From the archives, 20 Nov 2003 

THE THREAT OF WAR

‘Will Pakistan use the Bomb?’ is generally the question dealt with in security literature. Expectedly, a self-serving answer emerges from both India and Pakistan. Pakistan believes that the threat of nuclear weapons will avert war while India subscribes to the notion that war can be pursued without it turning into a nuclear one. Indications from the highest quarters in Pakistan, the latest one being that Pakistan will ensure a ‘no-win’ situation at the end of the next war, are that it does envisage use of nuclear weapons in conflict. India, for its part, prefers to believe in the robustness of its nuclear deterrent based on a ‘strategy of punishment’, for to concede otherwise would be to accept failure of its deterrence, if not the very logic of deterrence itself. 

A more pertinent question would be ‘How will Pakistan use the Bomb?’ A plausible answer to this would imply that the next war could well be nuclear war. Whether such a future is in the offing for South Asia would depend on the threat of war. The examination of the threat of war here reveals that war despite the onset of the nuclear age war is not quite passé.  

 

The foremost utility of nuclear weapons for Pakistan is political, in that the nuclear backdrop helps keep the international community’s attention reverted on the subcontinent during periodic Kashmir related crisis. Under the nuclear umbrella, Pakistan has ventured to promote unrest in Kashmir. Militarily, the message explicit from Pakistani quarters is that it has contemplated a ‘First Use’ doctrine for its nuclear weapons, betraying shades of a ‘strategy of denial’. India for its part has been seeking a way out of this strategic dilemma posed it by Pakistan. It has recently been attempting to reduce the space available to Pakistan for prosecution of its ‘proxy war’ through propagating ‘Limited War’ thinking. Militarily, Indian nuclear doctrine has been fairly consistent about the ‘No First Use’ principle. In a nutshell, while India may not resort to nuclear weapons, the same cannot be expected of Pakistan. While India may like to downplay nuclear weapons and the nuclear backdrop, the reverse would be the case both politically and militarily with Pakistan.

 

The Indian doctrine of infliction of ‘unacceptable damage’ in retaliation is only credible in the circumstance of ‘first strike’ by an adversary. This is however the least likely manner in which Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons given the credibility of Indian deterrence in this case. Pakistan is also not likely to wait till regime or state survival is threatened, even if doing so would make its case for ‘going nuclear’ compelling in light of the ICJ ruling on the legality of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan when pushed to the wall would be left with the option of a wargasmic ‘first strike’, prompted by crisis generated ‘use it or lose it’ thinking. This would be at a juncture when the staggering regime is least able to conduct such a strike. India is also not likely to provoke Pakistan by pegging its war aims that high. Therefore for nuclear capability to be of any use to Pakistan, it would be only to redress India’s superiority, both in terms of general conventional superiority and in the area of operations. ‘Rational’ use would imply non-escalatory employment to influence a battle-field situation while deriving political level benefits in terms of international war termination pressures on both sides.  Therefore, enquiry as to how Pakistani ‘nuclear use’ will transpire at lower levels of the nuclear threshold is both legitimate and appropriate.

 

It is widely assessed that Pakistan likely imitates the erstwhile NATO philosophy of offsetting an opponent’s conventional superiority, There is however one departure from the NATO model. While with the NATO, conventional forces were to act as ‘tripwire’ for a Tactical Nuclear Weapons based counter, Pakistan probably departs from this knee-jerk nuclear use in attempting first to best India conventionally. This it could attempt to do in the belief that Indian aims, that are likely to be ‘limited’ in keeping with the new ‘Limited War’ thinking in India, may require commitment of only a proportion of India’s conventional forces. With limitation manifesting in terms of force levels, objectives and areas of operations, Pakistan may feel bold enough to be able to meet the challenge conventionally.

 

In so far as ‘nuclear use’ is concerned in such a scenario, it may be prompted by threat to or loss of a city or place of some importance. Even if India attempts to avoid posing such a threat, misperception of Indian aims, very much possible under the proverbial ‘fog of war’, could trigger a nuclear response. Nuclear weapons would be so employed as to influence the tactical situation, defensively and on its own territory, while the breach of the nuclear taboo would be the intended political effect. This would be a feasible option for Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority to envisage, since the limited nature of the war, at least in its early stages, would not have affected the capacity for strategic direction of this nature. Pakistan can therefore be expected to resort to a deterrence strategy based on ‘a threat that leaves something to chance’, meaning that though it may not choose to employ nuclear weapons, they cannot be discounted altogether.

 

Pakistan could also preemptively employ the nuclear weapon as a ‘green field’ option on its own territory, particularly in its sparsely inhabited desert region, in areas of likely advance by Indian armored forces prior to their attack. Locally this would make the area unsuitable for speedy armor operations and thereby canalize the Indian attack to where Pakistan could cope with the attack. At the political level it would focus international opinion in such a manner as to make the intended Indian offensive a non-starter. India’s nuclear doctrine itself rules out an Indian nuclear response since it contemplates nuclear use only in case of threat of use or use of WMD against it or its forces. Thus India’s preference in such an instance could be to continue sitting on the blocks in keeping the precedence of Operation Parakram rather than begin fighting conventionally under terms dictated by Pakistan. Attempting to prevail elsewhere in built up, thickly inhabited areas further north would be to fight against a defender’s advantages.

 

That India has partially thought through this conundrum posed by Pakistan can be discerned from the ongoing developments in the security field. India is attempting to recreate its conventional superiority by having new CRPF units release its BSF from policing duties in urban Kashmir, who would in turn substitute the Army’s defensive units elsewhere for offensive use. A massive influx of equipment and weaponry into all three services through deals with Israel, Russia, UK and USA points towards movement of Indian strategy from ‘compellence’ implicit in the ‘coercive diplomacy’ practiced in Operation Parakram to ‘dominance’ by force of arms if necessary in future. In the nuclear field, visible progress in the form of raisings of missile units is no doubt being matched by computer simulation based progress in warhead design and miniaturisation. India’s movement towards structures enabling nuclear war fighting presently lacks only the creation of a Chief of Defense Staff. The aim of India appears to be to attain ‘escalation dominance’ across the conflict spectrum in order to ensure that it can prevails at any level. With Pakistan suitably impressed, it can then be compelled to fight at the level chosen by India, rather than escalate - for even at any higher level the outcome would not be materially different and at a greater cost. India’s propounding of the twin doctrines of ‘Limited War’ and ‘No First Use’ are designed to deflate any Pakistani impetus to escalation to the nuclear level.

 

An economically weaker Pakistan cannot hope to match India’s trajectory militarily. India’s modernization initiatives, based on a series of enhanced defense budgets post-Kargil, will bear fruit over the near term. Thereafter India will have the option to employ its superiority of a higher order than hither to fore for enforcing a military end to Pakistan’s ‘proxy war’. The interim is therefore a rapidly closing window of opportunity for Pakistan. Pakistan may be tempted to refocus world attention on Kashmir in an unambiguous manner before India becomes unchallengeable. From the manner the Diwali Peace proposals were offered by India and greeted in Pakistan, the Indian peace initiative of last summer can be deemed to have run its course. A military adventure may therefore appear to Pakistan’s military regime as not only the best suited but also the only choice to concentrate minds on the K word. While in doing this Pakistan would stay clear of offensive use of nuclear weapons, these will enter the picture, as discussed, once India’s ‘befitting’ reply gains momentum.

 

Since it takes ‘two to tango’, even the best-intended ‘Limited War’ is likely as not turn into a nuclear war sooner than later, albeit becoming only a ‘Limited Nuclear War’. It can thus be hazarded here that the foreseeable future up until at least the middle term is fraught. The near term danger emanates from Pakistan following the precedence of its 1965 War launched in fear of India’s recovery from its 1962 defeat placing Kashmir forever out of its reach. Over the middle term the danger originates from India in case Pakistan has by then not shriveled up and fallen off by the way side as per the expectations of Indian strategists in emulating Reagan’s strategy of early Eighties in exhausting the USSR.

 

The concluding observation here is that the threat of war has been accentuated by the convergence of two factors, namely the two diverse nuclear doctrines and the diverging levels of war preparedness. With increasing strength of religious radicalism in both polities this threat can only accentuate. War will continue to remain a threat, waiting to spring on an unsuspecting populace with the provocation being as low key as the report of a Kalashnikov. While respective security establishments are aware of this and are preparing accordingly in the only way they know how, civil society’s complacent belief that Indo-Pak relations are but a series of crisis may be rudely shaken. It is time therefore to dwell on the logical implications of India’s military trajectory, Pakistan’s persistence with its folly in Kashmir and the illogic of nuclear deterrence. 

 

 

 From the archives, 2 Sep 2003

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

 An article in a recent Pratividrohi (March 03, p. 51) gives out ‘Pakistan’s future strategy’ as under:

 “Pakistan has dovetailed its support to its insurgency in Kashmir with other sinister machinations in the interiors of our country. Its future aims are:

• Force violent right wing reaction by engineering communal clashes.
• Coerce the Muslim population to instigate insurgency in other parts of the country.
• Destabilise Indian polity through espionage, urban terrorism, sabotage, communal discord and economic manipulation.
• Culminate in the break up of the Indian Union into numerous smaller states.”

 

In the author’s perception this ‘strategy’ is doubtless a culmination of the present

 

“game plan to escalate trouble in Kashmir…and simultaneously exploit insecurities of the Muslims of our country to create communal incidents across the length and breadth of the nation and thereby apply the ‘Kashmir formula’ elsewhere.”

 

If this formulation were merely an individual’s perception, it would not have been remarkable. The fact is that it has acquired the status of ‘common sense’ within the Service as evidenced by similar expression in other service journals. The troubling issue that the critique here deals with is the underlying assumption that Muslim India is subvertible, if not already subverted. The assumption, however widely held, is untenable and on that account downright derogatory.

 

There is no denying that in the games State’s play, ‘insecurities’ of one are exploited by the other. Pakistan is no exception if it were to ‘exploit’ Indian vulnerabilities in terms of an ‘insecure’ minority. It must be unapologetically remembered that India has played a like hand with vastly greater finesse elsewhere. Therefore the answer clearly lies in introspection and preemption. Notions that Op Topac (a semi-fictionalised piece of scenario writing by an Indian Defence Review Research Team) was Pakistan’s ‘Kashmir Formula’, and it is repeatable ‘across the length and breadth of the nation’, militate against such an exercise.

 

The author also appears to subscribe to the idea that ‘violence’ perpetrated by the ‘right wing’ is ‘reactive’. It accounts for his understanding that to Muslims can be attributed ‘communal incidents’. Three points emerge. One is that greater agency is accorded to the minority than warranted, while denying the same to the ‘right wing’. Secondly, while a whole community is being implicated for the violence, only the ‘right wing’ is deemed as a other participant. Like disaggregation of the minority community is not thought to be relevant or necessary. Lastly, sensitivity to the possibility that such a perception favors the political agenda of the ‘right wing’, and therefore, could well have been fostered by it, escapes subscribers to the formulation.

 

The article also errs in giving Pakistan an unrealistic capacity for manipulation. Not only is its ISI deemed to be able to ‘force the muslim population to instigate insurgency’but also ‘coerce the right wing to violence’. It can be conjectured that Pakistan has a more reasonable self-assessment, based on which it would set itself attainable ends, rather than vainly countenance the farfetched ‘break up of the Indian Union’. As with Pakistan’s case of 1971, such an outcome would only be the result of implosion brought on largely by unchecked prejudices such as the one at the center of the formulation discussed here. Therefore the first step to avert the unlikely scenario is a timely and uncompromising rebuttal as attempted here.

 

It is important that the respectability acquired by the formulation through repetition, rather than rigorous argumentation or research, be dissipated by contestation thus. Failing to do so would widen its influence to the extent as to render any meaningful security analysis awry. More importantly it would render the ‘apolitical’ status of the service questionable - an unthinkable and irretrievable fallout. 

 

 

 

 

 From the archives, 11 Oct 2003

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Apropos Book Review by Maj Kapil Rana of ‘Beyond Terrorism – A New Hope for Kashmir’ published in Infantry (India), June 2003, pp. 126-27.

Firstly, it is not understood why such a dated book has been reviewed. Book Review columns are generally devoted to bringing desirable books recently published to the attention of the readership or to refocus on books that have acquired the quality of being classics. The reviewer claims, as late as June 2003, that ‘the book sheds new light on the Kashmir problem’! The only reason the review could have been acceptable is if the reviewer had elaborated on his cryptic comment: ‘Another interesting thing about this book of 1994 is that the events professed by the author in a ‘Soothsayer fashion’ are turning out to be correct.’ Only on reflection on how the author’s crystal ball gazing has been retrospectively validated could have lent credibility to the review. Not doing so raises the issue as to the criteria of inclusion and exclusion of book reviews being followed by Infantry (India) and the necessity for their revision.

 

Secondly, and more pertinent are the passages below:

 

‘He (Mr. Khurshid) was the Minister for (sic) External Affairs when he wrote this book and this makes it more significant and authoritative.’

 

‘The unique feature of the book is that it presents India’s viewpoint about the J&K Issue (sic) with the author being the incumbent (sic) Minister of External Affairs besides being a ‘Indian Muslim’s’ view – the ones who are supposedly oppressed in the eyes of the Western world.’

 

It is not understood as to why the reviewer deems it necessary to remark on the religious affiliation of the author of the book under review. Why is it thought so ‘interesting’ in the reviewer’s words? The questions that arise are:

 

- Why does the reviewer think that an ‘Indian Muslim’s’ view would be different from ‘India’s viewpoint’ as to remark on the coincidence?

 

- Even if in the ‘eyes of the Western world’ ‘Indian Muslims’ are ‘supposedly oppressed’ (an arguable proposition at best), how does and why should a Muslim Indian’s ventilating of his views justify the Indian position any more than that of any other Indian?

 

The point that emerges is that the idea of Muslim Indians being different from the so called ‘national mainstream’, the spreading of which has been the agenda in certain political quarters, appears to have found a constituency in the Army, as witnessed by the reviewer’s inviting of attention to the fortuitous and entirely irrelevant aspect of religious affiliation of the author then serving as Foreign Minister. If this is true then this is truly an unfortunate development.

 

Lastly, Hari Singh’s ‘historic letter’ has been dated to ’26 Oct 1944’!

 

 

 

 

From the archives, 19-8-2003 

A QUESTION OF IDENTITY: THE LEADER-MANAGER BINARY

‘Identity’ has been central to recent theoretical discussions in academic disciplines ranging from Sociology to Management. Security Studies have been no exception. In Security Studies, ‘the question of identity’ has surfaced repeatedly and at times controversially, testifying to its importance. This is self-evident from the various arguments using identity as referent in debates at the macro plane: the outbreak of instability post Cold War has been attributed to identity based conflicts between human collectivities; the famous Huntington thesis has it that today’s world order can be best explained as a ‘clash of civilizations’ based on religio-cultural identification of states and social groups; to some, persistence of the Indo-Pak conflict owes to Pakistan’s need for an identity other than being a mere negation of India’s democratic and secular polity; there is a school of thought subscribing to the view that the Kashmir problem has origin in the attempted redefinition of Kashmiri identity away from an inclusive Kashmiriyat to a fundamentalist Islamist one. It is only natural therefore that the resulting effervescence of literature on the vexed question of identity has also found reflection at the micro plane.

 

At the micro plane, the discussion regards identity in Security Studies has contributed to the growth of Military Sociology. The landmark study by the aforementioned Huntington, The Soldier and the State, dealing with officership as a profession, defined the military’s role as ‘management of the means of violence’. In this definition lies the origin of the controversy over the primary identification of the officer corps - as Warrior-Leaders or Managers. Successor studies in the same genre by Janowitz (The Professional Officer) and Moskos (The Institution-Occupation Debate) are indicative of the search for, if not a crisis of, identity of the military professional through the preceding half-century. The on-ground situation that this theorizing helped explicate has been summed up in a passage in the ARTRAC publication on Leadership thus:

 

“…even the Armed Forces in USA replaced leadership with management…The Americans lost that war (Vietnam War), the only war they have lost in their history. One of the major reasons that contributed to this set back was that they had discarded leadership in favor of management.” (p. 9)

 

There are two strands in the theoretical discussion on identity – that of the individual and that of the collective identity as a corporate entity. As regards the former, Psychology informs that individuals subsume within their composite whole multiple identities. Furthermore, individuals not only self-select to identities but also have these devolve or thrust on them. For instance, a person may be a liberal-humanist and yet be categorized by religious denomination by the very sound of his name. An individual could simultaneously be Indian, cosmopolitan, an ex NDA, a father, an army officer, an Infanteer, a regimental officer, conservative and more pertinently both a leader and a manager. The identity that comes to fore would vary with the circumstance. Thus there is no contradiction in a leader who can also manage and a manager who also leads.

 

Nevertheless, there is a primary identity that best sums up an individual. This commonplace logic is also not without its complexity. Firstly, his self-perception of his identity may differ from that perceived by others. There may be a disjuncture between perception and reality. For instance an officer may consider and project himself as a Tiger. While he may convince himself and those who write his reports, many among his subordinates may remain skeptical. Secondly, between polarities, such as, for instance, religious and agnostic, it is relatively easy to locate an individual. It is relatively more difficult should the binary be envisaged as a spectrum, as is the case with the Leader-Manager binary. The situation and role would require the officer to draw on the two different identities, namely leader and manager, subsumed within him, amongst other identities latent under the circumstance.

 

Likewise, Organizational Theory’s reveals that corporate identity, such as that of a Service, or of its components like the Infantry, is equally problematic to delineate and forge. The kind of weaponry, structures, logistics and technology involved in modern war considerably privileges management at the expense of leadership. The Service being heterogeneous has its components lend it their chief characteristics. From this contention emerges the dominant identity of the Service. For instance, the Air Force glorifies the identity of a ‘flyer’ and within this identity that of a ‘fighter pilot’. Thus the identity of choice and necessity for Air Forces anywhere is that of the ‘combat flyers’ rather than of avionics experts or maintenance engineers. Correspondingly, for an Infantry heavy army, as is the Indian Army, and one so enmeshed in Infantry intensive operations as LIC and manning of the LC, AGPL and LAC, there is no denying that Infantry ethos will have a determining influence on Service identity. (This may not be the case with the US Army, given its current doctrine of having combat arms in a mop up role when firepower has already won the war for it.) Clearly, the operational circumstance, prevailing doctrine and organization of a force have a bearing on its self-image.

 

With that as theoretical backdrop, it remains to determine what ‘ought’ to be the primary individual identity of an Infantry Commander and the consonant collective identity of the Infantry. This owes to identity being the defining ingredient of organizational ethos and culture. It helps build cohesion, considered as a critical battle-winning factor. An organizational culture that commands consensus within an organization prevents dissonance and confusion that would otherwise result from identity ‘falling between two stools’ as it were. A positive cycle develops with members identifying with the dominant organizational ethic through appropriate socialization, and in turn deepening both corporate and individual identities.  There is thus a need for arriving at some clarity as to identity, and appropriating the dominant identity, in this case making an enlightened choice between Leadership and Management, to subserve war-waging ends. 

 

It is best to imagine the Leader-Manager binary as a spectrum owing to two causes. First is that ‘Command’ subsumes both leadership and management functions. It must be noted that even the head of the smallest sub-unit, a Section, is deemed a ‘Section Commander’.  Secondly, both individuals and collectives locate at different points along the spectrum depending on circumstance and conjuncture. For instance the management function would naturally demand greater attention from an Adjutant than from a Company Officer. Thus the same individual would have to be both a manager and a leader so as to make possible and smoothen this somewhat frequent transition between jobs. For a collective as the Infantry, evolution as evidenced by the induction of new equipment and weaponry and educated manpower, would see its collective identity necessarily move from the leadership end to the management end over time. Nevertheless, identification of the primary identity of Infantry Commanders is in order, for logical identification of the collective identity of the Infantry.

 

In so far as what ‘ought’ to be this identity, there is one defining imperative for a fighting arm, more so the Infantry - it being summed up in the adage: ‘You cannot manage men to what may be their deaths, you have to lead them.’ The Infantry’s role in battle being ‘to close with and capture or destroy the enemy’ or ‘deny a piece of ground’, there is no escaping death as a feature of combat. Therefore, the leadership function will continue to overshadow the management function. (This argument incidentally remains true for the US Infantry even if this is not so with the US Army.) It is but a corollary that an Infantry commander at any level, from a Section to a Division, will require to be primarily a Warrior-Leader, even as he is alongside also a Manager. The fact is that the closer a commander is to where the ‘dying gets done’ and to direct charge of the troops who are to ‘do the dying’, in terms of hierarchical level, distance and time, the more pronounced is the leadership function. This is more intimately so for commanders at the junior level, who are therefore rightly referred to as ‘junior leaders’. Since they are the mainstay at the spear end where results are achieved, their primary identity will naturally color the identity of their collective, the Infantry. Resort to analogy from the Air Force is instructive. Since only ‘fighter pilots’ perform combat duties delivering the desired results, their identity defines that of the Air Force. There is therefore little difficulty in identifying the identity of the Infantry as ‘Leadership’ as against ‘Management’.

 

Having discussed the ‘ought’, a look at the actuality is in order. We need look no further than Kargil for an answer. However, a revisit to the vaunted officer casualty-ratio may be instructive. While this statistics underlines the Warrior-Leader identity of junior officers, it serves to obscure the inadequacy of the same of the JCO cadre that comprises Platoon level leadership. There is a case to be made out as to the questionable wartime utility of this literally and figuratively bloated cadre. Alternate avenues for social mobility for the soldiery require institution rather than compromising on combat effectiveness in this manner. Secondly, it is for consideration whether the cynicism expressed in the barroom distinction oft made between a ‘good’ and ‘successful’ officer is smoke of a raging fire. This springs from the requirement of honing and demonstration of managerial expertise so as to exhibit qualification for higher ranks and tenanting career appointments that give greater job satisfaction. This could well be at the expense of Warrior-Leadership traits, particularly when senior levels may inadvertently reward mirror images of themselves. It is for this reason the highest level in the Infantry hierarchy of the Division, must subscribe to the Infantry identity of Leadership, even if higher the level, the greater is the call on managerial abilities. It is only at the operational and strategic levels, that leadership subsumed within a dominant management can be practiced.

 

The problem therefore boils down to ensuring Leadership as primary identity for commanders at any hierarchical level in the Infantry, in order that the collective identity of the Infantry remains sacrosanct. The latter would establish a closed loop with its incremental positive feedback. That the Infantry has been continually in operations over the past decade has helped in this. The demands of operations have kept the Warrior-Leader to the fore, while not discounting the contribution of the ‘Manager’ within each commander to the heartening results. That a few ‘climbers’ (For an apt definition of this term please see the concluding section of the ARTRAC pamphlet ‘Leadership’!) ‘manage’ to project themselves as Leaders only testifies to consensus on the primacy of Leadership over Management as the primary identity of its members and the collective identity of the Infantry. Continued emphasis on this aspect through an appropriate incentive-reprimand regime would serve to foreground this aspect, given that, owing to the very success of the Infantry, operational commitments appear to be winding down over the foreseeable future. Such measures would guard against a replication of the draw down from the professional heydays of 1971 ending in the rude awakening at the Battle for Jaffna.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 From the Archives, 16-6-2002

 REFLECTION ON THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

 ‘Nuclear weapons are meant for deterrence rather than fighting a war.  The two superpowers ie. USSR and US had perfected the language and grammar of nuclear deterrence dialogue.  In view of India, as well as its potential adversaries being nuclear powers, is the threat of a conventional war diminishing?  Do we still need to maintain large standing armies?’

 

The proposition advanced above is that strategic space for conventional wars has constricted in the era of nuclearisation.  The fear of escalation beyond the nuclear threshold is the principal war deterrent factor. Given this the conclusion arrived at is that with the possibility of conventional wars receding, the prospects of mass armies are diminished.

There is however a contrary view, with two divergent offshoots.  The position is that given strategic stability brought on by mutual nuclear deterrence, the scope for sub-nuclear threshold conflict exists.  In its Pakistani variant, the understanding is that nuclear weapons deter not only nuclear weapons but also war itself.  This opens up the sub-conventional portion of the spectrum of conflict whereby ‘proxy war’ can flourish.  Cognizant of this, the Indian variant has an echo of early Cold War theorizing, in which ‘Limited War’ was seen as justifying conventional preparedness.  Therefore, in the Indian view, conventional armies have a continuing relevance in the nuclear age.

The point is that conventional war in its Limited War avatar is seen as enabling continued utility of the military as a political instrument.  It is another matter as to how this military must be configured.  The foremost impact in terms of any reconfiguration from the ‘mass’ characteristic modern armies is not of the nuclear aspect (as given in the proposition), but that of technology.  Therefore, the assumption in the proposition that a nuclear armory implies a leaner army is misplaced.  An example is that both China and the USSR had mass armies coexisting with a massive nuclear arsenal.

This is likely to be the fate of both India and Pakistan.  Pakistan will continue to require a large army to be able to combat an Indian conventional response to its proxy war.  Substituting it with nuclear reliance may not be prudent in face of the declaratory Indian nuclear doctrine of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in retaliation for any nuclear use against it or its forces.  Likewise, India cannot escape the logic of a large conventional army.  It is required not only to fight the proxy war but also to deter it.  Indian military preponderance is the singular factor that keeps Pakistan from raising the intensity of the proxy war beyond the threshold of Indian patience or tolerance.  There is also the threat scenario (a maximalist’s delight) in which India may have to take on a ‘one and half’ to ‘two front’ war.  Thus mass will continue to be a defining characteristic into the middle term.

As mentioned earlier mass can be transformed into muscle with technology.  However, technology infusion into an army is also not enough.  The absorption of the same requires a sociological environment conducive to the same.  This has two dimensions – one is internal to the service and the other is external.  In the case of the Indian Army neither is heartening enough to venture prediction to the contrary.

External to the Army, the fact is that while Corporate India has responded adequately to the demands of the Information Age, `Sarkari’ India has only lately begun to.  The government will be politically imprudent to countenance beginning reform in terms of down sizing with its strongest instrument, the Army.  As long as disinvestment remains taboo there will be little impetus from without for the Army to lose its flab.  The second external factor is the assiduousness with which Pakistan addresses the power asymmetry with India.  By tying down the Indian military power surplus from Kargil to Kashmir, it ensures that budgetry factors also intrude into any consideration of reorientation from a low cost mass to a techno-savvy capital intensive army. 

The prospects of an internal thrust towards the same are also none too convincing.  Certain selective miniscule segments are at a technological frontier.  However operational demands conspire to keep incentives towards expansion of this sector below par. The proxy war battlefield does not compel a departure from the traditionalist approach.  The strengths of the rural peasantry are still the mainstay of the premier fighting arm - the Infantry.  Innovations such as the suppression of 50000 vacancies recently are absorbed by ongoing institutional expansion.  Lastly is the question of inter-regiment, inter-arm and inter-service rivalry. The relative salience of each at the end state of the downsizing exercise will be fought over in the run up to downsizing.  Where institutional expansion is a norm, this will be a veritable Kurukshetra   

Having addressed the dimension of size, the question requires a look at whether ‘standing’ armies are obsolescent.  Here again the Indian concept of `naukri’ will prevent any importation of market place principles.  Whereas it may make economic sense to have smaller armies with members on negotiated tenures, the pension bill is unlikely to go down any time soon.  The Army is already at the lower end of the job popularity ratings scale.  If its mainstay - the fact that its institutional bias caters for ‘teenage to grave’ support systems - is withdrawn, it is likely to attract far fewer recruits than it does.  It would be a misinterpretation were we to believe that the crowds at post–Kargil recruitment rallies were brought on by patriotic fervor rather than for a chance at an assured income.

A lean army that expands in contingencies is possible given the surfeit of recruitable manpower in India.  However, our extended commitments and periodic moblisations in face of continuing threats dispel possibility of adopting this option.  This second disadvantage is that the manpower will be harder to train in the short time frames granted by impending threats, and therefore, will be less combat worthy on employment. Variants of the conscription model mooted from time to time may not prove attractive enough.  A potential short service candidate will weigh the nature of duties required against the skills he will miss out on in committing a portion of his youth to military service.  The military effectiveness of such short tenured troops in politically sensitive assignments as internal security is debatable.  They will import civilian value systems that will contaminate the military ethic already under strain.

Having addressed the questions posed, it is time to sum up the argument thus far.  The threat of war has not receded owing to nuclearisation. A ‘large’ ‘standing’ army is not obsolescent on account of nuclearisation either.  Having said that, we now turn to two elements of the proposition, namely, that nuclear weapons are not meant for war fighting, and, secondly, that the Cold War protagonists had ‘perfected the language and grammar’ of nuclear deterrence.  The proposition is in favor of the theology of deterrence.  It buttresses its claim through a reading of cold war history.  Neither is sustainable individually and fare no better together.

There are alternate readings in Cold War historiography.  A powerful critique has it that the Cold War was `cold’ less by design than by sheer good luck.  The accidents and misperceptions are now more generally known.  Of greater importance is the fact that the Cold War warriors were satisfied powers having conceded to each other primacy in respective spheres of influence.  Where the boundaries were hazy, such as in the Third World, the rivalry played itself out.  Since these areas were outside the central strategic balance that prevailed in Europe, there was the incidence of the Long Peace.  Millions in the Third World were victims to the neo-colonial presence of extra territorial powers and their wars by proxy.  In other words, war has been a prevalent phenomenon in the nuclear age. That it did not involve the super powers in direct confrontation is better explained by factors other than nuclear weapons.

The mutual accommodation that existed between the superpowers over core issue areas (as Europe) is marked by its absence in the subcontinent.  Here two nuclear powers jostle for strategic space.  An unresolved territorial dispute with ideological dimensions incites political rhetoric and military action – the raw material for doomsday scenario writers.  Rightist agendas, political demagoguery, and street power complicate the strategic calculus.  In this equation, Pakistan is a revisionist power, the weaker state and is ruled by the military.  India is also a power manifestly in search of a place on the high table. In effect, ambition can prove to be the Achilles heel of strategic rationality. Therefore, the belief that deterrence worked in the Cold War and can be replicated closer home is untenable.

Given that inadvertent and pre-meditated war is a possibility, there is no guarantee it will remain non-nuclear.   Kargil as an example of Limited War can be explained by the strategically inconsequentiality of the theatre it was fought in.  The fact is that notable impetus existed for the expansion of war through the agency of a bellicose public, adventurist politician and opportunist media.  Even the normally reserved Indian Army expressed its position in favor of expansion of the theatre of war.  The point is that even Kargil war fortuitously limited - the role of Clinton and Sharif being central to it having remained so.

What emerges is that war will recur.  The problem is that nuclear weapons are available and have legitimising doctrines, target laundry lists and a growing institutional superstructure.  With miniaturisation, their tactical use is also envisaged.  The pre-disposition of this cumulatively to escalation is notable.  The contention here is that not only is war a possibility but that it shall be a nuclear one is a distinct probability. In a nutshell, war as an extension of politics, and the military as an instrument of politics, is unthinkable.

If that is so, the logic of the proposition needs to be turned on its head. The understanding of the inapplicability of power as a conflict resolution mechanism must now supercede the belief that power is the ultimate arbiter of disputes. Conventional modes of thought wherein the quest is for identifying renewed utility for military force through its reconfiguration cannot cope with the changed paradigm brought on by the nuclear factor. The need is to re-energise the political strand of conflict management means and mechanisms wherein an obsolescent military instrument is justly confined to the periphery. In the military sphere, this translates as an imperative towards mutual and balanced force reductions, conflict avoidance and confidence building measures.

If the Cold War is at all to be drawn on for precedent then such thinking approximates the Helsinki Accords and détente – only the need is that much more relevant in the subcontinental context of a half-century of strained relations. It will help foster movement on the strategic cul-de-sac - it being that India needs a large standing army to address the proxy war and to deter its escalation; and that Pakistan needs the proxy war and the nuclear deterrent to offset Indian military superiority. Clearly, this has brought us no closer to resolution – if resolution is indeed considered a value in itself. The limits of strategic thinking having thus been reached, exploring other fields for answers is pertinent. Doing so will involve straining the limits set for the discussion. However, not to do so will leave the idea advanced here merely a theoretical one.

Whereas India would prefer its preponderance to be accepted as such by Pakistan, the fact is that Pakistan is a state of considerable size.  Besides the historical factor, this also complicates Pakistan’s willing acquiescence of the same. Thus the power struggle ensues with Pakistan straining to undercut India and India attempting to prevail. This is at grievous cost to its citizenry – Pakistan has lost half of its country, while India has been a victim of terrorism.  It is a status quo that cannot be militarily shaken.  The power imbalance is thus the crux issue.

Conventional strategic thinking in India seeks answers in terms of deepening the asymmetry, while in Pakistan it is to negate the same.  However, strategy has to be mindful of politics  - its goals being politically determined. the high profile nuclear route to gate crashing on the P5 having proved futile.  Given that the dividend from the high profile nuclear route to a global player status has proved less than anticipated, economic betterment of the masses may be found to be the road to strategic empowerment. Secondly, as long as Pakistan remains recalcitrant, India is unlikely to break out of its regional embrace.  Thirdly, there may be unpalatable costs in terms of a rightist swing in domestic politics of both countries.  Enlightened national interest, articulated by the political class, would therefore point towards innovative strategic thinking - wherein the answer to the Indian conundrum is not in power maximisation but power balancing, or to coin a term – power symmetrisation.

This cannot be done in isolation.  It has to be arrived at mutually.  It requires an effort to get Pakistan on board.  It is to retrieve the future from strategic determinism.  Since Pakistan’s immediate concern is India’s conventional superiority, and India’s ultimate concern is Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, both tracks will have to be tackled simultaneously.  Indian downsizing of its forces will dispel Pakistan’s need for a nuclear deterrent. This scenario is predicated on political will.  As of now ‘political will’ is referred to only in the bemoaning of its absence by hard-liners in pursuit of a ‘proactive’ ‘ruthless’ response. To them political ‘will’ can only be demonstrated in being more uncompromising than the adversary. ‘Political will’ as understood here is the perspicacity to recognize the national interest in holistic terms and courage to pursue the same in face of the voluble and inevitable body of nay-sayers.

This may be more forthcoming when the renewal of strategic thinking in this direction gains currency in strategic circles.  The plain fact is that no self-respecting representative government can hold its citizenry hostage to a nuclear damocles sword.  Since that stage has arrived, a break through from the straitjacket of conventional strategic mode of thought requires enlightened political initiative.  For that to come about there needs to be a concentric expansion of adherents and proponents of this `new’ thinking to include intellectuals, public persons and institutions.  In the latter category is included the Indian Army.  It requires a paradigm shift, the beginnings of which must be made now – lest it be too late.  In so far as the Army, and indeed the Indian military, is concerned, let not institutional self-interest becloud its perception of service to the country and its people.

Having said that, a revisit to the original proposition is warranted.  The proposition has it that conventional wars are passe merely on account of the nuclear factor.  This is a dangerous fallacy - for conventional wars are very much on the cards, so long as prevalent strategic thinking remains in the conventional groove and institutional inertia persists into the twenty first century. This is particularly so within the Indian strategic community. Our position, adhered to by the Army too, is that nuclear war will be deterred by mutual possession of nuclear weapons, but not war itself. What is required is a change of conceptual edifice altogether.  Since nothing daunts more than a new idea, the effort involved in changing mental gears makes nonsense of the idea, implicit in the proposition, that the very threat of nuclear war outlaws conventional war.  Persistence of the conventional power oriented discourse, and the other retarding factors discussed in the early part of this essay, are what will ensure that it does not. Therefore the effort outlined here will be arduous in the extreme. The only incentive to embark on the same is to avoid the just desserts of intellectual sloth, a nuclear catastrophe.

 

From the archives, 25 Jan 2003

REFLECTION ON MILITARY ETHOS

                                                     

“Society has imbued the soldier with sterling qualities of character…his reputation and prestige must be built up, to make him physically and morally superior to the rest of the society…Social degeneration and increasingly materialistic norms in our country are bound to adversely influence soldiers also…”

     Lt Gen VK Kapoor, ‘Soldiering, Spirituality and Leadership’, Combat Journal, Sep 02

 

Theory has it that the military is a profession owing to the service it performs, of security, for state and society.  Therefore, the values inherent in all professions are to be part of the ethos of the military as well.  These include a sense of service and obligation, whereby the autonomy accorded to the profession for self-regulation, is not transgressed.  Whereas these are to be inherent in the military, there are a few additional features specific to it that are required to be present, particularly in militaries of democratic societies. 

 

Two major ones need to be mentioned here, namely, sense of subordination to the political imperative, and, secondly, the obligation of self-sacrifice should duty so demand. If these are constitutive of service ethos, the value systems of members will accordingly be conditioned.  Individual character traits that these systemic values encourage include non-partisan behavior and subordination of the self to the collective respectively.  The former is external in orientation linking the military with society, while the latter, internal to the military, is a measure of its cohesion.

 

A caveat needs introduction at this stage - it being that the military is a heterogeneous system.  The desirable traits will vary across it from the combat arms to the combat support elements.  The support elements owing to the nature of the job exhibit the managerial culture of their civilian peers.  However, it is the combat arms that have the distinctive and defining function in any military thereby separating it from the mainstream of national life.  They are at the operating edge where mission fulfillment may demand the ultimate in commitment.  Therefore the character traits its members exhibit are the ones referred to here and accepted as representative of the military.

 

A survey of the theory is useful as a measure of the reality.  The bias towards the Army owes to the central position it occupies on account of its size and commitment in national security affairs.  Therefore, the terms ‘military’ and the ‘Army’ are used synonymously here, and within the Army the reference to service ethos is directly concerning the combat arms.

 

The expansion over the years has lead to the Army getting to be more representative of society {as befits those of a democratic society}. The officer cadre is now drawn from the middle classes that are the most politically potent strata of society in liberalizing India.  It is only axiomatic that the restiveness of society under change seeps into the cantonments.  This permeability of cantonments has increased owing to the pervasiveness of mass media fostering a ‘pop’ culture.  This has led to a dilution in `island’ as descriptive of the secluded image of the military.  Given the heightened operational engagements of the military over the last two decades, there has also been an expansion of the military, particularly the Army, to cope with the same.

 

These two points taken conjointly have had a ‘civilianising’ influence on military culture.  Thus, ironically an army with a diluted service ethos now addresses the operational situation that demanded it. This makes the answer – expansion - a part of the problem.  This is a self-reinforcing problem.  A deepening operational commitment is reducing the opportunity and time for socialization of its members into military mores. In other words, the Army is fighting to losing battle in preserving its ethos.  This could eventuate in the Army literally fighting a battle it is unable to win on the operational front.

 

The intensity of LIC operations has necessitated deployment of additional numbers.  These have been created largely through amalgamation of myriad elements into a new paramilitary force.  Each constituent brings the baggage of the ethos into which it has been nurtured, to the high- tension environment.  The point is that inattention to the basics of a fighting man’s value system is itself evidence that the managerial ethic has penetrated warrior value systems at an inopportune juncture.  No doubt the warrior ethic is healthy at the spear tip preserved by a regimental system.  That the benefits of this have not been extended to the ‘paramilitary’ force engaged in the Army’s, if not the nation’s, greatest challenge yet is also well known.

 

The other parameter - apolitical behavior - needs also to be approached critically rather than reflexively.  The globalising phenomenon has lead to a certain cultural resurgence in all societies.  This has been particularly marked in the strata that provide the officer corps, specifically the middle classes.  Therefore for the officer corps to exhibit a similar consciousness is a high probability. Proof that this possibility exists can be gleaned from a textual analysis of service journals that carry articles reflecting the revivalism affecting larger society. There is an element of defensive nationalism and ideological conservatism discernible.

 

The argument that the military is but a cross section of society and will mirror it loses sight of the theoretical imperative that, as an instrument of polity, it has to stand autonomous from societal forces and political currents.  The point is that the military has to fight a rear guard action now to preserve its identity, autonomy, culture and unity.  The evidence is the Indian military is understandably finding it problematic to remain an ‘island’.  However, it certainly can preserve its core culture should it be seized of the issue. 

 

The assumption of continuing utility into the future of character values reflecting service ethos needs now to be addressed.  The responsibility of the military has not changed. However, the Revolution in Military Affairs has placed weapons in the control of the military whose usage requires stricter political oversight and input than hithertofore. The military is now unable to prosecute a conflict without reference to the other issue areas equally relevant to the outcome of such an enterprise. War cannot be left to the Generals alone. The understanding therefore is that the macro service ethos cannot remain unaffected. 

 

A corresponding change in character traits is axiomatic. This is true also at the micro-level as the very nature of the spear end itself is in the throes of change.  This process is underway elsewhere and replication of the same in India is but a matter of time. Assessment of the manner of change will of necessity be based on military models in the West in order not to reinvent the wheel and must be mindful of the socio-cultural context in which the evolution of those armies is taking place. 

 

The interesting theoretical insight emerges is that both the character attributes of members and the ‘military mind’ must undergo a change.  This owes to the fact that rising to the ultimate in dedication will not now normally be required, given the stand-off war-fighting tools of war available.  ‘Asymmetric war’ { taken in the sense of one waged by conventional armies as against that waged by irregulars} that ensures survival of the warrior will be engaged in.  Where force levels and technological prowess are about equal, mutual deterrence is likely to prevail.  The declining utility of the war waging tools owes to the heightened destructive potential that renders dubious the cost effectiveness of war as perceived in the economy-centric analysis of governments. The warrior is transformed, if not reduced, to being more a ‘manager of the means of violence’.  The ethos pervading such a system, and the character attributes of its members, will naturally be divergent from that of the armies of yore and the present. Thus the warrior ethos, though not obsolescent, is endangered. The point is that while the warrior ethic is still valid for modern Armed Forces, a post-modern military will require to exhibit a changed, diluted warrior ethos. This is occasioned by the Tofflerian insight that the value systems of the armies, and character attributes of their members, are of necessity different for agricultural age, industrial age and information age armies. 

 

Our military is indeed well on its way from being in a ‘war waging’ mode to being a ‘war deterrent’ one, to use terms coined by the leading military sociologist, Charles C Moskos.  The nuclear umbrella and the surge towards a technological edge are pointers.  However, ours is still a ‘mass army’ – the induction of a new generation of tanks, additional commissioning of young officers and the new paramilitary raising being evidence.  To an extent this is the last gasp of the subsets that lend ‘mass’, a feature most evident in the Army as against other services.  {This reinforces the recommendation of downsizing as an antidote – a matter that will require top–down enforcement, possibly under political intervention to regulate the backlash of vested interests.}

 

In India’s case, the Armed Forces are transiting from a modern to a post-modern future, as is the society they form part of. However, the combat arms, particularly of the Army, are as yet in the modern, industrial age. There is a need to reclaim the diluted warrior ethic appropriate to the circumstance on two counts. One is that the warrior ethic has not outlived its utility, reason being the widespread operational commitment requiring it. The second is that a future that necessitates a changed ethos is not quiet here. The imperative is an in-service return to the radical professional ethic for coping with the present. However to tackle the future, a managerial ethos more relevant to handling technology and technical hands may be privileged.

 

In conclusion it may be said that, firstly, the distinctiveness of the military value system has eroded under the assault of the socio-political change of revolutionary proportions underway in our society. Service ethos in the form of radical professionalism may need preservation against this onslaught. Secondly, the demands of future warfare compel a change in service ethos away from radical professionalism. Acknowledging the existence of the apparent contradiction here would help initiate measures then can enable re-institutionalizing the warrior culture to tide over the present, even if a warrior culture may be dysfunctional for the future.  The remedy over the long term is downsizing in order that the military obligation is met not by escapees from the job market as of now, but through self-selection of inductees, particularly in the officer cadre, being inspired only partially by traditional warrior traits. Over the middle term, there is need to progressively privilege managerial culture in order to usher in a post-modern technology intensive, war deterring military. In the short term, an in-service reemphasizing of the warrior ethic may yield operational dividend for the present day mass and civilianized army enmeshed in LIC. The challenge facing service ethos is in managing the contradictory pulls of the present and the future in face of the influence of the past.       

 

 From the Archives, dated 2-2-2003

MARTYRS AND INFANTRYMEN

The term ‘martyrs’ has increasing currency in referring to those who have made the supreme sacrifice in the line of duty. Since most of these heroes happen to be infantrymen, it is worth addressing the appropriateness of this term in an infantry forum. Doing so will enable us to dissect the core value – Duty. The nature of ‘duty’ has been of military interest since Shri Krishna dispelled the hesitation of Arjun on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Therefore, for the current generation of infantrymen to revisit this is warranted, if not an imperative. This article is an attempt in this direction.

 

Martyrdom, without going into etiology, is generally accepted as referring to the sacrifice of life itself in the defence or furtherance of beliefs and principles. It has been the fount of motivational energy, particularly in face of persecution. The martyrdom of the Sikh gurus exemplifies this understanding of the term. Historically, it has been linked with the profession of faith. Even today, the use of the term by the so-called ‘jehadis’ for their dead – ‘shaheed’ – underscores this.

 

Given its religious antecedents, it is debatable whether the term is unambiguously appropriate for the ‘Unknown Soldier’. The second reason uncritical acceptance of the term is not considered desirable is that it has not been applied for our departed comrades of our past soldierly engagements.

 

In the Indian tradition, the ‘kshatriya’ (Warrior) performed the duty of defending the society and state in the social division of labour. This was built upon in the British Indian army through the pseudo-concept of ‘martial races’. The instructive aspect of this system was the compelling concepts of ‘namak’ and ‘nishan’. In other words, the central idea has always been ‘Duty’ as defined by the nature of the calling.

 

The question that needs to be addressed is : ‘Duty unto what?’ This is best encapsulated in the line: ‘Theirs is not to reason why…’ It would appear that the defining of the ends and purpose of the military charter is not in the military’s domain. This echoes the Gita: ‘The fulfillment of duty is its own reward.’ The conclusion is that duty beckons regardless - faith and belief being incidental.

 

A look at the problem through the prism of civil-military theory is in order. This theory underpins the modern Indian state and therefore it is important to internalise it. The apex of the military hierarchy is to fulfil the functions of rendering advice and management of the means of violence. The exercise of choice amongst options furnished by the military and allied agencies is that of the elected political head. Therefore, even our constitutional scheme and governmental structure reinforces the inherited tradition of ‘duty’.

 

The notable point is that ‘belief’ is subordinated to ‘duty’. Therefore martyrdom is an inappropriate appellation for those who have passed the ultimate test of devotion to duty. They have met heroically with a professional hazard, something the terms and conditions of service had made amply clear when they had signed up.

 

Having made a case against embedding the term in our consciousness, it is worth examining as to why this process is now underway. Firstly, there has been resurgence in religiosity in general, an unexceptional phenomenon under the onslaught of globalisation. Evidence of its penetration into the force is in scenes as the lighting of the lamp even when in uniform in inauguration ceremonies, vocabulary as ‘shivshakti’ etc. Secondly, there is a danger of the essentialist doctrine professed by Pakistan – the ‘two nation theory’ – finding acceptability in India. The essentially secular territorial struggle between two nation states in the making is being transformed into an ideological contest. Here, the importance of beliefs is inherent. Therefore the motivational ingredient is no longer ‘duty’ but ‘ideology’. This explains the utility of the term ‘martyr’ in the internal spread of such dogma. Thirdly, the media is implicated in its prevalence. Adoption of the term by us is evidence of the power of the media, particularly the visual media.

 

An illustration of the apprehension raised here is in order.  Take the case of the Pakistan army. The reliance on islamic ethos has undercut its professionalism, demonstrated in its repeated forays into the politics of its country. For them and their jehadist proxies, martyrdom may have some meaning. However, for a secular dispensation as ours, convergence of vocabulary is questionable. Ideology, either denominational or secular (eg. Communism) cannot substitute professionalism as a war-winning recipe.

 

In summation it may be said that the tendency of our doctrine on motivation may need a revision. Modernity demands that the secular liberal ethos prevail in the force. Whereas this is the hallmark of the Indian army – it is so only on account of its vigilance. The infantry, that bears the brunt of sacrifice, has to be ever more so – lest its professional edge is dulled by erosion in the understanding of the concept of ‘duty’. It must reclaim the ‘Unknown Soldier’ from becoming a ‘martyr’.