https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/russo-ukrainian-war-implications

Russo-Ukrainian War: Implications for India's Cold Start doctrine

Does the Russo-Ukrainian War bury Cold Start?

Does the Russo-Ukrainian War bury Cold Start?

Cold Start is the colloquial term by which Indian strategic analysts term India’s conventional war options against Pakistan. The term, as does the concept it denotes, has had a chequered history. It made an appearance sometime in early 2000s. General ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan when being interviewed post retirement on his experience of Operation Parakram, the Indian mobilization against Pakistan in face of the terror attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, had used it first. He was referring to the move afoot that he initiated to get offensive formations on an operational footing in quick time from a ‘cold start’. The lesson learnt from early days of Operation Parakram was that these took longer to mobilize than could be militarily useful in a crisis. Since crises brought on by terror attacks were unpredictable, they would have to be agile enough to take to the offensive from a ‘cold start’.

The term soon acquired the status of a doctrine with the then army’s public information chief in a briefing to journalists on a publicly released official doctrine of the army used the term, thereby making in stick in unofficial lexicon to the 2004 doctrine. That the doctrine envisaged a speedy start to proactive offensive operations remained unacknowledged in its early years, since its release coincided with the onset of the United Progressive Alliance government which professed restraint as a strategic doctrine and was in the midst of an outreach to Pakistan over the 2000s.

When an opportunity to test the doctrine came by in 2008, at Mumbai 26/11, the army passed up the opportunity, averring it was unable to give a guarantee that Pakistan’s nuclear threshold would not be crossed in case it went on the offensive in reprisal for the terror attack. The army then jettisoned Cold Start, though working towards cutting down mobilization schedules from a week to less than 72 hours. It shifted to proactive contingency operations which in retrospect can be taken as forerunner to surgical strikes, credit for which has been appropriated by the successor government of Narendra Modi.

Modi upped the scale of surgical strikes, besides going public with these for their electoral benefit, something his self-effacing predecessor had not done, though having undertaken some surgical strikes on a lower scale of his own. With surgical strikes having revealed the hand, the new Modi-appointed chief, General Bipin Rawat, went public with the badly kept secret that Cold Start was to be resurrected from its cold storage. The doctrine was to be given teeth with integrated battle groups (IBG) formed, with an objective-specific all arms structure. Jointness would provide the airpower heft to their firepower.

This was an adaptation to the nuclear age in South Asia, indubitably on since 1998. The Kargil War, merely a year after the two states, India and Pakistan, went nuclear that May, signified that to the Pakistani army going nuclear did not make war obsolete. Borrowing a page from the Pakistanis, the Indian army chief, Ved Malik, opined that there was space for a limited war below the nuclear threshold. This was the genesis of Cold Start, which is some 20 years down the line being followed through to fruition. Over these years, Indian army was ambivalent on the what to do with its offensive strike formations and followed the precepts dating to the World War II, modified for nuclear conditions in the Cold War doctrinal thinking on operational maneuver groups and AirLand Battle of the respective sides then. Since strike corps continue to exist, it is not certain where Cold Start and IBGs are at the moment. The ongoing efforts at taking forward jointness in terms of conjuring up theatre commands may finesse this matter. Till then, strike corps and nascent IBGs – combat commands equivalent strike forces controlled by offensive corps headquarters – appear to be India’s conventional crown jewels.

That the national security establishment remains as unimpressed by such doctrinal shifts as was the Manmohan Singh government when contemplating its options post 26/11, is clear from National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval at a speaking engagement last year at Pune ruling that wars as we know it are passé. Now Doval also has the Russo-Ukrainian war to inform his judgment. He would be even less liable to buy into a conventional military operation, howsoever nuanced by IBG employment buttressed by surgical air and missile strikes, given that the primary difference between the Russo-Ukrainian dyad and the India-Pakistan one is that both putative belligerents in the latter case are nuclear powers. In fact, one of the significant insights from the ongoing war in Europe is that Ukraine would not have been in its present position, had it retained nuclear weapons. The guarantees that allowed it to give up nuclear weapons - those from it backers to its west and those of its invader to its east – did not quite work. Despite this difference, it may be worthwhile to see if there are any lessons that India could take away from the conflict.

A major similarity is the extended frontage, shallow depth attacks. Cold Start was also visualized as being conducted along an extended front but only to operational depth, so as to not trigger any nuclear red lines that Pakistan might have. The Russians have attacked from three sides – Kiev in the north, along Ukraine’s eastern border till its southern portions in the Donbass and along the south to capture the Black Sea coast.

A departure is the Russian bid for an early investment of Kiev in order to, from the line-of-march, trigger a capitulation or internal coup in Ukraine, sparing them the bother they are now subject to, not having succeeded in their coup de main operation. Avoiding nuclear red lines might have kept Cold Start offensives from threatening such value objectives.

Whereas Cold Start presumes an early start to operations, truncating crisis timelines, this was not the case with the Russian invasion. It was predicted by the United States (US) weeks before the event, giving the Ukrainians enough time to prepare militarily, including by stocking up defensive weapons helpfully sent in by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Even so, the unreality of a conventional war in the 21st century was such that when the Russians did invade, their egregious violation of international law was somewhat of a surprise. 

The invasion itself has similarities with the Cold Start script. It was with limited aims and with limited forces in terms of numbers and the use of force. They set about the invasion with less than 200000 soldiers, part of several battalion battle groups.  Not wanting to alienate the populace of kin ethnicity, they were initially mindful of the firepower employed. They had two sets of aims: some rhetorical such as denazification, and, a second set, political and substantial, such as the taking over of the Ukrainian separatist region of Donbass, demilitarization to levels assuring Russian security interest and that Ukraine remain out of NATO. Accordingly, their offensive was caliberated to take over Donbass, open up a land corridor between the sliced off Crimea and Donbass, thereby also restricting Ukrainian access to the Black Sea coast. Operations elsewhere, such as along Ukraine’s eastern border were to tie down Ukrainian forces lest they interfere with the main thrusts in the  south east and south and the operations aimed at Kiev were to either trigger a regime change, failing which they were to pressurize Kiev into conceding.

As things have turned out, Russia has bogged down to an extent. Its Kiev operation has been counter-productive in strengthening Ukrainian resolve, also ascendant with the support it has elicited for Ukrainian war effort. It is possible that the investment of Kiev has drawn away forces that could have been used elsewhere to wrap up by now. Russia seems to have messed up with its political aim of intimidating the Ukrainian government distracting from its military objective of making territorial gains rapidly.

This summary of the war so far has lessons for any Cold Start-based conventional operations India might undertake. Cold Start would have the political aim of reeducating the Pakistanis on the virtues of temperance. Since Pakistan is largely controlled by its military, the military aim would be to give it a knock, hoping that doing so displaces it from atop the Pakistani hierarchy, or , at worst, the punitive action makes it rethink its India strategy.

The foremost lesson has already found mention: that Pakistan is a nuclear power and Cold Start may not be an appropriate instrument to address India’s Pakistan problem. That said, India would do well to follow the China model. China in its 1962 War on India and its 1979 War on Vietnam was politically sensible enough to declare victory and retrieve to its start line, even though in the latter, unlike in the former, it had received a bloody nose. Therefore, India will do well not to get its regional power gander up and ego ensnared.

This is easier said than done. The successor strategy to Cold Start - proactive operations strategy – has it that IBGs would make a run for it at war outbreak. It bears reminding that the Pakistani having followed the Indian discourse have wargamed the contingencies and prepositioned forces accordingly. They would prove difficult customers. Consequently, India – not wanting the IBGs to be shown up – might have to release reserves to get the better of the Pakistanis. This would up the ante into the No-Go nuclear terrain. In short, the political leaders must be willing to lose face.

There is a lobby that thinks Pakistan Occupied Kashmir could be a Donbass equivalent for India and that gains made across the LC are gains kept. This misses the fact that the terrain there is apt for irregular war. India would be hard put to retain gains.

The take away from the humanitarian consequences of the Russian invasion is that the suffering needs being multiplied manifold, since the population figures here are higher. This will not only hamper operations, but prove a CNN ambush.

The influx of foreign fighters into wars elsewhere, such as those in Iraq and Syria, has repeated itself in Ukraine, with Ukraine calling for a mercenary legion to join on its side. To the extent this is a right wing influx, it puts paid to Putin’s denazification cover story. In Pakistan, this will an irregular counter can be expected in real time, with Pakistani Punjabi numbers buttressed by Talibani and Islamist fighters. The political aim of mollifying Pakistan would be dead at birth itself.

While this might sell Pakistan down river to Islamist extremism, the political mirroring effect in India needs factoring in too. India, under a nationalist regime, might not see this as a problem, but a gain of sorts.

Therefore, it appears that the Russo-Ukrainian War has put the epitaph on Cold Start: a doctrine laid to rest since it was not worth chancing. This begs the question of India’s future doctrinal direction. On this NSA Doval may have set the ball rolling with his observations that conventional wars are obsolete. What takes the place of military-dominant wars is a mystery left for another post, since the Russo-Ukrainian War suggests that humankind is not done with wars as yet.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/ending-russo-ukrainian-war?s=w

Ending Russo-Ukrainian War

Peace Strategising

Peace strategizing to end the Russo-Ukrainian War

By Ali Ahmed

Through this century, it’s taken on the status of a truism that getting into a war is easy, getting out of one is the tricky part. The example of the United States (US) is stark. In the midst of the unipolar moment, the US stepped into Afghanistan post 9/11 with the ease of a hyper power to displace the Taliban and scatter the Al Qaeda. Handing over Afghanistan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) International Security Assistance Force, it made off Iraq to displace Sadam and find his weapons of mass destruction. Though President George Bush Jr soon thereafter declared victory from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, the war went on and 10 years on morphed into one against the Islamic State. The US was finally able to leave Afghanistan only last year, an exit facilitated by the Taliban guarding the Kabul airport as the Marines boarded the last airplane out.

This recent history appears lost on President Putin as he headed into a war of his own by invading Ukraine. Even if we are to take a purported war aim - denazification - as rhetoric, the ostensible reason – to keep Ukraine out of the NATO – appears to have been conceded by his opposite number, Ukrainian President Zelensky. And, yet the two sides are embroiled a war that could well have ended. This only goes to reinforce the observation on war.

One of the problems of getting out of a war is that strategizing is taken as the remit of war colleges and there is not enough theory out there to help guide how to end wars. War termination in strategic theory is about prevailing over the other side or leaving in such a strait as to make continuing the war worse than ending it. This is easier said than done since the opposite side receives enough succor from external partners to avoid losing a war, thereby keeping a war going. In this case, Ukraine, the weaker side is being kept afloat by the US, with the US hoping that its showing in the war will help weaken Russia in the long term. A longer war will help the unprecedented sanctions in place bite.

Thus, we see Ukraine not only soldiering on for retrieving lost ground for the hard bargaining on the negotiations table when a peace process kicks in, but also to milk its predicament to the hilt in terms of assistance it can hope to receive in the reconstruction to follow. The US has already pledged USD 10 billion. This is at a price in terms of temporary inconvenience to its population facing displacement and refugee status. As for destruction, most of it – though not all such as in Kiev - is in contested areas that Russia might retain control of such as Donbass and the Black Sea coast. Thus, the post war problem of rebuilding will be heightened for Russia.

As for Russia, it has not been able to make the headway it might have wished at the outset. It had hoped for a quick victory from the line of march, but its columns headed for Kiev and President Putin’s call for a military coup to displace President Zelensky did not materialize the hoped for dividend. The Russian military has settled for methodically taking over territory of its interest: Donbass that it might not return; along the Black Sea coast that it would like to retain control of; and along Ukraine’s eastern border that it will likely wish to maintain as a demilitarized buffer zone. It continues to bedevil Kiev and intimidate through bombings elsewhere, including by hypersonic weapons, in order to break Ukrainian will to continue in the fight.

Even as these military moves play out, the diplomatic field has been busy. The two sides have had three rounds of talks, but only touched upon humanitarian consequences. The last round was at foreign minister level in Turkey, but did not make headway on substantive issues as ceasefire and a subsequent peace process. Intermediaries such as Israeli President Naftali have lent a hand in conveying each others’ bottom-line between the two sides. Others, as Turkey, Greece and France, have helped assist the two sides with managing the humanitarian consequences. The United Nations has served as venue for global power equations to play out in both the Security Council and General Assembly serving as site for passage of resolutions on the politics of the conflict and its humanitarian fallout. Missing has been shuttle diplomacy by the United Nations (UN) or any regional organization, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that had been overseeing the earlier truce in the Donbass area. The former may owe to UN limitations since a Permanent Five member, Russia, is implicated, while the OSCE got its fingers burnt in the outbreak of the war.

Thus, avoidably, the war continues because there is little imagination on how to end it and even less political heft to do so. To think about how to end it, recourse must be taken to insights from peace studies, a subject not taught in war colleges and with far fewer faculties engaged with it than are defence studies departments. Even within the peace studies community, the emphasis post Cold War has been on internal wars and how peacekeeping and peacebuilding can be deployed to help manage and end these. What needs doing is to fish out traditional peacekeeping by venturing back to the Sixties for insight.

The two sides are messaging their concerns and portents are for the war to draw to a close. Even the military moves, such as reports of Ukrainian forces staging a counter at places, are indicators of peace at hand. That it drags on owes to the two sides awaiting a credible word on the other side on what each could concede to incentivize the other side to broach a ceasefire. Apparently, Turkey and Israel are facilitating a channel between the two, though the degree of collaboration between the two is not known. Turkey, having provided a venue for the foreign ministers’ meeting, leads the way on ceasefire negotiation prospects. The UN has been self-effacing for most part and attracted some adverse attention on that count, such as from UN veteran, Shashi Tharoor, who wants the Secretary General to get on a plane and shuttle. There is no shortage of eminences that the UN could deploy, not least of whom is recently retired Angela Merkel, who carries formidable political weight.

While Russian demands include a declaration of Ukrainian neutrality and Ukraine’s letting go of Crimea and perhaps Donbass. NATO membership ruled out, Ukraine has indicated that any concessions it makes will be subject to a referendum. Secretary General Gueterres believes this should suffice to get the two sides to the table to come up with a preliminary agreement on a ceasefire. He himself has not stepped up perhaps to avoid ‘forum shopping’ temptations for the two sides and to avoid complicating off-the-radar-screen peace initiatives unfolding.

An assisted preliminary agreement will buy the two sides time to get on with substantive talks over their major differences, even as humanitarian needs are met in areas that suffered conflict while normality returns to areas less affected by violence. Ensuing peace talks may well be long drawn out. The two sides, having just fought a war, would require assistance in keeping respective forces apart. Displaced people require to be ushered back and humanitarian actors need protection in order to service them. The ceasefire agreement may require Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory other than in certain areas where it might be seeking the fruits of its invasion, such as Donbass, Crimea and perhaps along the Black Sea coast. Their withdrawal would require verification and those that stay would require monitoring. A demilitarized buffer zone in the space Russians vacate may emerge from the ceasefire talks and would need monitoring by a force comprising both monitors in blue berets, protected by blue helmets. Lately, a draw down in Russian war aims restricting its interest to retaining Donbass may make for a more wieldy peace operation.

The UN is rather deliberate if not downright slow, in its procedures to deploy troops. The circumstance may warrant speedier inter-positioning of peacekeepers. Two countries figure in meeting the needs of both neutrality and strategic reach: China and India. Both have preserved relations with Ukraine while not burning their bridges with Russia. Other countries with similar out of area capabilities being ruled out on grounds of acceptability to Russia, the two can collaborate on a joint and early deployment of peacekeepers once the ceasefire agreement invites such a force under UN auspices. India being in the Security Council as a non-permanent member helps with this. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to Delhi is an indicator that cooperation on such a mission can be pulled off, though the two have been at odds with each other for two years over what India sees as Chinese intrusion into its territory in Ladakh. The opportunity of working together in returning stability in Ukraine might help the two overcome their differences in the Himalayas.

Peacekeeper presence will allow for the two sides to commit to a comprehensive peace agreement covering areas of major divergences. Implementation may require to be overseen too, for which the UN presence could be enhanced by other neutral Troop Contributing Countries. An integrated peacekeeping operation with a traditional interpositioning role alongside a humanitarian assistance mandate is not foreseen since the two sides are resilient enough to deploy their own resources and network with respective UN Country Teams on reconstruction, returns and humanitarian assistance.

India has been an active player, not only in the Security Council where it has been consequential in its messaging, but on ground in evacuating some 20000 of its students studying in Ukraine. It can however enhance its role by leveraging its peacekeeping forte. Peacekeeping can be foreseen, though with a return to the early period of peacekeeping for a model – a period when India used to punch above its weight in international affairs. India has a brigade worth committed to stand by arrangements. It has the air capability for out of area deployment of this brigade but also of Special Forces. If it is collaborating with the Chinese on a joint deployment, then the premium on its forces to be available for responding to a Chinese threat in the high Himalayas is reduced, enabling them to be used temporarily elsewhere.

Wars acquire a dynamic of their own. Peace strategies are to intercept wars in their escalatory trajectory, contain and bottle up the violence. These also help belligerents a face saver to get off slippery slopes. They require as much finesse in execution and sense of urgency and timing as war strategies. Unfortunately, there is much less attention paid to war termination in war colleges and strategizing peace in diplomatic schools. International Relations as a field can at best explain war, rather than help resolve it. Its prominent subfield, strategic studies too is left floundering when war, its instrument of choice, is revealed as ineffectual. Conflict Resolution as a field must leverage the opportunity of a European war looking for a suitable external intervention to end it to mainstream. India, for its part, could also use the opportunity to play to its weight on the global stage. Imaginative pointers here can be put to good use.

 https://southasianvoices.org/india-pakistan-a-missile-misfired-opens-up-opportunity/

India-Pakistan:  A missile misfired opens up opportunity

Pakistan has surprised India twice in the past month.Most recently, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan praised India’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine for maintaining “an independent foreign policy” for the “betterment of people.”

Prime Minister Khan’s remarks came amid Pakistan’s refrain from taking action when a misfired Indian cruise missile accidentally landed in Pakistani territory. India, for its part, has acknowledged that an inquiry is underway—papering over the legitimate questions that arose over its lack of transparency immediately after the missile crashed and its failure to keep Pakistan informed of the mishap. Though the supersonic missile did little damage, the knowledge that it was a “dual-use”Brahmos missile could have proven a trigger for crisis escalation. 

Fortunately, the context is one of rare convergence on India and Pakistan’s delicate positioning concerning Russia’s war in Ukraine. Both India and Pakistan have tried to maintain cordial relationships with Ukraine and its backers—the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and Russia. While Prime Minister Imran Khan was present in Moscow when Russia launched the armed attack on Ukraine, Pakistan remained neutral during a UN vote on Ukraine.India also abstained at multiple fora where Russia’s action came up for censure: in the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council.  

Thus, when India and Pakistan found themselves in a similar predicament on the war in Ukraine, the two sides were able to take a wide-angled view and move past the missile episode soberly.

Their similar positioning on Ukraine was on the back of growing cooperation in other arenas, that when buoyed by their non-confrontational attitude to the accidental missile launch, can potentially manifest this turn in their interrelations into a trend.

Since reiterating the ceasefire on the Line of Control in February 2021, the two sides have been tentativelyworking through ways to get past their hostility. Their most recent instance of working together was on the humanitarian front, allowing for the transit of wheat from India through Pakistan intended as food assistance for Afghanistan.

Pakistan also avoided retaliating against the accidental missile launch since itis interested in improving its relationship with India now thatits reaction to India’s revocation of Article 370 has run its course. Pakistan has thus far largely privileged a diplomatic response in the aftermath of the abrogation of Article 370, rather than a re-upping of its proxy war. The outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic in early 2020 also put a halt to any military action Pakistan may have contemplated against India. Chinese intrusion into Ladakh and preoccupation with the US withdrawal in Afghanistanmay have also constrained Pakistan from upping the military ante. 

Faced with all those limitations, Pakistan has reportedly sounded India through back-channel talks to return a degree of autonomy to Kashmir.  Since this initiative of Pakistan was in play during the misfired missile episode, Pakistan perhaps did not want to jeopardize it by overly embarrassing India.

On the back of an advantage, India is well on the way to organizing elections in Jammu and Kashmir. The afresh delimitation of constituencies is almost complete. India’s home minister has indicated the way forward as being elections followed, at a suitable time, by a return to statehood. India would be loath to have a crisis with Pakistan derail its plans. Therefore, after some initial demur, India it forthrightly acknowledged its mistake, thereby nipping the potential crisis in the bud.   

The Indian defense minister’s statements in parliament accepting the mistake is intended to also reassure Pakistan. Ideally, the inquiry must come up with recommendations to follow through on the Memorandum of Understanding dating to the Lahore Declaration of 1999. 

Should the inquiry underway in India take cognisance the forward looking contents of the   Memorandum and call on India to operationalise the measures in collaboration with Pakistan, it would provide India the cover to proceed down the route the two sides arguably ought to have taken long back. Had they done so, they would already have in place the protocols to respond to such incident.

 Improved relations between India and Pakistan best explain the absence of a crisis sparked by the misfired missile landing in Pakistan. For Pakistan, the advantage would be in posturing that their intercession with India – even if off the radar screen –led up to the action. It hopes to incentivize Indian reciprocation in easing up its dragnet in Kashmir, while India would prefer Pakistan to not complicate the campaign to UT assembly elections.

The mature actions of the two states in wake of the misfired missile not only reflect the improving relations but using the episode to strengthen CBMs will broaden the silver lining, enabling both to move in tandem on other issues that continue to plague the relationship, including Jammu and Kashmir.

 Book chapter contribution for the book on RIMC's 100th anniversary 

https://www.amazon.in/Valour-Wisdom-Years-Unparalleled-Leadership/dp/9356075964/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1647925269&refinements=p_27%3ASidharth+Mishra&s=books&sr=1-2

edited by Air Marshal PP Reddy (retd.).  Sidharth Mishra 

FOR THE HONOUR OF INDIA

Rimcos have gone global. A prominent field of their martial endeavour and cosmopolitan spearheading is peacekeeping with the United Nations (UN). This is inevitable, since being toppers in their respective batches, the computer at MS 17 invariably throws up their names. As elsewhere in the spectrum of national life, Rimcos remain at the UN’s knife edge and spear tip. UN peacekeeping came into its own after the Cold War. Quite naturally, the story of Rimcos’ incremental engagement matches that of the evolution of peacekeeping.

Characteristically, having been the first Indian to lead a brigade and only Indian brigade commander of World War II, Kodendera Subayya ‘Timmy’ Thimayya (1922-24/Raw) set the bar high for Rimcos by heading two different UN peace operations. He had his baptism in such operations while heading the India-Pakistan Boundary Force. Faiz Ahmed Faiz had then paid poetic tribute to him, saying, ‘Na hindu, na musalman, sirf insaniyat tha Thimayya ka imaan (Only humanity was Thimayya’s faith).’ No other competency required for a UN assignment, Thimayya was the new multicultural nation’s natural choice when asked for by the UN to head a delicate operation of repatriation of over 120000 prisoners on both sides in wake of the Korean War, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), in May 1953. For his year-long stint on the 38^th parallel he was awarded the Padma Bhushan. After serving out the balance of his eventful service, he was recalled in July 1964 from retirement to lead yet another intricate UN operation comprising 6000 troops along yet another ethnic fault-line, in Cyprus in 1964. Timmy passed away in harness in end 1965, setting standards that, as in anything else he took up, can only be aspired to, never surpassed.

Close on the heels of Thimayya to be appointed as a force commander was Lt. Gen. Prem Singh Gyani (1923-29). As 2nd Lt, PS Gyani became the first Indian officer to be commissioned into 'A' Field Brigade which was a unit comprising four batteries of horse-drawn guns. He was a graduate of United Kingdom’s Imperial Defence College, and had commanded the artillery school, Deolali, and Staff College, Wellington. He was appointed the second commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first traditional UN peacekeeping operation. The UNEF was set up in 1956 to secure an end to the Suez crisis by deploying some 8000 troops of 11 states, including India. General Gyani led the force from December 1959 to January 1964 with his headquarters located in Gaza City. His location in the Middle East allowed him to gain another unique distinction of briefly heading two other peacekeeping operations, for kick starting both, before returning to UNEF: the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) between September and November 1963 and the UN mission in Cyprus, UNFICYP. Sent to Cyprus between January and March 1964 as the Secretary General’s personal representative and observer, he then raised the force before handing over to its first commander, General Thimayya. 

Madras Sapper Major T Rajaratnam Lokaranjan (1937-42/Raw) headed a mobile team in Cambodia with a mandate similar to that of Timmy’s in Korea.  Following the French defeat by the Vietnamese in Indo-China, he headed a mobile team of the International Commission for Supervision and Control set up under the Geneva Agreement of 1954. He was perhaps the first Rimco military observer, a noteworthy distinction since many Rimcos, such as Maj Gen (then Major) Pramoda Dattatraya Sharlekar (1946-49, Rawlinson) who joined the UN Observers Group in Lebanon in 1958 soon after, followed in his footsteps.

With Timmy in the Indian Custodian Force served Lt Col Mihirsing Gehising Hazari (1933-40/Raw) leading 3 Dogra, the first post-independence Indian participation in an operation abroad. Hazari is the only Indian with a twice-over infantry command experience with the UN. He led 1 Dogra in the first UN peace enforcement operation, United Nations Operation in The Congo, in 1961-62. A fellow battalion commander in the 99 Independent Infantry Brigade Group, at the forefront of ONUC operations in retaking Katanga from rebels, was Lt Col Raghuraj Singh (1938-43/Roberts) leading 2 JAT. The following rotation saw Ashok K. Mehta (1950-55/P) serving in Katanga with his unit 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, the deployment of which saw the UN to boast of two Victoria Cross winners in its service, the only time ever. Alongside, Maj Arvind Moreshwar Joglekar (1940-46/Roberts) led 22 Bombay Field Company.

Rimcos’ tryst with the mighty River Congo has never ceased since. As UN peacekeeping came into its own with the new world order in the nineties, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) witnessed its most challenging multidimensional operation. This contributor was privileged to be among the early military observers there. South Kivu, in 2010 witnessed the heroics by the Indian brigade led by the Rimco pair, commander Chandi Prasad Mohanty (1973-78/S) and deputy, Sanjay Singh (1976-81/S).  

Taking over the helm of the brigade at a challenging time when a Company Operating Base had just been overrun by an armed group, they went on to neutralize the Mai Mai Cheka armed group, that had carried out some 300 rapes, using the atrocity as a weapon of war and terror in a remote area, Luvungi. The Rimco duo got in touch on satellite phone through over-ground friends with the head of the armed group, coaxing him to hand over the leader of the unit that had perpetrated the crimes against humanity. They launched the first heliborne operation deep into the jungles, right into the heart of the armed stronghold of the group, where they were outnumbered 15 times over. Using an attack helicopter combat air patrol, helicopter gunships for close support and transport helicopters for flying in and out, Sanjay led the ground troops and Mohanty kept watch in an Airborne Command Post. They arrested the deputy of the perpetrators, flying him out to face the law. Seven such operations followed.

Close at hand, Rohit Kapur (113/S) went about doing something different. He had two tenures commanding the Indian Field Hospital Level-III for Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO, at Goma. The hospital is the only hospital at the highest Level-III in the UN peacekeeping system. Under Rohit, it has stared down both Ebola and the COVID-19. As a major in the mid-nineties, Rohit served as Regimental Medical Officer with the 16 GUARDS battalion group in UNAVEM-III, the third iteration of the UN operation in Angola.

His battalion had a Rimco commanding officer, Raj Kumar Manucha (1964-69/S). Manucha’s battalion was securing the peace as political transition was underway across Angola. He had several Rimcos serving alongside, with Vikramjeet Singh (1979-83/R) in his unit and Atul Rawat (1978-82/P) as part of his mechanized infantry company. Atul’s work involved escorting the UN convoys through the government and rebel held territory. As with most officers of his generation, it was his first exposure to the work culture of the UN, interaction with foreigners and exposure.

An extensive Rimco ecosystem developed, with Adosh Kumar (1977-82/P) a staff officer in the regional headquarter at Uige, Vijay Yeshwant Gidh (1967-72/S)as second in command of his unit, 14 Punjab (Nabha Akal), Hariharan Dharmarajan (1978-82/C) and Gurinder Singh (1977-82/S) with the 417 (Independent) Engineer Company. The sappers undertook demining and construction of 10 bridges all over the country. The Rimcos reached out to help each other across hundreds of kilometres, despite the lawless situation.

Similar Rimco networks have been witnessed across peacekeeping theaters. This author profited from one in 6 Mahar, deployed in South Sudan’s most difficult province, Jonglei. As the Mission’s political affairs officer looking at political reconciliation with the Murle and Nuer armed groups in the province, I invited myself to a stay over on occasion with Rajneesh Giri’s (1990-93/C) company over at remote Pibor. On hand at Juba, were Mayank Chandola (1995-98/R), Ashish Kumar (1994-99/C) and Abhishek Mamgain to tap into. When the civil war broke out in Juba in December 2013, the airport shutdown and supplies ran out, I landed up at their close-by mess now and then to replenish. They were at the vanguard of the UN’s protection of civilians learning curve, securing the internally displaced people who flooded into their camps at Juba and Bor.

The other epicentre of the civil war was further north, at Malakal, that changed hands 13 times over its course. Here, starting 2017, Gaurav Batra (1991-95/R) headed the 3 MADRAS Infantry Battalion Group over 18 months. He oversaw a volatile area bordering Sudan and Ethiopia, strategically important due to presence of oil fields contested by the rebels. Besides, there were the POC sites at Malakal and Melut, the latter successfully terminated in his tenure. He deployed a company operating base across the gigantic Nile for the first time after a decade long UN presence. His unit received the Force Commander’s Commendation.

That battalion command is the epitome of leadership in the Indian army is well known. In 2006-07, Rishi Deo Sharma (1975-79/P) led 1/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), selected as Force Reserve Battalion for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). For the first time in UN peacekeeping, a Battalion group was earmarked as the Force Reserve, but in a Mission with a Chapter VI mandate. The whole of undivided Sudan, the largest country in Africa then, was earmarked as his area of responsibility (AoR), a world record. Understandably then, it was deployed at Kadugli, Wau and Juba. As expected of a Rimco, Sharma took home a UNMIS Unit Citation.

A decade later, I served for some five years in those parts, ending up as a senior political affairs officer. For a duration I managed relations between two border communities in the UN’s most remote Mission at Abyei. I figure my Pratapian days over the turn of the eighties alone accounted for me withstanding the rigour.

A post commander is another unique position to tenant. In 2002, Samar Singh Pundir (1984-90/P) served with the INDBATT 4 in an otherwise well-endowed by dangerous-at-times Mission, in Lebanon. Besides pleasant diversions as command of the Medal Day Parade at Ab el Saqi, he was post leader of 4-7C, the forward post in the infamous Cheeba farms area, the tri junction of Lebanon, Israel and Syria. The Hizbollah squared off with Israelis in firefights and shelling.

Incidentally, his elder brother, Vikram Singh Pundir (1981-85/P) also flew helicopters for the Indian Air Force under the UN flag in the DRC. There their armed Cheetah helicopters supported the Pakistani brigade convoys along the banks of Lake Tanganyika. He misses sumptuous lunches at the Pakistani officers’ mess with their brigade commander, who went on to be the Pak army chief, General Bajwa. International exposure and/or exposure to scotch from UN PAX outlet does mellow warriors.He recalls operating from a 5000 ft altitude lava covered runway with under threat of further eruptions.

The IAF’s peacekeeping contribution beginning with Canberras flying over Congo in 1961 covered Somalia, Sierra Leone, DRC and Sudan. Rimcollians have been a part of helicopter contingents. Vikram’s earlier stint was in Sierra Leone in 2000,where rushed in on very short notice as part of Op Khukri, he helped in the release of 5/ 8 GR troops held hostage by rebels. Separately, he blew up rebel vehicles to secure six British troopers held similarly. With Mi- 35 attack helicopters inducted under a Chapter VII mandate in the DRC, Amitabh Shendye (1984-88/R), Jasdeep Singh Sandhu (1981-85/P) and Atul Anand (1980-84/R) occupied cockpits over the Great Lakes.

Among military staff officer billets, Arvinder Singh (1978-83/C) and Rakesh Verma (1995-2000/S) have tenanted the very busy Staff Duties 3 desk that oversees the UN’s highest Troop Contributing Country matters, in Delhi. In Delhi, Dharmendra Singh Gill (1973-78/C) headed the Center for UN Peacekeeping, India’s prestigious think tank. In the field, in 2003, Khurshed Manek Balsara (1968-73/S) served in the Asmara headquarters of the Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMEE, as chief logistics officer and deputy chief of integrated services staff. As India senior for part of his tenure, he was the hub with the Indian expatriate communities in both countries.

The military observer’s job is the quintessential, and is also the most memorable, UN assignment. Suyash Sharma (1978-83/C) had such a stint in Côte d'Ivoire, leading a Milob team in Duekoue in 2005. His team site received the Force Commander’s complimentary letter for its quality information and analysis that helped oil the Mission’s OODA loop.

This snapshot of UN contributions suggests that Rimcos were very much there at the global front. Their profile as high achievers has them don blue berets, where their qualities of character and professional competence prove invaluable. A UN ribbon, from possibly his most pleasant and profitable tenure, is thus often spotted on a Rimco’s chest.

 

 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/nuclear-command-and-control-locating-the-strategic-forces-command/#.Yh2rmq5hZIU.twitter

UNEDITED VERSION

Nuclear Command and Control: Locating the Strategic Forces Command

It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear command and control (C2) arrangement. In the current nuclear C2, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command (SFC), who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines. While operational authority over the SFC is said to lie with the National Security Adviser (NSA), the SFC once had an administrative reporting line to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), which is presumably now the remit of the Permanent Chairman (PC) COSC.

This article discusses the nuclear C2 in relation to the SFC. Closing on 20 years since its formation, its well-regarded success as a joint command bears discussion alongside the ongoing one on jointness. Also, much doctrinal and hardware development has occurred, necessitating a revisit to the verities. Even if the current arrangement has stood the test of time and there is a case for ‘not mending what ain’t broke’, the intervening two decades is good enough reason to revisit assumptions and arrangements. This article proceeds to do so by looking only at the paper trail, limited though it is on nuclear C2, since a keener look ‘inside the box’ is not possible owing to confidentiality that attends nuclear matters in general.

Whither command authority over SFC?

An academic has described the nuclear C2 arrangement as: ‘the command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) through the office of the NSA to the CCoSC (Chairman COSC) and the SFC commander.’ This indicates NSA’s operational line over both the CCOSC and SFC as regards decision implementation on nuclear matters.

Whether this is ‘proper’ must be examined in light of the criteria of ‘command’. The definition may provide a handy yardstick to examine if command relationships in regard to the very potent SFC are adequate. A definition from Indian Army Doctrine (pp. 31-32) can help in this regard:

Command is the legal authority exercised by the commander…. It carries with it the responsibility for planning, organising, training, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned, implied or inherent missions together with administrative responsibility for supply, health, welfare, morale, discipline, assignment and relief of personnel.

There are two aspects to command in relation to the SFC. The first is that of the C
-in-C in regard to the SFC itself. This is disposed off here at the very outset, with the focus shifting to the second, more significant, aspect of nuclear C2: Who does the C-in-C SFC in turn report to?

It is self-evident that by this definition the C-in-C SFC’s command authority over SFC assets - described as ‘manages and administers’ - is rather limited. The two terms do not lend confidence in the nuclear C2 standard put out by the Draft Nuclear Doctrine have been met, specifically: “For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.” The terms ‘manages and administers’ is not a viable substitute for a command relationship between the commander charged with execution and his tools.

The second aspect is of the location of the SFC in the nuclear C2 arrangement. The amendment to the Allocation of Business rules on the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) gave out the authority of the CDS in his capacity as PC COSC. The press release on the appointment of the CDS informs that the CDS ‘will not exercise any military command, including over the three Service Chiefs, so as to be able to provide impartial advice to the political leadership.’ His command authority is restricted to ‘(T)ri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space.’

Since SFC does not find explicit mention, the PC COSC relationship to the SFC is subsumed in his nuclear role: ‘the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ The earlier mandate of administrative oversight that logically devolves on the PC COSC does no find explicit mention among his duties, but can be presumed. Even so, it is a notable omission, even if a premeditated one.

The relationship of the PC COSC with the SFC is restricted to an indirect advisory role on nuclear matters and a (presumed) direct one in terms of administrative oversight. More on the former role later, but, prima facie, mere administrative oversight appears suboptimal. Quite like the other Cs-in-C of geographical commands of the Services who report to their respective Service Chiefs - who exercise command authority - the C-in-C SFC as head of a functional joint command requires being accountable to the PC COSC. Earlier there being a rotating Chairman COSC, this aspect did not figure. But with a PC, it demands relook.

Need for clarity

As for the advisory role of the PC COSC, this too could do with enhancing. For this the popular understanding of the SFC being operationally under the NSA needs to be problematised. It is surprising that there is no mention of nuclear C2 in the Allocation of Business rules. The NSA, with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the Principal Adviser on National Security matters to the Prime Minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role, which puts into question the operational authority that the NSA is supposed – in the popular narrative - to exercise over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: ‘The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’ This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the Executive Council, operational authority over the SFC: C-in-C SFC being a member of the Executive Council.

The Political Council, being ‘the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons (italics added),’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The Executive Council ‘executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’ In other words, a subordinate committee (Executive Council) is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee (Political Council).

Recall also, the single-point authority given in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine, thus, ‘(T)he authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India (italics added),’ was not replicated in the 2003 nuclear doctrine. The latter reads: ‘The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons’ (italics added).

The inference is that the C-in-C SFC, a member of Executive Council, is answerable to the Political Council as part of the collective, the Executive Council, answering to the collective, the Political Council. Such an interpretation of the official nuclear doctrine in effect suggests - irrespective of the NSA’s presumed operational authority – that there is no single-point authority – military or civilian – overseeing the three-star C-in-C SFC. This suggests that the Draft Nuclear Doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has not been fully met as yet. The operational and administrative disjuncture militates against ‘unity of command’, which reasonably ought to apply to a significant force as the SFC.

Changes proposed

The finding here so far is that command relationships in respect of the SFC are not strictly compliant with the definition (covered earlier) of ‘command’: ‘Command is the legal authority exercised by the commander… (italics added)’. There is no ‘commander’ the C-in-C SFC reports to, unlike other Cs-in-C of the three Services. In the ongoing jointness debate, C2 of joint theatre commands is a significant aspect of the debate. However, the C2 over the functional command, the SFC, has not figured so far. The ongoing defence reforms offer an opportunity for explicit insertion into the nuclear C2 arrangement a military superior for the C-in-C SFC in a consequential addition to the remit of the CDS as PC COSC.

Even in the presidential system of the United States (US), the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls the nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the Secretary of Defence.

The PC COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the Political Council, as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, the PC COSC would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the Political Council, of which the defence minister – the civilian political authority over the military - is part. Operational authorization of nuclear weapons can thus be transmitted to the SFC through a single - uniformed - chain of command.

By virtue of such empowerment of the PC COSC, he could also co-Chair the Executive Council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity; not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state.

The PC COSC would require a nuclear staff as a separate vertical in the HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Hiving off the strategic weapons’ ‘employment-related’ operations staff from the Strategy Programs Staff, with the nuclear weapons ‘development-related’ staff retained under the NSA, will be necessary.

This onerous responsibility requires that CDS’ bandwidth needs to be enlarged. To avoid an overload, the Secretary Department of Military Affairs hat of the CDS can be shed to a three star vice CDS.

Arguing for the makeover

With the SFC ‘under command’ the PC COSC, deterrence is the gainer. Continuing with a nuclear C2 that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. The PC COSC is best positioned to keep a tag on the escalatory dynamic of conflict, making for an efficacious discharge of his nuclear advisory role. Having an executive role alongside makes for a neater nuclear C2 arrangement, that should impress prospective foes.

Escalation possibilities necessitate keeping an intimate eye on when and how nuclear weapons can move from the backdrop to foreground and responding appropriately. Whereas the full spectrum deterrence threat held out by Pakistan is a concern, China continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal. Consequently, military factors in the nuclear domain are of increasing import in conflict. The PC COSC presence in the Political Council in an advisory capacity will ensure that military factors are not blindsided, but resilience of response compels a military – uniformed - chain of command.

Irrespective of validity of the conception that ‘nuclear weapons being political weapons are not meant for warfighting’, periodically revisiting the concept is warranted. A military chain of command for the SFC does not violate this principle since it does not in any way affect the C2 doctrinal principle: that authorization for nuclear use rests with the Political Council headed by the prime minister and advised by the NSA. 

The change can also ease the span of control issues for the National Security Council system under the NSA. The NSA would then have more attention span for forward looking and civilian predominant areas – nuclear weapons development, general deterrence and a holistic national security overview. The NSA’s ambit has increased lately, with his wearing the hats of the Defence Planning Committee and the Strategic Policy Group. Therefore, both an explication and revision of his mandate is in order.

The counter argument

The plausible counter argument is that operational authority is better retained by the NSA. The NSA is more situationally aware of the political and diplomatic dimensions of conflict. It is the overall situation rather than its narrowly military coordinates that will drive nuclear input and decision making. Next, he is also better positioned in conflict to oversee the responsiveness of the civilian nuclear complex.

Finally, if command over the SFC is vested with the PC COSC, this would be a departure from the military understanding of ‘command’: directing military forces for achieving military objectives. The SFC does not easily come under this definition since it is not meant to deliver on strictly military objectives as are other military forces. India is not venturing into the realm of low yield nuclear weapons and therefore there is no call for a military command over SFC.[2] 

Conclusion

The proposal is the next logical step in the incremental cooption of the military into national security structures. A maturing of the three systems involved - the CDS, the SFC and the NCA – allows for inclusion of nuclear C2 in the consideration on ongoing defence reforms.  With a new CDS in saddle soon, the proposal here can be thrashed out in the ongoing debate on jointness, the SFC being a significant - and popularly regarded as the most successful - joint command. Rebuttal of the counter argument in favour of the status quo is not attempted here for reasons of space as much as keeping powder dry if a debate ensues. There is also little doubt that nuclear C2 has gone much further than the initial steps reviewed in this paper cover. At a minimum, the government needs bringing such de facto strides into the open domain since these depict implacability of the deterrent, enhancing deterrence. At a maximum, the government could take the next steps in nuclear weapons operationalisation by indubitably domesticating these in military structures, thereby - yet again - boosting deterrence.

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[1] 

[2] ­The author thanks a reviewer’s feedback on this article for this point.

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/defence-reform-chief-of-defence-staff-nuclear-command-control

Defence Reform: Giving teeth to the new Chief of Defence Staff

India is temporarily back to the erstwhile system of a rotating Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) in which the senior most serving Service Chief tenanted the appointment. It’s now over a month since General Bipin Rawat’s untimely demise in saddle, but the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has not been appointed as yet.

The jointness initiative has been at a pause. The Services have been asked to turn in studies on how each wished to see jointness shape up. Appointed interim CCOSC, General Naravane, though familiar with the fledgling steps taken on jointness so far, cannot take it forward full throttle.

This indicates certain sanguineness that the CDS will not be overly missed, even though the CDS appointment is triple-hatted, with the third hat being that of Secretary Department of Military Affairs.

This complacence owes to the CDS appointment missing a vital ingredient, that of command authority. His command authority is restricted to ‘Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to Cyber and Space.’ Therefore, his absence does not appear critical.

However, this inadvertently gives rise to a question that curiously has not figured with any salience in the strategic commentary so far. Since the CDS’ command authority does not include the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in its remit, who exercises command authority over the SFC?

The CDS, in his capacity as Permanent Chairman (PC) COSC, is only ‘the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ The NCA’s Military Adviser being absent appears to have been easily reconciled with. The implication is that the SFC does not report to the PC COSC.

A cursory look at the security situation over the past two years, when a military crisis has been ongoing in Ladakh, suggests that keeping deterrence honed would be a priority. To be sure, there is no nuclear dimension to the crisis, but general deterrence is never meant to be upfront. It is to be quietly ticking away in the background.

Persisting with a structural flaw in not having the SFC under a command authority and having a part-time Military Adviser to the NCA – which is what a reversion to the rotating Chairman COSC implies – means a neglect of deterrence.

The forthcoming appointment of the new CDS can only resolve the latter. The suggestion here is that the former deficit also be simultaneously addressed. 

Ambiguity galore

In the current nuclear command and control (C2) arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command (SFC), who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines: with operational authority lying with the National Security Adviser (NSA) and being only administratively under the PC COSC.

An academic has described the nuclear C2 arrangement as: ‘the command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) through the office of the NSA to the CCoSC (Chairman COSC) and the SFC commander.’ However, there is no mention of nuclear C2 in the Allocation of Business rules.

The NSA, an unelected civilian presently with cabinet rank and with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the Principal Adviser on National Security matters to the Prime Minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role for the NSA. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the NSA’s operational authority over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: ‘The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.’

This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the Executive Council, operational authority over the SFC, the C-in-C SFC being a member of the Executive Council. Does this also mean that the NSA also has operational authority over the other members that include Service Chiefs and the PC COSC? Chairmanship of a committee does not imply subordination of the members by the Chair.

The Political Council, being ‘the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons,’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The Executive Council – as a collective - ‘executes the directives given to it by the Political Council’. In other words, a subordinate committee (the Executive Council) is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee (the Political Council).

In this interpretation, the C-in-C SFC, a member of Executive Council, is as part of the collective, the Executive Council, answerable to a collective, the Political Council.

Recall the Draft Nuclear Doctrine had named the prime minister, as head of the Political Council, the sole authority for nuclear use authorization. The relevant para reads: “The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).”

The official doctrine departed from this by vesting the authority with the Political Council, stating: “The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”

In effect, a three-star C-in-C SFC is without a single-point superior with command authority overseeing him and his Command. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has apparently not been met.

It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear C2. Even so, the lack of transparency that gives rise to such ambiguity does not help with deterrence.

Why fix nuclear C2?

To vest the NSA with operational authority over of the SFC is an anomaly in India’s democratic system of governance based on collective ministerial responsibility. The NSA’s advisory role is understandable. But an executive mandate with operational authority over a critical military formation – the SFC - is at odds with the ministerial system.

Even in the presidential system of the United States (US), the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls the nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the Secretary of Defence.

The belief that ‘nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting,’ may have led to the civilian political authority channeling its nuclear directives through a civilian NSA. The apprehension may be over militarization of nuclear decisions. Since the NSA would be on hand for a holistic input, such a situation would not arise. The NSA has a Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat, a military veteran, who can potentially provide a second opinion to the military’s advice.

Changes necessary

The PC COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the Political Council as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, the PC COSC would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the Political Council, of which the defence minister – his boss - is part. Operational authorization of nuclear weapons can be transmitted to the SFC through a single - uniformed - chain of command.

By virtue of this empowerment of the PC COSC, he could also co-Chair the Executive Council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity, not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state. 

With the SFC ‘under command’ of the PC COSC, deterrence stands to gain. Departing from the nuclear C2 that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. The security juncture is appropriate for the military to take over the operational reins of the SFC, the logical final step in the structural inclusion of the military.

In the interim - at a minimum - the role of the PC COSC in relation to the SFC must be explicated by in the mandate of the new CDS. Leaving the SFC out of his remit is either an oversight, that can be remedied, or is result of a misplaced sense of confidentiality, which too needs amending.

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