https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/short-wars-creating-tomorrows-reality-2/?_sfm_volume=CXXXVII

Short Wars – Creating Tomorrow’s Reality  2008 USI Journal

Introduction Conventional wars have historically been resorted to with the intention of being kept short.  Military history proves that as often as not, this is not how wars have turned out.  The expectation that tomorrow’s wars will be short arises from the transition of South Asia  into the Nuclear Age. However, if tomorrow’s wars are to be short, two aspects will need to be kept in mind. The first is regards the elements which keep conflict duration limited, and,  secondly, are the factors that militate against this. Most studies on Limited War suggest a deliberate limitation to politico-strategic aims,  geographic spread, weapons and forces involved. Keeping conflict ‘limited’ is easier said on  account of factors that stoke the conflict spiral. This article dwells on the drivers of conflict,  through a look at military history and by analysing the current strategic reality in South Asia.  The concluding recommendations are for working on the pre-requisites of a Short War during  peace and in future conflict; these being, paradoxically, moderation of national passions, war  aims and military means. The lessons of military history The key impetus to conflict initiation has been the expectation of victory. Strategic sense  decrees that victory be obtained at the earliest and at minimum cost and risk. Political masters  considering war initiation in an inter-state setting have historically been persuaded of war as  an option only in case of a short duration war. Other than the nuclear factor, factors that  lend themselves to Short Wars have been present earlier. These include the role of international  organisations; international opinion and pressures; tacit understanding between adversaries;  sensitivity of leaderships to the underside of conflict, such as escalation and extension; and  finite military capabilities at the outset of war. But these have not proven consistently effective  in keeping wars short. Recourse to military history would help identify factors that bring about   a reality contrary to expectation. A review of military history reveals that most wars in the modern age dating to the Napoleonic  Wars have been long. Napoleon spent the better part of two decades at war prior to meeting  his Waterloo. The inspired manoeuvres of the revolutionary French armies led to his opponents  joining in concert, thereby prolonging the war1. The American civil war is taken as the first war  in which modern military systems, weapons and tactics made their rudimentary appearance. It  was a long war with Lincoln preserving the Union through a time-consuming strategy of  bringing the industrial might of the North to bear. The relatively brief campaigns of the Bismarck-Moltke era were on account of Prussia having  perfected the general staff system. Such momentary asymmetry can bring about quicker  victory; however, German triumph led to French revanchism culminating in the Great War2.  The First World War was embarked on by all sides with the expectation that, troops would be home for Christmas3. The static front owed to Moltke the Younger losing his nerve in carrying through the Schlieffen plan, evidence that the art in war can confound any science in it. The limitations of operational brilliance in the industrial age are revealed once again in the  next war. Blitzkrieg heralded joint-manship of a high order that won campaigns, but could  not withstand the test of war in the industrial age. Industrial capacity in case of Albert Speer’s  Germany was not of the order required to impose Hitler’s will4. Likewise in the East, Admiral  Yamamoto, who struck at Pearl Harbor, is quoted as saying: “In the first six to twelve months  of a war with the US and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”5 Ultimately, the Total War doctrine of ‘unconditional surrender’ ensured a prolonged contest eventuating in the nuclear age. The nearly half-century long Cold War, curiously dubbed ‘the long peace’,6 witnessed the  Superpowers contending through proxies in the Third World, with individual conflicts lasting  for decades. The three year long Korean War, energised ‘Limited War’ and escalation control  theories.7 The wars of colonial liberation were also long duration ones in Africa and South  East Asia. The Vietnam War, sustained in the belief that incremental application of force would  ensure its early conclusion, was a decade long. So was the Afghan war. In the post Cold War  era, wars, both conventional and sub-conventional, have largely been of long duration, be they  in central Africa, the Balkans and, indeed, counter intuitively, the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq War that  consumed half a million lives lasted seven years, being fuelled by all the Great Powers  interested in its extension for strategic and commercial reasons. The two Iraq Wars are taken as Short Wars and seen as heralding wars of the future.  However, this case is based on the interim between the two Gulf Wars being taken as a  period of ‘peace’- an arguable proposition in face of a decade long blockade, sanctions,  air space restrictions and episodic intervention using missiles and proxies leading up to an  assessed toll of half-a-million.8 Besides, the second Iraq War has self-evidently not quite  ended. The latest Israeli month-long incursion into Lebanon against the Hezbollah was a  short foray. That it cost the Army chief, General Dan Halutz, his job, indicates the limitations  of Short Wars in gaining war aims.9 The only gain has been avoidance of the earlier outcome  of intervention under Begin and Sharon of 1982; but the jury is still out as to whether Israel  is more secure today on account of this military self assertion. From the foregoing brief survey, certain lessons help identify the drivers of conflict.  The first is that, aims that do not brook compromise, such as ‘unconditional surrender’, ending secession and regime change, presage a long haul. Keeping aims limited through a conflict is at best a difficult proposition. Second, from Napoleon through Guderian to Petraeus, the lesson is that operational level advantages cannot make up for strategic shortcomings. Thirdly, in the Age of Nationalism, political forces in society push for longer wars, thereby constraining autonomy of decision makers and impacting strategic rationality. Fourth, the form of the conflict embarked on could change, such as from conventional to sub-conventional. This would require viewing the conflict as one and its duration as a continuum. Periods of ‘phony war’, howsoever normalised in consciousness and discourse, also require being included as periods of conflict. Next, there is no guarantee that external interests would converge to end conflict.  International organisations, including the UN, are vulnerable to manipulation by the  Great Powers; therefore any expectations of these would have to be suitably tempered.  Lastly, the ‘stability-instability’ paradox is permissive of long duration LIC through which strategic aims other than the most desirable one of durable peace can be materialised.10  By this yardstick, even a conventional war can also be chanced in the stability afforded by nuclear deterrence, as Pakistani planners persuaded themselves to believe in the run up to the Kargil intrusion. The sub-continental experience An analysis of conflicts in South Asia does not unambiguously reveal an inherent propensity  towards limitation from which it can be confidently extrapolated that wars of the future will  be short. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was short, less due to the unilateral ceasefire by China than to India refraining from joining the contest in earnest. It need not have been so,  especially as Western aid was requisitioned. The War was kept short by Pandit Nehru taking  a considered political decision on not displacing India’s development trajectory, even if  non-alignment suffered a momentary eclipse. Earlier Indo-Pak wars have been taken as relatively gentlemanly affairs owing to shared legacy.  Of the wars against Pakistan, the first was a long duration one lasting over a year. Marshal  of the Air Force in hindsight reflects that the 1965 War ended prematurely as the full weight  of air power could not be brought to bear.11 It was restricted to the three weeks of intensive  fighting. However, in case the Kutch incident of April, Operation Gibraltar of August, and  subsequent violations of the ceasefire till the Tashkent Agreement of the subsequent January are included, then the conflict duration qualifies as long. Likewise, the duration of the 1971 War need not be restricted to the two week ‘lightening  campaign’. It should instead be dated to April that year when Sam Bahadur famously  withstood political pressure for an early campaign. The Mukti Bahini period, migration of  10 million people, killings of hundreds of thousands within East Bengal and local border  violations can be subsumed in the period of conflict.12 Even the short campaign was  fortuitous, in that, the view of Generals Jacob, Nagra, Sagat Singh and Inder Gill of going  for Dacca prevailed in the last stages of run up to war, as against the original intent of  salami slicing and time consuming capture of towns enroute’.13 The Kargil War, called a ‘short, sharp war’ by the Kargil Review Committee, is usually taken  as forerunner of short duration wars of the future fought in the nuclear backdrop.  According to the suspect Pakistani perspective,14 a long campaign of attrition was  preempted through US intervention. President Musharraf’s claims in his autobiography  have been credibly disputed on this score by former Chief, General VP Malik.15 However,  a time-continuum can be discerned with Low Intensity Conflict across the Line of Control  abutting either end of the mid-intensity Kargil Conflict. Conflating the two kinds of conflict  into one would make the conflict a long duration one and part of the wider proxy war. The lesson to be drawn is that India’s conflicts, like conflicts elsewhere, have an equal, if  not greater chance, to be of long duration rather than short. Political heads took decisions to  cease the conflict at a great personal and political cost on both sides of the border. The  development of rival nationalisms and resulting politicisation of issues since, would impinge  on future ease of settlement of issues. Secondly, these wars have not always yielded a  meaningful result in terms of settlement of issues. A Short War in the future may also leave core issues unaddressed, begging the question of its utility. The ‘push’ for resolving issues  militarily ‘once and for all’ may then make an appearance. Precautions require to be built into  the preparation for and conduct of war to ensure a Short War. An analysis of the present Understandably, none of India’s sub-conventional conflicts have been short duration ones:  Operation Pawan, Operation Rakshak, Operation Rhino and the LIC in Siachen.16 This trend  is likely to persist into the future. To escape this strategic cul-de-sac, Short War thinking has  arisen in which space in the conflict spectrum can be opened up for a conventional ‘Limited  War’, with limitation being exercised in duration as against other parameters as extent of  theater of engagement, weaponry used and targets engaged. The tendency of conflict towards escalation, leading up to the ‘ideal’ state of Absolute War,  has been conceptualised by Clausewitz in his discussion of the reciprocal actions between  opponents.17 This tendency is accentuated by nationalism, intrinsic to modern nation states,  that yields ground to hyper nationalism in times of crisis. Historical memories also impact  the creation of the ‘Other’, resulting in stereotyping and dehumanisation of the opponent.  This tendency can be exploited by fringe political formations to tie down the government to  less palatable options. These factors conspire to dispel rationality. The expectation that external powers, valuing stability and fearful of the nuclear genie, would  intervene early for conflict termination is also shaky. Pakistan has persistently defended its  untenable position on Kashmir in defiance even of the US. India mobilised its troops in  response to the Parliament attack irrespective of the effect on the US led GWOT. The impact  of external pressure is limited to what states are willing to tolerate. International organisations also have their own limitations, hidden agendas and a case history of  limited efficacy in sub-continental disputes. Lastly, a look at the nuclear question on conflict duration is in order. General VP Malik  has it that there exists a window in the conflict spectrum below the nuclear threshold for  conventional operations.18 This is elastic so long as the perceived ‘nuclear reaction  threshold’ is not pushed. It is assessed that a threat to the threshold is more likely in a  longer war in which comprehensive national power is brought to bear. However, the  vulnerable state is also in a position to mobilise its national resources so as to preclude  a lowering of the threshold. Against extant wisdom, it can be posited that a high intensity  war, intended as a short one at the outset, poses the threat of stampeding the vulnerable  side into premature nuclearisation to redress some or other emergent asymmetry. Therefore,  the argument, based on the existence of a nuclear backdrop, is not entirely persuasive. War termination would be dependent on like-mindedness of the adversary. In the Indo-Pakistan i context, this may not be possible until Pakistan is able to pull off some gains either tangibly  or psychologically. Its Army would require some face-saving action for holding onto power  post-conflict within Pakistani political structure. This would likely result in Pakistan extending  the war till its purposes – not amounting to ‘winning’ the war, but merely preserving itself  from ‘losing’ abjectly – are achieved. Such a long war is in Pakistani interests for it will  enable resort to external balancing and ‘extended depth’. Besides, it may ‘do an Iraq’ on  an advancing India. In the event, India may end up with a partner unwilling to Tango. India, on its part, would not like to be left strategically exposed lest a Short War not serve  up its original aims. In trying to pull off a politically viable, strategically sustainable and militarily ‘decisive’ outcome, it may over-extend. Mission creep’ and ‘surge’ would then transpire, with uncertain outcome. Given the move of the discourse from Limited War19 to Short War,20 the premium on duration would necessitate a corresponding compensation through leveraging national and military power along other dimensions and levels in which India would be deemed to enjoy escalation dominance. This would compromise the resulting peace in leaving a bitter aftermath and an unrequited enemy. Concluding reflections Short Wars are desirable as against long duration wars, in that they imply limited war aims;  keep damage limited comparatively; do not deflect the national economy overly; do not  providing enough time for passions to overtake rationality; and, resultantly, do not permit  these to impinge unreasonably any future peace settlement. However, as seen here, the term  Short War verges on an oxymoron. Therefore, measures need to be identified and  implemented to bring about such an outcome. A few pointers to this end are recommended  in conclusion. At the political level, firstly, there requires to be a political consensus on the requirement,  nature and aims of the war embarked on. In case this is not there, then self-interested  political elements could whip up public passions forcing the leadership in unpredictable  ways. Secondly, demonisation resorted to generally in peace needs to be tempered to the  extent of permitting the adversary a locus standi on a vexed issue. This would enable easier  assimilation by the polity and populace of the necessity for early war termination through  compromise on mutually agreed terms. On the military level, the first Principle of War, namely, ‘selection and maintenance of aim’  requires constant foregrounding. Second, the threat of escalation would require monitoring,  particularly as the demonstration a capacity for ‘escalation dominance’, so as to influence  enemy thinking towards conflict termination, may go awry. Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that operational brilliance may beget victory, but, paradoxically, victory is not usually a necessary and sufficient condition for subsequent peace. Lastly, the military would require conditioning to a half-fought war. Air power theory of ‘infrastructure busting’; land warfare concept of ‘decisive victory’; and the naval apprehension of ‘sitting out the war’ may require muting. War is the least predictable social activity and the least controllable political act, and on  outbreak is liable to truncate rational aims and pious intentions. Short Wars have to be brought  about by creating the context and circumstance conducive to early war termination; best  achieved, ironically, through war aims that belie the necessity of war. The purpose of  military power in our context today is not to compel the enemy to one’s purpose; but to  nudge the enemy to a mutually beneficial end.

 

Nuclear deterrence in India’s strategic doctrine

 A talk at SIPRI, 2015

 

India does not have a declaratory strategic doctrine. It does not exist as a written document. It has to be discerned from the Annual reports of the ministries related to national security, the speeches of national security dignitaries, parliamentary and standing committee proceedings etc. It is to be read like tea leaves from India’s strategic behaviour. Any inferences are liable to question since what is looked at, the lens through which it is looked at etc would vary and so would the image received.

 

Strategic doctrine determines the military’s conventional doctrine and the politico-military nuclear doctrine. Strategic doctrine could vary between compellence to one of appeasement. Its variants could therefore be compellence; deterrence with its two subcategories – defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence; defensive strategic doctrine; and an appeasing strategic doctrine. Strategic doctrine is articulated in practice by conventional doctrine and nuclear doctrine. It is to control the place of nuclear weapons in the scheme of things.

 

This presumes ‘deterrence’ is not the only role that nuclear weapons can be put to. While this is undoubtedly so in so far as existential deterrence goes, deterrence is not necessarily the only role or utility of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrine. For instance a strategic doctrine of deterrence would understandably rely on deterrence value of nuclear weapons. In case of deterrence itself there are two variants reflecting the deterrence philosophy subscribed to: deterrence by punishment (defensive deterrence) or deterrence by denial (deterrence by warfighting and offensive deterrence). But a strategic doctrine of compellence would perhaps wish to ‘do more’ with nuclear weapons. A defensive strategic doctrine might rely on existential deterrence and a placatory strategic doctrine may even imply nuclear abnegation.

 

Given all this, I am doubly disadvantaged. I am to reflect on what is India’s strategic doctrine – if such an animal does exist in first place – and second what is the place of nuclear weapons in it, and this could be anything but what it is advertised to be. I can take the easy way out saying that India’s strategic doctrine goes by the term ‘strategy of restraint’ and is therefore one of defensive deterrence. The nuclear doctrine is one based on deterrence by punishment.

 

It can be argued that the strategy of restraint has been visible in both India’s strategic articulations and behaviour over the decades beginning with its antecedents in Nehruvianism. Over the recent past India has not responded aggressively to the long running Pakistani proxy war or periodic terror provocations, the latest instance being 26/11. India’s nuclear doctrine likewise is also one of NFU, making it a last resort defense. India says as much with a declaration reading:

 

Its defence policy and force postures remain defensive in orientation while its nuclear policy is characterized by a commitment to no-first-use, moratorium on nuclear testing, minimum credible nuclear deterrence, and the rejection of an arms race or concepts and postures from the Cold War era.

 

Are there departures from the declaratory? What does this ‘blind man’ ‘see’?

 

I feel India’s strategic doctrine is a differentiated one (to borrow a term from Bharat Karnad), in that there is a strategic doctrine directed at Pakistan and one in relation to China. The one in respect of Pakistan is one of compellence. Consequently, its nuclear doctrine is being worked in more ways than the acknowledged, and intrinsic, one of deterrence. Why do I say so?

 

Compellence would imply getting Pakistan to do something it would otherwise not do: change its offensive strategic doctrine to a placatory one. This is in keeping with India’s unacknowledged goal of regional hegemon, in keeping with its great power ambitions.

 

Further, India sees itself and is seen by others as a status quo power challenged by a revisionist Pakistan. However, while it is a status quo power if territorial control is central to the definition, India can also be seen as a revisionist power. Though it promises to end the territorial status quo through talks, it is revisionist in resiling from meaningful talks. As a revisionist state therefore it has to compel Pakistan to resign itself to the territorial status quo by ending proxy war.

 

How does it work? Military doctrine is an indication of strategic doctrine where the latter is not articulated. India’s earlier military doctrine was based on a strategic doctrine of defensive deterrence and therefore was predicated on a counter offensive capability. However, the move lately to offensive deterrence, as a half way house to compellence, has shifted military doctrine to ‘proactive offensive’. The aftermath of 26/11 suggested that there was work still to be done. Ongoing conventional and nuclear developments are a linear movement in this direction. 

 

An offensive military doctrine has not proven enough since it has to contend with Pakistan’s nuclear card. India’s corresponding nuclear doctrine has therefore not only to deter Pakistani first use, but to enable India’s conventional power fullest play. This means it has to deter early first use in a low threshold mode. It has to force a high threshold or late use last resort choice of first use on Pakistan. So even if the operational nuclear doctrine is not one of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation as declared, but posits ‘unacceptable damage’ in a punitive retaliation, it is to push upwards Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Taking advantage of this nuclear maneuver, conventional forces are to make the gains necessary if push comes to shove.  The nuclear doctrine is therefore not one for deterrence alone, but for compellence.

 

But let me caveat all I have just said. First, this is regarding strategic doctrine. It does not mean that ‘strategy’ is one of compellence. The neoliberal paradigm requires time and space. The government working within it would not wish to be involved in compellence or any other diversion either. Therefore, it leaves the strategic sphere alone, such as articulating of strategic doctrine, so long as it remains quiet and does not divert from the central strategic concern, the economy. Lastly, there is comfortable theoretical assumption behind the doctrine-force development-technology linkage. India’s complicated reality comprising a political and institutional interface requires a departure from theory. So while doctrinal and institutional factors push for acquisitions, India’s government deploys procedural brakes, lest an untimely ‘security dilemma’ trip things up. 

 

What does ‘framing’ such as this have to say for the questions posed for this session?

 

As for the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy, I reiterate, strategic doctrine is distinct from national strategy. A look at strategy must begin with the aim. The aim to me is to over-awe Pakistan, by deepening the power asymmetry between the two states. In other words, to emerge as a hegemon by fulfilling Sun Szu’s acme of skill, i.e. without a shot being fired. This is not impossible since Pakistan’s ability for external balancing to short-circuit this has been steadily degrading. The role of the nuclear factor is escalation dominance, to convince Pakistan that its game is up and get it to bandwagon.

 

The second question requires rewording. It says ‘minimum credible deterrence’. This sequencing has long since been given up in favour of ‘credible minimum deterrence’. Strategic sufficiency is therefore predicated on ‘credibility’. This is a shifting goalpost. So the planning parameter is: ‘more of every thing including of emerging technologies’. How are these determined? There is a scientific determinism behind it, institutional weight of technologists, the military’s institutional needs and a politically useful great power quest. Nascent organizational changes in the National Security Council Secretariat, such as a military adviser and another, a former SFC commander in chief, are promising in terms of bringing strategic rationale to developments in nuclear weapons. The danger is in the NSC itself being hijacked by conservative-realists warm to compellence; something that can happen as easily and early as a change in government.     

 

On the extent of doctrinal objectives guiding decision making, this is partially the case, with technological drivers accounting for the balance. Actors involved in these decisions are in the main technologists and the national security bureaucrats. The military is the dark horse, interested in the here and now. The politician is in it to prove he is not ‘soft’ on defence. Political imprimature is a matter of routine, since the PM or the PMO cannot really spare attention and time from managing a neoliberal economy. The military has gained a pie of the action in the SFC but not quite a seat at the high table.

 

I hope the view is controversial enough to merit a discussion and not so controversial as to be marginalized.

 

 https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/jammu-and-kashmir-it-is-in-national-interest-to-conduct-elections-soon-1192536.html

Jammu and Kashmir: It is in national interest to conduct elections soon

Early this week, the Supreme Court dismissed a plea against setting up of a delimitation commission to redraw the assembly and Lok Sabha constituency boundaries in the Union Territories (UT) of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). It ruled that the exercise of power by the government was valid under Article 370 of the Constitution, as redefined by the Union government in August 2019.

Since the challenge to the very revision of Article 370 is yet pending with the Supreme Court, the judges clarified, “Nothing stated in this judgement shall be construed as giving our imprimatur to the exercise of powers under clauses (1) and (3) of Article 370 of the Constitution.”

The judgement is in itself not consequential to the political strategy unfolding in Jammu and Kashmir. It merely put paid to a bid by Kashmiris to stall or reverse the developments in Kashmir since the landmark reading down of Article 370.

However, the judgement’s explication that it has kept clear off remarking on the legal challenges to the evacuation of Article 370 of its original substance of preserving autonomous status of J&K has however lent some cheer to Kashmiri political circles.

The contours of the government’s Kashmir strategy were explicated at an all-party meeting in June 2021. Home Minister Amit Shah had put out that the intention was first go ahead with the delimitation, followed by elections. On the demand for statehood by the Kashmiri attendees, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had assured that action would follow ‘at the right time’.

The delimitation commission’s report was released in May last year. It met with serious objections from the mainstream regional parties. They apprehended that election results were being gerrymandered, in a manner as to beget the ambition of the ruling party at the Center, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), of having a Hindu chief minister from the Jammu belt in place.

Elections were expected early this year. However, there is little visible movement on this for now, though new electoral rolls incorporating an additional eight lakh voters has already been drawn up.

It is not as if the government is waiting for the Supreme Court to pronounce on the clutch of cases against Article 370. Opposition leaders aver that it’s the parochial aspiration of the BJP is holding up elections.

The BJP has been cautioned by the results of the District Development Council elections, held in late 2020, in which a hastily-formed loose coalition of the mainstream regional parties, the People’s Alliance for the Gupkar Declaration, pipped it at the post.

The recent enthusiastic reception of the Bharat Jodo Yatra would have cautioned it further. Even Jammuites too have developed reservations since their region is now exposed to competition and influx from the plains.

Having created an opportunity to wrest political power away from Srinagar in favour of Jammu, it would want to clinch it by deliberate moves.  But there is a price to pay in terms of India’s democratic credentials.

Whereas security conditions warranted prolongation of the last bout of extended presidential rule in J&K between 1990 and 1996, this time round the security indices are indubitably better. Any eyebrows raised if the elections are further delayed may not easily be brushed off with claims that India is the ‘mother of democracy’. 

Persisting inordinately with the status quo in governance in J&K can impact the preparations the Modi government is making as the rotating chair of the G20 and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation for the respective summits in New Delhi.

Delay also gives negative forces an opportunity to polarise the electorate. Killings early this year in Rajauri area and rekindling of the Village Defence Committees in response, are indicative of avoidable adverse security possibilities.

The national interest would appear to be in conducting elections soon. While this may disappoint the political parties wanting clarity on statehood, they have not made their participation in UT elections conditional on grant of statehood. They may participate in elections not only to keep the BJP from gaining its ends, but also using their new perch in government, if they win, to bid more forcefully for statehood.

This should not deter the BJP. The BJP is also capable of forging an alliance on the basis of a strong showing in the Jammu belt, as it has done earlier. The experience of the elected government in Delhi in tussles with the UT Lieutenant Governor indicates that control over J&K can yet be retained by the Center.

Thus, as Modi goes into his third national polls in 2024, Amit Shah could yet ensure a nationalist-led government in Srinagar, enabling Modi to make the vote-catching claim he has delivered conclusively on integration of Kashmir into the majoritarian mainstream.