
– rendered scarce by the current societal and governmental concentration on
liberalization.
In the technological field the somnolent pace
manifests itself owing to the primacy of the governmental sector in
provisioning the inventory. This self-reliance has both prestige and cost
related reasons. The traditional, post-colonial practices of the military are
another impediment. This inertia owes to the size of the officer cadre and of
the force. Reform can only begin by being more selective, down sizing and
bringing in elitism and professional arrogance. On the contrary, the present
trend is towards institutional expansion.
The Change Internal to the Military
A brief review of the internal changes necessitated
by the RMA in the military is in order. There has been an import in managerial
practices and ethos form the civil world, thus narrowing the peer
identification between the military and the civil. This has led to a dilution
in the warrior ethic, except in the sword arms where radical professionalism
can yet be witnessed. However, the technical manpower having increased, the
dilution is more evident. These technologists are not necessarily in uniform
and yet have a greater impact on the battlefield beyond the horizon.
Specialization is the order of the day. The need to keep this voluntary
manpower in service has required requisite incentive be given. It is also being
supplemented by the female induction even into combat support arms. For the
officer cadre, the emphasis is on mental mobility and intellectual development,
to include degrees in civil universities. Thus, the regimentation that
characterized military life has been a casualty to the RMA. The direction of
the future is to turn out soldier-scholars. The defining characteristic of
military culture - discipline - would no longer be obedience to orders but be
redefined to mean action in the absence of orders.
Over the long term there will be a need to
review quite a lot of what we take as granted. This could include the
regimental system; our generalist orientation; the place of tradition and
regimentation; our parochial affiliations to regiments, arms and services; the
ungainly nature of our mass army – aging and top heavy; and the manner of training
and socialization. The point to note is that there is likely to be a transition
from an institutional ethos to an occupational one. The point is that we would
require to preserve the essential features of institutionalism, for the
military would still remain a profession that makes the ultimate call on the
individual – to sacrifice his very life. With that assured, we would do well to
support the occupational trends, such as a managerial orientation and
ascendance of those technically qualified, in order that we assimilate the
technologies better into war fighting.
Findings: Part I
In so far as India is concerned, there is some
evidence to show for the revised approach to the use of armed force in keeping
with the past trends in advanced societies. This does not amount to being
‘revolutionary’ in any way. Therefore, the typically Indian momentum is likely
to attend the inclusion of RMA related structural, doctrinal and hardware
reform in the Indian military. Given our technological potential, and the reach
of our ambition, it is likely that this could be harnessed for military
purposes. However, to call this revolutionary would be to overstate the case
presently. In so far as the changes internal to the military are concerned, the
onset of the RMA is visible. The change with regard to attitudes, behavior, and
value systems is largely in the dilution of the warrior ethic. The
institutional-occupational strain will have to play itself out for a new
military to emerge. It would not be premature to now say that the brain would
eventually and finally eclipse brawn; thinking replace obeying; a key board a
rifle; and possibly a pony tail a crew-cut. As a last word it may be said that
the RMA is relevant to the context of the advanced information societies, and has
yet to acquire the same connotations and immediacy in the developing societies
including India
PART
II: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The Change in National Politics
Two
complementary trends in Indian politics are notable over the past decade. One has
been the splintering of the center with the decline of the Congress and the
second has been an ascendance of the political formations of the Right to
political credibility. The reconfiguration of electoral power has resulted in
an era of coalition politics. This democratic phenomenon by itself is
unexceptionable. However, in the strategic community, this is viewed with some
concern. It is conservatively assessed that this impacts adversely on
stability, will and consistency in policy. Much of the discourse is along the
lines that strong governance is thus compromised, with obvious implications for
security.
Cumulatively the positions of the strategic
community, the security agencies, and the interested political parties combine
to conjure an image of ‘threat’. Whereas for the agencies, the ‘threat’ is
largely in the external domain, it is not necessarily so for the parties
concerned. The precedent of Rajiv’s Congress getting the largest parliamentary
majority on the contrived image of an internal enemy aided by the ‘foreign
hand’ exists. Thus, new sources to generate internal paranoia can be found, in
order that new ‘vote banks’ can be generated.
The Threat to an Apolitical Military
A major problem area resulting from the contest
in the political arena is the unwitting import of the same into the security
agencies. The result of the politicization of the police is self-evident in
India. An illustration of the wider problem resulting from such identification
is in order. The German General Staff has been among the most potent war
managing mechanisms the world has seen. Crippled by the Treaty of Versailles,
it was eager to cut its teeth in the new concepts of the age of mechanized war
all through the twenties. The political tumult of the Weimar Republic was ended
by the rise of Hitler to legitimate power. He enabled the rearmament of
Germany. This was of nationalist and professional interest to the officer
corps. Their technocratic and scientific preoccupation with the tools and
mechanics of their craft made them disinterested in the changing
socio-political scene in their own society. The older general officers were
gradually unceremoniously forced out thorough trumped up charges, one of which
was even homosexuality. Thus came about the unfortunate marriage of convenience
between the interests of National Socialism and the General Staff. The rest as
they say is history.
The point of this narration is that history is
for being heeded. The issue being raised is that there appears a need for
introspection in the Indian context. Examples may help amplify this point. The
popular position on various issues in the armed forces can be discerned by a
textual analysis from the myriad professional journals. However, what is of
concern is that even unwarranted presumptions that are now part of the wider
discourse creep into what passes for strategic analysis. Take for instance the
following extract:
‘Regardless of the differences with its
hostile neighbor to the West, it is home to nearly 130 million Muslims. They
are Indian citizens. While some of them may have been subverted by the
blandishments of the militants, the vast majority of them have contributed
considerably to the progress that India has made since Independence.’(Maj Gen
Sehgal, (Retd.), USI Journal, July-Sep 2000, p. 441)
Superficially
this is unexceptionable, since the popular discourse has inured us to its
troubling facets. The fact is that the retired General is linking gratuitously
a minority to the coreligionist neighbors as though this minority has a monolithic
national existence. Secondly, he further makes the subtle linkage of the
community to militancy, propagating the lie that the militancy has none but the
religious factor as inspiration. Thirdly, the backhanded certificate he
patronizingly hands out is also questionable. Nevertheless, this tract has
found entry into a reputed journal without critical comment. Another
illustration will prove the point:
‘Manage
the perceptions of Muslim population of India. Wean away clergy and madrassas.
Provide them with money, computers, and modern facilities. An in-depth policy
of reassuring Indian Muslims should be evolved and implemented. Active
participation of Hindu cultural and religious organizations in the process is a
must. (Brig Arun Sahgal and Col Anil Sharma, Combat Journal, Sep 2000, p. 32.)
The perspective that these authors apparently
subscribe to needs spelling out. It is that the Muslim India is a vulnerable
and exploitable section of our society on account of the religious commonality
with the Western adversary. The said neighbor is making inroads into this
community with its premier intelligence agency, the ubiquitous ISI. Given that
they are a potential ‘fifth column’, they require to be ‘reassured’ – lest they
turn into one. Such perspectives are increasingly finding their way into the
strategic discourse due to editorial oversight or complicity. Thereby they are
acquiring an increased acceptability.
There are also instances of accepting, if not
adopting, a revised symbolic format. An example in this regard is the
installation of a religio-cultural image of the Goddess of Learning in the
library of a leading military training institution, the Valmiki Library of the
DSSC. The point is that only those images that contributed to the warrior ethic
were permissible in public spaces. The problem is in the search to substitute
the British legacy through idealization. This search is not unproblematic for
it poses the question of defining the complex ‘idea of India’. It would appear
that military ethos is now in danger of deriving its inspiration from the
tenets of cultural nationalism, arbitrarily defined and non-representative.
This may indicate a certain level of absorption of the currently popular
discourse that is not necessarily in the best interest of the institution.
Findings: Part II
The Kargil
windfall, and keeping pace with the ongoing revolution in military affairs, is
likely to be the core of our concern over the next decade. The pursuit of this
is likely to blind us to the soft underside of security, namely its societal
context. Whereas this is indeed a democratic battlefield, it is not solely
where the forces will play themselves out. The military would require to be
more guarded in its environmental interaction. Additionally, it is but a reflection
of or a cross section of society. Therefore the possibility of import of the
ideological assumptions and predilections into military space is cannot be
dismissed. This is more likely to be through default than by design. The moot
point is that military socialization may not by itself prove equal to combat
this. There has to be a concerted effort to do so. However, it may be
reiterated that the perspective regards ‘Change’ presented is about trends not
yet fully manifest. Therefore, it may not (it is hoped) stand the rigorous test
of the future. That would be the ultimate testament to the apolitical character
of the military. However, complacency in this regard could prove the point.
Therefore, to be forearmed would entail being more alert to intrusions of
ideological fallacies into strategic discourse.
PART III: THE GRAND STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CHANGE
Kashmir Revisited
Kashmir has been central to Indian security concerns over the past
decade, and therefore merits our attention with regard to the possibility and
direction of ‘Change’. Keeping in mind the instrumentality of the army to
political purpose, any revisit to the Kashmir question cannot be in a political
vacuum. The Indian case with regard to Kashmir is well rehearsed. The main
contours of the Pakistani animus are also widely acknowledged. Given the
popular position with regard to the recent and ongoing happenings in Kashmir it
is surprising that the popular position is not ambivalent on the extent of
apportioning the blame for the state of affairs there. It takes cognizance of
Pakistani complicity while being neglectful of Indian contribution to the
problem. In being less than holistic such a position does not lend itself to
rational policy formulation. It is therefore important to revisit the issue at
this stage, for the military strategy cannot be arrived at in a vacuum or based
on false premises.
Two points on the Indian handling of the
situation are of pertinence. The first is at the political level, in which
India has been reluctant to countenance movement on its position. Being the
revisionist power, the status quo is not in Pakistan’s preference. The Indian
stand is that it will not engage in negotiations at the ‘point of the gun.’ The
Pakistani’s, fearing that India might resile from its commitment, are wary of
giving up the sub-threshold use of force as a means of pressure. The present
position in Kashmir can be taken as a militarized dialogue, one described as
‘the dialogue of the deaf’. The recent invitation to the Pakistani CEO for talks
is an effort to end this stalemate.
The second point flows from the first, in that,
the Indian engagement with the Kashmir problem militarily owes in part to the
ability of the military to deliver. The army’s ability to cauterize the problem
has had the fallout in terms leaving no incentive for political resolution of
the problem. It has thus been a victim of its own success. Militarily the price
has been in terms of erosion of the conventional deterrent. The less visible
price has been the political and physical expansion of the army resulting in an
unacknowledged decline of professionalism.
Clearly, there also exists a military need to
revisit the Kashmir strategy. Presently, the contemplation of military strategy
is along the two lines of deterrence, namely, deterrence by punishment, as
recommended by the Kargil Review Commission, and deterrence by denial as exists
at present. The latter is as much an expression of the attritionist mindset of
the military, as of the territorial fixation of a modern state. Both are
identifiable characteristics of the state and its army of the now bygone modern
era. The need is therefore to move beyond the baggage of the last century.
Presently the impetus to this end arises in the disproportionate cost factor,
in terms of strained finances, personnel policies and morale. Responding to the
military logic of the situation by merely moving on to deterrence by punishment
is inadequate, in light of the ongoing nuclear weaponisation in the
subcontinent. The situation calls for a comprehensive reevaluation of
assumptions, positions and courses open.
Rethinking the India-Kashmir-Pakistan Equation
Adequate literature exists to implicate the
Indian state with regard to the making of and sustenance of the problem in
Kashmir. Suffice it to mention that the India-Kashmir equation demands
redefinition. This implies that the adversarial postures have to be relegated,
firstly, as regards the alienated populace of Kashmir, and later with the
interested party, Pakistan. With respect to the Kashmiri people it has to be a
peace tempered with justice. A cause that exacts over thirty thousand lives
deserves nothing less. The fruits of Indian constitutional existence,
specifically democracy, have to be made available to the people of the Valley
in complete measure.
The approaches that have import for South
Asia’s future lie in the non-traditional conceptions of security. These include
concepts as environmental, human, and cooperative security, while the means
include multi-track diplomacy, economic engagement, cultural interpenetration
and people-to-people contact. These have not found a constituency within our
strategic community, enamored as it is with the dominant international
relations paradigm - realism. In short, we are in a strategic cul-de-sac.
However, with regard to addressing the Pakistan factor, substantial ground can
be traversed. Specific contours of this in military terms are downsizing;
adoption of non-offensive defense; sensitivity to the ‘soft’ underside of
security; demilitarization of the LC and Siachen; military diplomacy; and
confidence building in the nuclear field.
Findings: Part III
The inescapable fact is that the most
irresistible thing is an idea whose time has come. In other words, the army
will have to adapt to change, lest it be forced to do so by the circumstances.
In order to maintain a measure of initiative in this regard, it needs to dwell
on the contours of its continued utility into the future. Only the bare outline
can be reflected on here. The future is of regional economic blocs.
Globalization implies an interdependence that will constrain the military
sphere. Traditional military power, territorial aggrandizement and bean
counting are passé. The more aware populace is unlikely to want to be defended
unto death, as the nuclear shadow portends. It is an age of ‘warless
societies’. Armies are anachronistic, if not redundant. They will need to
downsize, become less visible and take on new roles. Institutional momentum may
see the present through the near term, however the future is already here.
The Indian army is an ideal candidate, being of
the nation that sees this century as its own. By seizing the initiative, it
will be delegitimise the Pakistani army’s hold over its society. This would
enable the reclamation of political space in Pakistan by the liberal element.
This would usher in the elusive détente. Such a denouement is indeed what Sun
Tzu may have meant in saying that the finest victory is one in which the enemy
is subdued without a fight.
PART
IV: THE DOCTRINAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The
Onset of Limited War Theorizing
Only recently has the strategic community addressed itself
to exploring the nature of limited war as applicable in the subcontinental
scenario. Since this is a change of recent vintage it requires to be addressed
in the context of our wider deliberations on the implications of the phenomenon
‘Change’. Here the logic of limitation is carried to its logical conclusion, it
being at variance with the votaries of limited war theology. The prevalent
logic is that, given the nuclear deterrence operative between the perennial
adversaries of the subcontinent, there is a need to create space for the
continued utility of the conventional forces in a conventional war, albeit a
limited one. It is for that reason that the Draft Nuclear Doctrine posits that
the conventional capability will continue to be well honed, despite
nuclearisation. This aspect of the doctrine is challenged here by an
examination of the problems of limitation in a conflict between these to
nuclear-armed neighbors.
The Indian Position
First is an examination of the present Indian position on
limited war. It borrows on the American definition in that such a war is one
kept deliberately limited by an exercise of strategic choice by the political
decision maker. The form of limitation may be in terms of political aims,
strategic objectives, operational means and methods employed in pursuit of
these, and with restrictions on spatial extent and intensity. It is worth
looking at its chief characteristic – it being that it takes ‘two to waltz’
i.e. both sides tacitly accept and respect the limits. In other words
limitation is a result of neither side escalating. The importance of escalation
dominance therefore emerges, specifically that the restraint on escalation is a
function of the belief on the insignificance of any gains accruing as against
the cost of doing so.
The point to note is that this is a calculation left to the
adversary to make. All that a side can do is to orchestrate the forces in a
manner, and communicate the same to the enemy by tacit in-conflict signaling,
so as to reinforce the perception in his mind of the undesirability of
escalation. This is a difficult proposition for it is overly reliant on the
rationality of the enemy and disregards the noise element in the signals
sent. This is the crucial problem with
regard to limitation in an Indo-Pak conflict.
The present position is that India must retain the option
of responding with conventional forces should the Pakistani provocation in
Kashmir cross our tolerance threshold. Lately it has been appreciated that
Pakistan has upped the ante in Kashmir under the impression that the logic of
mutual deterrence has raised Indian tolerance levels. In short, it is under the
impression that it possesses escalation dominance with respect to the LIC in
Kashmir. The Indian assessment is that the falsity of this can only be brought
home to Pakistan by creating the strategic space to enable employment of Indian
conventional advantage. This would be a dissuasive measure to help rein in
Pakistani proxy war. This explains the recent Indian interest in limited war.
The limits to the exercise of Indian conventional strength arise from the
nuclear backdrop. The main implication of this limitation would need to be the
discarding of the ‘Sundarji model’ of war making of deep thrusts. The limits
could be in the form of limited objectives, shallow penetrations and nuclear
non-use – given the problems of assessment of the Pakistani nuclear threshold.
Pakistan has for its part anticipated this well and has
sought to deny India this space it seeks, by resorting to the NATO model of
nuclear use – deterrence by denial, i.e. a doctrine that envisages the
employment of nuclear means to redress their conventional disadvantage. They
have tried to reinforce this by the ploy of ‘the rationality of irrationality’,
by posing as a state that cannot be relied to see the writing on the wall. To
offset this adroit bit of Pakistani strategic footwork, Indian Draft Nuclear
Doctrine states that India would consider itself released from its ‘no first
use’ pledge should its territory or ‘its military forces’ be subject to a
nuclear attack. In short, this is an effort to gain escalation dominance by
reliance on deterrence by punishment.
The Problems with Limitation
It is here that the plethora of problems that plague
in-conflict limitation comes into play. The foremost has already been averred
to earlier, namely, that it is reliant on the good sense of the Pakistani
decision making elite. The pertinent point here is that this is an effort to
call Pakistan’s bluff. In doing so it plays into Pakistani hands, in that it
has to contend with Shelling’s concept ‘threat that leaves something to chance’
– the second fundamental of Pakistani nuclear deterrence. Indian political
decision maker is likely to end up being self-deterred, for to exercise the
conventional option may well be to take a prohibitive chance.
The ‘plethora’ mentioned above must now be addressed. The
foremost is the theoretical one drawn from Clausewitz on the inherent tendency
towards Absolute War in the age of nationalism. In other words, limitation is
rendered problematic by the political pressures arising in the involvement of
the passions of the masses. This may be multiplied in our case given the
demonisation that exists on both sides of the ‘other’. It is pertinent to
recall here that in a leading Pakistani’s assessment one assumption that
underlay the four wars waged by Pakistan has been the inferiority of the
‘hindu’ decision makers. Second is that most wars are begun with the assumption
that they will be short, affordable and winnable. In the event, this proves to
be unwise. Lastly, is that institutional pressure that may lead to mission
expansion.
Having considered the strategic conundrum of limited war in
the Indian context, it is worth considering the aims and objectives that may be
sought. Clearly, these need to be consciously limited. This raises the question
that if this is so then is resort to war worth it? Secondly, the sphere in
which the decision is sought is pertinent to the assessment of costs. If it is
restricted to the LC, then the mountain terrain will impose penalties in terms
of time and casualties, as amply demonstrated in Kargil – where it bears
recalling that the defenses were relatively under-prepared. In both Siachen and Kargil, the strategic
expectations from the limited war initiated by India and Pakistan respectively,
have proven ambiguous in retrospect. If the area of conflict is across the IB
then the subsequent observance of international law by a return to the status
quo would not be of consequence enough to justify the war and taking of the
chance of it going nuclear.
Findings: Part IV
From the foregoing, it appears inescapable that Limited War
as an option flatters to deceive. If it is to be operationalised, then doctrine
formulators will have to think through the problems raised here. The question
is as to how to bring war fighting back into the reckoning. It can be predicted
that resolution of this will be an Indian military planner’s nightmare. Therein
is the challenge – to prevent Pakistan having its cake and eating it too!
Only the contours of the resolution need be addressed here,
to prove the complexity of the task – doctrine generation being complex at the
best of times as it is. The first is to convey unmistakably the Indian resolve
to toe the intent given in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine – of inflicting
‘unacceptable damage’ in retaliation of nuclear use by Pakistan. This could be
rendered problematic in the event of Pakistani use of its weapon in defense of
its own territory, in its own area and against threatening military targets.
Under such circumstance, we would be self-deterred not only from mounting
international pressure but also from the incommensurable response of the
magnitude of ‘unacceptable damage’. The only alternatives would be to try and
prevail conventionally or use tactical nuclear weapons in return on enemy military
targets. Neither is acceptable, the first being ruled out due to the domestic
demand that we retaliate in kind lest we lose the credibility so essential to
nuclear deterrence. Second, is limited nuclear war in highly populated terrain
as the Indus basin would be a throwback to the days it was intended by NATO to
stop the Soviet attack by tactical nuclear weapons in Germany. Escalation to
the next step up the Kahnian ladder – city busting - would be axiomatic. The
point is that the firebreaks up this ladder will not appear as pronounced to
the politician as to the planner.
The second is the improbability of finding value objectives
that are not likely to be unambiguously linked to Pakistani nuclear threshold.
Threat to any such objective would have the Pakistani’s reserve the right of
nuclear response, thereby compelling us to take what has been termed above as
the ‘prohibitive’ option. Reliance on Pakistani rationality would be to impose
our strategic sense on an unpredictable adversary – a cardinal strategic error.
War being the extension of politics by other means; the political dilemma would
then be to arrive at a viable aim. This is likely to prove elusive. The
conclusion is that limitation is not an easy proposition, thereby ruling out
‘war’ as an option. This begs the question on the continued utility of military
force as presently configured physically and conceptually.
CONCLUSION: ILLUMINING CHANGE
This paper has consciously trod the less beaten track in search of
the parameters of ‘Change’ and their implications for the Indian military. The
intent has been to illumine aspects that do not get the attention they deserve.
This neglect is not due to any desire on the part of the strategic community or
the military to water down the aspects raised, but are largely on account of
the discourse being dominated by the traditionalist conservative-realist
paradigm of thought. The alternative perspectives and prescriptions as dwelt on
here therefore do not find adequate mention. The idea of doing so was that for
finding answers in the dark, it is not enough to merely look in the area
already lit up.
The major point that arises when the foregoing dimensions of
‘Change’ are dealt with as a whole can be succinctly summarized as: Downsize
and Professionalise. The former imperative arises on account of the need to
move beyond ‘mass’ – the chief characteristic of a modern military as against a
post-modern one. The latter owes origin to the fact that ‘mass’ detracts from
the levels of education and specialization necessary to professionalism of a
military of a liberal-democratic state entering the 21st century.
Downsizing can only transpire if we move on from responsiveness to threats to
seeking to transform them, in the manner our look at the central military
problems, namely, Kashmir and the nuclear issue (Part III and IV), reveals. The
need for professionalisation flows from our examination of the sociology of RMA
and the dangers of politicization in the current political environment. The agenda outlined here is a largely an
abstract one. The next step is to deal with its military specifics. Any delay
in taking this step now cannot be for want of knowing which road to take!
(Words- 5261)
