Friday, 17 March 2023

 From the archives, 6 Feb 2003

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Lt Gen VK Kapoor has contributed the lead article ‘Soldiering, Spirituality and Leadership’ to the Sep 2002 issue of the Combat Journal recommending the adoption of the practice of Sahaja Yoga meditation as revealed by HH (Her Holiness) Sri Mataji Nirmala Devi for the ‘benefit of the individual and collective fraternity of the Armed Forces in all respects including physical, emotional, moral, material, and spiritual so that we develop military leaders of unimpeachable character which constitute the bedrock of military leadership’.

 

This letter is prompted by the following passage in the article as it has a bearing on the thesis the author advances:

 

“We do not need military professionals who are primarily sociologists but we do need military professionals who understand the society of which they are part. We do not need politicians in military uniform but we do need officers who are sensitive to the political system they defend. Most of all we need senior officers who understand the dangers of politicizing the military profession of a democracy through inherently flawed internal management policies, parochialism or bias.” (p. 10)

 

The author has pointed out that our backgrounds are informed by a wide variety of religious and cultural traditions. He rightly mentions that each of these has a positive influence on character formation, soldiering, spirituality and leadership potential. He nevertheless goes on to advocate Sahaja Yoga for adoption in Service leadership as a character development tool. The author does not explicate as to how any particular one of the several equally compelling practices believed in and practiced by a substantial segments of the officer corps should be privileged for wider collective applicability within the Service. The necessity for explaining why Sahaja Yoga ought to be adopted is required, given that its merits are replicated in the numerous equally valid spiritual development practices in all cultural traditions and religions. Selective advocacy, even if based on personal knowledge, research, experimentation and practice, may testify to parochialism and bias. Therefore, it is important that evaluation of which of these the Service chooses to adopt, if at all such a training innovation is deemed an imperative (at best an arguable proposition in itself), be a collective and rational exercise aiming at a consensus. This will be in conformity with the author’s injunction above that sensitivity to the political system and understanding of society are important facets of officership.

 

Alternatively, officers could be sensitized to the spiritual foundation of leadership in keeping with the author’s broader thesis. It should be left to individual officers whether they continue to pursue their own spiritual trove for self-development or internalize any other particular practice from the manifold, open and accessible paths widely known to exist in the Indian spiritual tradition. The leading of a moral life in keeping with rational, liberal and humanist principles is also an option that could be left to an officer’s individual judgment. Sahaja Yoga can perhaps be one of many such options to which officer may be exposed as part of professional leadership pedagogy. Singling it out would imply that it has inherently superior individual and collective benefits that may not be so obvious to the other practices to which officers express a sense of ownership. 

 

In so far as which of the diverse methodologies of meditation that officers can be enlightened about, a technique of comparative evaluation may be evolved whereby individual and collective benefits of each can be assessed. In the perspective of this writer, this is not an exercise that the Services are equipped or mandated to conduct, irrespective of the expertise available at the INI or the Center of Meditation, College of Combat. Importation of a popular practice from wider society and giving it Service imprimatur may not be entirely appropriate given the personal nature of spirituality and its wellsprings in respective culture and religion. Attempting to inject specific practices into our professional development through formal incorporation into our leader development curriculum would amount to a lack of appreciation of the socio-political environment through which our nation-state is currently transiting and within which our armed forces require to navigate in keeping with our apolitical heritage.


 

 

 

 

 

 

 From the archives, 5 May 2003

THE ‘PATHOLOGY’ OF INFO WAR

Info War is a leading ingredient of the RMA currently underway. Since the RMA is largely technology driven, doctrine lags a step behind. The Indian army is also subject to this phenomenon and is its wont is coping professionally. However, there is a somewhat narrow focus on the issue encompassing only its technical and doctrinal dimensions. Owing to sociology being relatively marginal to military studies and thinking, its searchlight has not been turned on the issue. As a result the RMA, and Info War in particular, are not addressed in their entirety. While this author considered the sociological aspects of RMA in a previous issue of the Pinnacle (Sep 2002), this article brings to bear similar sociological scrutiny on to the issue of Info War. The aspects covered in the current study of the evolution in war fighting are the nature of the impact on the battlefield and the manner the new technologies and techniques can be harnessed in a conventional battlefield with a nuclear backdrop. What the field of military sociology can inform us on is the nature of the impact on areas to the rear of the combat zone and the limits of usage of these techniques. This article attempts to derive insights on Info War through the prism of military sociology.

The effort is restricted to the examination of the implication of one specific dimension of Info War, namely, the limits of use of Info War techniques in influencing the domestic info-sphere. Erstwhile ‘propaganda’ has acquired impetus since the onset of the communication revolution. In its renewed emphasis its very name has changed to Public Affairs or Civil Affairs in order to purge it of the negative connotations that the term ‘propaganda’ has acquired. Given this negative aura, it is seen as suitable at best for direction against the adversary. Even when so directed it requires a subtlety that changes its very nature to something better encompassed by the term Info War.

The recent deepening of democratization, called Third Wave of Democratization by Huntington (the first being the Western States, the second comprising the newly liberated coloinies, and the latest one being consequent to the collapse of the Communist block) has led to a heightened importance of public support for state indulgence in conflict. It is no longer a matter of unilateral exercise in sovereignty by governments. It requires popular ratification. Witness the anti-war demonstrations across the globe, particularly in the national capitals of states forming part of the Coalition of the Willing. Thus, states generally feel the need for the use of Info War techniques to influence the public opinion in such a manner as to make it supportive of the military in general and of in-conflict military action in particular.  The chief lesson of the Vietnam War of keeping domestic opinion sufficiently supportive of war, is too obvious to reiterate here. India’s experience with the IPKF in Sri Lanka only served to reinforce this lesson.

 

Given the nature of the relationship between the Clausewitzian trinity – the State, the Military and the People - in a democratic state, this use of Info War techniques to influence the domestic info-sphere clearly requires deliberation. Since this is the domain of military sociology, its corpus of insights has to be turned on the issue. This article attempts this with the aim of discerning the limits of the manipulation of the information in the public domain. The threshold it seeks is one beyond which manipulation would be to the detriment of the democratic basis of the triangular relationships. It follows that first must be established the necessity for such a study. Thereafter must be ascertained what constitutes the democratic balance between the Trinity. From this can be derived the Laxman Rekha beyond which democratic health of polity is likely to be encroached on by the pursuit of effectiveness in conflict.

The Previous RMA’s

The current RMA is but one of a chain of periodic upsurges in military art and science. The Toffler’s count three such revolutions, namely, the onset of agricultural age warfare; industrial age warfare; and lastly the ongoing info-age war.  Industrial Age warfare of the modern era, witnessed at least three such revolutions. These include the sociological revolution in the Napoleonic era that brought on the age of mass armies; the technical one resulting in the mechanization of war; and lastly, the nuclear revolution that changed the role of military force from war-fighting to war-deterring. The present RMA heralds the post-modern age, and therefore reflection on it is partially a matter of crystal ball gazing. Nevertheless, certain lessons from past RMAs are of instructive worth in so far as understanding the current one is concerned.

The first lesson is that, despite the catchy name, a military ‘revolution’ is incremental and spread over time. For instance, the democratization of war in terms of use of mass armies that began with the French Revolution reached its culmination only in the First World War. The mechanized battlefield that made its first appearance in the First World War reached its zenith only in the ‘Hail Mary’ maneuver of Swarzkopf. Though the Little Boy and Fat Man were dropped in 1945, nuclear war doctrines and theorizing are still evolving.

The second lesson is that the effect of the revolutions on conflict outcome is not dependent on the level of adaptation to or proficiency in the same. Of interest in this regard is that eventually Napoleon was exiled to Elba; the foremost proponents and practitioners of mechanization, the Germans, lost their war; and, lastly, nuclear weapons self-deter as much as they deter. In short, revolutions play themselves out in the refinement of the techniques and the adaptation to the same by the adversaries with equal felicity. The Concert of Europe against Napoleon, the Allies against the Axis powers, and the Soviet Union redressed the initial asymmetry they were faced with.

The salient lesson, however, of the modern age is that of democratization of war. The say of and participation of the society in decision-making and war waging has increased exponentially. Witness the Vietnam and Afghan War experience of both sides involved. This is also applicable to internal armed conflict, as evident from Russia’s handling of Chechenya. In both the Gulf Wars, though Coalition military superiority was stark, the effort to gain and retain popular support was treated as a major Focus of Effort. In other words, the military - ‘hard’ - component of power is of declining significance in relation to ‘soft’ power with respect to the outcome of war. 

The point is that military proficiency or effectiveness cannot be defined by, or confined to, professional-technical competence alone. In short, the most technically skilled army in Info War techniques is no more likely to win than lose, if it is to focus, as most armies are now doing, only on the ‘hard’ side of Info War. There exists a ‘soft underside’ that has not attracted like attention, and may yet prove an Achilles heel. This article proceeds to examine this clinical condition that it terms the ‘pathology of Info War’. Synthesizing the lessons above: Info War is here to stay; the relative importance of the hardware component of it does not justify devotion of the present fixation on it; and, lastly, since Info War directly affects the democratic basis of the Trinity, it requires a non-traditional inter-disciplinary scrutiny.  

The Trinity

The traditional heuristic on this is in terms of two concentric circles with the military forming the central-core circle; the state being the next concentric circle subsuming the military; and the outer circle being formed by society. However, sociology tells us that this is an unwarranted simplification. A truer depiction of reality is a relative displacement of the three circles in the form of three overlapping circles.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Democratic health can be discerned by a look at two sides of the triangle: the state-society, and the state-military relationship. The state-society relationship is what is generally addressed in such considerations, and therefore the familiar ground will not be traversed here. The second relationship is the academic concern of military sociology and is relevant to our discussion.

The famous Huntington thesis is that objective civil control is the characteristic of democratic civil-military relations. In this relationship, the military is permitted the requisite autonomy for professional exercise of its social responsibility of providing the service of security. The military is thus an instrument of the State to be used for its political purpose as envisaged by Clausewitz.

However, there is a school of thought that the military is a representative of the people - ‘the military belongs to the people.’ This brings to fore the third side of the triangle. Popular support is necessary for morale, and at one remove combat effectiveness, of the military. The contrast between the Indian army’s Sri Lankan and Kargil experience testifies to this.

It is this necessity that leads to the possibility of the manipulation of information in the public domain by the military using Info War techniques and mechanism. The legitimacy for this is lent by the fact that such manipulation is seen to be in the national interest as it is meant to increase combat power. Therefore, the importance attached to the requirement of the military’s media interaction being in conformity with the larger governmental policy on public information.

The Laxman Rekha

There is one aspect that necessitates reflection on the democratic threshold of Info War directed at a domestic audience.  This has institutional origin. The first is the aspect of the ‘military mind’. The military is, of necessity, a conservative institution. The ‘military mind’ emphasizes the ‘worst case’ scenario, prioritizes capabilities over intentions, and emphasizes in-being military power over social and economic power that can be accessed only over the longer term. Thus the military has an inbuilt propensity to focus on ‘threats’, which has the downside of resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Second is the aspect of ‘institutional interest’. An insight from management studies has it that there is an inherent tendency of institutions to further and protect their corporate interest. Doing so does have useful fallout in terms of garnering resources for the accomplishment of the mission.  However, constant self-monitoring by the leadership is called for to see that pursuit of corporate interest does not turn unilateral and arbitrary or that corporate interest is not mistaken for ‘national interest’.

It is these two aspects that are of significance to the ascertaining the limits of military-society linkage unmediated by the state. There are two points of concern in this regard. First is the danger is in the military impinging on governmental prerogative by taking its case or position on an issue to the people through the media, either overtly (directly) or covertly (indirectly). This could result in the pressure on the government from the environment to be responsive to the military perspective. By using such extra-procedural means, the military would be behaving in the manner of any lobby or pressure group. Such behavior is not unknown and is not entirely illegitimate in democratic polities elsewhere, not excluding the USA. However the danger is the pursuit of unilaterally defined corporate interest. The determination of the context and the scope of the military’s autonomy is a governmental privilege, mediated in the Indian system by a generalist bureaucratic ‘steel frame’ between the itinerant politician and the professional military. 

Second, and more importantly, is with respect to the former point of institutional ethos. In a democratic society, political formations are in contest for the electorate’s blessing. While conservative political parties are inclined to pay heed to the military’s perspective on security, liberal and leftist ones are generally skeptical not on account of aversion to the military sphere but more on account of the implications of the military budget on the social sector that they would prefer to privilege. Thus the military may unwittingly lend its viewpoint for use as political capital. This could eventuate into a quasi-alliance, in that the conservative parties may be more amenable to subscribing to and furnishing the military with what it deems necessary. This has implications for the democratic basis of polity.

This begs the question as to what must then be the Laxman Rekha? It is without argument that the public has to be knowledgeable of the military’s position. It is also accepted that the military may at times require manipulating information in the larger interest of not hurting its combat potential. In short, media interaction, expertly done through application of evolving info doctrines and techniques, is inevitable. The point is to keep this within democratic bounds.

The first measure in this regard is to develop sensitivity to this aspect at the operational and strategic level through doctrinal reflection and education. The leadership will have to vet its motivations and its information input to the public so as to preclude any contamination by corporate interest. It will have to ensure that it is not inadvertently made into a political player or football. Second is a requirement for the media to develop independent expertise in military matters in order to ensure that its commentary is credible and conveys contrasting points of view with equal credibility. Lastly, the political decision maker and the bureaucratic intermediary would need to filter the military input sympathetically so as to preclude resort to indirect means. This can best be done by coopting the military into apex security decision making structures, the prelude to which has been done by the establishment of the NSC and the NCA. The benefits of the exercise need now to be extended to the MOD. 

Conclusion

The pathology of Info War lies in inattention to the insights facilitated by military sociology. The new tool in the military repertoire - Info War doctrine and techniques - influences the aspect of democratic balance in the trinity. The strategic community has not adequately addressed this aspect. Its reflections on this would help the military do so, since the military is not as conversant with the non-traditional fields from which such insight can be derived. This is important as the limits of new fields of war-fighting or of waging peace need the military’s professional consideration. It is another matter that the government may choose to delude its public as to its intent and actions - witness the propaganda offensive of the Coalition of the Willing on Iraq’s WMD in the run up to the Gulf War. It has come to light that a key element that influenced the support of the US Congress for the war was a forged document implicating Iraq in importing uranium shipments from Niger. The onus of such decisions must rest squarely with the political decision maker, with no unsolicited input emanating from the military. Military ethics, defined here by the proverbial Laxman Rekha, must serve as a ‘watchdog’ in terms of application of Info War strategies and techniques to the repertoire of measures under taken by the military of a democratic state in furthering its societal obligation.

 

                                                                             

 

From the archives, 26 May 2001

COMMENTS ON ARTICLE: THE J&K PEACE PROCESS


The article under review (The J&K ‘Peace Process’: Chasing a Chimera; Faultlines, Vol 8, pp. 1-40)  carries a critique of ‘peace processes’ in general and of the ongoing one in J&K in particular. The broader reservation of the authors (Dr. A Sahni and Mr. KPS Gill) is that the search for peaceful political solutions is akin to appeasement. With respect to J&K, the contention is that the initiative is flawed in that it is neglectful of the context of the problem – the context being taken as the increasing presence of radical islam in the subcontinent through the instrumentality of a Pakistani state held hostage by its military and its intelligence agencies. This comment offers a diverse perspective on the issues raised in the article. The importance of expressing the same lies in the hope of a Hegelian synthesis emerging from an ensuing debate.

 

It takes as its starting point the theoretical proposition that ideological perspectives held apriori inform perceptions of reality. Thus the assumptions (on which perspectives are based) influence the way a problem is defined. Given that, the resulting alternatives considered, their examination and prioritization are axiomatically divergent. In other words, a conservative perspective will yield a markedly different analysis of a problem than one formed in the liberal perspective. If that is so, then it is the contention between the two perspectives that will determine the outcome. This contention is the arena of politics related to security. There seems to be a deterioration in the standard of democratic debate attending security issues lately that the space for reconciliation of these perspectives is being constrained by the invective that attends this ‘dialogue of the deaf’ in India. The article in question is also guilty of the same in this regard, for it does not seek to argue its point of view but to assert it. 

 

With regard to the allegation of peace initiatives through political dialogue with the militant groupings being ‘appeasement’, three points need to be noted. One is that it would be a symptom of a militarized polity, and worse a militarisation of society, should this not be undertaken. It is beholden on a liberal-democratic system to search for solutions outside the military template, even if the same is simultaneously operative. Second is that not doing so is to put too large a premium on a military solution. The violence spiral can be empirically demonstrated in the plethora of conflicts in which it was erroneously believed that a higher degree of military action would beget the desired result. The search for the elusive military ‘victory’ is to chase a receding horizon. Lastly, there is a need to operationalise strategies originating in the peace studies discourse. This is occasioned by the fact that these may offer hitherto untested avenues of exit from quagmires of violence.

 

In so far as the J&K situation is taken as an example of the futility of activating a ‘peace process’, the argument here is that indications are that the affected people are so inclined. If such reports are true, then it is incumbent on a representative government to seek to materialize the inchoate articulations of a people in the midst of what amounts to a human tragedy. Second, the military has had a fair share of autonomy to combat the anti-national menace there, and continues to do so. Any constraints that were there were inherent in the situation wherein the operations were incident in demographic terrain – e.g. the necessity to use minimum force. That it was temporarily constrained by the ceasefire from pursuing certain tactical options is to convey the message of the ceasefire and to act as both an incentive and a threat in being. In the event, the withdrawal of the same also carries its own message. Thirdly, the criticism that the intended talks are with anti-national elements begs the question – who else, pray, will they be with than the antagonist?

 

Having made the broader counter-point, the specifics of the article will now be engaged in the sequence the points are raised in the article.

 

Point One (p. 5). The Israeli experience in negotiating peace is derided, and equated with the pre-Second World War appeasement of Hitler. In doing so the intent is to give negotiations a bad name. This ‘far right’ critique of the Peace Process in Israel lacks credibility for three reasons. One is that the Israeli-Palestinian equation in no way replicates the Jewish-Nazi one, or the Hitler-Remainder Europe one. Secondly, the relevance of this digression to the problem of J&K is somewhat contrived, for it is unmindful of the domestic attributes of the J&K problem.

 

Point Two (p. 6). The criticism of Nehru is a jaded one. The ceasefire and resort to the UN were the acts of a satisfied power willing to be reasonable. Having got to the ethno-linguistic divide that marked the political pre-eminence of the National Conference, it was a logically sustainable line at which to rein in the army. It conceded to the enemy his gain – that of geographical depth to his heartland. In the former lies the political sense in the decision and in the latter its maturity.

 

Point Three (p. 7). That the political formations that were unyielding of Nehru’s critics are now seeking a negotiated settlement to the Kashmir problem is prompted by their larger agenda. The settlement they reportedly are in favor of is trifurcation along sectarian lines, which is to reenergize the ‘two nation’ theory. This is thinkable in their scheme, for this would enable the larger project of reducing the minority elsewhere in the country to second-class citizen status. However, in so far as the government is concerned, it is not hostage to this agenda. Ruling parties, particularly in coalitions, have a more restrained approach to governance. Therefore, in pursuing efforts to a ‘negotiated settlement’ with the ‘sponsoring nations’ they are doing no more than mandated in the Simla Accord. As for negotiations with ‘terrorist forces’, the dialogue through violence is also on – in keeping with the preference of the authors. So why the angst?

 

Point Four (p. 7). The outcome of negotiations cannot be predicted ab-initio. This is no reason not to undertake the same. There are advantages of the interregnum for such groups. However, they cannot be blamed for the ‘confusion’ if any in the minds of the SF. For that the blame must be squarely put on the operational leadership’s shoulders that have been unable to translate the strategic direction into tactical action and communicate the same to the spear end. It must be understood that the military instrument has to be flexible and responsive. Its mental mobility must therefore be of the order of the militant/terrorist/insurgent/underground/hostile/ANE. There may be times when the restraint imposed is to convey the intent of the government to talk. The interim can be equally well exploited by the SF, e.g. Op Rhino that followed a brief monsoonal hiatus after Op Bajrang yielded better results as the SF did their homework well. In so far as the ceasefire in J&K went, it was in part a self-serving one to see the winter through and to restrain alienative operations as large scale CASO,

Point Five (p. 8-9). There is talk of a trifurcation of J&K along religious/geographical lines in order to arrive at a modus vivendi with Pakistan over the subsequent status of the Valley. The liberal critique of this is that it harks back to the Partition for its basis for a further division. The fear is that this may have a backlash for the minority population elsewhere in the country. The problem with this formulation is that it is unimpressed with the specifics of the Kashmir situation. Any answer in this ‘solution’ will only emerge when it is considered. Besides it holds Kashmir hostage to the separate issue of minority management. Apprehensions on that score need not stay the hand with regard to Kashmir. It would be a double abdication of governmental responsibility to plead that the vulnerability of muslim Indians elsewhere to backlash prevents imaginative options with regard to the Kashmir problem from emerging.

 

Point Six (p. 11). There is logic to the American assessment (and indeed the Indian one) in not treating Pakistan as a ‘terrorist state’ for doing so could well turn out a self-fulfilling prophecy. As with Egypt, Algeria, Turkey and the Gulf states, the military in Pakistan is not as islamised as the propaganda tracts will have us believe. So in determining our policy we need to be careful not to be victims of our own propaganda.

 

Point Seven (p. 11). There seems to be an element of wishful thinking in the statement: ‘…had India followed a consistent and coherent counter-terrorism agenda in J&K ensuring that the civilian population did not suffer inordinately even as the state applied all necessary force to defeat the terrorists’. Such precision in engagement is not a practical proposition in so far as the SF is concerned. In fact, the recent ceasefire can be attributed to sensitivity to the same, for the alienation in the population was in some measure due to the unsubtle military actions of the SF. 

 

Point Eight (p. 14). The demise of the JKLF was partially owing to the enthusiasm in the bean count game by the SF – unmindful that the intelligence flowing in was on account of the Pakistani need to be rid of the autonomous JKLF.

 

Point Nine (p. 15). The explanation that the ‘mass support’ for the extremists disappeared when they had been defeated on the ground in Punjab is closer to reality when turned on its head. In other words, when the ‘mass support’ disappeared, the extremists could be defeated. One would hesitate to use the word ‘mass’ here, and it rightly enclosed in apostrophes even by the authors. No doubt, this would eventually be true of J&K, and therein lies the importance of a people-friendly approach.

 

Point Ten (p. 17 and 28). In page 17 readers are informed that the ‘major and effective secessionist groupings in J&K are simply agencies of the Pakistani game plan in the state’. At page 38 readers are told that Pakistan is ‘no longer in control of forces of extremism it has created and nurtured.’ While the former deals with these forces in J&K, the latter is with respect to them in Pakistan. Page 38 also informs that the two are inseparable for these suicide squads ‘will increasingly come to J&K to do the only things they know and understand: ‘kill and to die’.  There is an inherent contradiction in this – Pakistan can control them when in India but not in its own backyard!

 

Point Eleven (p. 19). A favorable quote from that ‘authority’ Yossef Bodansky – one who believes that the importance of Kashmir to Pakistan is in the rail based ‘trans-Asia axis’ it wishes to open to Central Asia through Kashmir!

 

Point Twelve (p. 19). A victory for ‘terrorism’ is deplorable. The point however is in how the situation in Kashmir is defined. If terrorism is seen as merely a tactic of the insurgency therein, then non-military efforts to end the insurgency are not inappropriate. Secondly, the search for ‘victory’ by the state cannot conscionably be to the last Kashmiri. The myth must be recalled that even the killing of all Jewish babies by the Pharaoh could not prevent the birth of Moses.

 

Point Thirteen (p. 19). It is regrettable that the anti-imperialist struggles of the afro-asian people that had the support of the Indian people and governments are categorized as ‘terrorist’. To club the terrorism/insurgency in J&K with these is to shoot oneself in the foot, for the use of violence in the freedom from metropolitan powers was legally and morally justified. By equating the two, the authors err in alleviating the militants, else denigrating the anti-imperialist freedom fighters.

 

Point Fourteen (p. 21). One reason for the use of ‘terrorist’ methods by groups is that states are impervious to ‘peaceful and democratic’ methods, subject as they are to what Ayoob calls the ‘third world problemmatic’ of nation building in an accelerated timeframe. Thus this advice to ‘ambitious and impatient groupings’ holds good for states too – an advice that is marked by its absence in the article. It is for this reason that the Indian government is rightly following a dual track approach.

 

Point Fifteen (p. 22). One reason for a ‘final settlement’ to the inter-state dimension of the Kashmir problem is that arriving at the same will help undercut the fundamentalist energies that the following paragraphs in the article tell us are welling up in Pakistan. Therefore it is not the ‘pressure’ that should focus our attention towards negotiations, but self-interest – for page 38 tells us that such a denouement may not be desirable from an Indian point of view. 

 

Point Sixteen (p. 22). The pan-islamic agenda to which this is attributed is the search by the West for fresh enemies to replace the Soviets. Pakistani insecurity arises owing to its strategic elite dominated by the military operating in the realist paradigm. It quite naturally sees the very magnitude of India along all and any parameter as a threat. Therefore, being the weaker power, it seeks to address the same by attempting to undercut Indian advantages. Therein lies the strategic sense in tying down Indian conventional superiority in LIC as in Punjab and Kashmir, and in unimportant theatres as Siachen and Kargil. Indian realpolitic approach likewise has not assuaged Pakistani fears any. India has intervened in pursuit of its self-interest in its neighbors’ domestic domain – remember East Pakistan and the LTTE in Sri Lanka! Secondly, it is unlikely that India would have pursued the Simla Agreement enjoined bilateral negotiations for the ‘final settlement’ of the J&K problem without the application of pressure in the manner it has been built up by Pakistan, given the Indian definition of the ‘unfinished business of partition’ – the vacation of POK by Pakistan.

 

Point Seventeen (p. 23). The late 80s were not a period when ‘terror broke out’ in Kashmir. Terror was a tactic in the larger population-based uprising in the early period of the insurgency. This facet needs to be put into perspective, lest we impose our preferences on contemporary history. The secular bases of the grievances and demands need to be factored in to our analysis. A view has it that the nature of the surprising uprising was such that to tackle it effectively its contours needed to be changed. This was a shared perception across the LOC. Therefore the religious angle was played up by both states for their own purposes. It is so much easier for India to engage with a ‘proxy war’ than an internal armed rebellion. For the Pakistanis the ‘azadi’ movement was equally distasteful. It is important therefore to vet the vocabulary we use – for it is the building block of perceptions. Calling it the outbreak of ‘terror’ surely blinds the reader to the wider and secular mass struggle that was commandeered by the two states to respective realpolitik purposes in the early years of the last decade.

 

Point Eighteen (p. 23) One aspect on the ‘hardening of beliefs’ is the simultaneous rise of the hindutva philosophy to political ascendance and credibility. A minority, already nursing perceived relative deprivation, is further ghettoized by violence. The false propaganda of having been ‘appeased’ (any set of economic indicators will reveal the falsity of the claim), and the few avenues thereby being threatened with closure in a dispensation that is no longer ‘pseudo secular’, is driving the minority to be defensive about its identity.

 

Point Nineteen (p. 23). The danger of putting too fine a point on the intelligence game of subversion is that doing so leads to the subconscious identification of anti-nationalism with the minority community. This plays into the hands of hindu fundamentalist elements in polity who would prefer this for their political and ideological ends. Therefore allusions to the supposed ‘recruitment of religious soldiers for a pan-islamic jihad in pockets of muslim populations all across India’ is dangerous. It reminds one of the dialogue in a hindi movie Fiza in which the heroine searching for her lost brohter lectures a muslim cleric on the futility of entertaining thoughts of the making the green stripe in the Indian tricolour take over the rest of the flag. The point is that any fervent in the green is not divorced from the same in the saffron, and secondly the green is at best merely trying to stay on under the push and shove of the saffron. Therefore it is sociological innocence to believe that ‘Pakistan’s covert agencies and extremist religious groupings’ are responsible. It denies agency to the extremist elements in both Indian communities, who incidentally have a symbiotic relationship – needing each other to capture power over their respective communities. It must be noted that analytical simplicity (such as viewing Indian society as binary as done here) is also dangerous and is the very project of the extremists. This further underlines the point that viewing the muslim communities as monolithic and homogeneous, and easily susceptible to inducement, without reference to their local political and economic situation is untenable.

 

Point Twenty (p. 23- 26). It bears mention that the local/sub-regional factors of consequence are neglected if we are to believe that there is a grand design behind the ‘process of encirclement’ the subsequent paragraphs in the article reflect on. For instance, firstly, the showing of its law enforcing agencies compromised the state, in riots in both Bombay and Coimbatore. The defensive retaliation/arrangements by the muslim communities there need to be seen in that light. There is a strand of opinion that the Bombay blasts have done much for the subsequent peace there, by restoring the sense of honor/local balance of power. In this regard it must be kept in mind that the party responsible for the Bombay riots was in power over the state. Secondly, the influx of Bangladeshis into India is divested of the socio-economic rationale that is at its core. As a result it is self-servingly made to appear as an ‘invasion’. This suits the purposes of certain political formations that wish to dramatize the issue of an in-the-make minority vote bank of their opposition for making of the majority community a vote bank for themselves. In effect, such a characterization of the Bangladeshi issue in strategic discourse is to legitimize the party line of these formations. Lastly, the politics of identity is not a one-way street. In a globalising world there is a corresponding return to the roots phenomenon by cultures that are threatened. These include those of both the majority and minorities. The efforts at cultural preservation by these communities as tablighi movement, madrassas etc. need to be seen also in this light. To see it entirely as a national security issue wherein these are seen as threatening is to betray a political agenda – for the article does not mention the equivalent efforts of revivalism in the majority community. As they cliché goes – ‘You don’t clap with one hand.’

 

Point Twenty One (p. 29). The phrase ‘process of encirclement’ metamorphoses to ‘strategy of encirclement’ within a space of few pages. ‘Strategy’ by definition implies purposive thought and action. Therefore the ferment in muslim communities elsewhere in the subcontinent (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka) that is described without reference to the local dynamics is tried to be put in the framework of an ISI engineered grand strategy. Next we will be told that the ‘monkey man’ was an ISI plant!

 

Point Twenty Two (p. 31). Your survey of the islamist movement neglects a few pertinent issues. Firstly, the ‘extremist Islamic vision’ is not seen in the context of the international political economy. The neo-colonial embrace of the arab world by the West, legitimized by the energy security enamored, state-centric, world order, is the root of the revisionism of radical Islam. Secondly, the Afghan problem needs to be viewed in light of the formulation of Stephen Walt, in that the revolutionary energy dissipates in accordance with the levels of satiation reached by the regime (witness historical France and Russia, and lately Iran). The taliban in Afghanistan are being denied recognition by a concert of external powers (to include India) propping up their opponents. This increases their extremism directed without, lest the revolution collapse in on itself. In terms of Indian self-interest this is a regime we could reconcile to, in the hope of a ‘Frankensteinien dilemma’ (p. 32) overtaking their sponsors Pakistan. Doing so would help keep Afghan fighters out of Kashmir – presently sent their as a quid pro quo.  Lastly, is the issue of the drugs trade - the demand side is not above blame, for the market is the West. If arms could be sent into this region for US Cold War interests, surely these can be reciprocated with drugs – howsoever reprehensible may this be. The effect of arms is not invisible here, and by no stretch of imagination can it be equated with the effect drugs have on the consumer society – remember 1.5 million Afghans died to give the West its peace dividend! The weak will adopt the weapons they can.

 

Point Twenty Three (p. 32). The ‘cancerous malformation’ referred to in the quote is not the ‘non-islamic world’ as interpreted by the authors, but is a reference to the state system that is disrupting realization of the doctrinal tenet of ‘ummah’. Secondly, the ‘terror’ referred to in the second quote can be equated with the clausewitzian concept of imposing one’s ‘will’ on an enemy. 

 

Point Twenty Three (p. 34). On the gratuitous sectarian violence in Pakistan, within Pakistan exists a point of view that these are at least in part the doing of the RAW as part of the intelligence game (See recent book by Shahid Amin, a retired Pakistani diplomat). Sensibly, the RAW does not advertise its work. There is no evidence of democratic oversight of its budget. Therefore, the formulation - ‘what ISI is to India, RAW is to Pakistan’ - is not implausible.

 

Point Twenty Four (p. 35-6). It would suit us to project Pakistan as a ‘failing state’, an imminent victim of islamists. We need to take a second opinion on this. Interestingly, it is a projection that Pakistan itself manages equally well for its own ends! It must be recalled that as late as a 1996 (?) an islamist coup led by Maj Gen Abbasi was suppressed by the Pakistani army.

 

Point Twenty Five (p. 39). It is true that ‘terrorists’ and ‘mass murderers’ must not be accommodated in a democratic polity. However, the borderline between criminality and politics has been breached more blatantly in mainstream politics. Therefore, the distinction cannot solely be made in the periphery. Like charity, it must begin at home – at the center. Secondly, ‘freedom’ is indeed a ‘birth right’ that needs to be ‘fought for and defended’. That is a message that the restive periphery is sending the center by taking up arms for the democratic fruits of independence have not trickled down to them (In J&K there has been only one election that may be considered as a free and fair one, that of 1977). Therefore, these militant movements are not to be ‘defeated’, but deserve to be ‘accommodated’. Thirdly, the search for a ‘demonstration of this in Kashmir’ would be to put our eggs in a singularly militarized basket – the prudence and strategic sense of which is questionable.

 

Having made the counter-points with reference to the specifics, a major conclusion emerges from the exercise. It would appear that the dimensions of a problem seem to change with the kind of spectacles with which the problem is viewed. It is probable that both perspectives cannot be right at the same time, nor are both entirely wrong. It behooves the analyst and policy maker to take a bifocal view of a problem. In effect, the national security perspective in the realist state-centric mold needs to take its critique seriously by factoring in insights from diverse fields as socio-economics, organizational theory, domestic politics etc. As to what the implication of the above is on the nature of journal itself and on the drift of the articles therein, this writer leaves to the judgment of the editorial team.                                            

 

 

 

 From the archives, 16 Sep 2003

WIDENING THE DISCOURSE ON TERROR

 

Concentration on the violence of the act and its distressing outcome restricts reflection on terrorism in its wider dimension. There is also the perspective that seeking ‘roots’ of terrorism only serves to rationalize it, an unacceptable proposition. Since such effort could indirectly legitimise the pernicious, though politically useful, ‘action-reaction’ theory, it is not pursued. Furthermore, in India the dominance of the explanation that the incidence of terrorism in India is ISI engineered on account of Pakistan’s congenital antipathy to India or their manner of redressing the adverse power equation accentuates the discourse on terrorism.

 

One manner in which such restriction has occurred is the understanding that ‘terrorism’ is that perpetrated by foreign and criminal sponsorship as in Kashmir and Mumbai. Mass terror stemming from mob action, largely with state collusion and generally borne by minority communities as evidenced in the anti-Sikh riots and Gujarat, has not attracted requisite attention. However, given the unremitting incidence of terrorism in India of both kinds, there appears to be a requirement to study any linkage between the two, for the ending or containment of one may be dependent on the manner the other is addressed.

 

Rightly the internal intelligence agencies and the police have been acting with dispatch in destroying terrorist ‘cells’. The Home Minister let on that the last count of cells neutralized was at ninety-two all over the country. In this regard it would be rational to assume that should such alacrity attend police action in cases of one-sided mob violence, any underlying rationale for the mushrooming of these ‘cells’ would dissipate. Therefore while nullifying these cells, convictions such as the recent one of Dara Singh for the murder of missionary Graham Staines would be to address the problem at both ends.

 

Reflection on Chief Justice Khare’s observation that the essence of democracy is not electoral majorities but is ‘rajdharma’, arbitrarily defined here as governance furthering constitutional freedoms, is an opportunity for widening the discourse on terrorism in this manner. The Chief Justice was commenting on the Best Bakery case of the Gujarat pogrom The Chief Justice’s conflation of democracy with the rule of law is a reminder that roots of terror also have an internal, equally compelling, dimension. Judicial activism in this direction has been buttressed by the salutary conviction of Dara Singh’s for the murder of Australian missionary Graham Staines.

 

Three instances where departure from the democratic principle has resulted in long running security problems has been the unrest in Punjab of the Eighties, the Kashmiri militancy of the Nineties and the bomb blasts in Mumbai of 1993 and 2003. There is no gainsaying the fact that a sense of grievance arising from the perceived injustice of the anti-Sikh riots and the hardline suppression of the Kashmiri militancy has fuelled disturbed conditions characterized by terrorism to an extent. The bomb blasts in Mumbai, while bearing the stamp of ISI and D Company, could have been averted had police politicization not made them participants in the largely one-sided riots of 1993 and 2002. Widening the popular definition of terrorism has the underside of making it unweildly, but in the event may be a practical reaction to the Indian circumstance.

 

Another pertinent aspect that escapes attention, for want of substantiating information, is that in the absence of civilized engagement between India and Pakistan, these terrorist acts are a substitute dialogue between the two states entrusted to respective intelligence agencies. The Pakistani reading of the bomb blasts and sectarianism in Karachi and elsewhere has echoes of India’s fixation with the ISI. In both states votaries of a ‘tit for tat’ policy exist and may have seized the policy agenda. Ending terrorism would thus require a political approach, along both dimensions, internal and external, besides the present law and order and military approach.

 

Admittedly, the present approach to terrorism may well be a ‘political’ one, in that it is one sanctioned by political rulers and is naturally conditioned by a right wing world-view, one that globally subscribes to dousing ‘fire with fire’. Demands of making of the majority community a ‘vote bank’ increase with the proximity of elections. Being seen as ‘soft’ on terrorism, by considering ‘roots’ as against the outcome of terrorism, may not be politically attractive. However, in the Indian context, considerably more complex sociologically, historically and politically, a ‘political approach’ demands, inter alia, depoliticisation of governance, with professionalisation of policing being a major strand of the effort. The perspective of democracy as majoritarianism, lying at the root of institutional decomposition, requires review.

 

Privileging militarized policing alone may yield a diminishing deterrence value. There is a need to prevent the dastardly nature of terrorism limit the debate on ending it. The criminality of the act should not be allowed to delegitimise its political context. Even as the act and its perpetrator faces inexorably the long arm of the law, the arm should not itself be selective. While it is likely that the wider contestation over the definition of nationalism between civic constitutionalism and cultural-territorial nationalism would provide long term answers, the interim could be negotiated by a securitisation of the ‘roots’ of terrorism.

 

 

From the archives, penned on return from MONUC, DRC, 1 Oct 2003

MONUC AND INDIA’S PEACKEEPING CONCERNS

MONUC is the acronym of the French reading of the ‘UNO Mission in the Congo’. (To Congolese children it is simply an affectionate ‘Monique!’ tossed lightly at passing MONUC personnel!) It is an ambitious UN undertaking, in light of earlier perceived failures of the UN in Somalia and Rwanda. In fact, with regard to the latter, the MONUC is almost a kind of atonement, given that the failure in Rwanda sparked off the conflict in Congo that has required UN attention in the form of its most expensive mission, budgeted for this year at over $ 600 million. Expanded mandates indicate the interest of the international community in alleviating a human tragedy and international security threat that has consumed about 3.5 million lives. In its recent capture of CNN headlines through disturbances in its North Eastern Ituri region, glimpses of Congo’s broader plight can be obtained from the instances reported of cannibalism, tribal war, warlordism, child soldiers on drugs and murder of UN Military Observers. With India having recently contributed an Air Force contingent comprising attack helicopters and utility helicopters, and an infantry guard company for their protection, it is worth revisiting the conflict to assess if the Indian peacekeeping investment will be both secure and successful.

Despite its chequered history, the MONUC has delivered peace. Having implemented the initial phases of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, it is presently poised in support of the interim government that is to lead the country into democratic elections two years hence. The initial phases were the disengagement of belligerent forces and withdrawal to new defensive positions, overseen by military observers of MONUC. Thereafter, in Phase 2 of its operations MONUC verified the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese territory. However there are continuing allegations made by all sides, namely the two major rebel sides known by acronyms RCD (G) and MLC, and the government (GoDRC), of foreign presence abetting the other side. Since this admittedly intractable problem does not threaten strategic peace, the MONUC has rightly moved on to making DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Resettlement) as its Main Effort. This has necessitated a change in the deployment from overseeing peace along the ceasefire line between the three sides to concentration towards the East of the country where the main groups of fighters slated for voluntary DDRRR are anchored.

This has also required the expansion of the military component of the mission to include two Task Forces for undertaking the envisaged DDRRR. India had initially been a prime candidate for providing the troops for the Task Force owing to its formidable peacekeeping reputation and skills. In the event, the task has been taken on by South Africa in search for regional preeminence. A Indian helicopter contingent is to operate in support of the South African Task Force in furthering DDRRR operations in an area imagined loosely as a triangle with its apex resting at Kindu, a provincial capital, and its base stretching from Lake Edward to the North to Lake Tanganika to the South. The second Task Force, cornered by Bangladesh, has been diverted to the Ituri region owing to compulsions arising from the ethnic crisis between the Hemas and Lendus mentioned earlier. In September 03, it is slated to take over from the International Emergency Multinational Force, an EU contribution as its first ‘Out of Area’ operation, currently engaged in stabilizing the delicate ethnic conflict in Bunia, the capital of Ituri region.

DDRRR is a multi-million dollar enterprise funded by World Bank for foreign fighters in Congo. The program is ‘voluntary’ and envisages the move back to Rwanda of disarmed fighters for reintegration with civil society. The exit of these groups from Congo will not only partially reduce the internal military turmoil in Congo but will end Rwandese security interest in Eastern DRC as these groups are seen by Rwanda as an existential threat. Given this external security dimension of the problem, DDRRR is focused on more intimately by the UN. The groups targeted are the ex-FAR (Forces Armee Rwanda), comprising the Hutu elements of the former Rwandese Army, and the Interhamwe, a militia recruited in the mid-Nineties from the Hutu refugee camps that came up in Congo in the aftermath of the genocide.

The problems with this program are considerable. The areas that these groups operate in are largely anarchic, even though they are nominally in RCD (G) territory, a rebel faction propped up by Rwanda. These areas are controlled by the bush fighters called Mai Mai. Given this complexity, DDRRR becomes a difficult proposition at best and a non-starter at worst. In order to ensure these territories answer to a central authority based at Goma, the RCD (G) has launched multi axial operations. So long as these operations continue, the targeted groups would not yield themselves for DDRRR. Therefore the prerequisite for DDRRR is for an end to RCD (G) expansionist operations. This is an unlikely development given the political requirement of RCD (G) appearing as a rebel faction in control of its territory in order to extract maximum from the political engagement with the GoDRC in the Interim Government in Kinshasa.

DDRRR operations themselves have been low key, proceeding from ‘preliminary’ to ‘progressive’ in the period prior to the arrival of the Task Force and requisite air assets to penetrate into the interior. Thus far the focus has been in employment of civilian ‘facilitators’ with language skills on information operations under a civilian dominated DDRRR set up within the MONUC. These facilitators run a string of ‘contacts’ who are able bodied and conversant with the terrain. The contacts penetrate the jungle with the DDRRR message. Thus far their dragnet has yielded a steady stream of volunteers and their dependents that can at best be classified as ‘refugees’ rather than ‘former combatants’. For the process to be more effective there is a requirement of pro-active Milob-centric (Military Observer) contact operations. With the authority of the uniform, these Milobs would be better able to convince the leadership to volunteer their motley groups for the process. Presently, lack of security in the areas prevents Milob activity of this kind. At the moment the junior lot of soldiery are amenable to repatriation as they are too young to be implicated in the genocide. Given that the leadership comprises those ‘wanted’ for their role in the genocide by the UN Tribunal dispensing justice in the case, it is hardly likely that their accession would be readily forthcoming. The process can therefore be expected to do no better than to attract a steady trickle of weaponless deserters.

It is at this juncture that the Indian helicopter contingent, comprising five Mi 35 attack helicopters and five Mi 17 utility helicopters, acquires relevance. Not only must their role but also the threat thereto must be considered. Its political utility for India is in its visibility as a high profile military asset for a high stakes UN mission. This is in keeping with India’s larger bid for a UN Security Council seat, resting as it does partially on India’s half-century long inimitable peacekeeping record. In terms of military employability, the helicopter assets are to help deploy and protect Task Force troops sent into the proverbial African ‘bush’. The plan is to deploy ‘reception areas’ and ‘assembly areas’ in vicinity of the targeted groups for enticing them into the DDR process. These will of necessity have to be air maintained and secured owing to absence of road access in Congo’s interior. The groups are then to report at these centers, be disarmed, subject to the bureaucracy of registration etc, and then heli-lifted into rehabilitation camps in Rwanda for subsequent re-induction into civil society. The initial tasking of the helicopter assets would be to enable establishment of contact with these groups. This would involve extensive aerial recon, obtaining of security guarantees for the liaison work and landings and finally induction of Task Force troops and logistics for austere UN facilities to come up for DDRRR. Clearly, this is easier said than done.

The foremost problem is naturally of security, that of ‘who?’ will stand security guarantee in the jungle. The masterminds of the Tutsi genocide are unlikely to be keen on the process as it hits at their power base of forcibly recruited Hutu child fighters. While their combat power has been whittled due to absence of access to warlike material, they remain masters of a forbidding terrain in which finding targets for attack helicopters would be a near impossible task. Therefore it is only an acceptance of reality that the DDRRR process remains a ‘voluntary’ endeavor, with the MONUC using its political acumen rather than military muscle for inducing a sense of participation in these groups. The military assets could thus play a supportive role in this propaganda war as visible instruments ready to provide security to those willing to sign up. Indian diplomatic and military minders should carefully scrutinize any evolution of the mandate away from this restricted role, lest its brave airmen are put into harm’s way for no corresponding gain or appropriate purpose. The tendency to ‘creeping mandates’ has been a UN pathology that has marred its record in Africa. It is only prudent that a constant watch be kept in the mission area and in New York on the institutional factors and Security Council political dynamics that largely account for mission expansion despite sobering on-ground reality.

A word on the threat assessment of these assets while based at Goma, their place of deployment, is in order. Goma is a visually exciting place, nestling as it does on the lava slopes of the active volcano Mount Nyiragongo that merge with the inland sea, Lake Kivu. It is the politico-military stronghold of the strongest rebel movement in Congo, RCD (G) - G for Goma. As can be expected, the sway over Goma of the faction is complete, and its hold decreases only with distance from Goma. Therefore the assets are secure while at the helipad abutting the airstrip at Goma and guarded by alert Garhwali infantrymen who have earlier served in ‘hotter spots’ as Srinagar and Kargil. The over the horizon ‘threats’ can only arise from the presently far fetched possibility of an implosion within the RCD (G), in which splinter groups fight it out for control of their capital and its tactically important airport. Lastly is the threat from the materialization of the perpetual rumour of the Kivus region having an agenda of secession from Congo, given that it is mineral rich and physically, economically and emotionally forms part of the Great Lakes Region.

A positive outcome in terms of DDRRR has potential to emerge from the political outlook in Kinshasa. An interim government comprising representatives at Vice Presidential level from all factions has been formed under President Kabila. The integration of respective militaries of the rival factions is underway. Understanding reached at this level and cooperative working relationships established are hoped to over time ease the political factors that impact adversely on DDRRR in the East. A politically secure and placated RCD (G) would be in a better position to permit MONUC access to the targeted groups on its territory. An eventually integrated Army would be best positioned to induce, if not coerce, the groups in question for exiting Congolese territory. MONUC facilities could thus provide a safer and quicker way out for these groups. The success of DDRRR is further dependent on one other factor, it being the handling of indigenous groups of Congolese fighters, the Mai Mai, who as has been mentioned, are in a tactical alliance with the Interhamwe and ex FAR groups. It is envisaged that a program administered by the MONUC and funded by the UNDP will help resettle the Congolese groups. Once this is underway, the targeted groups will be isolated and their continued violation of Congolese sovereignty will attract no outside support, thus making DDRRR as their only option. It is recommended that the Indian contingent await these developments rather than to proactively seek a military ‘solution’ to the problem of kick-starting DDRRR. When this stage arrives or is imminent within a timeframe of about a year and more, India could revisit the question of contributing a Task Force comprising an Infantry Battalion to the MONUC to operate alongside its airmen.

Stating that peacekeeping in Africa is challenging would be an understatement. In other words it is fraught with the risk of situations spiraling out of control in fairly short order. Take for instance the latest crisis to emerge out of the ‘Heart of Africa’ (Joseph Conrad’s imperishable phrase), Congo. The situation in its Ituri province deteriorated to the extent of mass ethnic killings on account of inattention of the Security Council seized as it was with the Iraq War. This indicates that the institutional evolution of the MONUC (and at one remove the UN) is not of the order as to be able to handle multinational military operations, particularly in crisis situations. Therefore entrusting Indian military assets to the UN must be with the caveat that a national veto will attend their employment when dispensing force. This would ensure no abuse or misuse of national military power placed at the disposal of the UN occurring for reasons of organizational perversity or hidden power games that an unromantic look at any UN deployment will reveal. A manner of doing so would be to have Indian military staff officers in key decision making positions of operational control over these air assets, and later over a putative Indian Task Force. Interestingly, the civilian political wing of the MONUC presently does not have a single Indian! The Indian Milobs number 41 at last count. An endeavor at New York must be to get them into positions of authority in the mission which would be beneficial for both the mission and for India. 

Congo requires every support that the international community can extend to enable it to emerge from its testing times. Its leaders have made giant strides in reconfiguring their country from its time of war. India could extend a supportive hand, not only for altruistic reasons, but also for strategic ones. There is a large Indian trading community in Congo and in Central Africa in general. India has a respected image as a political heavyweight in Africa and a considerable cultural influence, emanating incidentally from Bollywood. India would only be bolstering its strengths by being militarily involved through peacekeeping under UN auspices. Given the larger political gains expected thus, the risks attending any military undertaking in Africa must both be courted and negated with elaborate mental and procedural preparation. While lessons from India’s Liberia experience need to be taken into account, any unwarranted caution they impose is unjustified. It is a sprit of engagement that should inform India’s participation in MONUC and future peacekeeping in Africa.