https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/kashmir-resolved-fine-as-election

"Kashmir resolved": Fine as election rhetoric, not policy

ali

Oct 16

This week Prime Minister Narendra Modi credited himself with resolving the Kashmir issue. Immediately in wake of this victory lap, his home minister Amit Shah seconded the claim. Since both were speaking at rallies in Gujarat set to go to the polls early winter, this should be taken as a bit of excusable primping.

Expectedly though, Pakistan has taken umbrage and the usual India-Pakistan slugfest has been witnessed at meetings in international forums spanning three different continents over the week. Clearly, for Pakistan, Kashmir is not quite history as yet. Even though beset with the worst floods in its history and staring at a food deficit, it has chosen to do without Indian assistance, showing up Kashmir as its jugular.

Simultaneously, within Kashmir, there has been yet another instance of terrorism, the targeted killing of a Kashmiri Pandit. This means militants continue to have efficacy. If security forces are to be believed, their tactics of hybrid terrorism is suggestive of their being fish in hospitable water, the community. In other words, it’s not curtains on insurgency, such killings keeping it alive for a show down sometime down road.

This begs the question: Did the prime minister really mean what he said? Does his home minister know something that we don’t?

A theoretical lens

Three terms can help with the answer: Conflict Containment, Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution.

That the conflict in Kashmir has been contained - and, indeed, rolled back - over the last two decades is self-evident. India has been in a Conflict Management mode since, ministering upheavals between 2008-10 and 2016-18. Learning from the two episodes, it clamped down in 2019, saturating Kashmir with boots on ground. This crippled the mobility enjoyed by insurgents, precluding deaths – rightly observed by India’s foreign minister recently when he defended internet curbs as minimizing killings.

At best this has brought India negative peace, defined as absence (or near absence) of violence. Getting to positive peace – peace with an admixture of justice making it self-fulfilling - requires a look at Kashmir through Johann Galtung’s triangles on conflict, violence and peace.[1]

Galtung’s Conflict Triangle, popular in introductory courses to peace studies, has at its vertices: A-ttitudes; B-ehaviour; and C-ontradiction. The C-ontradiction is the dispute that has led up to hostile A-ttitudes and resulting violent B-ehaviour.

A corresponding Violence Triangle has as its vertices: Structural violence stemming from the C-ontradition; Cultural violence witnessed in adverse A-ttitudes; and Direct violence, result of adversarial B-ehaviour.

Theory juxtaposes a Peace Triangle to address the conflict, its vertices being: Peacemaking to engage with Structural violence or the C-ontradiction; Peacebuilding to address Cultural violence framed by A-ttitudes; and Peacekeeping for containing Direct violence.

Additionally, strategic (ends oriented) peacebuilding has three vertices: Structural peacebuilding; Cultural peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation. Structural peacebuilding is to get to normalization by tackling root causes through peacemaking and implementing agreements arrived at by elites. Cultural peacebuilding is facilitating reconciliation between parties estranged not only by the dispute but also holding grievances from the conflict. Conflict Transformation goes beyond conflict resolution, into forging deeper social and psychological bonds allowing for alternative means to address differences and tackle disputes, thereby transforming the relationship.

Negative Peace

Peacekeeping in the Galtung’s peace triangle can be substituted here with the counter insurgency, anti-militancy and counter terrorism measures and operations. All indices of violence are down, and comparatively speaking, it can be said that militancy is at ebb. The evidence of near normality trotted out is that tourist footfalls – that includes Hindu pilgrims to sites outside the Valley proper - have set new records. However, even as this is an important aspect of returning normalcy, it is not all.

It only bespeaks of a negative peace. It addresses violence through kinetic means. It does address root causes, that necessarily require engagement through other techniques: peacemaking and peacebuilding.  

A truism has it that militancy cannot be ended by military means alone, but requires a political solution. A political solution implies peacemaking resulting in a negotiated settlement. Military means are only to create the conditions for peacemaking to kick-in. We need look no furrther than Sri Lanka to refresh this in our minds.

With Pakistan, peacemaking is reportedly on. Ever since the Ladakh intrusion of the Chinese, India has worked a secret channel with Pakistan, with third parties in the Gulf acting as go-between. Its chief product has been the ceasefire reiteration on the Line of Control. Talks continue, though Pakistan is holding out for substantive movement on Kashmir.

Internally, there is little obvious effort at peacemaking. The list of antagonists has multiplied, including as it does these days mainstream regional political parties clubbed with separatists. After the crackdown that coincided with the vacation of Article 370 of substance, many political activists remain in jail – one having died recently from medical causes while in custody.

That the government is insincere is clear from the special interlocutor appointed in 2017 who only created the grounds for the parliamentary maneuver on Article 370. Episodic interaction, such as the meeting mid-last year of the prime minister with the political spectrum in the union territory, reveals the lack of consistency. As it turned out, it was to set in motion the delimitation exercise, while blindsiding the consensus in the political parties on restoration of statehood.

There is of course a political ‘solution’ in place, which portends denying Kashmiris agency into perpetuity. Its first step has been in relegating the territory to being Delhi-governed. The next step is Union Territory elections over the coming winter. The spadework has been done for elections, in the form of a delimitation exercise, to pave the way for the ruling party at the Center taking over reins at Srinagar untrammeled by a coalition.

Statehood is being withheld for the moment in order to see who the electorate returns to power. If the ruling party, then statehood will be conferred as a reward; if the Gupkar opposition, then retention of intimate control by New Delhi would preclude statehood.

Peacemaking absent, peace is sought to be bought. Infrastructure-heavy investment biased towards strategic connectivity and exploiting of water resources for electricity is ongoing. Though the figures are impressive, how much of this helps Kashmiris directly is questionable.

Even so, from reports of an apple harvest rotting in trucks unable to exit the Valley due to traffic hold-up on the national highway, it can be seen that even in this easy bit of peacebuilding, India’s showing is not encouraging. 

Often, throwing money at a problem does not make it go away. It is useful as a demonstration of commitment and to build momentum towards peace. Regenerating the economy and weaning it away from a conflict economy is a non-trivial essential step. But this cannot be mistaken for what it is not – positive peace - and cannot be implemented in isolation of non-material peacebuilding.

Positive Peace?

Peacebuilding as a line of operation has three strands: Structural, Cultural and Conflict Transformation.

Structural peacebuilding is not in evidence as of now. Structural peacebuilding assumes tackling root causes, in this case quenching the thirst for azadi. As of now, this is being denied to Kashmiris into the fifth year. When it was similarly denied in the early nineties for over six years, it was with plausible reason: security. By its fight year, efforts were underway – with redoubtable Seshan in the lead – to get the voters into the driver’s seat. Today, there is no excuse for central rule, but for the self-created exceptional circumstances arising from the erasure of content in Article 370.

As a former home minister found at long last, azadi is not self-determination but a community’s feeling of being responsible for and in control of its own destiny. Statehood without returning autonomy that can assure against fears of demographic change and cultural impositions will remain insufficient. Arvind Kejriwal’s experience in heading the lame duck Delhi administration indicates as much.

Constitution provisions exist for allaying such fears, such as enjoyed by neighbouring Himachal Pradesh. Not going down this route forthrightly shows the structural peacebuilding will continue to have a deficit that cannot but sabotage cultural peacebuilding.

The necessity of cultural peacebuilding and what it constitutes is well known to Indian security minders. The techniques were at play during the 2000s, when the outreach to Pakistan was underway. The five working group reports on Kashmir of the period and the report of the three interlocutors show how this could be done.

When the previous government had no use for these reports, it is easy to see the current-day security establishment oblivious to these. Today, they believe information war is all that is required.

This too is directed mostly at the populace in the hinterland. This is a hold-over from the past practice – taking the Vietnam lesson to heart – when the hinterland’s resolve to sustain a militarized template was seen as necessary to minister.  This continues, though its need is much less so – the populace in mainland India being sufficiently infused with cultural nationalism to of its own accord want more of a militarized template than warranted.

As for addressing the perceptions of the Kashmiris, the engagement is rather ham-handed, as exposed by a recent study. Indian flags on high masts are to elicit nationalism. The practice is borrowed from Turkiye. It is uncertain if anyone researched how these flags appear to Kurds. How Kashmiris might be taking the demise of Army Dog ‘Zoom' in a gunfight that saw two of their young men dead too does not figure in security calculus on the brouhaha surrounding the disposal of the canine's remains. Masterly has been the substitution of the holiday in memory of the Lion of Kashmir with one on its last Maharaja.

If the film The Kashmir Files is any indicator, a reverse gear is set in respect of cultural peacebuilding. Whereas the pain of the Pandits is projected, it is almost as if the intent is to paper over that of their brethren community. This is the abuse of the Kashmir Pandits’ plight in national politics for purpose of polarization. It only shows that for now the Kashmir issue has political utility, necessitating the conflict be kept alive.

The leitmotif of cultural peacebuilding would be the reconciliation between the liberal and radical, Pandits and Muslims and between communities in its differing regions. Going beyond is Conflict Transformation, which is a change of heart wherein peace is arrived at by restorative justice and moving from tolerance to acceptance of others’ narratives. But going that far is to get ahead of the story.

It is apparent that the two prongs of strategy – one external and the other internal – and the peace techniques – peacemaking and peacebuilding - are not in sync. Negative peace is at hand, but positive peace has been sabotaged.

Accounting for the sabotage

The external prong - in respect of Pakistan – is hardly an outcome of a strategic design, but one brought about by a need to keep the Pakistan front dormant, even as India pivots to the eastern, China front. It profits from Pakistan’s external (the dividend from its assistance of the Taliban has not quite materialized) and internal (politics in disarray) discomfiture.

Even though India has been put on the backfoot by the Chinese intrusion, the asymmetry with Pakistan is of levels of which it can be said that a peace prong can witness negotiations from a position of strength. The asymmetry is not going to attenuate further that India needs to wait for longer. It cannot hope to kick in the door once Pakistan folds up.

But the tentativeness of the peace process does not suggest it has much grist. That it remains under wraps – being intelligence-led - means the political master is uncertain of investing political capital in its outcome.

Consequently, it is at best tactical, designed to restrain Pakistan till India gets an administration of its choice in place in Srinagar and tides over the challenge in neighbouring Ladakh. The danger arises from not only India being tactical, but also Pakistan – waiting to get past its constraints of today.

As for Pakistan, even a change in its Army Chief – due next month – can herald a change in attitude to Kashmir – as was the change once with the baton moving from Musharraf to Kayani. Though the feared spillover from Afghanistan has not materialized, it can yet play out – after all, reports are that Swat is once again threatened by the Pakistani Taliban.

It is not in a fit of senility that United States’ President Biden said Pakistan’s nuclear weapons without cohesion in structures that manage them makes it the most ‘dangerous’ country. A new international security order is emerging. Once the Ukraine War ends, the weaponry injected into the region is bound to spill over. Already, the Security Council has met twice informally over Kashmir, with Germany, a heavy weight permanent seat contender, saying the UN has an interest in unresolved Kashmir.

Internally, negative peace has held at the price of some 1000 Kashmiri youth killed since operations were stepped up with the killing of Burhan Wani. It is unlikely that youth will take an imposition from New Delhi as the next chief minister with equanimity. While the apprehended explosion has not transpired, that troops continue in place betrays the security establishment fears as much.  

The external and internal impetus can potentially upset the current status quo. The Indian State’s suppressive capacity is infinite. Its military can rightly claim to a higher standard of ethical operational conduct. However, this is not so for its paramilitary or police. The recently released citizens’ report on North East Delhi violence reveals that these forces cannot be trusted when confronted with Muslims.

The army has been progressively disengaging from Kashmir. Some elements of Rashtriya Rifles have been deployed to Ladakh. The army is to reduce numbers too, reportedly numbering 200000. The Ladakh commitment is likely to see it tied down into the middle term. Its Agniveers are likely to be quick at the draw and imbued with cultural nationalism, coming of age in the Modi era, which makes it equally suspect when they deploy in aid to civil authority.

Consequently, keeping Kashmir quiescent is a national imperative. And yet, not buttressed by peacemaking, the negative peace is tenuous. Quite the reverse is being done by way of structural peacebuilding. It is mistakenly believed that cultural peacebuilding is only about changing perceptions though old-fashioned psychological operations, only with new media.

It is unclear how insertion of a Hindu chief minister from Jammu is seen as panacea. This only becomes clear when seen in relation to national politics. The messaging nationally is that Kashmir’s Muslim majority stands integrated into the Union.

As Modi put it, he has taken up and finished what Sardar Patel started and Shyama Prasad Mukherjee couldn’t. As election rhetoric, that’s understandable by standards set by Modi. As policy, his ‘solution’ will generate the next cataclysm.

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[1] Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity, 2011, p. 10.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/taking-stock-of-a-hindutva-foreign

Taking Stock of a Hindutva Foreign Policy

Vivek Katju, senior in the diplomatic service to Foreign Minister Dr. S Jaishankar (Katju uses prefix Mr. not Dr.), upbraids Jaishankar on his ‘articulation of some areas of the Modi government’s domestic agenda’ in his address at the recently concluded United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. To Katju, Jaishankar’s voicing of Hindutva’s domestic agenda in an international forum ‘raises several deeply troubling questions.’ Katju observes:

this is perhaps for the first time that the basic interpretation of Indian history of the current ruling dispensation has been projected in the UNGA, although in coded language. This is a dangerous path to undertake for domestic controversies are best avoided when national positions which have to be, necessarily rooted the Constitution, are authoritatively articulated abroad. As a former diplomat, Mr. Jaishankar would be well aware of the Indian diplomatic tradition which has always presented nationally unified positions abroad, particularly at the UN and in multilateral forums.

This amounts to a rocket. It shows dissonance in the foreign policy fraternity, if not the establishment itself, from Hindutva appropriation of India’s foreign policy to its purposes. It is of a piece with the polarization in the administrative service veterans, with a Concerned Citizens’ Group being shadowed by another – motley – group of civil servants a different persuasion. But then Vivek Katju is not without blame for the situation to have gotten to this pass.

Hindutva’s piggy back ride into strategic space

Katju is part of the conservative-realist cabal that dominated the strategic community over the past 20 years. They created conditions for the ushering in and triumph of Hindutva in national political culture. This they did, mostly unwarily, by outpointing the liberal-realists in the inevitable ideological competition between the two perspectives. In their internecine guerilla action against the liberal-realists, who peopled the national security establishment in the Manmohan Singh years, they claimed the government was soft on national security.  

They neglected to look over their shoulders and observe that cultural nationalists were waiting on the wings to outflank them. Thus, they paved the way for hardboiled cultural nationalists to capture the high-ground in strategic discourse. Taking advantage of the victory of conservative-realists in the ideational competition, cultural nationalists - politically better-equipped – wrested the strategic space.

They prepared the ground for the triumph of Hindutva at the political hustings. Their narrative was that Indian security stood compromised and a strong leader was called for. Alongside a strong leader was being manufactured by the Indian ‘deep state’ through a series of fake encounters, leading to elimination of Muslims depicted as terrorists, across Gujarat. A cover up of their tracks is evident from a senior police officer, who spilt the beans on this, now running from pillar to post to have his pension restored. The rest is history, political culture now Hindutva owned.

Hindutva’s pointsman

Dr. S. Jaishankar was along the way coopted by Hindutva. He was always a hardliner – a realist of the old school. This perhaps appealed to the champion of Hindutva, Narendra Modi, out to commandeer institutions. He needed a wrecking ball for the foreign office, seen as an elitist holdout, a Nehruvian product. Just as Bipin Rawat was alighted on for the purpose with the army, Modi set his eyes on Jaishankar.

The two got along as Jaishankar – when ambassador in Washington D.C. - midwifed Modi’s return to the diaspora stage right in the center of New York, the Madison Square Garden. There was no looking back thereafter. Jaishankar was elevated to foreign secretary post just two days prior to his retirement, displacing the incumbent – a woman officer - prematurely. The rules were tweaked for Jaishankar to hang on for another year, trampling the aspirations of diplomats from subsequent batches. The cooling off period after his retirement was waived so he could join the corporate sector – better than a sinecure.

After winning the 2019 elections, Modi anointed Jaishankar minister. Jaishankar took membership of the ruling party and was fielded for the upper house by Modi from his pocket borough, Gujarat. He won an election later challenged in the High Court. Ideally, representativeness within the cabinet requires ministers to have faced electorates directly. Political heft strengthens ministers to hold their own, rather than kowtow. In the regime’s case, such democratic niceties are easily dispensed with, many significant ministers being from the upper house. Subject to such largesse, it is no wonder Jaishankar – in a hagiographical book on Modi to which he contributed a chapter - admits to having ‘liked’ Modi prior to interacting with him as prime minister.

Jaishankar is thus hobbled. It is uncertain if he is driven by personal ambition or by a belief that the greater glory of India lies in adoption of Hindutva or by both. The first is unexceptionable in itself, though there is a line that should be drawn. In his case – as was the case with Generals Bipin Rawat and recently Anil Chauhan – they shouldn’t have so readily stepped over others’ shoulders. (Anil Chauhan as military adviser failed to advise against taking on a retired brass-hat as Chief of Defence Staff when there is no emergency.) Ambition that has personal interest supersede the institutional upsets cohesion and solidarity, creating instability and precedent. That Jaishankar’s predecessor as foreign secretary was not present for handing over speaks for itself. Starting off with a misstep, the regime is fully capable of manipulating the weakness. Yet, each knowingly lent his services to dismantling verities of respective institution. Perhaps, they genuinely believed that Hindutva ideals substituting the old as being better for the institution and the country. The belief fetched Rawat a Padma Vibhushan. From Jaishankar’s verbiage in defence of the Hindutva-inspired regime it is fair to infer that he is a bhakt, a mitigating factor.

Jaishankar with a trident

The ‘professionalism and precision’ - that Katju is appreciative of - has been placed service of a deeply held beliefs. Katju is wrong in berating Jaishankar for violating Indian diplomatic tradition in airing Hindutva abroad. Katju perhaps believes that there is no consensus on Hindutva yet and therefore the foreign office should wait for paradigm dominance. That is debatable.

Dominance of political culture does not happen of its own. It is a creation, a construction, a product of exertion by idea entrepreneurs and believers. Jaishankar’s pitching for Hindutva is both symbolic of Hindutva dominance as much as an effort to enable dominance. Jaishankar’s taking it international is not premature. Afterall, India has twice-over voted for Hindutva. Even if some Hindus continue to believe in the promise of development, they are not the ones that upped Hindutva voting numbers the second time round.

As foreign minister he has also to pitch for and explain Hindutva externally. It has received a bad press lately. India’s standing has fallen since its soft power has been undercut by Hindutva. Jaishankar has to roll back skepticism. He has to counter cynics, both home-based and in the diaspora, besides taking on some mastheads conniving against New India. The very thin talent pool commanded by Hindutva makes his articulate defence even more prominent than it might have been.

He has to hold his own in Delhi’s bureaucratic politics, which – if rumours are anything to go by – has him pitch against the redoubtable National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. Doval for his part has been restricted by the overweening heavyweight, Amit Shah, one part of the duo that rules New India. Jaishankar has had to keep him off foreign policy, since Doval in any case controls a fair bit, both the Pakistan policy, and, as Special Representative on talks with China, a critical portion of the China policy. (The blinders on Doval on internal and foreign policy explains his being overly intrusive into the military, in successively appointing ethnic kin to the post of Chief of Defence Staff.)

Not to forget the personal factor: as a political light weight, with no constituency other than the good will of Narendra Modi, Jaishankar has to go the full distance. This explains his highfaluting phrases as ‘correction of history’, ‘hesitations of history’, ‘restoration of identity’, ‘cultural trust’, ‘liberation from a colonial mindset’ and - the mother of all bombast - ‘obligation to right historical wrongs’. Jaishankar’s authoritative verbalizing lends Hindutva gravitas that helps paper over its cultural vandalism. It legitimizes the authoritarianism of his benefactor, Modi, who can be seen as a prophetic figure turning back the tides of history unfavourable to Hindus – as imagined by Modi the Narcissist of himself.

New India’s diplomacy

Academics have noted Jaishankar has been rather successful in facilitating Hindutva penetration of Indian diplomacy. Hindutva visibility is easy to see. Terrorism – though at an ebb both internationally and internally – continues to be Indian diplomacy’s favourite hobby horse. It is invariably trotted out in regard to Pakistan, not only because doing so helps keep Pakistan on the defensive in relation to the Financial Action Task Force, but more importantly the regime has not done with the Othering of the Indian Muslims within. Jaishankar’s persistence thus has more to it in terms of consequences than merely high politics. It keeps India hyphenated to Pakistan and holds up a resolution to Kashmir. Though keeping India vulnerable in relation to China – allowing China space to box India into a South Asian sand pit – it is a price worth paying to keep up polarization in domestic politics.

India’s religion-based domestic politics determines its regional policy, putting paid to the ‘neighbourhood first’ propaganda. The Citizenship Amendment Act, though seemingly a home ministry product, has foreign policy implications. It tacitly suggests India’s Muslim neighbours are communalized societies and polities. Nothing on record has Jaishankar’s ministry inputting this action negatively. That Jaishankar – a Tamil – did not bat for Sri Lankan Tamils, similarly beset, shows him up more as an alienated, displaced-to-New-Delhi TamBram - exposing his Achilles heel in being merely a technocrat.

A technocrat in charge, Hindutva is now being exported through official conduits, no longer needing a cultural cover - such as yoga - or using the Gujarati-heavy diaspora auspices. A recent case to point is the Indian high commission in London batting only for Leicester Hindus, though most Muslims with whom extremist Hindus brawled, are of Indian origin. At the UNGA, Jaishankar’s glib convergence of the colonial and precolonial periods into one contiguous period in which Hindu India lost its sovereignty to outsiders discloses a pronounced bias.

Jaishankar has been most useful for the regime in shaping its China policy, understandable in light of his having been India’s longest serving ambassador in China.  Earlier he had been instrumental in fashioning India’s proximity to the United States (US) during the previous government, having steered the nuclear deal through labyrinthine processes both in Delhi and in the US. As to who - between Modi himself, Doval and Jaishankar - plugged for personal diplomacy - based on informal summits between Modi and Xi - is not known. Jaishankar cannot be let off the hook in terms of accountability till more is known.

Important for the regime has been his assertive public posturing on China, even as the facts on ground have been elided. It is difficult to square Rajnath Singh’s claims that the situation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is under control, with, on the one hand, the army conceding buffer zones on the Indian side of the LAC, and, on the other, Jaishankar positing that normalization needs Chinese to retract further. Even as Jaishankar pretends that all is not normal, Indian trade with China climbs, with an adverse trade balance continuing.

Jaishankar has been careful in keeping off the military parlays at corps commander level (though a joint secretary level diplomat is present). Jaishankar has the excuse of Doval as Special Representative to keep off holistic repair of the relationship too. What foreign office inaction - at both the tactical and strategic levels - does is to place a premium on the military, necessitating it sit up in high altitude. The military tied up, the upshot is Jaishankar is prima donna, pulling Modi’s chestnuts out of the fire. 

Whither Hindutvised foreign policy

Given how lean the Hindutva ecosystem is on intellect in its ranks, Jaishankar is its saving grace – contributing the sound bites necessary to keep Hindutva credible. His speaking marathons in the US help keep Americans perplexed as to what to make of Indian foreign policy comprising ‘pirouettes’ – in the words of late veteran diplomat, Satyabrata Pal. They have ceased posting an ambassador in New Delhi to help interpret New India. India bats for a permanent seat on the Security Council, even as it does nothing to bolster the Charter at a time when sorely challenged. It goes to town over Modi’s meaningless homilies on peace in Ukraine are taken up by the West for Russia-bashing, even as it buys up Russian oil. It plays mum on human rights matters in Geneva, hoping that doing so will elicit reciprocation from others when at some time it is instead on the mat.

A Hindutvised foreign policy will be judged not so much by India’s multilateral balancing act but how the balancing act plays out in the region. Currently, India has stowed its deterrent against Pakistan, compensating with Doval-overseen secret talks. This has allayed its two-front concerns as it gets into gear on the China front, where it has restored immediate deterrence. However, general deterrence is unlikely to be restored since China has spotted India’s weakness: its skittishness about exposing facts internally. As an analyst has pointed out, in return for India’s concessions in Ladakh, China has spared Modi a domestic political debacle. Jaishankar, who knows most as to how this has come about, owes India an explanation. The hitch is that the explanation can potentially end Hindutva’s reign, which means it will remain an enigma.

Finally, that Muslims united the country into a proto Akhand Bharat is missed by Hindutva. What Hindutva fails to perceive is that creating a discontinuity dating to 2014 in India’s existence as a State over the past millennium can rebound. Modi’s thesis on decolonization of the mind is basically short hand for resumption of ruling privileges by advantaged castes, perceived by them as dissipated by Muslim conquest. Therefore, the animus against Muslims.

Given that Muslims constitute one third of South Asia, Hindutva’s fond beliefs sets India off against its neighbours. It’s a truism that unless neighbours endorse India’s rise, it is not going anyplace. An ugly India is unlikely to receive this. India believes its economic magnetism will see them fall in line. This is a high hope in light of economic realities, created by the regime itself and the social turbulence that awaits Hindutva’s follow through with Amit Shah’s ‘chronology’.

India’s soft power - traditionally conceived - can see it transcend the subcontinent. That Hindutva is out to dismantle such soft power and install in its place majoritarian notions will hold India back. Jaishankar is not about to let his patron know this. Not doing so will be his enduring legacy