Reframe the Kashmir conflict from terrorism to insurgency

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/politics-reframe-the-kashmir-conflict-from-terrorism-to-insurgency-4069191.html

The latest set of the periodically released statistics from Kashmir indicate that some 75 per cent of those killed in military operations there are locals. Last year, the figure for Kashmiris killed of those killed in operations was 62 per cent. This figure compels a rethink on how India approaches the problem in Kashmir.

Currently, the understanding that India is contending with terrorism in Kashmir is based on the presence of Pakistani proxy fighters and the understanding that the local fighters are doing Pakistan’s behest.

However, the numbers of locals among those killed in military operations indicates that there is a considerable indigenisation of the conflict. Is it time, therefore, to rethink the tag of ‘terrorism’ that continues to be applied?

There is no doubt that terrorism has been incident in Kashmir, seen in the killings of unarmed soldiers while on leave and relatives of policemen, political workers and civilians who are ‘informers’.

Even so, most encounters are a result of proactive operations by security forces, with militants cornered fighting in self-defence. A disaggregation of the military engagements in Kashmir would indicate that incidents that can be subsumed under the definition of terrorism are considerably less than those more appropriately covered by the term insurgency.

This indicates that the broad-brush appraisal of the conflict as terrorism does not best capture its reality. Insurgency may instead be the appropriate frame to view the conflict.

This trend in the military sphere of the conflict is reinforced by the developments on its political strand. The separatists have taken pains to point to indigenous roots and interests of their political struggle.

Zakir Musa, the recently killed head of an Al-Qaeda affiliated group, was upbraided by the separatist leadership for his advocacy of Islamism. Likewise, late last year, the separatists were quick to condemn a mob’s agitation in favour of the Islamic State in the premises of Jamia Masjid in Srinagar.

Their most recent statement lends support to any political talks contemplated by the newly re-elected central government in relation to Pakistan’s reaching out for talks going back to its elections last year.

The political context to the conflict finds resonance in the positions of the mainstream political parties in the Valley on issues such as sanctity of Articles 35A and 370, application of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the relevance of Pakistan as a stakeholder in the conflict.

The military and political dimensions of the conflict in Kashmir taken together dilute the reading of the conflict solely as terrorism in favour of militancy or, more accurately, an insurgency. Where it is not a defining feature of a conflict, terrorism can be subsumed as part of an insurgency.

It is arguable that proxy war has been a dwindling feature of the conflict in Kashmir in its phase after the killing of Burhan Wani. In its definition of insurgency, the army’s subconventional operations doctrine notesthat insurgencies often rely on external support (p. 64). It also notes that terrorism is in evidence within subconventional conflicts.

Such a reframing of the conflict in Kashmir is useful. It provides scope for a peace process kicking off. While there is little appetite in governments to engage with ending terrorism politically, it is widely regarded that ending insurgency is only possible through political means.

Thus far, treating the conflict in Kashmir as a proxy war by Pakistan and a war of terror against India, New Delhi has refrained from a peace process both internal and external. However, if a reframing of the conflict is done as to have it re-interpreted as an insurgency rather than terrorism, then a peace track to India’s strategy both towards Pakistan and within Kashmir is possible to envisage.

The timeliness of such reframing also owes to the government beginning its second innings. As its new Union home minister, Amit Shah, takes stance and surveys the field, he could consider if the statistics from Kashmir bespeak of changes on ground permitting a policy gearshift.

If this is deemed premature for now — reports from the Line of Control have it that infiltrators are in 16 camps across it — Shah could well hold course till a trend manifests over time.

Shah should not hold on to election-time rhetoric. He could instead use the summer to test the thesis that the conflict in Kashmir qualifies as insurgency. The security situation over the Amarnath Yatra and the upcoming elections in autumn will provide ample evidence either way.

In the interim, his newly-sworn in counterpart, external affairs minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, while reiterating the traditional India position, could signal that India could shift gears since it now has activated surgical strikes as an option to tackle terrorism. Pakistan had earlier indicated its preference among the political parties during elections, believing a Right-wing victory can help deliver on talks better.

A reframing of the conflict provides the government an opportunity to open a line internally, to begin with. This would be a doctrinally compliant political track to complement the military prong of strategy in countering insurgency.

https://www.orientblackswan.com/pressreviews/978-81-250-5853-3_1.pdf
Book review of my book India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia, Routledge 2014

Achin Vanik, After the Bomb. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. 2015. 213 pages. `575. Ali Ahmed, India’s Doctrine Puzzle—Limiting War in South Asia. New Delhi: Routledge. 2014. 240 pages. `695. DOI: 10.1177/2321023017727993 These two books deal with India’s nuclear policy. Both appear sceptical of the security rationale of Indian nuclear weapons. Although both the books look doubtful about the security role of India’s nuclear arsenals, the two authors have adopted two different approaches to examine ‘Nuclear India’. Vanaik discusses the issue in a broad nuclear disarmament framework while Ahmed wants to resolve the puzzle of the evolving limited conventional war military doctrine. Vanaik has adopted the classical or orthodox anti-nuclear perspective in which a nuclear weapon is an unnecessary evil. Ahmed narrates the issue from a military perspective, and explores how the nuclear arsenal has added complexity to the making of the limited war doctrine. Vanaik has gone into some of the issues generating curiosity in the global security community in a somewhat incoherent and disjointed way. For example, the existence of India’s nuclear weapon is a big conundrum for the community. The author has ‘unravelled’ the nuclear elite of India; otherwise, the group is referred to as the small but powerful nuclear bomb lobby. The book has also dealt with 10 dilemmas of nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia. Several writers on nuclear issues have been writing on those dilemmas for years, and Vanaik’s book includes some of these discussions. The book touches on nuclear terrorism and has also proposed a plan of action. The plan of action has a number of fascinating unilateral, bilateral (India–Pakistan), multilateral and global measures. Ahmed’s book, somewhat more coherent, deliberates on different facets of the limited war doctrinemaking process. The book has a collection of different concepts/theories of limited war, but ironically, it ignores or overlooks the concept of limited nuclear war that was invented immediately after the advent of the nuclear weapon age. Indeed, both major issues—nuclear disarmament and limited war between two nuclear weapon countries located in South Asia—are dominating the nuclear discourse of India and the world. Vanaik’s book has given an overview of the global force structure and doctrinal and other factors that may fulfil the dream of a nuclear weapon-free world. Similarly, limited war between India and Pakistan is considered a possibility in the dominant discourse of the Indian strategic community, but Pakistan and the Western strategic communities appear sceptical that the conventional war may not escalate to the nuclear level. 298 Book Reviews India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine is a much talked about element of India–Pakistan nuclear deterrence. It is not an official doctrine, and this fact has been stated countless times. Yet, it is considered ‘official’ in some quarters. Ahmed in his book has casually treated the status of the Cold Start doctrine. However, officially, a policy/doctrine exists, which considers that there is scope for fighting a conventional war or conventional wars between two nuclear neighbours. The doctrine is supportive of limited war. Tired of Pakistan’s terror strikes, which get a nuclear shield, India wants to punish Pakistan in a conventional war. India enjoys conventional superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan and the duration of such a war could be shorter. Ahmed, in his book, elaborates this aspect when he discusses limited war in South Asia. Will there be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan? Will Indian doctrine of limited war be rendered useless by the Pakistani posture or policy of First Use and the use of tactical nuclear weapons? Actually, Pakistan’s posturing is aimed at deterring possible India’s conventional intervention after Pakistan’s provocation. The Pakistani regime is aware of India’s retaliation. If it is done quickly, Pakistan may suffer massive damage. International public opinion will be in India’s favour as no country after Japan has been attacked with nuclear weapons in the last seven decades. However, both books fail to highlight this reality properly. Of course, any war, nuclear or conventional, needs to be avoided. Unfortunately, both the authors see the Indian nuclear bomb only in the context of the flawed South Asia nuclear paradigm. Although Vanaik has given some room to the nuclear policies of countries outside South Asia, yet India and South Asia dominate the book. In this account, the South Asian region does not have more than two nuclear weapons states. Other countries in the region are not nuclear weapons states. Even the use of the term ‘India–Pakistan nuclear relationship’ instead of ‘South Asian nuclearization’ misses the real dynamics of nuclear India because China is overlooked. Nuclear China is a major factor in shaping India’s choice for nuclearization. If the term Southern Asia that includes China is used, any regional reference or regional discussion on nuclear issues may acquire some meaning. What is the role of the civil society in formulating India’s nuclear policy in general and the limited war doctrine in particular? Both the books have underlined the role of Indian civil society and even foreign individuals in contributing to India’s policy. Ahmed mentions that the origin of the idea of India’s limited war with its nuclear adversary may be traced to the seminar at the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Recently civil society is debating revising the nuclear doctrine. Some are arguing even to change ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons, the much cherished component of India’s nuclear doctrine. Ahmed has described various forces shaping the limited war doctrine. The book assumes significance in the light of the new voices for change in the doctrine. Both books allude to the Bharatiya Janata Party government’s contribution to introducing a new nuclear age. Ahmed uses ‘cultural nationalism’ to refer to aggressive nationalism indirectly. In fact, both the authors speak of changes either introduced in the nuclear policy or expected to come in it. Actually, the strong demand for the revision of nuclear doctrine comes from the strategic community and the organizations directly involved in India’s security management. A political party like the Bharatiya Janata Party has to balance and accommodate these demands and interests. Somehow discussions on strategic culture have also downplayed the strong support nuclear disarmament has in the Indian strategic community and in India’s strategic culture. Nuclear India has to accommodate global and universal nuclear disarmament. When the Conference on Disarmament concludes a Nuclear Weapons Convention, India will not surprise the world by staying away from it. Already, India had shown its strong support to disarmament treaties of two other weapons of mass destruction. India will not go for any regional disarmament measure like South Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, as Vanaik has explicitly stated that he is against unilateral disarmament of India or Pakistan. And for India, a regional disarmament means unilateral disarmament. Book Reviews 299 As the world has stopped even paying lip service to nuclear disarmament, Vanaik’s book may give some idea of the global security scenario after the bomb. In addition to it, discussions on the Indian nuclear elite provide a different perspective on the nuclear decision-making process of India. Needless to add, a strong counter-perspective to his understanding exists in the Indian strategic community. Similarly, Ahmed’s work may provide an insight into the puzzle of India’s nuclear and conventional war doctrines. He has used a number of documents and papers on India’s limited war otherwise not known to scholars. A nuclear war is a remote possibility. The nuclear world is stable, but of course, a world without nuclear weapons will be more secure and stable. Rajiv Nayan Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis New Delhi, India E-mail: raj.nayan@gmail.com

http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=91323#
Event management is no substitute for strategy

Event management that fetched Narendra Modi a second term was fully on display at the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhawan during the swearing in of Team Modi 2.0, a perfectly unnecessary spectacle meant only to reinforce the Modi cult. Since it would not do to attribute Modi's second term to a manipulation of the voting machines or to an anti-minority animus among Modi voters, it can be charitably gauged that the voters were instead convinced by Indian crisis response, or better still, by the event management that attended the crisis response. As any information warrior knows, the internal public sphere too is target. Clearly, the information war effort was indubitably successful internally. 
It would not do to dignify the other Indian actions during the crisis with the label 'strategy'. The Pulwama episode has far too many questions tagging it to qualify as 'black swan' event. It set the stage for an air force riposte. Barely had the planes got back, Modi was off to Churu to attend a preplanned rally, comprising ex-servicemen to boot. That evening, he took a metro ride to another public engagement. Modi was clearly out to milk the opportunity, oblivious to Pakistani preparations for counter strike. His choreographers were apparently impressed by the sequence in the Oscar winning film Churchill in which Churchill character is depicted interacting with the people in the London underground after rendering in parliament the famous 'we shall fight them on the beaches' clarion call. It is another matter that Churchill escaped his security detail to mingle with the common man, whereas Modi's metro ride was patently for the cameras. Expectedly, Modi was nowhere on the screens the next day when Pakistan did strike back. 
A script cannot substitute for strategy. The air force had to go into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir airspace for a bit to get a better stand-off shot at their target in Balakot owing to cloud conditions. The stipulations on the air force were to not to cross over and to ensure against hitting a military or civilian target. A cloudy night forced the air force's hand, belying Modi's 'andar ghus ke maarna' boast. The cloud cover also prevented use of the missiles that could have recorded the destruction at the target end. There being no bomb-damage proof, 'success' of Balakot strike is better attributed to information warfare specialists. Since Modi by his own account based his decision expecting cloud cover to advantage the air force, the buck stops at his door. 
As for the other boasts (nuclear weapons not for 'diwali' and 'qatl ki raat'), these further put paid to any notion of strategy guiding actions. Modi - citing western sources rather than admitting to it - let on that missiles were readied to threaten Pakistan to force it to give back the Indian pilot captured in the Nowshera dogfight. This does not bespeak of strategy since the objective - getting back the pilot and preventing him coming to harm in custody - is not what missiles should be put to, especially against another nuclear armed state with like capability. Expecting Pakistan to abuse the pilot in its custody - after his captivity and conditions have been exposed in social media - is to be naïve of international relations and the place of the Geneva Conventions in it. Clearly, the rationale of readying missiles to pressure the release of the pilot is an after-the-fact one. 
So what was the original purpose of the missile readiness? Equally clearly, these may have been to deter the Pakistani counter strike, a measure that in the event failed. Pakistan was willing to chance its counter strike in real time, assuredly having readied its own missiles to prevent escalation by India in retaliation with missiles. This is a plausible strategic rationale for missile readiness. It is obvious that the follow through with the missile strike was not undertaken by India, using the excuse that Pakistan having chickened out and promised to return the pilot. 
Instead, the plausible reason for the lack of follow-up missile strike(s) is that India chickened out of countering Pakistan's gumption at Nowshera. In strategic terms, Pakistan's retaliation needed to be replied in a manner as to ensure India comes out on top, especially since India initiated the exchange with its Balakot aerial strike. This was necessary for moral and psychological ascendance, particularly since India claims that it has shifted the goal posts and more surgical and aerial strikes are to follow in the implementation of an Indian version of the 'mow the grass' strategy (a term attributable to India's strategic partner, Israel). Not following through with retaliation cannot be substituted with spin doctoring regards the controversial downing of the F-16 in the Nowshera dogfight. 
Strategically, India can be faulted for readying missiles as the next step in the escalatory ladder since their use is escalatory to a higher degree. The likelihood of their introduction into the crisis forced involvement of the Americans, who were up until then stand-offish and focused on Trump's talks with the North Korean dictator. Since missile readiness can be expected to trigger American de-escalatory contingency action, claiming missiles were on the blocks is meaningless. It can cynically be suggested that India provoked American intervention, hoping to be bailed out thereby. 
Limited land operations of the order of surgical strikes could have proven costly since Pakistan's army was surely hair-trigger ready. Conventional air power found wanting and surgical strikes by land not an option, limiting next steps to missile strikes - that would surely have forced international crisis management intervention - suggests the limitation of the template of military response to crisis. Therefore, rushing off to Balakot was not the best option, nor was the military option the only one. 
Another problem is in the legacy of the crisis for the next one. That India would be starting off with a deficit would instigate its overcompensation. Therefore, a higher threshold of Indian retaliation can be expected even if the trigger does not warrant it. The first set of Rafales is in by September. India tested a stand-off glide bomb from a SU-30 last month. Its Navy postured in the Arabian Sea for a long while even after the crisis. This included the aircraft carrier and the nuclear submarine (not the boomer). The latter can carry cruise missiles, which - incidentally - can also be nuclear armed. It is only by next year India would be in a position to impose on Pakistan. It is not without reason Pakistan fired off the Shaheen II missile even as Imran Khan congratulated Modi for his win on election results day. A crisis turning into conflict is therefore not unlikely, putting paid to the notion of willfully going across now and again in a mow-the-grass operation, à la Israel's occasional forays into Gaza and Lebanon. 
Though India might posture a willingness to escalate in order to deter better and acquire the ability, its ability to strategise continues to be suspect as the national security adviser has been carried forward. The same set of decision makers is in the cabinet's security committee, except for the foreign minister. While S. Jaishankar, the new incumbent, can be expected to live up to his tough image, the others will be informed by a political logic. They have the implementation of the internally-directed Hindutva project to attend to and cannot afford any setback. 
The balloon of national security toughness can dissipate in quick time, exposing their election time claims as hollow. Uncertainties surrounding military action are self-evident from the probable nullity of result of the Balakot strike; from the fratricide over Budgam that accompanied the Nowshera episode; and the fire aboard the aircraft carrier as it returned to station after its extended crisis-related deployment. If the friction that attends military action is this costly, the real thing is certainly nothing like the movie 'Surgical Strike'. It may well leave the 'emperor without clothes'. Besides, the event management surrounding the crisis having yielded results in a pocketed electorate, there would be little need from internal politics point of view to chance a crisis. 
The upshot is that the election time rhetoric is just that, rhetoric. India may not up-the-ante. This presumes Pakistani intent to provoke. The Security Council's noting Pulwama was through a press release. Pulwama did not find mention in the resolution arraigning the key accused, Masood Azhar. Knowing that Pakistan may not be provocative in first place, it makes sense for India to posture aggressively since it knows it would not be challenged to put its money where its mouth is. India can then claim its new line has checked Pakistan, even if Pakistan is not up to mischief of such levels in first place. It remains to be seen if India can have its cake and eat it too.

EPW articles

The Modi Era

Vol. 54, Issue No. 21, 25 May, 2019

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But, a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability.

• Read moreabout The Modi Era

Putting India’s Land Warfare Doctrine in the Dock

Vol. 54, Issue No. 8, 23 Feb, 2019

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

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• Read moreabout Putting India’s Land Warfare Doctrine in the Dock

Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority

Vol. 53, Issue No. 46, 24 Nov, 2018

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

When the army is called in aid of civil authority, robust action taken by the army in a timely manner can prevent civil disturbance from exacting a strategic cost. The recent revelations on army inaction in the critical first 24 hours during the Gujarat carnage in 2002 are examined.

• Read moreabout Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority

Modi at the Helm

Vol. 53, Issue No. 34, 25 Aug, 2018

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

Nuclear decision-making, when examined at the institutional and individual levels, suggests that India’s case is fraught with shortcomings. This adds to the complications for regional security, already present on account of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making being military dominated. The aggravated institutional infirmities of India’s nuclear decision-making structures and the authoritarian tendencies in India’s primary nuclear decision-maker, the Prime Minister, heighten nuclear dangers in future crises and conflicts.

• Read moreabout Modi at the Helm

The Doval Scorecard

Vol. 53, Issue No. 21, 26 May, 2018

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

As the ruling party at the centre, the Bharatiya Janata Party, contemplates the forthcoming national elections, its record on national security warrants a review. The key player in crafting and implementing its national security strategy has been National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. An examination of Doval’s record over the past four years reveals that his principal contribution has been in facilitating national security interests to be held hostage to the electoral calculus of the Narendra Modi–Amit Shah combine.

• Read moreabout The Doval Scorecard

The Missing Muslim Army Officers

Vol. 53, Issue No. 4, 27 Jan, 2018

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The representation of Muslims in the army officer corps, at around 2%, is abysmal in contrast to their percentage in the population of India. Diversity is also compromised in the army, with over half of army officers hailing from a handful of north Indian states. This deficit of diversity along social and geographical lines has negative implications for the army’s apolitical and secular credentials.

• Read moreabout The Missing Muslim Army Officers

The Kashmir Charade This Winter

Vol. 52, Issue No. 47, 25 Nov, 2017

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The ill-planned and hurried appointment of an interlocutor for Kashmir by the government, supposedly for a sustained dialogue, does not suggest that the government is serious about resolving the Kashmir conflict. The initiative, however, appears to want to hold the United States at bay, which needs India and Pakistan talking to safeguard its Afghan engagement. The interlocutor’s mission will likely turn out to be yet another wasted opportunity in Kashmir.

• Read moreabout The Kashmir Charade This Winter

Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’

Vol. 52, Issue No. 34, 26 Aug, 2017

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The reference to a “two and a half front war” by Army Chief General Bipin Rawat is critically dissected. The “half front” apparently covers large tracts of India and a significant number of its marginalised people. The thought of a war on the half front, as conjured by this term, needs to be controverted outright. The army’s imagining of such a war and preparation for it is questioned.

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A Disjointed Doctrine

Vol. 52, Issue No. 21, 27 May, 2017

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The recently released joint doctrine of the armed forces outlines the manner in which they expect to fight the next war. Though the doctrine suggests “decisive victory” is possible, it bears reminding that the closer they get to this the closer would be the nuclear threshold. Since the doctrine does not dwell on the nuclear level, it cannot be said that the doctrine makes India any safer. However, the doctrine’s take on civil–military relations is far more interesting.

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Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir

Vol. 52, Issue No. 8, 25 Feb, 2017

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The army has had an extended deployment in Kashmir. While it has enabled operational experience for its members, there is a danger that the advantages of this can make the army acquire a stake in the disturbed conditions. This makes the army part of the problem in Kashmir. Its deployment is not without a price in regard to the internal good health of the army.

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India's Strategic Shift

Vol. 51, Issue No. 48, 26 Nov, 2016

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

In abandoning strategic restraint in favour of strategic proactivism, India is transiting from a strategic doctrine of offensive deterrence to compellence. This is not without its dangers since the military doctrines of India and Pakistan are presently coupled in a volatile way. Moving towards proactivism makes them altogether combustible. This makes the strategic logic of the shift suspect, prompting speculations as to its inspiration.

• Read moreabout India's Strategic Shift

War and What To Do About It

Vol. 51, Issue No. 35, 27 Aug, 2016

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

A case for the peace lobby to continue its engagement with anti-war issues, even in times of relative peace. The military doctrines are geared for a quick war, resulting in shorter crisis windows. Therefore, keeping the public informed and capitalising on such preparations for ensuring moderation in strategic decisions in crises and war can prove useful when push comes to shove. This would be an uphill task, but inescapable for war avoidance and limitation.

Nuclear Retaliation Options

Vol. 51, Issue No. 22, 28 May, 2016

Strategic Affairs

Ali Ahmed

The debate on nuclear retaliation options has been hijacked by realists, with even the liberal security perspective marginalised. Engagement with the issue by nuclear abolitionists is called for, lest the impression of a consensus develops around the realist offering of "unacceptable damage" that promises nothing but genocide, a global environmental disaster and national suicide in its wake.

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Yoga as a Prelude to Politicisation of the Military

Vol. 51, Issue No. 11, 12 Mar, 2016

Commentary

Ali Ahmed

Drawing on the news reporting of the army's association with Ramdev's organisation for yoga training, a discussion on the potential and possibility of politicisation of the military with Hindutva philosophy.

• Read moreabout Yoga as a Prelude to Politicisation of the Military

No First Use Nuclear Policy

Vol. 49, Issue No. 20, 17 May, 2014

Commentary

Ali Ahmed

That India's No First Use policy is under threat of the axe in any future review of the nuclear doctrine is apparent from the election time controversy over the mention of a nuclear doctrinal review in the manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The reference - subsequently toned down - was possibly an attempt by the conservative party to live up to its image as a strategically assertive replacement of the Congress Party.

• Read moreabout No First Use Nuclear Policy

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/17002/Agenda-For-The-Next-Defence-Minister

Unedited version

Agenda for the next defence minister

Admittedly, what follows is wishful. Nevertheless, with the Election Commission of India felled and the Supreme Court betraying signs of doddering, it is important to preserve the last institution standing, the military, from the New (Ugly) India.

The timely discussion on politicization of the military witnessed at election time suggests that the priority of the incoming defence minister (not known at the time of writing) would be to invigorate the military’s professional, secular and apolitical standing.

The danger is in the mandating of the minister to disregard or, worse, devalue these two-hundred year old facets.

Musical chairs attended the appointment over the past five years, with one incumbent bravely battling a major ailment, a second moonlighting at another major portfolio while also battling health issues, and the third split between being minister and party mouthpiece.

None of the three could see, leave alone prevail, on their more politically inclined colleagues to leave the military alone. Even though precedence suggests another weak minister is in the offing, even so, it is worth reminding the minister that in the cabinet system the buck stops at her door.

At the outset, the minister is must be warned that she is starting off with a deficit. The strong-on-defence claim of the ruling party is buoyed by hot-wind. Bluntly put, India came out second best in the optics surrounding the Balakot-Naushera episode. While information war is a major front, spin-doctoring cannot substitute for the real thing. Worse is if policy makers believe their own propaganda output.

Course correction requires being mindful of the three inter-twined facets that have been under threat - if not assault – over the past five years.

Professionalism has taken a beating in the government’s elevating the third in line for chiefship of the army over two of his seniors (if not betters) on account of his expertise in a secondary role of the army, counter insurgency.

No recourse to management and organizational theory is necessary to discern that - taking cue - there would be a scramble in the brass to demonstrate their showing in countering insurgency. For example, a colonel’s brief author-bio at the end of his article in a service journal highlights his 17 years in Kashmir. Such bias might have diluted its ability in its primary role, conventional warmaking.

Even so, the defence minister must ensure the winner in the pack is one not one cottoning the means and methods recounted in the recently released report by two non-governmental organizations in Jammu and Kashmir, Torture: Indian State’s Instrument of Control in Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir.

On secularism, illustrations may better prove the threat. An extract from a book on ancient warrior culture published by a regimental press reads: ‘(there were) four types of flying machines, including instructions for its construction and pilot training. Based on these instructions, fly-worthy machine was reportedly reconstructed by a native ….’*.  The former general officer who authored this installed the statue of the goddess of learning in the Valmiki Library when he in his time in uniform headed that joint services institution.

While cultural nationalism has now been indubitably mainstreamed by voters, making tracts as above par for the course, the new defence minister should not throw the baby of secularism out with the bathwater.

Societal debate as to the extent Hinduism and Hindutva are congruent and the extent to which these define New India is underway. The military needs cauterizing from the effects till the electorate rules on the results of New India five years downstream.

As for the third – apolitical – facet, it is cannot any longer be taken as self-evident. Take the case of the unnecessary upping of the ante in Kashmir after the last round of elections there resulting in 14 militants dead in short order. Even if the zest accounted for the Al Qaeda affiliated top-gun there, does this heightened operational tempo not bespeak of a military attuned to the political breeze?

The Northern Army commander – supposedly in line for next chief – reprised, albeit after voting finished, the line put out by the operations directorate that there were no surgical strikes prior to September 2016 since it had no records of prior such actions. Is the military unmindful of the political context to the discussion on surgical strikes? Should the army commander be points-scoring over his predecessor’s line to the contrary, adopted by an opposition party?

In case the military has been put to it in both cases cited, then it should have the savvy to ‘shirk’ in civil-military theoretical jargon (dither and duck) or the backbone to stand up and ask the conveying authority of the political plank in both cases (likely the national security adviser (NSA)) to lay off.

A minister needs to have a reassuring presence. It is not for the military to battle the trickle down of political compulsions. A minister needs being possessive about her ministerial turf. It is not a part time job, nor is it confined to managing the civilian side of military matters alone.

Inability in incumbents so far has led to the NSA system - fattened on proximity to the prime minister’s office - to lay into the military using the prime minister’s shoulders at the first address of the prime minster at the combined commanders’ conference. Lack of traction on the speech by end of the first Modi term led to the NSA muscling in on the reins that appropriately should have been with the minister and a chief of defence staff.

The minister’s first call would be to wrest back the reins. She must  step up and reenergize the cabinet system of ministerial accountability. That the Congress manifesto had something sensible to say on institutionalizing the national security council system does not mean it cannot be appropriated. (After all, if Imran Khan’s slogan Naya Pakistan can be appropriated for New India, so can a leaf from a fallen foe’s book!)

A change of NSA would be useful alongside, with candidates aplenty. For instance, there is the former foreign secretary, S. Jaishakar, who held his own while holding the confidence of his political minders.

This would be precautionary buffeting of national security from arbitrary decision making, witnessed multiple times, for example, at demonetization and in the comical rationale (the radar-cloud relationship) to the Balakot decision.

The more significant matter is however likelihood of the military being next port of call for ideological and institutional reshaping by Hindutva.

The first term witnessed a subtle way of doing so. For instance, when the late former minister visited a leading military school in Dehra Dun, he took along with him the ideologue, Tarun Vijay. What the outcome was is not known, but this time round the right wing will be out to take over the only remaining institutional space in the country.

One way to keep watch is with an eye on veterans with known right-wing predilections. Keeping them off professional discussion rooms is one way, even if they manage a foot in the door for their sponsors via social media.

A simple measure could be a conference of editors of the military’s in-house publications in which editorial ethics are revised. Such a measure would keep instances, such as, in one case, of advocacy for depriving immigrants voting rights in the north east, and, in another case, reference to terrorism as an ‘Islamic’ way of war, despite twenty years even though a better substitute, ‘Islamist’, has been part of strategic glossary some twenty years now.  

The incoming minister needs being cautioned to insure against beclouding of the military’s patriotism with the ruling party’s potion on nationalism. History will judge the minister by her showing on this. As a sweetner, she may be reassured that only with the military instrument remaining professional, will she be able to deliver successfully on any muscular policy her boss chooses to adopt,

*Aiyengar, SRR (2018): Timeless ethos of the Indian warrior, Jabalpur: Grenadiers Association Printing Press.